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Animal umwelten in a changing world: Zoosemiotic perspectives 
represents a clear and concise review of zoosemiotics, present-
ing theories, models and methods, and providing interesting 
examples of human–animal interactions. The reader is invited 
to explore the umwelten of animals in a successful attempt to 
retrieve the relationship of people with animals: a cornerstone 
of the past common evolutionary processes.
The twelve chapters, which cover recent developments 
in zoosemiotics and much more, inspire the reader to think 
about the human condition and about ways to recover our lost 
contact with the animal world. Written in a clear, concise style, 
this collection of articles creates a wonderful bridge between 
human and animal worlds. It represents a holistic approach 
rich with suggestions for how to educate people to face the 
dynamic relationships with nature within the conceptual 
framework of the umwelt, providing stimulus and opportuni-
ties to develop new studies in zoosemiotics.
Professor Almo Farina,  
University of Urbino “Carlo Bo”
This important book offers the first coherent gathering of 
perspectives on the way animals are communicating with each 
other and with us as environmental change requires increasing 
adaptation. Produced by a young generation of zoosemiotics 
scholars engaged in international research programs at Tartu, 
this work introduces an exciting research field linking the 
biological sciences with the humanities. Its key premises are 
that all animals participate in a dynamic web of meanings 
and signs in their own distinctive styles, and all animal spe-
cies have distinctive cultures. Animal umwelten in a changing 
world reflects the emerging consensus in animal studies that 
is bringing radical shifts in theoretical, artistic, and historical 
understanding of rich interrelationships among animals.
Professor emerita Louise Westling,  
University of Oregon
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Animals are. A multitude of diff erent species surrounds us in our everyday 
doings, and infl uences our behaviour and culture. Dogs and cats develop delicate 
and personal relationships with the families they belong to. Swans and geese are 
waiting to be fed by passers-by. Th e wing-strokes of doves and jackdaws give a 
subtle ephemeral atmosphere to our cities. Spiders, snails and snakes are met with 
surprise or disgust. Beavers are blamed for reshaping the landscapes, and wolves 
for killing livestock. People and animals engage and interact in a number of ways: 
from hunting and fi shing to bird-watching, from the help provided by assistance 
dogs to family holidays in zoological gardens and animal parks. Children’s fi rst 
encounters with the written word oft en take place through animal stories. And 
many fi ctional animal characters are known and internationally celebrated by 
name: Lassie, Moby Dick, Bambi, King Kong, etc.
None of these interactions would be possible without semiotic processes: 
perception, communication and interpretation occurring between humans and 
animals. Sign relations or mediated relations that connect humans with other 
animal species are the very subject of this collective monograph. We make an 
inquiry into the semiotic character of diff erent species, study the ways in which 
humans endow animals with meaning, and analyse how animal sign exchange 
and communication has coped with environmental change. In this research, our 
core disciplinary framework is zoosemiotics, the semiotic study of animals – the 
paradigm that was proposed by the eminent American-Hungarian semiotician 
Th omas A. Sebeok in the 1960s and that recently had its fi ft ieth anniversary. Our 
approach is essentially semiotic and biosemiotic. At the same time, we engage 
in dialogues with ecocriticism, Actor-Network Th eory, posthumanism and 
other contemporary schools of the humanities, as well as with more practically 
oriented research topics in visitor studies, animal welfare studies and human–
animal studies, not to forget ethology and conservation biology.
Th is book is a collective eff ort. Its authors belong to the research group in 
zoosemiotics and human–animal relations based in the Department of Semiotics 
at the University of Tartu in Estonia, and at the University of Stavanger in 
Norway. Th e two opening chapters are written and edited collectively and present 
a framework of philosophical, historical, epistemological and methodological 
matters of zoosemiotic research. Th ese initial considerations are followed 
by specifi c case studies that have been conducted by individual authors. Th e 
specifi c chapters, however, have been cross-edited and commented on by other 
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authors of the book so that the whole collection forms an integrated set of view-
points.
Animal Umwelten in a Changing World follows the work of several subsequent 
research projects and grants and concludes the latest one, “Animals in changing 
environments: Cultural mediation and semiotic analysis”. Th e general history 
of zoosemiotics is discussed in detail in the fi rst chapter. At the University of 
Tartu, the scholarship in zoosemiotics started, however, in 2000 when ethologist 
Aleksei Turovski fi rst held a course in zoomythology and zoosemiotics. From 
2006 onwards, courses in zoosemiotics have been taught by Timo Maran on 
a regular basis. Some of the authors of the present book received the grant 
“Dynamical zoosemiotics and animal representations” (2009–2013) from the 
Estonian Science Foundation. Th is was followed by the international research 
grant (EMP 151) “Animals in changing environments: Cultural mediation and 
semiotic analysis”, part of the Norwegian–Estonian Research Cooperation 
Programme (2013–2016). Meanwhile, Morten Tønnessen (2011) defended his 
doctoral dissertation on Uexküllian phenomenology in Tartu and later started 
his own research initiative in Stavanger, Norway. Th is added valuable insights to 
zoosemiotic studies from phenomenology and animal philosophy, environmental 
history/archaeology and multimodal discourse analysis.
In the framework of the research projects, three large international conferences 
have been held with a focus on zoosemiotics or semiotic studies of animals: 
“Zoo semiotics and Animal Representations” (Tartu, Estonia 4.–8.04.2011), 
“Framing Nature: Signs, Stories, and Ecologies of Meaning” (Tartu, Estonia 
29.04.–3.05.2014), and “Animals in the Anthropocene: Human–animal relations 
in a changing semiosphere” (Stavanger, Norway 17.–19.09.2015). Related to the 
research grants, an anthology (Maran et al. 2011), three special issues of academic 
journals (Martinelli, Lehto 2009; Tønnessen, Lindström 2010; Maran 2014) 
and two essay collections (Tüür, Tønnessen 2014; Tønnessen, Armstrong Oma, 
Rattasepp 2016) have been published on zoosemiotic topics. In addition to these 
organising eff orts, specifi c zoosemiotic case studies have been made on several 
topics by the participants of the research group: human–animal interactions in 
zoological gardens, communication in the teams of visually disabled persons 
and guiding dogs, animals in nature writing, semiotics of the animal condition 
in philosophy, the changing interactions of wolves, dogs, sheep and farmers, 
historical changes in the role of animals in human households, and developments 
in the cultural perception of novel species. Many of these specifi c topics form 
chapters of this book. Based on these considerations, the present monograph can 
be also considered as a report of the state of the art of zoosemiotic studies in the 
Tartu semiotic school.
Th e authors of the book are grateful to Aleksei Turovski and Dario Martinelli 
for their eff orts in launching contemporary zoosemiotic studies, to the professors 
Kalevi Kull and Peeter Torop as well as other members of the Tartu Semiotic 
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School for their  guidance and supportive intellectual environment, to Ivo Volt 
and his colleagues at University of Tartu Press for their help in issuing this volume, 
and to the Norwegian–Estonian Research Cooperation Programme (2013–2016; 
EMP151) for fi nancing the most recent research.  
Th e authors
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 Introducing zoosemiotics: 
philosophy and historical background
Timo Maran, Morten Tønnessen, Riin Magnus, 
Nelly Mäekivi, Silver Rattasepp, Kadri Tüür 
Timo Maran et al
 1. Animals as objects and subjects of semiotics
Zoosemiotics, or the semiotic study of animals, is a research fi eld that is situated 
between the biological sciences and the humanities. Th is claim is accurate with 
regard to the history of the discipline, its theoretical position and basic concepts, 
and its methodology and research objects. Semiotic studies of animals were 
originally very much associated with the legacy of Th omas A. Sebeok (1920–2001) 
and his research program of zoosemiotics, defi ned as a “discipline, within which 
the science of signs [semiotics] intersects with ethology, devoted to the scientifi c 
study of signalling behavior in and across animal species” (Sebeok 1963: 465).1 
More recently, zoosemiotics has been specifi ed as “the study of signifi cation, 
communication and representation within and across animal species” (Maran et 
al. 2011: 1). As such, semiotic studies of animals constitute an interdisciplinary 
research eff ort that aims at studying the semiotic activities of animals and their 
relations to human culture. At the same time, it is also necessary to study the 
ways in which humans represent and interpret the semiosic activity of animals, in 
order to achieve a better understanding of the limits and possibilities of human–
animal interactions.
Th e understanding of animals as a research object of semiotics integrates the 
humanities and the biological sciences. On the one hand, zoosemiotics stands close 
to animal studies, posthumanism and other similar fi elds within the humanities, 
in its emphasis on the subjectivity of animals. Th e subjectivity of animals is 
understood here as the active participation of an animal individual in a semiotic 
web of meanings, in communicative relations, and also in human discourses. 
Animals are treated as active participants in semiosis, that is, as interpreters 
of signs, and as being related to other animals and the environment through 
perception-action cycles (functional cycles, see below). Th e understanding of 
animal subjectivity goes hand in hand with valuing qualitative aspects in animal 
1 On Th omas A. Sebeok’s work in zoosemiotics, see the next chapter “Methodology of 
zoosemiotics: concepts, categorisations, models”.
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appearances (Portmann 1960, 1990), expressions and representations, as well as 
the use of the methodological tools necessary to study qualitative phenomena.
On the other hand, zoosemiotics is close to the biological sciences in its 
empirically based attention to the diversity of animal species and to their per-
ceptual, expressive and cognitive capacities. Th is means that zoosemiotics does 
not treat an animal just as a general singular (for criticism, see Derrida 2008; 
Rattasepp 2015), but focuses on the physiology, ecology and communicative 
capabilities of every species studied. Diff erent species are considered as having 
a subjective integration with the world via their specifi c ecological niche and 
umwelt2  – which is related to the necessity of studying animals in relation 
to contexts and environments (which could be considered to be the third 
characteristic feature of zoosemiotics, see below). Th e character of the semiosic 
activity of the species needs to be taken into account in studying cultural 
representations of animals as well as in regard to human–animal relations. In 
this emphasis on species-specifi city, zoosemiotics shares the biological sciences’ 
understanding of the diversity of animal life. However, some zoosemioticians 
have also criticised an exaggerated emphasis on species-specifi c traits even in 
bio- and zoosemiotics (see e.g. Lestel 2011: 84; Tønnessen 2011: 19–20), and have 
called for more focus on intra-species diversity.
Zoosemiotics starts with the general biosemiotic conviction that semiosis 
(sign process) and life are interconnected or interdependent. Th is idea was 
originally proposed by Th omas A. Sebeok in his attempt to widen the range 
of semiotic phenomena to cover all living organisms: “the process of message 
exchanges, or semiosis, is an indispensable characteristic of all terrestrial life 
forms” (Sebeok 1991: 22). In this endeavour, Sebeok’s views oppose most 
representatives of European semiology, who consider language and language-
based sign systems to be the sole objects of semiotics. Sebeok also did not 
share the view of a radical discontinuity between animal and human semiosis, 
as he discussed communication and interpretation in animals and studied 
artistic behaviour, individual recognition and other higher cognitive processes 
in animals as forms of nonverbal communicative behaviour. As Sebeok points 
out, the basic communicative channels are similar in all animals, including 
humans. At the same time, human natural languages are but one specifi c means 
of communication. Consequently, whereas the content of human speech may be 
inaccessible to other animals, the tone of the utterances, gestures, bodily postures, 
smells, and other bodily features of human communication are not. Th is implies 
that various pre-linguistic signs not only exist, but that they are also perceivable 
and intelligible across species.
Th us, in zoosemiotics, semiosic properties are treated as essential characte-
ristics of animal life. In addition to zoosemiotics, animals can also be studied 
2 Umwelt is Jakob von Uexküll’s concept for the aspects of the environment that are per-
ceived, meaningfully organised and responded to by an animal.
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from other semiotic perspectives, such as cultural semiotics, language semiotics, 
and sociosemiotics, but these approaches focus on animals as denominators in 
language and culture and do not include the semiosic activity of the biological 
organisms themselves. Th ere are also numerous instances that suggest a strong 
interconnectedness and no clear-cut divisions between zoosemiotics and branches 
of semiotics rooted in culture. In addressing this issue, the zoosemiotician Dario 
Martinelli has proposed to incorporate our interpretations of other species into 
the realm of zoosemiotics under the name of anthropological zoosemiotics 
(Martinelli 2010: 121–170). As a practical example, in the fi eld of species con-
servation, most conservation programs have focused on large charismatic 
mammals (Adams 2004), giving much less attention to other species whose 
umwelten are less similar to ours. Many of the decisions made in conservation 
stem from the perceptions that people hold of other species, and these perceptions 
are in turn established by our own biological heritage. 
 2. The specifics of the animal condition
In biosemiotic understanding, various semiosic processes diff er in their com-
plexity and take place at diff erent levels of biological organisation. It is possible 
to distinguish between semiosis as taking place inside the animal body, semiosis 
between animal individuals, and semiosis on the level of biological communities 
and ecosystems. Whereas the fi rst is seen as a subject matter of endosemiotics and 
the last of ecosemiotics (or ecosystem semiotics3), the middle ground – semiosis 
of and between animal individuals, with an attention on morphological, meaning-
carrying traits, as well as on communication and representation  – forms the 
scope of zoosemiotics (for discussion and detailed typology, see Tønnessen, Tüür 
2014). Th ere are several characteristics that are specifi c to the zoosemiotic level – 
the level of the animal individual – as compared to other levels of the semiotic 
organisation of nature. Due to their developed perceptor organs, most animals are 
capable of perceiving their surrounding environment, including other animals, in 
a temporarily and spatially organised way. As such, animals – unlike ecosystems 
or cellular structures – have meaningfully organised perceptions, that is, a model 
of the world (umwelt). Th e presence of an umwelt also means that an animal 
is able to perceive its own location or position in relation to the surroundings, 
and also to change its location or perspective. Together with the ability to move, 
3 Ecosemiotics is a complex fi eld of research that draws from diff erent historical back-
grounds and which has been defi ned in various ways by diff erent scholars, as for in-
stance: the semiotic aspect of human ecology or the study of nature in cultural semiotics 
(Kull 1998), the study of signifi cation between animal organisms and their environment 
(Nöth 2001), or of semiotic processes on the level of ecological systems and the biosphere 
(as ecosystem semiotics, Nielsen 2007). Here we refer to the latter use. 
TIMO MARAN et al.
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the umwelt-structure endows animals with novel semiotic capacities: 1) spatial 
semiosis as an ability to perceive, use and communicate through spatial marks, 
measurements and relations; 2) orientation as an ability for directed movement 
in space, and related capacities of memorising spatial relations; and 3) search 
behaviour (tracking, search image, category-based recognition) for recognising 
and locating environmental resources and species-mates in the environment.
In semiotics, a basic distinction is drawn between types of signs on the basis 
of the relation of the sign vehicle to its object. All three types in this typology – 
icons (based on a similarity between object and sign vehicle), indices (based on a 
causal relation between object and sign vehicle) and symbols (based on a habitual 
connection between object and sign vehicle) – take part in animal communication. 
Icons are present, for example, in the form of simple cues, patterns and imprints, 
and indices as tracks, territorial markings, and many gestures signalling moti-
vation. Th e question of symbols in animal communication is complex and hinges 
on the particular defi nition of the concept of symbol (e.g. with reference to other 
signs in the sign system, arbitrariness or conventional habituality); nevertheless, 
several authors have claimed that behavioural rituals and courtship displays 
can be treated as symbols (Sebeok 1990: 42; Maynard Smith, Harper 2003: 59) 
due to there being no motivated connection between the sign and the object. In 
some cases, the designation of the sign type may be unclear. For example, some 
bird species and marine mammals are known to address their individual group 
members with a unique sequence of sounds. Th is is similar to name-using in 
humans, and proper names belong to the category of symbolic signs (Lotman, 
Uspenski 1978: 211–234). At the same time, the sound used for addressing a 
fellow wren, for example, may imitate the song of the particular individual, 
having thus the qualities of an audial icon. 
From these three basic types of signs, animals appear to take the most 
advantage of relation-based indexical semiosis (cf. Kull 2009). Indexicality 
further relates to other important characteristics of animals, such as orientation/
diff erentiation along the inward-outward axis (cf. Portmann 1990), and to inter-
individual communication. Although the ability to distinguish self from non-self 
appears to be present in simpler levels of biological organisation (Sebeok 2001b), 
these are indexical relations (and the Peircean category of secondness), through 
which other organisms are perceived as “the other” and which thereby pave the 
way for social relations and intraspecifi c communication. Diff erent forms of 
indexical relations (spatial perception, orientation, communication by means of 
the environment) lend a dynamical character to animal semiosis. Th is means that 
the methodology and research methods in zoosemiotics need to be suitable for 
describing both the dynamical, changing, and interactional semiotic processes 
and need to take into account their embodiment, contextuality, and relationality 
to the environment.
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 3. Diversity of umwelten 
It was remarked above that zoosemiotics aims to take into account the plurality 
of life forms and their distinctive semiotic character. In doing this, zoosemiotics 
has found considerable inspiration in the umwelt theory of Jakob von Uexküll 
(Uexküll 1921, 1928, 1940 [cf. 2010], Uexküll, Kriszat 1934 [cf. Uexküll 2010]). An 
umwelt, in Uexküll’s sense, is the subjective world of an animal that corresponds 
to its body plan and perceptual and eff ectual organs, and which consequently 
forms the only perceivable reality for it. Although umwelten are described by 
Uexküll as species-specifi c, the perceiving and acting unit is still an individual 
animal. More specifi cally, Uexküll considers the umwelt to be the fusion or totality 
of two main elements: the Merkwelt, i.e., the specifi c perceptual fi eld of a given 
organism, and the Wirkwelt, i.e., the fi eld of actual interaction, the operational 
dimension of the same organism (Uexküll 1982). Perceptual and operational 
factors contribute to form a specifi c umwelt, which is exclusive for each species 
(and to some extent, for each individual). Uexküll’s concept of umwelt provides 
zoosemiotics with its fundamental principle that any animal lives, perceives, acts, 
and communicates in its own subjective world. As a result, the communicative 
abilities of every species must be observed on the basis of the structure of its 
umwelt. For example, many cases of biological mimicry are deceptive within the 
umwelt of those species that are engaged in an evolutionary involvement with an 
imitator, but that same resemblance may be not deceptive, and may not even be 
perceivable, for other species in the ecosystem.
Accordingly, communication systems, communication channels and ranges 
used by diff erent species diff er signifi cantly. Studies of the various animal species’ 
communicative abilities that remain outside the human umwelt  – ultraviolet 
markings, pheromones, tactile perception – here serve as good examples. Such 
diversity should not be viewed as forming a hierarchy, but rather the specifi c 
peculiarities of diff erent communication systems should be emphasised and 
investigated. For instance, studies have demonstrated the complexity of birdsong 
on the syntactic level (comparable to the semantic complexity of human languages, 
see Salwiczek, Wickler 2004). Conveying the same meaning by various diff erent 
syllables should not always be interpreted, however, as something less than 
human language; there is, indeed, the possibility to see it as something extra, such 
as emphasising, for instance, the aesthetic dimension in avian communication. 
In studying cultural representations of animals, we should also be aware 
that our perception and understanding of animals is biased by our own umwelt 
structure. Many features, forms of communication, modalities and, indeed, 
even entire species are oft en underrepresented since they are not present in our 
umwelten. At the same time, understanding the human umwelt structure (that is, 
the basic functional distinctions and meaning categories which we use for making 
sense of the environment), also aids us in analysing human–animal relations. 
In recent decades, approaches that acknowledge and focus on the ontological 
TIMO MARAN et al.
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diversity of umwelten have been also emerging outside of semiotics, in the form 
of multispecies ethnographies (Kohn 2013; Münster 2014; Smart 2014) and 
more-than-human geography or hybrid geography (Whatmore 2002; Lorimer 
2010; Philo, Wilbert 2010). Some authors have welcomed these developments as 
a “species turn” (Kirksey, Helmreich 2010).
Yet another important concept from Jakob von Uexküll, one which was later 
employed and developed in psychology and cybernetics, is the functional cycle 
(or Funktionskreis, Uexküll 1982). Th e functional cycle describes the relation 
between a living being and an outer environmental object as consisting of two 
complementary processes – perception and eff ect. Th ose processes, however, do 
not proceed causally but are instead mediated by the animal’s meaning-attributing 
activity. Th e core of Uexküll’s functional cycle describes a process of selective 
perception and interpretation, with further reaction or feedback following the 
interpretation. As a principle of coupling, the concept of the functional cycle 
allows for analyses of the diff erent relations that animals have with the objects 
in their environments, with other animals of the same or diff erent species, 
and between animals and humans. Furthermore, functional cycles provide the 
ground for analysing semiotic interactions at the communal level, either in social 
groups or in biological communities. Accordingly, on the level of the ecosystem 
the environment cannot be conceived in the abstract – for example, the forest as 
such – but only as the environment as a sum of umwelten: the forest of an ant, 
a fox, a man, and the complex ways in which these combine, correspond and 
interact. From the zoosemiotic perspective, an analysis of biological communities 
should be conducted fi rst of all as a study of the interactions of animal umwelten. 
 4. Environmental semiosis
Indexicality and the umwelt-structure of animal semiosis are related to the 
notion that semiotic studies of animals must pay attention to contextual and 
environ mental aspects. Attentiveness toward meaning relations that connect 
the animal to the surrounding semiotic structures  – either to the rhythms of 
the environment or to the cultural meanings and social functions in the case of 
animal representations – is a characteristic feature of the zoosemiotic approach. 
For zoosemiotics, an animal as an object (and a subject) is necessarily situated; 
put more precisely, as a living individual it situates itself through its semiotic 
activities in the surrounding environments and contexts.
Th e emphasis on contextual and environmental relations may have diff erent 
practical outcomes, such as attending to the role that environmental enrichment 
plays for captive animals (see Mäekivi, this volume), the challenges presented 
by the urban environments for guide dogs (see Magnus, this volume), the eff ect 
of environmental change on animal representations, etc. An animal’s semiosic 
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activity and the environment are closely interlinked since, fi rst, perception and 
communication always take place in particular kinds of environment and depend 
on the environment’s properties and, second, animals oft en make use of mediated 
communication in which messages are imprinted on environmental structures 
(signs, traces, etc.) or where the environment is changed such that this change is 
meaningful for other species (territorial markings, nests, etc.). In addition, the 
environment that animals inhabit may be subject to human infl uence, which 
blurs the boundaries between zoosemiotics and other fi elds that study human–
environment relations. 
Many authors have elaborated on environmental semiosis and the types of 
signs specifi c to these semiotic processes. Winfried Nöth (2001: 71) states that 
“ecosemiotics is the study of environmental semioses, i.e. the study of sign pro-
cesses which relate organisms to their natural environment” by focusing mostly 
on natural signs and signifi cation. Th omas A. Sebeok (2001a) has discussed 
indexical signs in his six species typology of signs. He lists “symptom, cue, 
clue, track, trail” as synonymous with the index, and provides several examples 
from animal and environmental communication (traces and tracks of animals, 
the dance code of honey bees, the behaviour of the great honey guide). Charles 
Peirce’s classifi cation of indexical signs distinguishes between designators and 
reagents (CP 8: 368 fn23), both of which can also be found in environmental 
semiosis. Designators are the signs that point to something in the environment, 
which can be exemplifi ed by the dance code of honey bees, whereas animal tracks 
would be classifi ed as reagents, since they are signs based on causal connection. 
Natural signs also form an important part in understanding the relation between 
human language and the environment, the tradition within which the works of 
the Scottish philosopher Th omas Reid stand as an important milestone (Reid 
1764; discussed in Sukhoverkhov 2012).
Both everyday experience and studies in ecosemiotics suggest that there are 
a variety of signs in the environment. As an example, we can compare animal 
tracks with a seasonal sign, such as the melting of the snow. Animal tracks 
are specifi c forms that have a strict physical relation to the animal that has 
left  them, and as such they exemplify a specifi c and well-limited sign relation 
to the referent or object. Th e object of the melting snow, which is presumably 
spring or seasonal change, is ambiguous and more of a compound object than a 
singular entity. Zoosemiotics, as well as general semiotics, would benefi t from a 
clearer typological understanding of the possible types of environmental signs. 
Th inking of and analysing the processes of environmental semiosis in exact terms 
facilitates a better understanding of the umwelten of other species. It also helps 
us to estimate the human impact on them in the form of physical intervention 
through environmental change.
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 5. The history of semiotic studies of animals
5.1. Reconstructing prehistory
Th e history of studies in animal communication is older than zoosemiotics. A 
look back at the development of zoosemiotics makes it apparent that previously 
separate infl uences and lines of thought tend to gain relevance and come together 
at certain points in the discipline’s history. Research on animal communication 
can be reconstructed as going back to the works of Aristotle in Greek Antiquity. In 
Medieval and Enlightenment philosophy, too, the communicative and cognitive 
capacities of animals were discussed (most notably in the works of St. Augustine, 
Hume, and Locke). Much of the history of thought on animal cognition and 
communication can be construed as an opposition between two positions in the 
debate on whether the diff erence between human and animal capacities is that 
of type (qualitative diff erence) or degree (quantitative diff erence). Th e works of 
Charles Darwin have also had a role in preparing the ground for zoosemiotics. 
In his later works, Darwin (1871, 1872) laid the foundation for the comparative 
perspective for studying the behaviour and communication of humans and other 
animals, made observations about the communicative behaviour of pets, and 
introduced relevant theoretical concepts (e.g. antithetic pairs of expression). 
Darwin’s works on animal cognition and communication were later elaborated 
by George J. Romanes (1882) in the US, widely considered to be the founder of 
comparative psychology.
Th roughout the early zoosemiotic works of Th omas A. Sebeok (1972), there 
are reverberations of behaviourist methodologies, as proposed by Charles 
Morris, as well as echoes of the works of Julian Huxley, Konrad Lorenz, and 
other ethologists who had studied ritual behaviour in animals. From among the 
classical concepts of ethology, “search image” (derived from Uexküll’s notion 
of Suchbild), imprinting, and the understanding of the complexity of animal 
communication systems have found widespread use in zoosemiotics. From the 
mid-1970s onward, Sebeok started to popularise the legacy of Jakob von Uexküll, 
and elements of Uexküll’s theory of meaning began to appear extensively in 
zoosemiotic writings. Zoosemiotics has been much infl uenced by German 
philosophical biology (Jakob von Uexküll, Adolf Portmann), Gestalt psychology, 
and classical ethology (Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, Karl von Frisch). 
For example, Adolf Portmann (1960, 1990) laid emphasis on appearance as a 
meaningful animal form, the inward-outward orientation of the organisation of 
an animal’s body, and the special position of skin as a communicative organ, all 
relevant for zoosemiotics.
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 5.2. The classical era
Th e history of zoosemiotics proper begins in the 1960s. In 1961, Peter Marler, 
a researcher of animal communication, published an analytical paper “Logical 
analysis of animal communication” (1961). In this paper Peter Marler develops 
the fi rst properly semiotic approach to animal communication, building on 
the classical works of Charles Morris, Colin Cherry, Charles K. Ogden and 
I. A. Richards. In his description of a specifi c animal communication system (the 
song of the chaffi  nch), he makes use of Morris’s distinction between identifi ers 
(signifying a location in space and time), designators (signifying characteristics 
of objects or the environment), appraisors (signifying a preferential status or 
situation), and prescriptors (signifying the specifi c responses that are required). 
Peter Marler continued to be associated with zoosemiotics, publishing papers in 
collections edited by Th omas A. Sebeok, and studying topics close to zoosemiotics 
(e.g. the referential dimension of animal communication, comparative analysis 
of birdsongs and human language). In fact, research into the communication of 
birds has provided much insight for zoosemiotics. In addition to Peter Marler, 
who began his academic career in bird ecology, other ornithologists have also 
contributed to the development of zoosemiotics, such as W. H. Th orpe (who 
elaborated Hockett’s list of the design features of human language, and provided 
semantically organised lists of repertoires of bird vocalisations) and John W. Smith 
(who developed the understanding of the importance of context and contextual 
information in animal communication, Smith 1965, 1969). In this context, Jack 
P. Hailman’s (2008; Hailman et al. 1985) research on communication codes and 
syntax in bird vocalisation is also relevant. 
Th omas A. Sebeok’s role in developing zoosemiotics has been essential and 
multifaceted. He proposed the concept of zoosemiotics in 1963, organised 
the semiotic study of animal communication by developing an international 
network, and edited three large collections of papers (Sebeok 1968, 1977; Sebeok, 
Ramsay 1969). He also published on specifi c aspects of animal communication 
and semiotics, such as the question of lying in animals, codes and coding 
in animal communication, proper names in animals, aesthetic behaviour in 
animals, semiotic relations between humans and animals, and so on (Sebeok 
1972, 1990). Looking back at the development of Sebeokian zoosemiotics, we 
can distinguish three diff erent stages in his thought: the communicational period 
of 1963–1972, the philosophical period of 1972–1990, and the later biosemiotic 
writings of 1990–2001 (Maran 2014b). Th e fi rst period of his research centres 
on animal communication and its linguistic aspects, with a special emphasis 
on codes and coding; the second period incorporates the legacy of Uexküll and 
Peirce into zoosemiotics, and critical views towards animal language studies are 
developed; the third period saw the development of specifi c issues, such as the 
concept of the “semiotic self ”, and discussions of the position of zoosemiotics in 
biosemiotic studies.
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typology of personal spatial spheres and studied the use of space by animals 
(Hediger 1968, 1969, see Chap. 2). He also developed methods for animal diag-
nostics (based on animal expressions and symptoms in the zoo environment) 
and for distinguishing the diff erent meanings that humans have for animals and 
vice versa. A semiotic interpretation and elaboration of Hediger’s work was later 
provided by Aleksei Turovski (2000). Zoosemiotic research has been conducted 
in diff erent institutions in which animals are kept in captivity. Paul Bouissac 
(2010) has studied the cultural and communicative aspects of circuses, refl ecting 
on the taming of animals and on dressage. Nils Lindahl Elliot (2006) has described 
semiosic processes in zoological gardens, whereas Dominique Lestel (2002) 
has studied the specifi cs of communication in mixed communities of humans 
and apes in research laboratories. Furthermore, Gregory Bateson’s (1966) early 
theoretical refl ections on the hierarchical nature of mammalian communication 
were based on his experiences with dolphins in marine biology labs. 
In addition to zoosemiotic approaches to animals (that is, studies that take 
into account the semiosic activity of animals themselves), there are semiotic 
works on animals that depart from the anthropological, historical, literary or 
linguistic studies. In general, we can say that semiotic studies of animals in this 
wider sense do not start before 1960s, and many of them fall into the classical 
era of zoosemiotics. Several studies focus on the meanings of animal names and 
behaviours in diff erent cultures and languages (e.g. Schmauks 2014; Stetkevych 
1986; Costa Neto 2006), the connotative meanings of animal species and their 
pragmatic use in diff erent cultural contexts (e.g. Hewes 1994; Schmauks 2000), 
and the history of understanding animal communication (e.g. Eco et al. 1984; Eco 
1985; Percival 1982). Outside of semiotics, the study of animal communication 
has been on the agenda of many scientifi c disciplines, e.g. classical and cognitive 
ethology, comparative psychology and behavioural ecology which have produced 
a large body of knowledge on structural, evolutionary and cognitive aspects of 
animal communication (see for overviews Hauser 1996; Bradbury, Vehrencamp 
2011; Stegmann 2013). On a more mediated level, in ecocriticism it has been 
studied, among other topics, literary representations of animals throughout its 
existence. In recent years, the eff orts of literary scholars have oft en been joined 
with those made in human–animal studies (cf. Phillips 2010; Pollock, Rainwater 
2005). Combining ecocritical literary studies with zoosemiotics may also open 
up interesting insights into the modelling of human–animal interaction.
 5.3. Contemporary developments
In the last decade we have witnessed the integration of zoosemiotics with the 
environmental humanities and the development of anthropological zoosemiotics, 
An important resource for zoosemiotics is the practically-oriented research 
in zoological gardens. Heini Hediger, the founder of zoobiology, put forth a 
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to use the term established by Dario Martinelli (2010: 121). In this development, 
it is possible to distinguish between two directions of research, both moving 
outwards from “zoosemiotic proper”. First, zoosemiotics is interested in non-
verbal or indexical semiosis that takes place in human communication and 
culture by focusing on proxemics, phatic communication, zoosemiotic (umwelt-
based) modelling, onomatopoetic and other analogy-based expressions in human 
culture, etc. Studying nonverbal human semiosis is also an important aspect in 
understanding human–animal relations as specifi cally non-verbal aspects of 
human communication can be involved in interspecifi c relations, whereas our 
language-based communication is mostly not accessible to the members of other 
species.
On the other hand, zoosemiotics is interested in studying representations 
of animals in literary texts, art, and discourse, with reference to the semiosic 
and communicative capacities of animals themselves. Such an approach allows 
research on questions regarding how human representations relate to animal 
semiosic activities, to what degree they distort animal communicative agency, 
and how representations of animals can subsequently shape human action and 
thereby infl uence animals themselves. Th is development can also be characterised 
by an emergence of research objects that are far from ordinary communication: 
artistic behaviour in animals (see Mandoki 2014), tracks and traces (Vladimirova, 
Mozgovoy 2003), play behaviour (Tønnessen 2009), mimicry resemblances 
(Maran 2010), domestication (Kleisner, Stella 2009), etc.
Special attention should be reserved for the emerging synthesis between 
zoosemiotics and cultural or literary criticism. Such synthesis could be built 
upon several approaches, such as a common ancestry of humans and other 
animals, human–animal communicative relations, corporeal and endosemiotic 
aspects of humans related to linguistic activities, and analogies between semiosic 
processes in humans and other animals. An example of such a synthesis is the 
development of semiotically accentuated zoomusicology, mostly as a result of 
the research and organising work of Dario Martinelli (2002, 2009), who has been 
the most vigorous proponent of zoosemiotics since the 2000s. Among other 
things, Martinelli has developed a list of zoosemiotic universals in music and has 
discussed the problematics of etic and emic approaches to animal expressions. 
Another example of such an endeavour is the incorporation of the semiosis of 
animals into ecocritical studies, which either focus on general premises (Whee-
ler 2010; Maran 2014a) or on specifi c case studies, such as for example the zoo-
semiotic basis of depicting birds in fi eld guides and nature writing (Tüür 2009). 
Such a synthesis may pave the way to new theoretical insights, such as the issue of 
narratives and narrativity in zoosemiotic material, or the application of Sebeok’s 
distinction between zoosemiotic and linguistic modelling of literary texts. 
Th ese recent developments can be characterised as putting zoosemiotics into 
a larger context, and as including cultural and social aspects in the study. As such, 
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zoosemiotics should not be construed as a theory that focuses narrowly on one 
type of semiosic process – animal semiosis – but rather as a study of the entire 
semiotic fi eld with its diff erent traditions, exercised with a particular sensitivity 
towards animality. Th is vantage point entails important inferences regarding the 
method of zoosemiotics and its applications. Th e fi rst wave of zoosemiotics in the 
1960s focused narrowly on the investigation of the relationship between animal 
and human communication. In contrast, modern zoosemiotics strives to widen 
its scope in order to encompass diff erent types of semiotic relations with respect 
to animals, and to avoid excluding the social, historical and cultural dimensions. 
Th is development is characterised by the integration of zoosemiotics with other 
fi elds interested in animals, such as posthumanism, animal welfare studies, 
animal ethics, and others.
 6. Epistemology: how do we know about animals?
 Zoosemiotics, or semiotically informed animal studies more broadly, seeks 
to describe meanings and sign relations in animals and between animals and 
human culture, and therefore it inevitably encounters epistemological as well as 
methodological problems concerning how humans can know about meanings 
created by animals. Representatives of other disciplines working with animals 
(ethology, animal psychology, or communication theory) have considered the 
issue of non-human meaning as a problem better to be avoided. Th e other 
paradigms do not speculate on the questions of meaning or interpretation, and 
attempt to overcome this question by diff erent means, such as by using more 
objectifi ed terminology or quantitative description. Zoosemiotics on the other 
hand focuses precisely on this issue of meanings in animals. In his approach to 
zoosemiotics, Th omas Sebeok placed great emphasis on the referential dimension 
of communication (which relates a message to the surrounding context and 
to the semantics of signs) and claimed that the referential dimension is of key 
importance for zoosemiotics.
A crucial methodological and philosophical question for zoosemiotics is how 
do we get to know which elements of the environment or a message used in 
commu nication are meaningful for the receiving animal, and in what sense. Th is 
problem is well described by the ethologist Timothy Johnston, who emphasises 
the need to make a distinction between signal and sign-carrier. With reference 
to fi refl y communication of emitted light signals, he writes: “Th e distinction 
between the signal and the sign-vehicle is important […]. We may know that 
a fl ashing light serves as a signal, but be unable to decide whether it is the light 
or the fl ashing that acts as a sign-vehicle and is hence a sign in that it stands 
to somebody for something” (Johnston 1976: 47). Th e need to recognise the 
diff erence between the signal and its meaningful components is also the reason 
22 TIMO MARAN ET AL
why the American communication theorist John W. Smith (1965) proposed a 
distinction between “message” and “meaning”. In his interpretation, a message 
is a transmitted signal that contains some information about the sender or 
corresponds to the sender’s behavioural or physiological status. Meaning, on the 
other hand, is everything that the receiver gets from the message, the way that 
the receiver reads or interprets the message. Smith’s distinction proceeds from 
the observation that there are indeed many situations in nature where diff erent 
receivers interpret the same message quite diff erently. In other words, in the 
course of communication, information appears to change and, correspondingly, 
the observer does not have the same perception or interpretation of the process 
as does the animal participant.
In order to understand what the chances are for zoosemiotics to analyse 
the meaning processes in other living organisms, let us fi rst scrutinise the 
available criticisms against such a possibility. Th e critical position arises mostly 
from the complex of modern and postmodern views that associate human 
intellectual existence with human language. Th is complex of views has taken 
several diff erent forms (from Kantian enlightenment to analytical philosophy to 
Derrida’s postmodernism), but central to it is the belief that it is language that 
is the main characteristic feature of humans, that it is language that is the sole 
bridge for humans to reach the external world and which simultaneously limits 
the human possibilities of being connected with the world (see Rattasepp 2015). 
What appears to follow from this is that the human ability to know about other 
biological communication systems is hindered twice: fi rst by the diffi  culty faced 
by humans to acquire information from outside of the limits of human language 
and, second, by the diffi  culty of accessing the logic of other communication 
systems. Such a position presupposes, however, a quite specifi c understanding 
of human language that focuses on its systemic and formal properties and 
downplays its dynamic, dialogic and contextual aspects – aspects which could 
form a bridge to the communicative abilities of other species. It also presupposes 
quite a specifi c understanding of human beings, according to which thinking in 
linguistic categories is considered to be the essential criterion of human nature. 
On the other hand, in various philosophical accounts the understanding of 
animal communication is oft en perceived to rely on meanings and the semantic 
dimension more than may be warranted. Although animal meaning is an impor-
tant issue for zoosemiotics, for the purposes of comparative and systematic 
descriptions zoosemiotics also analyses the communicative situation, the sign 
repertoire, and other formal properties. Even among Sebeok’s own zoosemiotic 
set of research questions, only one out of six focuses explicitly on the semantic 
dimension. In the six research questions, the fi rst three pertain to the pragmatic 
dimension of communication; the next two deal with the syntactic features of 
animal communication, and the last one, concerning semantics, is partially 
deducible from the previous ones, or at least must not be in contradiction with 
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them. As such, the semantic dimension can be studied in the context of all other 
aspects of animal communication (for Sebeok’s set of research questions for 
studying animal communication, see the next chapter).
Many presumptions concerning the semiosic activities in humans and their 
corresponding lack in animals can be shown to be fallacious. For the sake of 
practical research aims, zoosemiotics needs to put forth criticisms against 
such views, but in this endeavour, it defi nitely is not alone and can fi nd allies 
in posthumanism, actor-network theory, speculative realism, and other con-
temporary intellectual movements.
Th e basic philosophical points that zoosemiotics can present in support of its 
case for studying meaning processes in the animal world are as follows:
1) In addition to having a formal structure, human language is also dyna-
mical, interactional, and contextual. It is coupled with and informed by the 
surrounding environment. Even if purely mimetic representation is impos sible, 
language as a complex modelling device is rich in analogical representation.
2) Humans are animals, we are endowed with pre-linguistic zoosemiotic 
modelling capacities (cf. Sebeok’s zoosemiotic modelling, Polanyi’s tacit 
knowledge), and much of human perception and communication takes place 
by non-verbal means. As such, understanding meanings in animals is related 
to understanding human zoosemiotic modelling.
3) In practice, we are interacting with animals (e.g. domesticated animals) by 
communicative and behavioural means; humans and animals make sense of 
each other and make use of each other. Humans develop their communicative 
skills through living and learning in a society, which employs diff erent 
kinds of signs, and the same holds for other animals. As Irene Pepperberg’s 
ethological research on avian cognition has nicely demonstrated, if one wants 
to teach a system of signs to another species that would allow for interspecifi c 
communication, the fi rst thing to do is to let the animals live in an environment 
in which these signs are in daily use (Pepperberg 2002). 
4) Communication systems and cultural representations of animals do not arise 
from nowhere. Our interactions with other animals have an evolutionary and 
cultural history; in other words, they are historically contextualised with our 
cultural and biological past with other species. A good example of this is the 
long-term symbiotic co-inhabitance of humans and dogs, which has resulted 
in the development of human-like social skills in dogs (Hare, Tomasello 2005). 
Th is means that our canine companions are integrated into human society not 
only in functional terms, but also in terms of a shared system of signs.
As an epistemological position, these points can be further simplifi ed and 
combined into a few basic principles. Namely, zoosemiotics can come to grasp 
animal meanings through comparative, participatory and context-sensitive 
(reciprocal) approaches, as applied to diff erent research objects with diff erent 
emphases (as shown in the following table):
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1. Approach 2. Sphere of interest 3. Emphasis
1. Comparative 
modelling
1. Human and animal 
communication




2. Interactions of humans 
and animals




3. Animal representations 
in culture
3. History of animal 
semiosis / human culture
Th us, for example, a zoosemiotic research project may be developed as a con-
textual (reciprocal) analysis (1.3) of human–animal relations (2.2) with an em-
phasis on their social, cultural and biological contexts (3.1). An analysis aware of 
contextuality and reciprocity would combine diff erent viewpoints and research 
methods in order to highlight relational environmental aspects, as well as 
reciprocal semiotic processes and activities, which are considered to take place 
in mutual directions among the participants (and/or between the research object 
and the researcher). From this perspective, human–animal relations are studied 
with an understanding that the involved human and animal counterparts are 
necessarily historically rooted in social, cultural and biological backgrounds in 
particular, specifi c ways. In principle, an approach of this type has been applied in 
the case study of novel species management used for the analysis of the European 
jackal in Estonia (see Maran 2015).
Th e table above does not presume to cover all the possible approaches to 
zoosemiotic research; instead, it illustrates the logic by which research projects 
may be constructed. Furthermore, zoosemiotics oft en combines those diff erent 
approaches with diff erent viewpoints and angles working complementarily 
and in comparison with each other. It uses diff erent research instruments in 
a toolbox-like manner and compiles a suitable set of methods for the specifi c 
research task at hand. In such a study, the presence of diff erent approaches itself 
becomes the measure of the quality of the description. In its practical applications, 
zoosemiotics can use umwelt modelling, communication analysis and other tools 
described in more detail in the next chapter.
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Methodology of zoosemiotics: 
concepts, categorisations, models
Timo Maran, Morten Tønnessen, Kadri Tüür, Riin Magnus, 
Silver Rattasepp, Nelly Mäekivi
1. The need for methodology
Animals and human–animal relations are studied in a number of diff erent 
research paradigms deriving from biology, medicine, sociology, philosophy, 
literary criticism, and others. Each and every one of them brings along its own 
methodological character and style of research – from the quantitative and strict 
approaches in anthrozoology and sociological research to the open and refl ective 
reasoning of critical studies. In this array of diff erent possible approaches, 
zoosemiotics and semiotic studies of animals try to hold a middle ground. 
Th e research objects of zoosemiotics are complex as a result of their individual 
character, of the biological and semiotic variety of animal species, and of the many 
possible human–animal interactions. Th is has resulted in a need for a well-forged 
methodology. Common methodological devices are a prerequisite for developing 
any systemic and comprehensive understanding of animal semiosis, since they 
make it possible to compare diff erent species and case studies, and provide 
zoo semiotics with some capacity for prediction. At the same time, however, 
zoosemiotics is inclined toward qualitative methodologies and research methods. 
Quantitative methods and statistics-based analyses, commonly used in biology 
and other life sciences, may well form a background for zoosemiotic research, 
but asking qualitative questions is always in the foreground. Instead of rigid 
concepts, structural distinctions and categories, methodology in zoosemiotics 
is best understood as dynamical and adjustable. Th ere are, nevertheless, a few 
key assumptions that we consider to be the general methodological grounds for 
zoosemiotic research: 
1.  In any research task, the attention is on semiotic processes (semiosis, re-
cognition, communication, environmental aff ordances, naming, representa-
tions, etc.). Any research object is considered to be predominantly semiotic 
(having its specifi c character due to semiosic relations).
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2.  Living organisms are considered to be subjects and agents, capable of creating 
their own umwelten and participating actively in semiosic processes. Living 
organisms are typically individual and always context-bound.
3.  Th e researcher is semiosically connected to the research object. Th e interaction 
between the researcher and the object is acknowledged as part of the research 
situation. In addition, concepts and descriptive language are also part of that 
situation; rather than being predefi ned, they develop and change according to 
needs.
Th ese assumptions, together with the emphasis on the qualitative approach, 
mean that conceptual categories and methodological distinctions are approached 
somewhat like tools in a toolbox. Depending on the specifi cs of the research 
situation, the scholar will select the most suitable approach and adjust and 
elaborate it for the purposes of the task at hand. In other words, methodology 
is treated as part of epistemology, as a part of human modelling activity of the 
other semiotic subject, object, or the environment, while any ontological claims 
are made very tentatively. 
2. Basic methodological approaches in zoosemiotics
Zoosemiotics provides several basic methodological approaches for the semiotic 
study of animals: 1) analysing animal umwelten and environmental perception; 
2) analysing biocommunication between animals; 3) analysing a given species’ 
spatial organisation and use of space or landscape; 4) analysing animal represen-
tations in literature, art, fi lm and other cultural media. In addition to these 
approaches, zoosemiotic methodology can be elaborated for the needs of specifi c 
research tasks (e.g. using umwelt theory dynamically for analysing the changing 
relations between animals and their environment), and for application in many 
other research topics (e.g. semiotic aspects of taming and socialisation [see 
Kiiroja, this volume]; the place of animals in philosophy [see Rattasepp, this 
volume]). 
 2.1. Umwelt analysis
Umwelt analysis is derived from the work of the Baltic-German biologist Jakob 
von Uexküll (Uexküll 1921, 1973[1928]; Uexküll, Kriszat 1934). Umwelt is one 
of his key theoretical concepts. It signifi es the meaningful species-specifi c world 
in which the animal lives, acts and communicates. In other words, the umwelt 
is the sum total of all meaning-relations, or semiosis, of the given animal (for 
alternative defi nitions, see Sebeok 1989: 194; Hoff meyer 1996: 54; Stjernfelt 
2007: 226–227). One of the goals of the zoosemiotic research is to analyse which 
objects carry meaning for the animal, and what those meanings are in respective 
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communication or behavioural situations. Since researchers do not have the 
means to access the meanings of another species directly, indirect methods of 
study need to be applied for the description of meaning-relations in the umwelten 
of other species. One such methodological possibility is umwelt mapping, where 
knowledge about the animal’s perceptual organs, body plan, ways of living, and 
ecology are taken into account for building hypotheses about the structure and 
contents of its umwelt (see e.g. Tønnessen 2014a; see also “Elaborating umwelt 
theory” later in this chapter). Umwelt mapping allows us to estimate which 
objects the animal can perceive and which of these are relevant for it functionally. 
It is also possible to map specifi c perceptual and eff ectual cycles, the so-called 
“functional cycles”, that connect an animal with a specifi c environmental object, 
and thereby indicate as to what kinds of meaning-relations are obligatory for 
the given animal. Most straightforwardly, umwelt mapping can be based on 
the diff erentiation between the four basic functional cycles which, according to 
Uexküll, are related to food, enemies, medium/environment, and partners/sex 
(relations may also include symbiotic relations and relations between generations) 
(Uexküll 1973 [1928]; Uexküll, Kriszat 1934). Th ese four basic functional cycles 
can also be used as a basis for the comparison of the umwelten of diff erent species. 
On the other hand, umwelt analysis can also entail participatory observation 
as a potential method. In this case, the researcher does not simply observe the 
behaviour and activity of another organism, but actively engages with the animal 
and sets up communicative situations for the other subject. Such methods 
are worth considering in the case of species that are socialised to the human 
community and whose umwelten are hence strongly entwined with the human 
one. Many species (pets, laboratory species) are also able to establish and 
participate in shared networks of communication with humans (cf. Lestel 2002). 
In such cases, communication with the animal can itself prove to be a valuable 
tool for investigating the sign usage and meanings of the animal.
Comparative or relation-based analyses of diff erent umwelten allows for 
making estimations about how diff erent animals relate to each other, and what 
the meaning of their characteristic features could be for each other. Examples of 
such umwelt analyses are found in Jakob von Uexküll’s books Streifzüge durch die 
Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen [A stroll through the worlds of animals and men] 
(Uexküll, Kriszat 1934) and Bedeutungslehre [Th eory of meaning] (Uexküll 1940). 
In one famous case, he analysed the umwelt of a tick encountering a mammal. 
As the fi rst stage of the analysis, Uexküll determines the roles of the meaning 
receiver and the meaning carrier, explaining that every umwelt analysis should 
explicate these positions. Next, he describes the relations between the animals 
in the form of points and counterpoints by fi nding specifi c correspondences 
between their perceptual organs and signals or body structures. In the example 
of the tick, correspondences are found, for example, between the tick’s olfactory 
perception and the butyric acid present in the animal’s bodily secretion, between 
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the tick’s tactile organ that allows it to navigate through the fur/hair of its prey and 
the presence of hair on mammals, etc. From these contrapuntal relations, Uexküll 
derives the meaningful rule that connects the subject with the environmental 
object or the other animal (in this case, the recognition of and attack on the 
prey, and the extraction of blood). In addition to the correspondence between 
perceptual organs and signals or body structures, the analysis could, in principle, 
also include physiological or behavioural correspondences or correspondences 
in the spatial and temporal activities of animals. 
Uexküll’s umwelt analysis can also be applied to determine the ways in which 
one and the same object can obtain diff erent meanings in the animal’s umwelt, 
depending on its development, stage of life, and motivation. In the case of insects 
that undergo full metamorphosis, the larvae have to follow entirely diff erent 
environmental cues in comparison with adult insects. Uexküll gives an example 
of the pea-beetle larva, which eats a tunnel from the inside of a still-soft  young 
pea to its surface. Once it has transformed into a pea-beetle, it exits the aged pea 
through that tunnel (Uexküll 1973 [1928]: 322; Uexküll, Kriszat 1934). Here we 
see how the meaning of the tunnel depends on the particular life cycle of the 
organism: at the larval stage, carving the tunnel to the surface serves as “food”; 
for the beetle, it becomes the “exit” (see also Linask et al. 2015). 
Alternatively, an elaborated version of umwelt analysis can be used to map the 
variety of diff erent meanings and functional cycles that diff erent animals have 
with one and the same environmental object. Uexküll provides a simple example 
of how one and the same plant can be endowed with the meaning of picking, 
climbing, and eating, depending on whether the animal that approaches the 
plant is a human, an insect, or a cow (Uexküll 1940). Umwelt analysis can also be 
expanded to describe more complex relations between animals, as for example the 
threefold relations of mimicry (see Maran, this volume), or between animals and 
humans, as for example in cases where an animal may have senses, behaviours, 
or meaning-making capacities that are entirely absent in humans, yet where 
humans project their own specifi c umwelt into those of animals, irrespective of 
those diff erences. An example of this is the assessment of animals based on their 
having or lacking the capacity for language, self-refl ection, consciousness, and 
so on. As such, umwelt analysis can be used as a critical tool for assessing the 
limitations of the human umwelt, and for a better understanding of the diversity 
of the forms of life. For further elaborations of umwelt theory, see also the section 
“Elaborating umwelt theory” later in this chapter.
2.2. Communication analysis
Th e second possibility for the zoosemiotic study of animals would be to focus on 
the communication process. Communication in diff erent animal species diff ers 
to a considerable extent. On a purely physical level, organs of perception and 
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expression are diff erent between species, and correspondingly, communication 
channels and ranges used in species and groups diff er. For instance, insects 
predominantly use chemical communication; many birds and insects are able 
to perceive ultraviolet patterns; many reptiles sense infrared radiation; moths, 
bats and many rodents can use ultrasound; etc. Related to perceptual diff erences, 
organs of expression diff er in diff erent species as well. Specifi c body structures 
exist through which messages are expressed in animals, and which vary greatly 
(including outgrowths, spikes, outer ears, horns, feather structures, and tails, 
among others).
In addition to acknowledging the diversity of bodily structures and media 
used for communication, any analysis of specifi c cases of communication 
in animals should pay attention to the spatial or temporal organisation of the 
signals of a given species. Visual signals can form repertoires of behavioural acts 
with a communicative function, e.g., the facial gestures or body postures of many 
group-living birds and mammals. In temporal means, visual signals can form 
specifi c sequences of ritual behaviour – for example, “wedding dances” and other 
forms of courtship behaviour. In their full species-specifi c complexity, animal 
signals can be dynamically employed in dialogic or polylogic encounters between 
the members of one and the same or diff erent species, and they can be described 
as conveying meaning or functions based on codes that organise specifi c acts of 
communication.
To study such diversity of animal communication, Th omas A. Sebeok (1990: 
111–112) has proposed a zoosemiotic research platform comprising six questions 
concerning the diff erent aspects of communication. In general, Sebeok’s approach 
is based on the classical model of communication introduced by Shannon and 
Weaver (and as derived from the works of Roman Jakobson). To this model, 
Sebeok adds the concepts of message, code, and context, and describes four 
processes of transformation: in addition to coding and decoding, there are also 
the formulation and the interpretation of the message. His research platform 
approaches communication in the form of six questions, as follows:  
1.  How does an animal that acts as a sender formulate and code a message? 
Here one should pay attention to the bodily forms and the expression organs 
of animals, which allow for sending diff erent types of messages. Formulating 
and coding the message is related to the question concerning the sender’s 
intention and the need for communication: what is their function in its 
umwelt as related to its current motivations and intentions?
2.  How are messages transferred, through what channel and under what 
circumstances? Diff erent channels, such as visual, audible, chemical, and 
tactile, allow for diff erent possibilities and have diff erent eff ects upon 
messages. Th e use of communication channels may depend on the specifi c 
communicative task, and diff erent channels may be combined for creating 
redundancy in communication. 
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3.  How does an animal that acts as a receiver in the communicative situation 
decode and interpret the message? Th e possibilities and limits of the perceptual 
organs of various animals diff er, and they may relate to the cognitive capacities 
and intentions of the sender in diff erent ways. Th e success of the receiver in 
distinguishing the message from the noise may diff er; it may be able to decode 
only part of the information that the message contains or, alternatively, 
interpret the message diff erently on the basis of the communicative context. 
4.  What is the possible repertoire of a specifi c species? Th is question may lead 
the researcher to describe the expressional possibilities of the given species 
in the form of a lexicon or ethograms. When describing the sign repertoire 
of a species, both synchronic and diachronic aspects, as well as messages 
belonging to distinct meaning categories, can be distinguished. 
5.  What are the properties of the code as used by a specifi c species? Sebeok here 
understands the concept of code to refer to a set of rules which are used to 
convert the message from one stage to another during communication. A code 
can be innate, learned over the course of life, or a combination of these, and in 
animal communication codes can also be related to environmental conditions. 
6.  What is the meaning (semantics) of the messages, and relatedly, what role 
does contextual information play in interpretation? In Roman Jakobson’s 
model of linguistic communication, the referential dimension is associated 
with context. For example, the interpretation of messages can vary greatly, 
depending on whether the territory in which communication takes place 
belongs to the sender or the receiver, on whether it is an open or a closed 
and secure environment, and on other features. Meaning and context are 
also associated with the history of the communicative situation, both as 
evolutionary history and as earlier individual experience.
Th e semantic dimension in animal communication can be further analysed on 
the basis of questions such as what kind of biological functions or behavioural 
motivations do the communicative situations allow the animal to fulfi ll. In this 
respect, Günther Tembrock (1997) has distinguished the following functional 
types of animal semiosis: spatial semiosis (e.g. territorial calls and other 
behaviour related to territoriality), temporal semiosis (which organises diurnal 
and seasonal rhythms), semiosis of metabolism (related to foraging behaviours), 
protective semiosis (mimicry and other antipredatory communication), semiosis 
of explorative behaviour, and partner semiosis (communicative relations within 
groups but also between symbionts). Th e typology of meanings can be described 
in greater detail, but in such a case, distinctions would depend upon the specifi c 
object of study (for diff erent possibilities, consider the chapters by Magnus and 
Tønnessen in this volume).
Th ese six questions proposed by Th omas A. Sebeok provide a good starting 
point for an analysis and comparison of specifi c forms of animal communication. 
Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that this approach is derived from 
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the classical transmissional model of communication, which has been criticised 
on various diff erent grounds (fi xating the positions of the sender and the receiver, 
presuming the sender’s intentionality, etc.). Sebeok’s research platform also appears 
to have limited applicability for describing communication between diff erent 
species, where the shared code and repertoire are exceptions. For many research 
tasks, however, it remains a good heuristic device, one which also illustrates well 
the general logic of the semiotic approach in animal studies – that is, proposing a 
set of logically related study points or research questions and applying the set, as a 
toolbox, in order to achieve a systemic understanding of animals. 
2.3. Environmental analysis
Zoosemiotics also provides theoretical tools for studying meaning attribution 
and usage of space by animals. Th e zoo biologist and semiotician Heini Hediger 
(1964: 7–18) has described the spatiality of animals by the use of the concept 
of territory, understood as a space that allows a member of a given species to 
fulfi l its needs for food, water, movement, social contacts, and so on. Inside the 
territory, Hediger distinguished the nest and the home range, the latter being the 
area in which the animal usually moves, where it feels secure and what it protects 
from species mates. In addition, Hediger (1968) describes concentric spheres of 
distance that are characteristic of a species: social distance, personal distance, 
fl ight distance, and critical distance. Th ese spheres are semiotic measures, as 
they are monitored and actively regulated by the animals. Social distance is 
the distance which is kept under normal circumstances by the individuals that 
belong to the same species and social group. Personal distance is the distance that 
is kept by individuals in pair relations. Flight distance is the distance from the 
animal body which, if crossed, is responded by the animal by a strong reaction 
of fear and an attempt to escape. In cases where escaping is not possible and 
the intruder approaches further, the critical distance is met and, once reached, 
animals (including peaceful herbivores) respond by attacking. 
From the Uexküllian perspective, the territory of an animal can be described 
as being constituted by diff erent patches and micro-niches, in which the animal 
fulfi ls its diff erent needs or life functions (nesting, foraging, resting, guarding, 
etc.). Such meaningful patches in the landscape, described as eco-fi elds by the 
Italian landscape ecologist Almo Farina (Farina, Belgrano 2006), are dependent 
on both the physical shapes and structures of the landscape as well as on the 
perception and life functions of the given species. Farina defi nes the eco-fi eld 
as a spatial confi guration in the landscape that has a specifi c meaning for an 
animal in the case where its relevant life functions are active. Adopting the view 
of Uexküll, Farina describes eco-fi elds as “space confi guration meaning carriers” 
(Farina 2006: 32). An organism’s habitat usually includes various eco-fi elds that 
are active depending on the motivation, physiological state, or stage of life of the 
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given organism. Th is also means that, depending on the state of the organism, 
the landscape that the animal perceives and acts upon does not remain static 
but shift s in meaning. Th e species-specifi c cognitive landscape is the sum of all 
possible eco-fi elds, or meaningful spatial confi gurations.
In practice, the eco-fi eld concept can function as a tool for describing the use 
of landscape by diff erent species. Such an approach allows for the mapping of 
shared environmental resources for diff erent species (for example, small passerine 
birds sharing the same forest), pinpointing areas in which diff erent species can 
meet, and indicating the grounds for confl icting relations between diff erent 
species. Eco-fi eld analysis is also a suitable tool for analysing confl icts between 
humans and other animals stemming from the use of landscape resources. For 
example, commenting on the disappearance of the Iberian lynx (Lynx pardinus), 
Farina et al. (2005: 171) suggest that “an unprecedented spread of man-made 
barriers reduce connectivity between sub-populations preventing the explorative 
behaviour of such large organisms. Th e survivorship of the lynx is not a simple 
matter of prey biomass availability […] but is the result of the low score of 
diff erent eco-fi elds that become rare in the Iberian region”. Specifi c mapping can 
be used, for example, to analyse the confl icts between wolves, farmers, and sheep 
(cf. Tønnessen and Th ibault, this volume).
Another example of a confl ict that might be analysed in terms of eco-
fi elds is connected to the Baltic coastal areas, where migrating barnacle geese 
perceive fi elds with newly sprouted grain plants as a place in which to refresh 
and nurture themselves along the long route. Farmers generally would like the 
grain to grow into maturation, in order to harvest and sell it. Feeding barnacle 
geese are perceived as a nuisance or ‘natural catastrophe’ whose deeds need to be 
reimbursed by the Ministry of Environment in the form of compensation for the 
unearned profi t. Farmers are able to protect their fi elds from the big mammals 
walking along the ground by building fences, but it is much more diffi  cult to 
stop birds coming from above. Th e habitual way of moving around (as a part of 
each respective species’ umwelt) contributes to the development of confl ict about 
diff erent interests with regard to resource usage (cf. Farina 2012). 
 2.4. Analysis of animal representations
Zoosemiotics is also interested in cultural representations of animals, especially 
as related to human–animal relations and the semiosic capacities of the animals 
themselves. In this kind of research, it is fi rst of all important to acknowledge that 
the meanings and positions of animals in any given culture or cultural artefact 
are manifold. Th ey can be infl uenced by and refl ect a specifi c cultural history, 
identity, religious backgrounds, social relations and contentions, specifi c cultural 
and economic practices with respect to animals, physical and semiosic properties 
of the animal species themselves, and so on (Tønnessen, Tüür, 2014). On the one 
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hand, animal representations can be thought of as refl ecting on how a culture 
organises its relations with other living beings; on the other hand, representations 
may also serve various functions in the culture itself, such as aiding in memorising 
certain places, times, or events, identifying or characterising certain objects of 
culture, or building personal or social identities. 
Cultural functions of animal representations as mediated in the wide array 
of human sign systems (such as text, song, dance, fi lm, performance, ritual, 
etc.) serve a wide array of purposes. Animal representations can be used as a 
magic simile, a protective ritual gesture, a parable, a pedagogical example, or 
anecdotal evidence, to name just a few possible functions in human culture. 
Even the scientifi c representation of animals as sequences of statistical data is 
but a conventional way of making the animal phenomenon somehow intelligible 
to humans. At the same time, we should not expect to be able to perceive any 
animal “as it is”, because our perception of both immediate and textual reality is 
conditioned by the limits and aff ordances of our human umwelt. Th e question 
“What is it like to be a bat?” (see Nagel 1974) calls for an emphatic approach, but 
it does not have an answer that we could actually judge as ‘true’ or ‘false’. What 
should be remembered here is that we as members of the human species operate 
in our daily lives with representations of animals that are culturally and naturally 
conditioned  – our cultural competence never leaves us in any encounter with 
other species, be it bodily or mediated. 
In the most general sense, animal representations can be analysed along the 
lines of the distinction between denotative and connotative meanings, as described 
by Roland Barthes. Denotative meanings here expresses the relationship between 
the representation and the best knowledge available about the animal from 
biology, ecology, and common sense. Connotative meanings here expresses the 
relationship between representation and its cultural context. Invariably, in every 
specifi c case of animal depiction both aspects are present  – some aspects are 
derived from what we know about the animal in its own ecological surroundings, 
and some aspects are derived from human cultural processes. For example, in 
popular nature documentaries, such as those made by the BBC or National 
Geographic, the postures and activities of animals are mostly authentic. Th e 
way in which the fi lm is narrated, however, is the result of human storytelling, 
replete with many references to the human social order. On the other hand, even 
fi ctional works about animals, such as Felix Salten’s book Bambi, a Life in the 
Woods (1928), have some biological basis. In this particular book, for example, 
the yearly life rhythm of the roe deer is depicted quite genuinely. 
In this network of the manifold meanings of animal representations, there 
exists a specifi cally zoosemiotic aspect or research topic, namely attentiveness 
to the possibilities and means of animals to “infl uence” their own cultural 
representations or, in other words, how the semiosic activities of animals can 
motivate their representations. As remarked above, the zoosemiotic paradigm 
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does not treat animals merely as objects of human discourse, but also as subjects 
who are by themselves capable of initiating and shaping communicative 
relations. Zoosemiotics endows animals with the capacity to attribute meaning 
to environmental objects, to organise their environment meaningfully, and 
to participate in inter- and intraspecifi c communicative relations. Although 
umwelten of diff erent species diff er greatly, humans are also animals and thus 
are capable of making sense of other animals by diff erent means (e.g. via the 
overlap of umwelten, using zoosemiotic modelling, analogy-based descriptions, 
etc.). Communication between humans and other species is oft en mediated 
through shared environments and joint activities. Such semiosic relations 
provide zoosemiotics with a methodological ground for studying the eff ects of 
the semiosic activities of animals on cultural texts.
At the same time, cultural convictions and textual representations of animals 
also infl uence how humans treat animals and shape human attitudes toward 
animals in areas such as nature protection, hunting, tourism, etc. (cf. Mäekivi, 
Maran 2016). In particular, public attitudes toward wild carnivores, foreign and 
invasive species, and pets depend considerably on cultural communication. 
Th e semiotic infl uence of animals on culture, and human understanding of 
and behaviour toward animals and their natural environment, appear to form a 
reciprocal relationship.
In the context of this reciprocal communication, zoosemiotics can inquire as to 
how culture as refl ected in diff erent mediums and artefacts represents the semiotic 
nature of other animals, their meaning relations with the environment, and 
communication in animals themselves and with humans. In the case of literature, 
one may enquire, for example, to what extent the author has paid attention to the 
perceptual and expressive capacities of the specifi c species, and how have they been 
able to express these. It is also important to enquire as to what extent the animal is 
allowed to act as a subject in the text by being an active participant in it and shaping 
the course of events. For example, is the animal protagonist endowed with the 
capacity to expresses itself (verbally), and are its utterances in accordance with the 
behavioural logic of its species? Zoosemiotics may also study the role of animals as 
motivators or inspirers of the literary creation. In nature writing, numerous essays 
relate back to the specifi c animal encounter. To provide an example, a fatal meeting 
with a wolf becomes a triggering motive for one central text in environmental 
philosophy: Aldo Leopold’s (1949 [1968]) “Th inking like a mountain”. In this essay, 
a personal encounter leads the author to the understanding that even a wolf pack 
has essential value as long as our point of view is broad enough to embrace the 
ecosystem as a whole. Further methodological possibilities of zoosemiotic studies 
of animal representation lie in analysing the position of the subjective character 
of an animal in relation to the manifold cultural connotations mentioned above: 
what is the position of animal subjectivity in narrative and discourse, and how it 
strengthens or confl icts with other textual meanings. 
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Th e ways in which animals infl uence human representation and interpretation 
of them in cultural texts are manifold. Th e diversity of representations of animals 
in human culture can be explained with the help of the notion of the nature-
text (Maran 2007). In brief, “nature-text” denotes a set of physically justifi ed 
associations of meaning between the natural environment and its textual 
representation. Th ese associations may appear as structural correspondences, 
may be related to the perceived modalities and the intensity of experience, may 
stem from the particular senses that are used in establishing contact with the 
represented reality, and may be related to the textual mediator’s mental states that 
have a biological basis, such as fury or joy. In addition, the reader’s experience 
plays a role in making sense of the cultural representation of the particular 
natural phenomenon. It may also aff ect the described environment/animal in 
the case of a non-mediated encounter with humans. Th e original introduction 
of the concept points out that the nature-text is characterised by locality: the 
inevitable connection of the text with its model environment. In the case of 
animal representations, a similar question about ‘organic’ similarities between 
humans and animals arises.
In broad strokes, each living being has a certain life-cycle that is framed by 
birth (or hatching) and death, and it generally includes activities of procreation, 
searching for food, hiding from predators, and avoiding pain (cf. Uexküll’s four 
basic functional cycles). As such, the temporal organisation of the life of an animal 
may inform the narrative, as is oft en the case with nature documentaries. An 
interesting example of a text guided by its subjects’ umwelt is the Finnish writer 
Leena Krohn’s fantasy book Tainaron – Mail from Another City (1985; English 
translation 2004) about life in an insect city, in which the narrative structure is 
thoroughly conditioned by the life cycles and habits of various insects.
Many other phenomena among animals may have an eff ect upon the struc-
ture of the text. Some species, particularly songbirds, have songs and calls that 
are aesthetically pleasing or are remarkable in other ways. Th e simplest example 
of the aesthetic representation of bird songs is their rendering by means of 
onomatopoetic words. Th e particular time of day when it is most probable to see 
or hear a bird oft en determines the starting point of its depiction. Th e dynamics 
of the aesthetically pleasing activities of a species oft en informs the temporal 
structure of the text in general. At the same time, it is a human value judgment 
as to which instances of an animal’s life are worthy of representation, of being 
embedded in the texts of human culture. 
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3. Modelling theory 
Modelling theory is a valuable source for zoosemiotics as both a means for the 
human observer to reach the research object and as a possibility for making 
sense of the meaning processes of other species. Models and modelling are broad 
concepts that allow us to treat human and nonhuman semiotic activities within 
the same theoretical framework (Sebeok, Danesi 2000). Th omas A. Sebeok 
derived his understanding of a model from Uexküll’s concept of umwelt and 
argued that all living beings that have umwelten also model their surroundings. 
Th e complexity of modelling diff ers among various species. For example, only 
humans are capable of using linguistic means for creating models. Modelling 
allows us to distinguish and map the semiotic competence of organisms based 
on the hierarchical complexity of their modelling processes. It also enables us 
to demonstrate how the process of making sense of the material environment 
itself leads to its change as models are created in relation to the object, while yet 
retaining the analogy-based linkage that can later be applied back to the object. 
For the present purposes, modelling is taken in a relatively broad way as an 
activity of making sense of some process or phenomenon with the help of (internal 
or external) representations that are at least partially based on analogies. Sebeok 
and Marcel Danesi defi ne modelling as the use of forms for comprehending and 
processing perceived information in a species-specifi c way (2000: 5–6). Ladislav 
Tondl adds that a “model is able to substitute for the original [… and] permits some 
important functions of decision-making or evaluations concerning the original” 
(Tondl 2000: 85). Models can include analogy-based representations of diff erent 
complexities: from prototype-based categorical perception and conditioned 
associations in nonhuman animals to the anthropomorphic descriptions and 
mathematical models of human discourses. As an example, we can consider a 
migratory bird’s mental map, which incorporates innate and experiential knowledge, 
the image of certain landmarks, and the position of the sun and the constellations, 
among other sources of environmental information; this mental map constitutes 
a model of its migratory route. Th e representations that are created in the course 
of modelling can remain internal (in the case of mental associations) or can be 
externalised (writing, artistic works, and other forms of human modelling). 
Humans are capable of carrying out several layers and types of modelling. 
According to Sebeok, humans share with other animals the activity of “zoosemiotic 
modelling”, a kind of modelling in which signs are distinguished by the organism’s 
species-specifi c sensory apparatus and are aligned with their behavioural resources 
and motor events (Sebeok 1991: 54). Th e basic associations in the umwelten of 
animals (for example, between signs in the terrain and movement, or between 
signs of food and consumption) possibly form the universal ground for modelling 
in animals. We can also think of the processes of recognition and mapping that 
take place in our immune system and in other centres of biosemiotic competence 
in our body, such as the peripheral nervous system or the endocrine system, as 
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forms of unconscious modelling activity. Verbal modelling is a unique capacity 
of the human species, and it may lead to higher, poetic, artistic, ideological, or 
religious forms of modelling, denoted as “secondary modeling systems” by the 
Tartu-Moscow semiotic school (Lotman 1967: 131). Sebeok and Marcel Danesi 
(2000) propose a further typology of diff erent modelling types: singularised 
modelling (sign-based), composite modelling (text-based), cohesive modelling 
(code-based), and connective (metaphoric) modelling.
A relevant feature of modelling is that a model represents an object not in all 
of its aspects, but only in a certain respect, and the specifi cs of this relation itself 
have semiotic signifi cance and meaning. “Th e model represents a homomorphic 
representation, i.e. not identical to the original. It means the representation in 
the sense of the Latin ‘pars pro toto,’ the part instead of the whole” (Tondl 2000: 
83). It is in this very relation between the original and the model that the specifi cs 
of the species, the umwelt, the language, the cultural tradition, the discipline, 
etc. of the interpreter become involved and make the diff erence. Th is specifi city 
of modelling is an important aspect of zoosemiotic analysis for understanding 
the object, e.g. the psychological motivation of the communicating animal, the 
discursive strategies and descriptive frames used in cultural representations of 
animals, and the presumptions and inclinations of zoosemiotics itself, attended 
to by means of auto-communicative refl ection.   
In humans, the basis that has been used to establish the relationship between 
the object and the model can also be used to distinguish a number of metaphoric 
ascriptions of diff erent levels  – the so-called morphisms. Th e Czech historian 
of science and philosopher Stanislav Komárek has proposed a typology of such 
morphisms, including biomorphism, technomorphism, and sociomorphism 
(Komárek 2009: 108ff ). In biomorphism, meaning transmission is based on 
the general characteristics of living beings; in technomorphism, the world or 
any entity within it is described by emphasising its machinelike properties; in 
sociomorphism, human society, culture, and economics are taken as the measure 
with which to describe the rest of nature. By using diff erent morphisms, humans 
are able to model matter as alive, humans as machines, machines as pets, 
nonhuman animals as humans, and so on. 
Among analogy-based modelling strategies, anthropomorphism is the most 
widely studied and criticised. Instead of a careless criticism of antropomorphism, 
zoosemiotics would rather consider its diff erent forms as relevant objects 
of study. Morphisms allow humans to comprehend things that are partially 
unknown to us, based on their analogies to things that are more common. We 
can, for example, use humans or other living organisms as a basis for metaphoric 
ascription to make better sense of material processes, or to give to these processes 
a human or at least an animate dimension. In a broader sense, zoosemioticians 
understand analogy-based modelling strategies as an important and oft en 
inevitable part of the research activity. Here zoosemiotics can follow the lead of 
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the cognitive ethologist Gordon Burghardt (2007), who has turned a version of 
anthropomorphism into a scientifi c method. His “critical anthropomorphism” 
treats anthropomorphic description as widely existing or even inevitable, and calls 
for the critical examination of both similarities and diff erences of communicative 
and cognitive skills between humans and animals in the framework of Uexküll’s 
umwelt theory. Such an analysis would expose the cognitive mechanisms that 
humans use for making sense of other animals, and thereby lead to a better 
understanding of the animals themselves.
4. Elaborating umwelt theory
Th ere are at least four signifi cant theoretical problems with umwelt theory: (1) 
What Brentari in his recent book Jakob von Uexküll: Th e Discovery of the Umwelt 
Between Biosemiotics and Th eoretical Biology (2015) calls “the Kantian problem”, 
(2) Uexküll’s idea of perfect harmony in the relation between organism and 
environment, (3) umwelt theory’s relation, historically, to animal psychology, 
and (4) Uexküll’s political use of umwelt theory (for an overview of the central 
criticism of umwelt theory on these points, see Tønnessen 2015b: 9–12). Such 
problems must be dealt with if we want to apply umwelt theory in today’s scientifi c 
and ecological context. As Brentari (2015: 241) aptly states, Uexküll’s work (and, 
implicitly, an updated umwelt theory) can be of great use in conservation biology 
because it shows us how preserving biodiversity implies protecting “the semiotic, 
perceptive and operative worlds in which life unfolds”.
Morten Tønnessen has recently proposed several ways to elaborate umwelt 
theory, which can be summarised in 10 points, as presented below. In several of 
these, new concepts are introduced, as well as the occasional model and fi gure. 
Th ese elaborations of umwelt theory are either claimed to be consistent with 
Uexküll’s original thought, or to be necessary given an updated scientifi c and 
philosophical understanding of the subject matter.
Th e fi rst elaborations concern the relation between subject and world, which 
are fundamental in Uexküllian thinking, given his programme for a subjective 
biology.
1. Uexküllian phenomenology derives from the umwelt theory of Uexküll, and 
represents a genuine, unique perspective within phenomenology. Uexküllian 
phenomenology “is characterised by an assumption of the (in the realm of life) 
universal existence of a genuine fi rst person perspective, i.e., of experienced worlds” 
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As has been oft en noted, Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt theory is an essential source 
of inspiration for the zoosemiotic research program. However, in order to be 
applicable to diff erent cases where animals, humans, environment and culture 
interact in complex ways, the umwelt theory would require some elaboration. 
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(Tønnessen 2011d: 35), and it is “an example of – a special case of – a semiotics of 
being, taken to be a study of signs designed so as to emphasise the reality of the 
phenomena of the living” (ibid.; see also Tønnessen 2010, 2011b, 2011c).
2. “Th e ontological niche of a being can be defi ned as the set of contrapuntal 
relations that it takes part in at a given point of natural history. Th e ontological 
niche of a being delimits the ‘area’ that this being occupies in the phenomenal 
world” (Tønnessen 2003: 288, emphasis added). Human ecology can be studied 
in terms of the human ontological niche (cf. also Tønnessen 2011a). 
Th e next couple of developments of umwelt theory concern the complexity of 
umwelten or their intertangled nature.
3. Not all umwelten are species-specifi c (i.e., applicable at the level of the species). 
In many cases, it is meaningful to refer to lower-level umwelten, such as individual 
and population umwelten, as well as higher-level umwelten, such as for example 
the mammalian umwelt.1 With the exception of individual umwelten, both 
higher- and lower-level umwelten can be described with an emphasis on whatever 
characteristics are shared within the group in question.
4. Not all umwelten can be meaningfully studied in isolation from other um-
welten. An umwelt assemblage can be “defi ned as the assemblage of two or more 
umwelten of creatures acting as one  – e.g., the synchronised behaviour and 
per ception of a rider and a horse” (Tønnessen 2014a: 162). Swarm umwelten, 
a special case of umwelt assemblages – for example the umwelt(en) of a school 
of fi sh, or of a fl ock of birds – rely heavily on umwelt alignment, which is “the 
process of adjustment by one creature to the presence and manifestation of other 
umwelt creatures (and further, to abiotic umwelt objects and meaning factors)” 
(ibid., 162–163).
Th e following elaborations concern the temporality of umwelten.
5. Umwelten are not static. An umwelt transition can be defi ned “as a lasting, 
systematic change, within the life cycle of a being, considered from an ontogenetic 
(individual), phylogenetic (population-, species-) or cultural perspective, from 
one typical appearance of its umwelt to another. An umwelt transition, in other 
words, can be regular, irregular or a singular, extraordinary event” (Tønnessen 
2009: 49). Umwelt transitions occur in evolution, in ecological developments 
(including those of an anthropogenic nature), in the development of individual 
organisms, in culture, and in individual lives.
1 In the human context, Uexküll referred, for example, to the umwelten of diff erent profes-
sions (Berufsumwelten), cf. Uexküll 1910: 126. For a critique of Th omas Sebeok’s por-
trayal of the umwelt as species-specifi c, see Tønnessen 2011d: 19–20. See also Tønnessen 
2003: 288–289.
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6. In many cases, it makes sense to refer to the umwelten of diff erent life stages, 
or to acknowledge that species-specifi c developmental patterns determine the 
character of the umwelt generally. In mammals and birds, we can distinguish 
between altricial umwelten and precocial umwelten. “[W]hereas precocial um-
welten are largely functional from the outset, a[l]tricial umwelten become 
fully functional only gradually” (Tønnessen 2014b: 282). At an earlier stage of 
ontogeny, we can identify a transition in the development of all sentient umwelt 
creatures from a simple embryonic umwelt to a sense-saturated umwelt (ibid., 
291–294).
7. An umwelt trajectory “can be characterised as the course through micro- or 
macro-evolutionary (or cultural) time taken by the Umwelt of a creature, as 
defi ned by its changing relations with the Umwelten of other creatures” (Tøn-
nessen 2014a: 161). Th e concept of an umwelt trajectory represents “an aggregate, 
collective (and evolutionary) equivalent of Uexküll’s notion of the Umwelt-tunnel 
of a single individual creature” (ibid., emphasis added). Umwelt futurology, the 
study of future umwelten, involves studies of the future which make use of 
umwelt modelling and methodology (ibid., 175–178).
Finally, the concluding elaborations of umwelt theory concern theoretical and 
methodological tools or perspectives.
8. Umwelt mapping can be understood simply as mapping  – systematically 
describing – the umwelt of a specifi c living being (see Tønnessen 2010: 388–390, 
2011d: 40–48 and 2015b: 15–19). Umwelt mapping can also be understood as 
mapping of ontological niches (cf. pt. 2). An ontological map (Tønnessen 2011a, 
101–104), a subjective ethogram of sorts, represents the signifi cant relations of an 
umwelt creature. “Each ontological map depicts signifi cant relations of a creature 
qua individual, or population, or species, and so forth, in a more or less idealised 
way. Th e procedure is a) to identify signifi cant others and b) to determine the 
functional tones of their relations to the Umwelt being at hand” (Tønnessen 2010: 
388).
9. Th e tripartite umwelt model makes it possible to distinguish between “Umwelt 
objects as encountered, Umwelt objects as anticipated and Umwelt objects as 
conceptualised” (Tønnessen 2011d: 37). According to this model of complex 
umwelten (ibid., 78–82), there are three aspects or layers of umwelt, namely 1) the 
core umwelt, 2) the mediated umwelt and 3) the conceptual umwelt. Only animals 
with a central nervous system (i.e. sentient animals with a sense-saturated 
umwelt) have conceptual umwelten. Th e umwelten of simpler organisms have 
only two aspects, namely the core and the mediated umwelt. Th e model has been 
developed further, for example, in Tønnessen 2015a, and for its use in umwelt 
futurology (cf. pt. 7), see Tønnessen 2014a. 
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10. An umwelt ethics (of which there might be several versions, involving diff erent 
normative stands) is “an ethics that rests heavily on fundamental features of 
Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt theory” (Tønnessen 2003: 281). “Th e reason why 
it makes sense to regard all semiotic agents [...] as moral subjects”, according 
to this specifi c umwelt theory, “is that in respect to these entities, our actions 
make a diff erence. Only for semiotic agents can our actions ultimately appear as 
signs that infl uence their well-being” (ibid., 292; see also Beever and Tønnessen 
2013). Relatedly, biosemiotic ethics (Beever 2011) suggests that semiotic agency is 
a morally relevant property (Tønnessen and Beever 2014).2
5. Hybrid objects and ad-hoc methods
Many objects of zoosemiotic research appear to have a hybrid nature; that is, they 
contain both cultural and biological processes. In this context, to be a hybrid 
means that it is not possible to place the object entirely into a single domain of 
knowledge; rather, it surpasses the boundaries of the diff erent spheres of human 
activity and scientifi c disciplines. In zoological gardens, in the behaviour of guide 
dogs, in the discourse of invasive species, and in other objects, biosemiotic and 
cultural semiotic processes are intertwined in myriad complex ways. Th e concept 
“hybrid” derives from the work of the French sociologist of science Bruno Latour, 
who used it to conceptualise the phenomena that overcome or problematise the 
central distinctions of the modern episteme between culture and nature, human 
and animal, description and the objective world. Hybrid, in this sense, is the blend 
or mixture of diff erent spheres or processes of the world. Latour introduced this 
concept in his book We Have Never Been Modern (1993), and has subsequently 
developed it throughout many of his publications.
In this subchapter, we would like to turn our attention to the semiotic aspects 
of hybrids and their relation to semiotic methodologies. One possibility of 
describing hybrid objects from the semiotic perspective would be to argue that 
they are objects that partially remain outside of the describing culture and that, 
for this reason, they are partially out of reach for the possible metalanguages of 
the culture. Th is is indeed true of most zoosemiotic objects. At the same time, this 
indescribable part appears to greatly infl uence those parts that are accessible for 
description in the culture. In this respect, the common structuralist approaches 
that attempt to delimit and describe that part of the object that is accessible 
by cultural means would result in partial and inaccurate results. Approaches 
characteristic of the biological sciences tend, on the other hand, to undervalue 
the relationship between the object and the cultural context of the researcher. 
2 For a review of biosemiotic understanding of agency in general, see Tønnessen 2015a.
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Biosemiotics and its subfi elds appear to be especially rich in hybrid objects. 
Th e common feature of hybrid objects is that they transcend certain epistemic 
divides. For example, hybrids can emerge:
a)  in communicative relations between humans and other animals, where the 
umwelten of diff erent species interact and new communication codes emerge. 
Such objects would belong to be the scope of zoosemiotic studies.
b)  between human culture and the internal endosemiotic organisation of the 
human body. Examples of this dimension are the diff erent conditions of the 
organism, such as illnesses, sexuality, motherhood, etc., and their refl ections 
and representations in culture.
c)  between human culture and the natural environment in the form of semi-
natural environments, traditional agriculture, nature writing, etc. Th is would 
constitute the traditional sphere of ecosemiotic research.
Many objects of zoosemiotic research go beyond or problematise the culture-
nature divide, and this brings along the need for particular kinds of epistemological 
approaches, methodologies, and research tools. In general, practical research of 
hybrid objects appears to underline the importance of open epistemologies and 
ad-hoc approaches.   
“Ad-hoc” as a scientifi c concept is derived from the philosophical works of 
Imre Lakatos and represents an important mechanism of the scientifi c change. In 
cultural semiotics, ad-hoc theories and methodologies have been propagated by 
the leading scholar of Tartu semiotics, Peeter Torop, who sees ad-hoc approaches 
as being attentive to the specifi cs of the complex research object: “Culture as an 
object of analysis oft en dictates its analysability, and therefore ad-hoc theories as 
object-based theories have a special place in the disciplines that study culture” 
(Torop 2009: 38). Further, “it is important for the researcher to address the 
research object in the right way. Th is creates a basis for fruitful discussions 
and competent analysis” (Torop 2011: 59). Torop treats ad-hoc approaches as 
particularly important in the context of cultural semiotics, but we argue that 
they are more generally suitable for studying semiotic objects, including hybrid 
zoosemiotic objects. Ad-hoc methodologies are suitable in cases where the object 
is considered to be complex, bringing along its own semiotical dynamics. In this 
context, it is relevant to point out the organismal metaphors (e.g. membranes and 
the spatial organisation of the semiosphere, Lotman 2005; “text as being alive”, 
Kull 2002) as used in the Tartu semiotic school.  
In general, ad-hoc analysis is a method of description that is created on the 
basis of a specifi c research problem. On a more general level, ad-hoc methods rely 
on an open epistemology, understood as a critical approach towards the concepts 
applied and the distinctions made that are considered conditional, temporary, 
and not fully corresponding to the specifi cs of the object. Th is is related to the 
distinction, proposed by Torop, between the high and low level of control in 
research. He writes: 
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High level of control refers to research conducted on the basis of a fi xed 
theory or concepts and the metalanguages that support this theory. Low 
level of control refers to ad-hoc analyses that try to deduce the analysability 
and the suitable metalanguage on the basis of the specifi cs of the research 
object. (Torop 2009: 28)
Th e open epistemological stance would also mean that distinctions and typo-
logies made at the beginning of the study need to made carefully and with the 
consideration that the object may bring along its own structuring, sign systems, 
and sign activity. In addition, the research methods and models should leave 
room for taking into consideration the principally unknown aspects of the 
hybrid object. 
Th e conceptual framework suitable for studying hybrid objects should 
preferably be relatively simple. Th is is for the reason that we must take into 
account the possibility that the metalanguage and the object language (or the 
semiotic structure of the object under study) may not suit each other well or be 
even confl icting. In the case of hybrid objects and zoosemiotics, the challenge 
appears rather to be in keeping the metalanguage relatively simple and open 
to the infl uence of the object, to include the conceptual means for addressing 
the processes and features that are unknown. In both cases, however, the 
metalanguage should be adjustable over the course of the research project as a 
result of the dialogue between the object and the investigator.
 6. Closing remarks
Th ese methodological considerations on modelling theory, umwelt analysis and 
hybrid objects remain underlying principles and need to be adjusted according 
to the nature of specifi c research objects and situations. Th e practical use of these 
research methods and concepts are demonstrated in the chapters that follow, 
focusing on case studies in zoosemiotics.
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The philosophical discourse on animals, and 
the philosophical animals themselves
Silver Rattasepp
Today, animal studies and related fi elds, such as posthumanism, multispecies 
ethnography and the like, are blooming. It is oft en said that we are now undergoing 
an “animal turn” or perhaps even a “species turn”, as suggested by Kirksey and 
Helmreich (2010). Th is latter “turn” was coined in order to accommodate newer 
and more encompassing works that are not limited to animals only (e.g. Kohn 
2013; Cohen 2012; Marder 2013). Analyses of animals proliferate in any number 
of fi elds in the humanities and social sciences, and in interdisciplinary works 
and journals. However, philosophy has, in general and in broad strokes but 
admittedly with a few notable exceptions, not followed this new trend. In fact, 
as argued below, philosophy has seldom had much of interest to say about living 
beings other than humans, and even there it steadfastly avoids anything that 
would smack of the biological, of the animal. Ever since Socrates declared that 
it is the men who dwell in the city who are his teachers and not the trees in the 
countryside, animals have been thought of, at best, as poor in world.
What follows is not, however, a survey of philosophical tracts and their 
commentary on animals. Such work is well underway elsewhere (e.g. Oliver 2009; 
Lippitt 2000; Calarco 2008; Lurz 2009; etc.). Instead, the chapter is divided into 
two parts: the fi rst lays down the basic structure by which animals are expelled 
from philosophy, and the second part tells certain admittedly fanciful stories 
about what an “animal gaze” at human theorisers would look like.
A claim was made above that the conjunction of philosophy and animals is 
lacking to the point of being non-existent. Th is claim is bound to sound ludicrous 
to many, since even cursory readings of philosophy will reveal that there are, in 
fact, menageries of animals in philosophy. Th is point should therefore be clarifi ed. 
What philosophy lacks is not discussion of animals, but rather discussions of 
animals where they would appear as living representatives of nonhuman modes 
of being, of alterity, of a life that is not human. Animals appear as symbols, 
tokens, fi gures and exemplars, but not as concrete individual species whose 
externally observable traits and behaviours could provide philosophical insights, 
nor as particular subjects representing life-worlds diff ering from those of human 
beings. It is to the reasons of this expulsion of animals that we now turn.
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1. Structure
Generally speaking, animals take on one of a few generic forms in philosophy. 
(1) Th ey are nonspecifi c placeholders in that the concrete, chosen animal is 
interchangeable, such that any one species is as good as another to be used as 
an example. (2) Th ey are used as codes or metaphors awaiting interpretation, in 
that behind the animal lurks a general philosophical idea which must be found 
or revealed. (3) Th ey are creatures who can be entirely described by a reference to 
a human capacity that the animals themselves lack, for which reason no species-
specifi c knowledge of them is required, since this reference to a human capacity 
that they lack is suffi  cient. Th is latter “use” of animals is analysed below; for the 
other two uses, see the extended discussion in Tom Tyler’s Ciferae (2012). In short, 
nonhuman animals are not actually there in philosophy as concrete creatures in 
their own right. Rather, animals derive their meaning from their application in or 
reference to some other, entirely unrelated endeavour. 
Th e most common form of discussing animals and animality in philosophy is 
to note and mark their collective lack of some human characteristic. In fact, the 
general way of addressing animals in philosophy is barely distinguishable from the 
common sense discourse on animals, the basic formula of which is “humans are 
distinct from animals due to some characteristic X”. Th e purpose of this formula 
is, of course, to fi nd one singular dividing line that would help us place all animals, 
in toto, to one side, and all humans as completely separate and exceptional on the 
other. For in humanist philosophies, the realisation of human identity is thought of 
as “a process of purifi cation and of separation, the peeling off  of extraneous layers 
of in order to reach an identity at the depth” (Marchesini 2010: 92). To talk about 
animals is, in philosophy, to talk about human uniqueness. 
Moreover, animals – or rather animals as convenient examples, for ethology 
is seldom of any interest to philosophers – are used to add “rhetorical force to 
their descriptions of distinctive qualities of the human” (Oliver 2009: 10). In their 
texts, “philosophers dissect, probe, exploit, and domesticate animals to shore up 
their notions of human and humanity [...] they turn wild animal metaphors into 
domesticated beasts of burden to prove their theories about man” (Oliver 2009: 
12–13). Th e result of this self-centred perspective is that attention to the vast 
diversity of life was, up until very recently, nearly absent in philosophical thought.
Th e common formula that “humans are distinguished from animals because 
X” can, of course, be further explicated. Th ere are at least six dimensions to it, not 
all of them present in every text, of course, at least not explicitly. Taken together, 
however, they form a set of interlinked lines of thinking, the consequence of 
which is to expel animals from philosophy as unworthy of interlocution, and 
thereby to reassure us of human uniqueness and exceptionality. Th ese six lines of 
thought are as follows:
1. Th e identity of the human, that is, uniquely human nature, is determined by 
a circularity, even a tautology: by looking only at themselves, humans decide 
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that human identity or nature can be determined entirely by studying humans. 
Th is applies to most supposed basic determinants of human nature, such as 
language. In fact, as Lippitt notes, “Th e economy of human subjectivity and 
speech is restricted: only human beings are capable of speech, which, in turn, 
founds the human subject. Animals enter that tautology as a phantasmatic 
counterpoint to human language” (2000: 15). Th is point will be examined 
further below.
2. On the basis of this decision, those traits or characteristics that are uniquely 
human, namely those that all animals lack, will be determined with no room 
for species-specifi c divisions. If an animal species has something unique that 
humans do not have, then they are merely diff erent; if humans have something 
that no other animal has, they are unique. In this perspective, comparisons 
between nonhuman animals themselves are irrelevant; comparing the 
evolutionary distance between some nonhuman animals is not of interest for 
this decision. (Cf. Ingold 1990: 210 for a more thorough discussion of this 
point.)
3. Th e distinguishing trait that separates humans from animals and makes them 
unique is found to be something related to some purportedly mental capacity, 
such as language, consciousness, rationality, etc. If a trait or property does not 
seem, at fi rst blush, to be related to mental capacity, it will be reinterpreted as 
such. Th is is the case, for example, with bipedalism and opposable thumbs, 
which would remain merely of biological interest until they are recast as 
opening up the capacity for tool-making and construction, that is, the 
reshaping of matter based on human mental conceptions. Other uniquely 
human traits that cannot be so recast – such as contagion by uniquely human 
parasites, for example – are of no interest to such a philosophy.
4. Related to the above points, the treatment of animals will be a negative mirror 
image of human uniqueness. Animals are describable entirely by their lack of 
what is supposedly uniquely human. At minimum, they lack the same degree 
of development of said property. It should be obvious that in such thinking 
no animal species is characterised by a level of development of a human trait 
that would be the same or even higher than the one found in humans. Other 
animals either entirely lack said trait (language, self-awareness, reason), or 
they have “lower”, rudimentary forms of those traits (e.g. a capacity for some 
forms of communication, but not for symbolic sign use).
5. In most cases, animals are treated in the singular: not as the diversity of life 
comprised of a plenitude of species, but as simply “animals”. Th e purpose 
of “animals” in the singular is to provide a background from which human 
uniqueness can stand out. As Marchesini puts it, this sort of thinking 
“creates a horizon of the non-human that is characterised by universality, 
which is considered to be neither a multiplicity not a bearer of individual 
characteristics, as opposed to the category of humanity which is intrinsically 
pluralistic” (Marchesini 2010: 93).
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6. Yet despite all of the above, animals still hold a fascination for humans, and 
oft en inspire fear. As such, to determine human uniqueness oft en does not 
amount to a mere denial of some traits to humans, but to an expulsion or 
overcoming of the supposedly animal and bestial. In the most forceful version 
of this thinking, to understand what is “man” is to expel the animal. “Th e 
eff ort to defi ne the human being has usually required a preliminary gesture of 
exclusion: a rhetorical animal sacrifi ce. Th e presence of the animal must fi rst 
be extinguished for the human being to appear” (Lippitt 2000: 8). In fact, the 
ascent of mankind from the order of nature is a basic theme in philosophical 
thinking. Th is can be achieved by ascertaining (by humans and in humans) all 
“animal” or “bestial” aspects, “by isolating the nonhuman within the human” 
(Agamben 2004: 37). Th is would help one to sieve out everything “truly 
human” so that the nonhuman bestiality in the human could be excluded, 
expelled or overcome: “Anthropogenesis is what results from the caesura and 
articulation between human and animal. Th is caesura passes fi rst of all within 
man” (Agamben 2004: 79).
2. Consequences
It is at this point where we can draw the diff erence between the schema of the 
knowing subject relied on by the various forms of humanism, including the 
exclusionary philosophy described above, and an attempt at the rethinking of 
that schema, to be found in animal studies and the so-called posthumanities. 
On the face of it, the distinction is relatively simple; it amounts to an integration 
of otherness, which includes nonhuman animals as opposed to the purging of 
the nonhuman, which may also include forms of the non- or inhuman, such as 
technology, AI, and the like.
Michel Foucault famously begins his Th e Order of Th ings with a nonsensical-
sounding list of descriptions of animals that seems to lack any coherence and 
systematicity (Foucault 2002: xvi). I will not repeat the list itself here, as it has 
been repeated enough. We should proceed, however, from Foucault’s point that 
the reason for the confusion is its lack of any explanatory framework or a ground 
that would help us perceive (in the motley abundance of the world) a certain 
kind of unity, without which we would be cast into a world full of sound and 
fury, signifying nothing. In the human sciences, however, this foundation has 
long been found: to unify in a system and to make coherent our perception of the 
world, we must cast our eyes to “man” and his ways of signifying, representing, 
discoursing, thinking: “Man [...] is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, 
since he is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all 
knowledge possible” (Foucault 2002: 347). In the human sciences, it is the human 
being who is the locus of both the condition of possibility of knowledge and 
the object of that same knowledge; both the object of study, and the conditions 
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of possibility of that very same study, are to be found from the human beings 
themselves. “Man” fi nds in himself knowledge that makes knowledge possible, in 
whom reside all those things that make knowledge comprehensible and systematic. 
In the course of philosophical thought, many of these conditions of the possibility 
of knowledge have been named, but in the end, and as already noted above, they 
all look similar, being reductions to the human mind: language, reason, rationality, 
symbolic signifi cation, consciousness, intentionality, discourse, culture, and so on.
It is a curious and, I should add, a very animal situation! For nonhuman 
animals, too, mark their territory with whatever their body is able to exude, be 
it with a scent, with excrement, with noises, and so on. And Massimo Filippi has 
provided an analysis of just this kind of territorial behaviour in human animals. 
As he notes, 
the common practice humans and other animals use to acquire the property 
of what is beyond their bodies – and therefore not immediately their own – 
consists of marking it, branding it, with their own physical traces. (Filippi 
2011: 50–51)
Like the animals that that they are, humans also use their own symbolic scent to 
mark their territory, mostly with the help of representations: for the empirico-
transcendental doublet, the appropriation of the world is made possible through a 
kind of “semiotic contamination” (Filippi 2011: 52), which is used to appropriate 
the world in order to domesticate it into a human representation. Th e result is a 
world-wide impoverishment, as Baudrillard so well admonishes:
Behind every refl ection, every resemblance, every representation, a de-
feated enemy lies concealed. Th e Other vanquished, and condemned 
merely to be the Same [...] Every representation is a servile image, the 
ghost of a once sovereign being whose singularity has been obliterated. 
(Baudrillard 1996: 149)
But all this no longer works, for alterity has begun to reveal its diversity and 
has become unresponsive to every attempt at compression into a single category 
opposed to humanity (Marchesini 2010: 93). As such,
It is not just a matter of asking whether one has the right to refuse the animal 
such and such a power [...] It also means asking whether what calls itself 
human has the right rigorously to attribute to man, which means therefore 
to attribute to himself, what he refuses the animal, and whether he can ever 
possess the pure, rigorous, indivisible concept, as such, of that attribution. 
(Derrida 2008: 135)
What is proposed here is, then, to take as if a circular or circuitous look back 
at human identities, societies, and ideas through the metaphorical eyes of 
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the nonhumans. It is a question asked with the gaze of the nonhumans, fi rst, 
whether what humanist philosophies have attributed to humans does indeed 
give rise to that solitary and isolated human subjectivity or human being in 
general, and then, second, to see how human societies, subjectivities and cultures 
are constituted by a network of relations, most of which cannot be said to be 
“human” in any straightforward sense (for this, see Wolfe 2010, particularly p. 
49ff ). Our embeddedness in environments that are full of myriad nonhumans 
with whom our lives are inextricably connected, our evolutionary background, 
and the external prosthetics of languages and cultural patterns, lay down the 
foundation of the human who, as such, is fundamentally nonhuman. “What is 
proper to man is never pure; it does not belong to him/her as a private property” 
(Filippi 2011: 57). Th e human is nonhuman – that should be one of the slogans 
of future humanities.
Th is conception has certain consequences for humanist philosophies. For it 
appears that such a process is already taking place: ever more new subjectivities 
are incorporated into thought, the scholar of the humanities incorporates into his 
purview ever new areas and topics of study. Th is is exemplifi ed by all the myriad 
“turns”, all the various “X studies”, from cognition to animals to ontologies. Yet as 
Cary Wolfe has claimed, this nevertheless leaves unquestioned the premises and 
the logic of the subject who does the incorporating, and consequently hidden 
under this gesture of emancipation, of the inclusion of previously neglected 
objects and subjects, there is a gesture of homogenisation, of standardisation. For
just because we study nonhuman animals does not mean that we are not 
continuing to be humanist – and therefore, by defi nition, anthropocentric. 
Indeed, one of the hallmarks of humanism is precisely its penchant for the 
sort of “pluralism” that extends the sphere of consideration to previously 
marginalized groups without in the least destabilizing or throwing into 
question the schema of the human who undertakes such pluralization. 
(Wolfe 2010: 99)
Th e empirico-transcendental doublet merely extends itself, repackaging its own 
historically, ideologically, and intellectually specifi c form of subjectivity into an 
emancipated pluralism – it extends itself with a gesture of benevolence, but does 
not question itself. 
Th e core issue at this junction is a matter of extension as opposed to 
attribution. Th e scholarly disciplines that are underpinned by the humanism of 
the doublet extend themselves over new and previously neglected objects and 
topics of study – hence the constant drive to fi nd ever new topics, themes, and 
avenues of research to which their gaze can turn, and the proliferation of endless 
novel “turns”. Yet they seldom attribute their own characteristics to those whom 
they study: how oft en is the humanist doublet itself an object under scrutiny by 
others? How oft en is the possibility acknowledged that whatever characterises 
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their object or topic of study could have something that could be either 
attributed or extended to themselves? Th is has been especially prevalent as far 
as philosophical speculations about nonhumans, especially nonhuman animals, 
are concerned. In addition to the refusal of attributing language, thinking and 
reasoning to nonhumans, other examples are easy to fi nd, such as the criticism of 
anthropomorphism as the root of evil in animal studies. Yet even here we already 
fi nd the breaking down of humanism, as exemplifi ed by novel ways of thinking, 
such as critical anthropomorphism, representing an attempt of overcoming 
what Rivas and Burghardt have called “anthropomorphism by omission”, which 
is the “failure to consider that other animals have a diff erent world than ours” 
(Burghardt 2002: 10).
As Derrida laconically asks, “if one defi nes language in such a way that it is 
reserved for what we call man, what is there to say?” (Derrida 1991: 116). For there 
is no way out of such question-begging formulations, described above in factor 1 
in the lines of humanist philosophies, according to which humans have language 
and thus language creates the human, or that human subjectivity is in language and 
therefore language creates who we really are. (An especially bizarre and essentially 
nonsensical version of this view was once presented by Kurt Goldstein, who 
declared that “Language is an expression of man’s very nature and his basic capacity 
[...] Animals cannot have language because they lack this capacity. If they had it, 
they would [...] no longer be animals” [cited in Griffi  n 1981: 75]).
But this circular reiteration of the same merely leaves us with nowhere to go. 
Yet it should also be obvious that this circularity is written into the very core of 
humanist thinking, of man conceived as the doublet. But the “possibilities or 
necessities, without which there would be no language, are themselves not only 
human” (Derrida 1991: 116). Not only does language itself have a nonhuman, 
evolutionary, embodied and thus non-linguistic origin, but if human subjectivity 
is shaped and constituted by language that is fundamentally exterior with respect 
to individual human subjectivities, then this subjectivity is moulded by the 
nonhuman, twice over. Th e unthought sedimentations of language and culture in 
which we are embedded are not “ours”, are not appropriable by us as individual 
subjects, yet neither can we think and act outside of the language and culture that 
are given to us and whose history and structure elude and predate us. We are not 
the owners of our thinking, for we are cast into a language and culture that are 
both external to and older than we are, and which we can never think of as fully 
ours; yet we cannot think outside them. Language, discourse, modes of practice 
are “always on the scene before we are, as a radically ahuman precondition for 
our subjectivity” (Wolfe 2009: 571).
To return to the beginning of this part, it is becoming ever doubtful whether 
what humanist humanities have attributed to humans does indeed give rise to that 
solitary and isolated human subjectivity or human being in general; rather, the 
target of our inquiries should be to see how human societies, subjectivities and 
cultures are constituted by a network of semiotic relations, most of which cannot 
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be said to be “human” in any straightforward sense. For all these reasons, we must 
rather start by inquiring about whether the assertions are true that humanity 
cannot know the world except by means of human aptitudes and abilities, that 
human beings will inescapably and unavoidably be the measure of all things. And 
to humanist philosophies, “to all these warped and twisted forms of reflection” 
which “refer all knowledge back to the truths of man himself ” and which “refuse 
to think without immediately thinking that it is man who is thinking”, we should 
indeed, with Foucault, respond with philosophical laughter (Foucault 2002: 373).
We are long past the time of telling exclusionary stories of animals, and should 
rather begin to tell stories that would take, perhaps at fi rst in an admittedly 
narrative form, an animal gaze at human–animal relations. For there may be 
room in philosophical thinking for looking at the possibilities of thinking itself, 
for pushing the boundaries instead of drawing limits. A sort of poetry of thought 
that is not so much a problem-solving endeavour, but rather an inquiry into the 
possibility of thinking with animals about human–animal relations. For this, the 
following presents certain philosophical fables, the sole purpose of which is to see 
what else we can think with animals.
3. Stories
3.1. Ape
In his Th e Open, Giorgio Agamben provides us with a brief analysis of a fascinating 
moment in the history of biological thought, that transformative moment when 
Carl Linnaeus, in the mid-18th century, placed humans among the primates in his 
grand biological taxonomy, Systema Naturae. In retrospect, it is unsurprising that 
this launched an uproar and an endless polemic about the loss of human divinity 
and dignity. In fact, this fear of the loss of human dignity and the concomitant 
attempt to expel the animal from the human, or to refuse the placement of humans 
among the animals, is endemic to Western philosophical thought to the point that 
Adorno and Horkheimer are left  to note that “Th e idea of man in European history 
is expressed in the way in which he is distinguished from the animal. Animal 
irrationality is adduced as proof of human dignity […] few ideas have taken such a 
hold on Western anthropology” (Horkheimer, Adorno 1972: 245).
Yet the cleverness of Linnaeus lies goes far beyond merely calling humans 
apes or simia  – something which had been discussed and debated ever since 
Antiquity. It lies rather in the fact that, instead of providing a short description 
of the distinguishing characteristics of human beings, he adds a short imperative 
adage, nosce te ipsum, “know thyself ”. In Agamben’s analysis,
man has no specifi c identity other than the ability to recognize himself. Yet 
to defi ne the human not through any nota characteristica, but rather through 
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his self-knowledge, means that man is the being which recognizes itself as 
such, that man is the animal that must recognize itself as human to be human. 
(Agamben 2004: 26)
In short, humans are animals that must recognise themselves as humans in order to 
become human. But Linnaeus’s cleverness extends beyond this, for this imperative 
turns into a double-tined prong from which there is no escape. Aft er all, those 
who consider Linnaeus’s placement of humans among apes scandalous should 
apply the adage to themselves – “in not knowing how to recognize themselves as 
man, they have placed themselves among the apes” (Agamben 2004: 26) – and in 
understanding the truth of Linnaeus and in recognising themselves as humans, 
they have also placed themselves among the apes. In Linnaeus’s trick, to either 
refuse or to accept human animality leads to the recognition of human animality.
3.2. Leaf insect
Th e leaf insects from the genus Phyllium mimic leaves to an uncanny degree, yet 
in a curious twist of evolution, some species of leaf insects mimic the decaying 
forms of leaves which are, at the same time, their own food: “Mirroring the 
necrosis of its own food, the Phyllium identifi es itself as a dying semblance of its 
own living sustenance” (Brassier 2007: 43). As a consequence of this morpho-
logical confusion, the leaf insects sometimes end up devouring each other  – 
that, at least, is Roger Callois’ fantastical conclusion. For him, in his Mimicry 
and Legendary Psychastenia, this represents a case in which the leaf insect and 
that insect’s leaf as its food undergo, in Brassier’s words, “an involution which 
simultaneously engenders the collapse of their identity and the erasure of their 
diff erence”, which “marks the compulsion whereby the organism is driven to 
disintegrate into the inorganic” (Brassier 2007: 43). As a symbol of the loss of 
human uniqueness, mimicry of this particular sort exemplifi es a dissolution of 
the borders between the “inside” of the organism (which in the case of human 
beings are, in humanist philosophies, thoughts, ideas, representations and the 
like), and the “outside” world of the unknowable, resulting in what Caillois 
himself called “depersonalization through assimilation to space” and likened it to 
the situation of schizophrenics:
when asked where they are, schizophrenics invariably reply I know where 
I am, but I do not feel as though I’m at the spot where I fi nd myself. For dis-
possessed minds such as these, space seems to constitute a will to devour. 
Space chases, entraps, and digests them in a huge process of phagocytosis. 
Th en, it ultimately takes their place. Th e body and mind thereupon become 
dissociated; the subject crosses the boundary of his own skin and stands 
outside of his senses. He tries to see himself, from some point in space. He 
feels that he is turning into space himself  – dark space into which things 
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cannot be put. He is similar; not similar to anything in particular, but 
simply similar [...] Th ese expressions all bring to light one single process: 
depersonalization through assimilation into space. In other words, what 
mimicry morphologically brings about in certain animal species. (Caillois 
2003: 100)
Th is description bears an uncanny resemblance to the struggles that many 
philosophies undergo in their attempts to retain human uniqueness in the face 
of all the forces – from biology to cognitive sciences – that threaten to dethrone 
him. Th e human fi gure, no longer knowing his precise spot, is dissolved into 
space and from then on is merely similar, and nothing unique can any longer be 
put into that dark space of the mind which he previously thought to be his sole 
possession.
Th e praying mantis, too, presents itself as precisely the same sort of symbol of 
the fear of the loss of human uniqueness. Th e various species of praying mantises, 
which can mimic a petal, a branch, a leaf with a stupendous resemblance, present 
us with a case “whereby the insect loses its identity and returns to the plant 
kingdom” (Caillois 2003: 80). But the praying mantis has yet another lesson. 
As is well known, the male praying mantis is decapitated by the female during 
reproduction. Th is adds another layer to this allegoric insect play, for in this case, 
the fear of the loss of human uniqueness results in a state of undeath, as it were, 
where the human being, decapitated from his language and representations, 
retains the capacity of behaviour but is no longer alive as a sovereign being:
there are very few reactions the mantis cannot perform in this decapitated 
state  – that is, without any center of representation or voluntary activity. 
In this condition [...] (this is truly frightening) [it can] lapse into a feigned 
rigor mortis in the face of danger or when the peripheral nervous system 
is simulated [...] it is so diffi  cult, I think, both for language to express and 
for the mind to grasp, that the mantis, when dead, should be capable of 
simulating death. (Caillois 2003: 79)
3.3. Mole
A curious reversal of the human–animal gaze in the form of a critique of 
anthropological studies of material culture is presented by Tim Ingold in his Being 
Alive. Such studies are wont to follow dimension 3 as presented in the beginning 
of this chapter. Material culture amounts to a reshaping of matter on the basis 
of human ideas or conceptions, so that the originally “culture-free” material is 
changed on the basis of a pre-existing mental plan, thereby imbuing the matter 
with “culture” through the workings of human hands and tools. Yet Ingold asks 
us to reverse the gaze and think of what material artefacts would be thought of 
if we were to imagine “anthropologically trained moles, of a philosophical bent” 
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(Ingold 2011: 23). It is the human embodiment and behaviour which lead us to 
the perception of artefacts as reshaped matter imbued with human mental plans. 
Ingold writes that burrowing animals such as moles, whose worlds consist of 
corridors and chambers,
would doubtless insist that the materiality of the world is not culturally 
constructed but culturally excavated […] in the sense that the forms of the 
things are hollowed out from within rather than impressed from without. 
In their eyes (if they could see) all that is material would reside beyond the 
objects of culture, on the far side of their inward-facing surfaces. Th us these 
objects could be phenomenally present in mole-culture only as material 
absence  – not as concrete entities but as externally bounded volumes of 
empty space. Th e very idea of material culture would then be a contradiction 
in terms. (Ingold 2011: 23)
A mole burrowing holes is a mere matter of its behaviour, being of no interest to 
a philosopher who, as per dimension 3, only deems something worthy of note 
once it can be related to some purportedly “higher” mental capacity. Yet once we 
extend imaginatively such a capacity to the mole, who then, without hesitation, 
commences its cultural activity, the human-centric conception of “material 
culture” is thrown into doubt. 
Th is short quote is a prime example of a sort of imaginative philosophy in 
which an animal looks at humans, and under this gaze we rethink our thinking. 
“Other animals are held by the look. Man becomes aware of himself returning the 
look” (Berger 2009: 5), and will render inoperative the belief in the pretence that 
human conceptions are universal in the sense that they should either be withheld 
from animals, or extended to them in a straightforward manner. In thinking 
about the mole, the former represents the commonplace anthropocentrism of the 
doublet, and the latter leads to a critique of the possibility of simply attributing to 
animals that which the doublet, as per dimension 1, fi rst discovered in himself. 
Instead, the mole is a method for studying man.
3.4. Vampyroteuthis 
An exceptionally curious and fascinating book was published by Vilém Flusser 
and Lois Bec (2012 [2000]). Due to the strange nature of the book, what follows 
is a retelling of one of its more philosophically interesting moments. Interested 
readers are invited to read the very short book in its entirety, for it contains many 
more strange and fascinating things than can be presented here. Th e story is 
presented as a series of oppositions in capacities and “thinking” between humans 
and vampire squids. 
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“Th e vampyroteuthic world is not grasped with hands but with tentacles,” they 
begin. “It is not in itself visible (apparent), but the vampyroteuthis makes it so 
with its own lights” (Flusser, Bec 2012: 38). Both worlds, those of humans and of 
vampire squids, can be touched and seen, but the ways of observing are diff erent. 
Humans experience a world that is concrete, as things that can be grasped 
with hands are wont to be. To experience the world, we must move through it 
in order to grasp it because the tentacles of our hands (that is, our fi ngers) are 
the products of a limb previously used for locomotion. Th e vampire squid, on 
the contrary, grasps the world with its eight tentacles that surround its mouth 
and whose original purpose was to move the fl ow of food towards the digestive 
tract. “Th e world grasped by the vampyroteuthis is a fl uid, centripetal whirlpool” 
(Flusser, Bec 2012: 38), and it grasps the world in order to diff erentiate between 
the things fl owing within it. Th e result is that 
Whereas our method of comprehension is active – we perambulate a static 
and established world  – its method is passive and impassioned: it takes 
in a world that is rushing past it. We comprehend what we happen upon, 
and it comprehends what happens upon it. Whereas we have “problems,” 
things in our way, it has “impressions.” Its method of comprehension is 
impressionistic. (Flusser, Bec 2012: 39)
Both of our worlds are thus concrete, as they consist of concrete objects that 
can be apprehended and comprehended. For both of us, everything in the 
world has clear outlines and a fi rmness to them, for which reason they can be 
manipulated. In both cases, there is present a subject faced with objects that can 
be manipulated. Yet the contrast between our two worlds remains vast. For us, 
“objects are problems – obstacles – that we handle simply to move out of our 
way,” and therefore our engagement with the world is “activity aimed against 
stationary objects, a deliverance from established things” (Flusser, Bec 2012: 39). 
For the vampire squid fl oating in a water current, the objects are, to the contrary, 
free-fl oating entities that come to it. We move, encounter objects, and declare 
them to be problems to be removed; for the vampire squid, objects move and 
appear to it, to be then sucked in and incorporated. Its activity is
of discriminating between digestible and indigestible entities, that is, a 
critique of impressions. Culture is not, for it, an undertaking against the 
world but rather a discriminating and critical injection of the world into the 
bosom of the subject. (Flusser, Bec 2012: 39)
As every philosopher knows, we do not perceive the world directly, but only as it 
appears to us by the mediation of our sense organs which gives rise experience. 
Since appearances are misleading, our constant philosophical goal is to get 
behind appearances, to get rid of mere experience and lowly sense impressions. 
63The philosophical discourse on animals, and the philosophical animals themselves 
Th e vampire squid’s world, however, does not appear, because it lives in darkness. 
“Th e vampvroteuthis itself irradiates the world with its own point of view. Its 
bioluminescent organs engender appearances, that is, phenomena” (Flusser, 
Bec 2012: 39). Whereas we instinctively believe that there is a reality behind 
appearances, the vampire squid cannot have a similar thought, because the 
appearances are its own creation: there is world only inasmuch as it has fl oated to 
the squid who then makes it appear. We think that there are things in themselves 
which we must reveal by removing the veil of mere experience; the vampire squid 
creates the world and as such cannot be deceived by it. For the squid, there is no 
“outside” toward which to struggle.
And this is the message we can draw from these fervent imaginations about 
the vampire squid, which well applies to the other examples of philosophical 
animals presented above, and perhaps should be one of the guiding lines of our 
thinking about animals:
Th e world of the vampyroteuthis requires, therefore, ontological categories 
that diff er from our own. Its are those of nocturnal passion, ours of diurnal 
clarity. Not one of wakeful reason, the vampyroteuthic world is rather one of 
dreams. […] As complex beings with complex brains, we are both partially 
rational and partially oneiric (Flusser, Bec 2012: 41)
4. Conclusion
In the infamous last sentence of his Th e Order of Th ings, Michel Foucault declares 
that if, due to some unforeseen event or shift , the empirico-transcendental 
doublet were to disappear, then “one can certainly wager that man would be 
erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 2002: 422). Th e 
species turn has the opportunity to be part of this process, which could perhaps 
one day lead to a positive fi gure who understands that as long as they exist, they 
have always already been something other than themselves, always someone 
else. Th at in fact these doublets are seized into and intertwined with a world in 
which their exteriority and alterity constantly create and renew them, and that 
everything which “man” the doublet deemed to be his own propriety, such as 
language, culture, and rationality, is in fact exterior to him and is neither chosen 
nor created by him, and cannot be entirely reduced to them without remainder.
It is clear that the above stories are but mere metaphors, allegories, even 
hallucinations. But perhaps they help us dislodge some of our habits and help us 
to move towards more scientifi cally grounded ways of doing something similar, 
of which the Uexküll-based umwelt-studies, also featured in this very collection, 
are a prime example.
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Human perceptions of animals: 
a multimodal event analysis of interview data
Paul J. Thibault, Morten Tønnessen
1. Introduction
Th is chapter presents fi eldwork focused on people’s perception of wolves and 
selected animals the wolf is oft en perceived as being in confl ict with (Skogen 
et al. 2013, cf. also SKANDULV). People’s perceptions of wolves are of interest 
for several reasons: fi rst, because wolf management, even more than other wild 
predator management, is controversial; second, because wolves represent a 
charismatic species which has given rise to a rich array of cultural imagery; and 
third, because wolves are to some extent perceived as symbolic (i.e., representative) 
of other large carnivores – at least this is the case in the Scandinavian context 
(see Tønnessen 2010, 2011). Wolves have been reestablishing in Southern 
Scandinavia for about a generation, and the viability of the population has so 
far relied on continued migration (Vilà et al. 2003). Th e legal status of wolves 
in Norway, where the reported interviews were carried out, is complex – wolves 
are considered a protected species and generally accepted in a rather small “wolf 
zone” in the Central/Eastern Norway. However, in eff ect wolves are generally 
not tolerated outside this zone (though policies may vary in diff erent regional 
“predator zones”). A majority of wolves die due to legal and illegal hunting, both 
of which are widespread.
In Norway, wolves are particularly associated with predation on sheep, even 
though offi  cial data show that wolves are responsible for only 4–5% of reported 
predation on sheep, and that wolverines and lynx in particular account for much 
more of the predation on sheep (Rovdata, cf. also Skogen et al. 2008). Th is goes 
to show that the wolf is perceived as a symbol of large predators in general (and 
that the general public is not always well informed about actual wolf ecology). In 
certain regions of Norway, particularly in Central/Eastern Norway, wolves have 
provoked locals by attacking hunting dogs. In the far North, migrating wolves 
are occasionally involved in predation on reindeer – as are other large predators, 
including the Golden Eagle – which are herded by the Sami people. In all these 
cases, people’s livelihoods or traditions are at stake. While the discourse on wolf 
conservation is clearly related to animal representations (Tüür, Tønnessen 2014), 
then, it is also related to obvious material confl icts.
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Using techniques derived from Multimodal Event Analysis (MEA) and 
Cultural Th ematic Analysis (CTA), the study analysed participants’ accounts 
of, attitudes to and reactions towards selected display materials. Th e term 
‘perception’ used in the title of this chapter refers to participants’ experiences 
with, ideas about and attitudes towards the study animals, as revealed in the 
interviews. Methodologically, the display materials are thus used in order to 
elicit responses that provide information about the participants’ perception of 
the study animals. Th e display materials included video clips, audio recordings of 
animal vocalisations, and images. Th e semi-structured interviews also included 
a few standard questions – these are described in the section ‘Interview Design’. 
Th e techniques of MEA were deployed in order to analyse the full range of 
interviewees’ meaning-making resources, including vocal utterances, gestures, 
facial expressions and other relevant body movements. Th e purpose of MEA in 
conjunction with CTA was to identify salient cultural thematic patterns, evaluative 
stances and feelings experienced by the participants in their encounters with the 
display materials and their recounts of their experiences of the study animals. 
With this chapter, we aim to demonstrate the feasibility of the research 
method described here, by way of theoretical presentation and sample analysis. 
While CTA has occasionally been used in the study of human–animal relations 
(see e.g. Stibbe 2012), MEA has to our knowledge so far not been much used 
within Human–Animal Studies.
2. Interview design
Th e data consists of video recordings and observations of a series of semi-structured 
interviews conducted in Norway in 2015. Th e pilot study on which this chapter 
is based took place at the University of Agder in Kristiansand, Southern Norway, 
on February 10th 2015. In the Agder region where Kristiansand is located, there 
are occasionally migrating wolves, but they have not been allowed to establish 
territories (instead they have eventually been shot dead). Further interviews 
were later (in Spring 2015) conducted at three more locations: Kautokeino (in 
Northern Norway, in the county of Finnmark), Rendalen (in Cental/Eastern 
Norway, in the county of Hedmark),1 and Stavanger (in Southwestern Norway, 
in the county of Rogaland  – control group). Study animals other than wolves 
include hunting dogs, reindeer (particularly relevant in Kautokeino, a centre for 
Sami culture and traditions) and sheep (particularly relevant in Rendalen). Th ese 
animals have been selected for study due to their centrality in regional discourses 
on wolf management. At each of the fi eld locations, participants were recruited 
from relevant interest groups, which included hunters, sheep farmers, reindeer 
herders, environmentalists and hikers. Th e data analysed in this chapter, from the 
1 Rendalen is located straight outside the wolf zone.
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pilot study, consists of four interviews. A total of 13 interviews were conducted in 
the whole study, with approximately 10 hours of video recordings, most of it shot 
from two diff erent angles.
2.1. Interview setup
For the pilot study, we made use of the interview setup outlined in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Bird’s-eye view of the interview setting showing camera positions relative to 
interviewer and interviewee. In the fi gure, the two video cameras are on the extreme left  
and right, with the interviewer and the interviewee sitting on tilted chairs in front of a 
laptop placed on top of a table.
As the fi gure shows, the interviewer and the interviewee were sitting on the 
same side of a table, with a PC (laptop) in between them. Th e two cameras were 
positioned so that one, the back camera (left ), would fi lm the back/side of the 
interviewer and the interviewee plus the screen, while the other, the front camera 
(right), would fi lm the interviewer and interviewee frontally, close-up. Generally 
Tønnessen served as the Interviewer, whereas Th ibault operated the cameras.2
Th e display materials shown to all interviewees during the pilot study included 
three audio clips, six images, and two video clips (in this order). While wolves 
were represented in all media types (one audio clip, three images, and both video 
clips), other study animals featured in display materials included sheep (audio clip, 
image), dogs (audio clip, image), moose (image), reindeer (image), and elk (video 
clip). Humans were featured in three of the images, two of the audio clips, and one 
2 Before the pilot study, we planned a somewhat diff erent interview setup, with the inter-
viewer and the interviewee sitting each on their side of the table, and the laptop facing 
sideways. As we were about to get started with the fi rst interview, however, we realised 
that this was not practical. It is much more advantageous to have both watching the PC 
screen from the same side of the table as the basis for their interaction about what the 
two see. In order to accommodate the adjusted setup, the chairs of both the Interviewer 
and the Interviewee were placed in a slightly angled position, leaning inwards towards 
the screen, so that their gestures and part of their faces were visible on camera.
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of the video clips. Two of the animals displayed in images – a moose and a wolf 
respectively – were dead, the rest alive. In the six display materials featuring wolves, 
the wolves were socialised wolves kept in zoos (Norway/USA) in four cases and 
wild in two cases (radio-collared in one case). Th ree of the six images were in black 
and white (with one being of old age), the other three in colour.
In addition to being shown display materials, the interviewees were asked to 
state personal details and were asked a few questions. Th e questions concerned 
what kind of animal the wolf is (before display materials were shown), whether 
the interviewees have any particular attitude to wolf management (aft er display 
materials were shown), and whether they reacted strongly in emotional terms to 
any of the display materials shown (fi nal question). Th e interviews furthermore 
included a short debriefi ng.
2.2. Preparing the interviews
Preparations for the fi eldwork took place in the period of November 2013 to 
February 2015. Initial preparations included outlining basic methodology and 
the expected interview design with the use of display material and the video 
recording of the interviews. Preparations closer to the pilot study included 
selecting display materials, draft ing the interview guide and an information 
letter. More mundane tasks included buying and testing technical equipment, 
arranging localities for the interviews, and reporting to Norway’s Data Protection 
Offi  cial for Research, based at Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). 
We also spent time recruiting respondents and made sure that informed consent 
was obtained at the onset of interviews.
2.3. Gathering of data
Th e study involved voluntary participants who were recruited by the researchers. 
Th e interviews lasted for up to an hour each and were all video recorded. How-
ever, we had some technical problems with one of the two cameras we used, and 
the third was therefore concluded with only partial use of the second camera 
(front camera), whereas the fourth and fi nal pilot study interview was conducted 
as a whole with the use of only one camera (back camera). Th e pilot study thus 
resulted in four interviews and a total of seven sets of video recordings.
2.4. Processing of data
Th e video material was catalogued and processed by the research assistant Laura 
Kiiroja, MA, in line with instructions developed by Th ibault and Tønnessen. Th is 
took place in May 2015. Th e material presented in this chapter has in turn been 
analysed by Th ibault and Tønnessen.
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3. Theory
Th is study employs a Cognitive Ethnographic framework (Alač, Hutchins 2004; 
Hollan et al. 2000). Our conceptual framework is based on the theory of 
distributed cognitive systems (Alač, Hutchins 2004; Hutchins 1995a, 1995b, 
2010; Clark 1997, 2008) and Multimodal Event Analysis (Baldry, Th ibault 2006, 
2008; Steff ensen et al. 2010. Our main unit of analysis is the Interviewer-Inter-
viewee-Artefact Interaction System (IIAIS) that is constructed in the video 
recorded interviews that are the data of this study. As Alač and Hutchins (2004) 
argue, cognitive ethnography combines traditional long-term participant obser-
vation with the microanalysis of specifi c occurrences of multimodal events and 
practices. Th e cognitive aspects of the observed practice are revealed in the 
detailed multimodal microanalysis. Th e multimodal microanalysis is concerned 
with the specifi c properties of the IIAIS. Th e participant observation is concerned 
with how the concepts, values, and predispositions of participants shape and 
become shaped by the IIAIS.
Th e unit of analysis will be analysed using the following constructs:
3.1. Participant Evaluation Protocol (PEP)
Th e PEP consists of the triangulation of Semi-structured Interviews, Multimodal 
Event Analysis (MEA), and Cultural Th ematic Analysis (CTA), as set out below:
3.2. Semi-structured interviews 
In a non-directed way, interviewees will provide information about the ways in 
which they exploit and orient to the aff ordances of the IIAIS in the interview 
tasks. Using video of individual participants observing and talking about their 
own encounters with the target animals and about their reactions to the display 
materials, we will elicit refl ection on their understandings of the video recorded 
activity in which they participated, with a specifi c focus on what aspects of the 
IIAIS shape and guide the activity, thinking, perceptions, and predispositions 
of the interviewees in the designated interview tasks. For example, we seek to 
discover how these aff ordances enable learners to select, connect and focus on 
the cognitively and perceptively salient aspects of the task in ways that promote 
particular culturally scaff olded perceptions of animal agency and culturally 
shaped meaning orientations. 
In the current study, semi-structured interviews were conducted and video 
recorded with varying degrees of homogeneity/heterogeneity in the composition 
of respondents. In the pilot study, there was an overrepresentation of (1) female, 
(2) older respondents (3) with higher education and (4) membership in an 
environmental NGO. At other fi eld locations, the composition was diff erent, so 
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for the study as a whole these factors (gender, age, education, NGO membership) 
were more balanced. Semi-structured interviews allow for the articulation of how 
the activation of prior knowledge and predispositions and the elaboration and 
co-construction of new knowledge occurs throughout the interaction process 
(see Ratner 2000). Using video of the participants engaged in the assigned tasks 
within the IIAIS, participants will be asked to observe and talk about the animals 
they view or hear in the display materials. For example:
• How do coordinated patterns of activity link interviewees to tasks and 
enable them to organise, segment, and link the diff erent parts of the task into 
meaningful experiences? 
• What aspects of the display materials do they see as salient, important, and 
relevant? 
• What predispositions impede or promote their accounts of their encounters 
with the display materials and their own experiences of the target animals? 
• Do richly multimodal interactive tasks in the IIAIS enhance particular 
aff ective responses and positive and/or negative predispositions to the 
featured animals? 
3.3. Multimodal Event Analysis (MEA): some theoretical considerations
Th e purpose of Multimodal Event Analysis (MEA) is to identify the various types 
of participant-task coordination situations and the resources and aff ordances 
used in them. Th e structure of the real-time participant-task coordination 
situations, when participants engage in specifi c tasks of various kinds, will be 
identifi ed and classifi ed in the study. MEA focuses on what participants do, 
their roles, the activities they perform, and the aff ordances that they interact 
with. Multimodal interactive events are cognitive events that coordinate persons 
and resources in cognitive and perceptual tasks and problems. MEA focuses on 
the micro-analysis of specifi c occasions of interaction using the techniques and 
procedures of multimodal analysis (Alač, Hutchins 2004; Th ibault 2004, 2011; 
Baldry, Th ibault 2006, 2008). MEA provides essential data on which semiotic and 
material resources (e.g. visual, gestural, kinesic, linguistic, tactile, etc.) are co-
deployed, how, and when, in the activities of participants and in their interactions 
with both other participants and relevant artefacts, such as the display materials. 
A small digitalised multimodal corpus or database based on the video recorded 
data will be constructed (see Baldry, Th ibault 2008). Th e concordances arising 
from searches in a multimodal corpus provide preliminary data that will in the 
longer run help to support or refute our basic theoretical assumption concerning 
the communicative resources and their co-deployment that are involved in 
participants’ engagements with and representations of animals and their agency. 
Initially, the corpus resulting from the pilot study will help to set up a research tool 
that will serve as the point of a departure for a larger scale study, involving several 
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locations in Norway. Th e development of such a corpus requires the development 
of appropriate transcription techniques and procedures prior to the entering of 
the tagged corpus data into the database. Th ese techniques and procedures will 
be adapted from those proposed in Baldry and Th ibault (2006, 2008).
Th e term ‘multimodality’ refers in the present context to the ways in which 
diff erent bodily and extra-bodily semiotic resources or ‘modalities’ are selected, 
combined, and attended to in the real-time construction of multimodal 
events, such as the video-recorded interviews in the present study. Multimodal 
transcription is a fl exible and adaptable research tool that can be used across a 
wide range of research contexts, including, for example, multispecies interaction 
(Th ibault 2004). Multimodal transcription serves to show how diff erent semiotic 
resources are combined and co-deployed in interactive events by transcribing the 
diff erent resources, their relations to each, and their signifi cance to the whole event 
(Baldry, Th ibault 2006). Most transcription techniques in the fi eld of discourse 
analysis have until quite recently been overwhelmingly biased towards the verbal 
(lexicogrammatical) aspect of language. Th e reduction of embodied interactive 
events to abstract verbal patterns as in discourse-analytical approaches misses most 
of what is signifi cant in the way humans coordinate in their social worlds (Th ibault 
2008, 2011). Multimodal transcription of interactive events shows how diff erent 
semiotic resources (e.g., body movements, deictic points, facial expressions, gaze, 
gesture, voice dynamics, and so on) combine with and co-contextualise each other 
in interactive events between persons and between persons and aspects of their 
physical and social environments. Th erefore, the transcription procedures to be 
adopted will reveal the multimodal character of the meaning-making activity of 
participants when they engage with the various interview artefacts. In this way, it 
is possible to show how diff erent classes of phenomena – words, images, actions, 
objects, gestures, and so on – are systematically related to each other as parts of a 
larger whole. Th is change in emphasis has important consequences for analysing 
and understanding the nature of both the activity-structures that regulate human 
interaction and the ways in which cognitive capacities are built up over time by the 
development and orchestration of cultural thematic patterns and other multimodal 
patterns whose appropriate contextualisation oft en depends on participants’ 
attunement to very fi ne-grained or pico-scale bodily events on time scales ranging 
from milliseconds to fractions of seconds (Cowley 2007, 2009; Th ibault 2008, 
2011). In the tradition of semiotic research, this approach resonates nicely with 
the emphasis that the American semiotician Charles Morris (1946), working in the 
tradition of American pragmatism, placed on the detailed observation of bodily 
behaviour. Our approach thus provides a way of understanding semiosis as a mode 
of embodied action that enables human and other agents to enact and construct 
their semiotic innenwelten and umwelten (in the sense of von Uexküll, cf. chapters 
1 and 2 in this volume). 
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Four stages are envisaged in the future construction and analysis of the 
multimodal corpus mentioned above:
1.  collecting an initial corpus and converting it to a digital format suitable for 
online concordancing; 
2.   tagging event types and resources and searching such a corpus and 
3.   producing multimodal transcriptions of selected situations in the data which 
is collected; 
4.  developing the theoretical model on the basis of the multimodal corpus. 
Corpus data will provide information on co-occurrence relations, the combinatorial 
capacities of diff erent resources, the constraints on usage of resources and their 
combinations, and how diff erent resources provide information about each other. 
Th e corpus thus provides both quantitative (statistical) and qualitative information 
as to how cultural constraints shape participants’ perceptions and accounts of 
animals in the population of participants in this study. Th e coded corpus data also 
provides the input to the analysis of salient cultural themes in the data.
3.4. Cultural Thematic Analysis
step in the analysis of Cultural Th emes, concrete meaning units as articulated 
by interviewees in their talk are identifi ed so that psychologically salient Central 
Th emes can be extracted from the meaning units so identifi ed. A Central Th eme 
is an abstraction from the data provided by meaning units that enables a number 
of meaning units to be grouped together as a single Central Th eme. A Central 
Th eme is a psychologically salient unit in the sense that it refl ects a meaning that 
is personally signifi cant for the interviewee rather than one that is imposed by 
external criteria invented by the analyst (Ratner, 2002: 167–168). Central Th emes 
provide the basis for the extraction of General Th emes that group a number of 
Central Th emes under the one more abstract heading. General Th emes express 
the more general cultural signifi cance of Central Th emes. Th ey are a further level 
of abstraction from the data provided by concrete meaning units. An illustrative 
Cultural Th ematic Analysis is provided in Section 4.4 below.
Th e Multimodal Event Analysis of the video recorded interviews provides the 
basis for the identifi cation and analysis of the cultural meanings that are expressed 
by the interviewees. Cultural meanings are thematically organised patterns of 
cultural-semantic meanings. Cultural Th ematic Analysis (CTA) emphasises 
the cultural origins of these themes, rather than suggesting that they refl ect a 
purely individual level of analysis. Th eir analysis and interpretation require the 
identifi cation of relevant meaning units – both verbal and nonlinguistic – together 
with the social activities, experiences, concepts, and artefacts that are embedded 
in the expression of particular meaning units (Ratner 2002: 167). As the fi rst 
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4. Analysis of data
In the analysis of this material, we do not emphasise factual utterances, whether correct 
or incorrect, as much as we emphasise the interviewees’ perceptions of multimodal 
display materials involving wolves and related study animals. Factual mistakes, in this 
context, can be informative of how something is perceived, but factually incorrect 
statements made by interviewees are no less interesting and telling in principle than 
factually correct statements (for an example, see Sample analysis below). 
Table 1 presents key personal details for the four interviewees that constituted 
the pilot study. As it shows, three of the four interviewees were members of 
an environmental NGO, with one of them working for it. All four were pro-
conservation, with two of them being satisfi ed with status quo policies, the 
other two opining that current wolf management policies are not favouring con-
servation aims to the extent that they should. Notably, all four interviewees had 
higher education, three of them were female, and three of them were quite old, 
i.e. 58–70 years old. Th ese are noteworthy demographic characteristics of this 
small group of interviewees. Although the number of interviewees is so low that 
no statistics can meaningfully be made, the perspectives of the interviewees must 
be expected to correlate somewhat with such demographic characteristics.
4.1. Multimodal Event transcription and analysis
In this section, we will analyse two brief excerpts from the video recorded interviews 
that formed part of the pilot study. Multimodal Event Analysis (MEA) is applied to 
two short video clips, which were extracted from the interviews. Th e interviewees 
are identifi ed as Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 4, respectively. Table 2 presents 
relevant descriptors used in the identifi cation and analysis of the two excerpts.
Multimodal Event Analysis (MEA) begins by segmenting the video recorded 
interviews into smaller phases or sub-phases that are coded according to Event Type. 
An interview consists of a diversity of phases and corresponding event types such 
as those shown in the two transcriptions and associated analyses featured below. 
A second aspect of the coding process includes the identifi cation of the semiotic 
resources (e.g., gaze, gesture, pointing, posture, verbal patterns, voice dynamics, 
etc.) that are the focus of a particular transcription. Transcriptions are selective in 
this sense; they do not attempt to transcribe every possible feature but focus on 
those of most interest or relevance according to the goals of the analysis and criteria 
of interest and relevance decided upon by the analyst. In this sense, the multimodal 
transcriptions shown below are guided by pragmatic criteria. A given co-selection 
of resources, e.g., verbal patterns and hand gestures, as in the transcription below of 
Interviewee 1, is also tagged in accordance with the cultural-semantic patterns that 
are evidenced in a particular selection. 4.3.2 sets out the tagging parameters for the 
two examples that are analysed below. At this early stage, these parameters remain 
provisional and therefore liable to revision in the further development of this work.
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4.2. Transcription conventions
Each stage of the transcription is identifi ed by a numbered Frame. Frames are of 
no fi xed duration; they refer to a meaningful unit or sub-unit that is illustrated 
by a screen shot. In the row above each Frame, the Frame No. and the duration 
of each Frame are shown according to the time measurements derived from the 
soft ware program ELAN Linguistic Annotator Version 4.9.0. Th e transcribed 
verbal text of each participant is in italics. Other relevant bodily actions are 
indicated in normal font. Th e ‘+’ sign indicates that one action is concurrent 
with another. Using ELAN 4.9, time measurements (e.g., duration) are expressed 
in minutes, seconds, and milliseconds in the following format: 00:00.000, e.g. 
00:02.436 is equivalent to zero minutes, two seconds and 436 milliseconds.
Th e multimodal transcriptions derived from the application of MEA are 
presented below, in 4.3.2 and 4.4.3.
4.3. Sample analysis 1
Th is sample analysis is based on Interviewee 1’s response to Audio Clip No. 3, 
featuring a bleating ewe and a lamb. She fi rst indicates that she thinks there were 
several sheep and identifi es a lamb, adding “perhaps”. Just before the sample 
excerpt starts, the interviewee has been asked by the interviewer whether bleating 
is a form of communication  – to which she says: “Yes, of course it is”  – and 
whether it is possible to tell what is happening in the recorded situation involving 
a lamb and an adult sheep.
For the verbal transcript (in the Norwegian original plus an English trans-
lation), see Appendix 1.
4.3.1. Multimodal Transcription of Interviewee 1 – preliminary details
Participant: Interviewee 1; Pilot Study
Location: Kristiansand
Display Material Responded To: Audio File No. 3
Event Type: Recount
Resources: Hand gestures, verbal patterns
Duration: 19.473 seconds (19 seconds and 473 milliseconds)
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4.3.2. Multimodal Event Transcription; Interviewee 1; Back camera 1
Frame 1: 00:05.000 – 00:09.000
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Frame 3: 00:10.514
I1: onset phase of gesture: arms extend outwards
I1: og de
Frame 4: 00:10.879
I1: … lager + both hands rest on upper leg
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Frame 5: 00:11.192
I1: … lager … + moves converging hands along upper leg away from body
Frame 6: 00:11.532
I1: ikke så mye lyd + moves hands back towards body
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Frame 7: 00:11.688
I1: hvis ikke det er et eller + moves hands away from body
Frame 8: 00:12.627
I1: anna galt da + three rapid movements of hands up and down leg (up + 
down + up)
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Frame 9: 00:12.967
I1: sånn for + hands raised above upper leg
Frame 10: 00:13.175
I1: eksempel + hands continue to be raised and converge
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Frame 11: 00:13.828
I1: når vi tar + hands lowered to leg; gesture beat synchronised with ‘tar’
Frame 12: 00:13.428
I1: når vi + hands raised (as shown) then lowered (see next Frame)
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Frame 13: 00:18.733
I1: skiller lamman og sauane … da er det veldig mye lyd i de + position of 
hands maintained without moving them
Frame 14: 00:19.046
I1: da driver + left  arm extended from previous resting position to position 
shown
84 PAUL J. THIBAULT, MORTEN TØNNESSEN
Frame 15: 00:19.854
I1: de + left  arm-hand raised to high position (00:19.411) then lowered to 
position shown
Frame 16: 00:20.846
I1: mødran og roper + left  arm raised (00:20.324) then lowered (00:20.637) + 
right hand begins to raise from previous rest position (00:20.820 – 00:20.846)
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Frame 17: 00:21.707
I1: svarer + right hand raised (00:20.663) and both hands raised make little 
up-down fl ourish synchronised with ‘svarer’
Frame 18: 00:22.072
I1: lamman + two hands begin to converge in synchrony with fi rst syllable of 
‘lamman’
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Frame 19: 00:22.177
I1: lamman + hands converge without resting on second syllable of ‘lamman’
Frame 20: 00:22.333
I1: skal de + without resting the speaker’s hands then cross over as shown
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Frame 21: 00:22.646
I1: prøve å fi nne + hands then separate to position shown
Frame 22: 00:23.272
I1: I1: hverandre + hands then cross over as shown
I: Ja
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Frame 23: 00:24.473
I4: ikke sant + hands separate, held wide apart (as in Frame 21) then converge, 
left  hand held above right hand (00:24.264) then cross over, as shown, and 
retract to resting position close to abdomen
4.3.3. Analytical discussion of the transcription
Th e transcription data of the episode transcribed in 4.3.2 shows Interviewee 1 
constructing a Recount of her experience of the sounds made by wild sheep in 
response to Audio Display Material No. 3, which featured a ewe and her lamb 
calling to each other.
Th e episode consists of four sub-phases, as follows:
Orientation: Frames 1–2;
Event: Problem/Generalisation: Frames 3–8;
Event: Exemplifi cation: Frames 9–13;
Solution: 14–23.
Overall, the four sub-phases shown above unfold the structure of a Recount. 
In the Orientation, Interviewee 1 orients to the audio fi le she has just heard by 
grounding her Recount in her experience with wild sheep (‘villsau’). In doing 
so, she diff erentiates this experience from the possible signifi cance of the audio 
fi le, which featured farm sheep, and thereby provides the basis for the brief 
recount that follows. Frames 1 and 2 thus establish the mutual orientation of 
the Interviewer and Interviewee 1 to each other, as shown in the interpersonal 
coordination of body posture and gaze in Frames 1 and 2. Th e two speakers orient 
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to each other rather than the computer screen as Interviewee 1 develops, in the 
ensuing Frames, a complex response to what she heard in the Audio File without 
directly referring to it. Th e mutually oriented body postures and gaze vectors 
of the two participants are maintained throughout the entire episode except in 
Frames 17–22, when the Interviewer looks at the question sheet on the desk in 
front of him before then resuming the previous postural orientation in Frame 23.
Frames 3–8 give voice to a general statement in the present tense that is linked 
to the general condition for the statement to be valid by the conjunction hvis 
(‘unless’), as follows:
De lager ikke så mye lyd (general situation)
Conditional Conjunction: hvis 
ikke det er et eller anna – galt, da (condition)
Th e semantic structure General situation + condition also gives voice to 
the meaning problem, which is then exemplifi ed by a specifi c instance in Frames 
9–13. Frames 3–8 give voice to a complex meaning that is co-articulated by the 
closely synchronised verbal pattern and the hand-arm gesture shown in the 
transcription. In Frame 3, the onset of the gesture is shown as I1’s two hands 
extend from their initial resting position in synchrony with the word de (‘they’). 
Th e two hands become the ‘they’ of the sheep in Frame 3. In Frame 4, the hands 
complete an initial downwards movement from the position shown in Frame 
3 and come to rest on I1’s upper leg before they move in parallel further along 
the leg away from the speaker in Frame 5. In Frame 6, the hands reverse the 
direction of the movement, which is now towards the speaker in synchrony with 
the wording ikke så mye lyd (‘not so much sound’). In Frame 7, the hands again 
move away from the speaker in synchrony with the wording hvis ikke det er et 
eller (‘unless there is something … ’). Frame 8 concludes this sub-phase. Frame 8 
evidences an increase in tempo of the same movement, which is performed three 
times in a rapid away from speaker-towards speaker-away from speaker 
sequence in synchrony with the wording anna galt da (‘something – well, wrong’). 
Th e intensifi cation of the movement characteristic of this sub-phase may be 
seen as the marker of the Problem or Crisis stage of the developing narrative-
like structure. Overall, the gesture in Frames 3–8 features an Actor-Movement 
Vector in which the two hands of the speaker realise the participant role of the 
sheep (‘de’ in the verbal text) and the hand movement up and down the speaker’s 
upper left  leg realise the sheep moving together as a cohesive and silent group. 
Th e upper leg is the space in which the sheep move. It is also noteworthy that 
the two hands are pointed inwards towards each other in a way that imagistically 
portrays the harmony and cohesiveness of the fl ock until something goes wrong, 
as suggested by the increase in tempo of the hand movement in Frame 8. Th is 
modulation of the previous movement – the more urgent or agitated quality of 
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the hand movement – anticipates the perturbation of the previously harmonious 
situation that is articulated in Frames 9–13.
Frames 9–13 specify a particular instantiation or exemplifi cation of the general 
meaning of ‘something – well, wrong’ in Frame 8. In Frame 9, the two hands are 
raised above the speaker’s leg and converge in Frame 10 to a position above the 
speaker’s leg. Th e movement of the hands to a position above the leg realises a 
new joint Actor, i.e., the sheep herders, and their viewing position. Linguistically, 
this Actor is realised by the pronoun vi (‘we’) in Frames 11 and 12. Th e change in 
the position of the hands to the raised position together with their convergence 
and the maintaining of this position in Frames 10–13 realises the action of the 
herders on the sheep. In Frames 12–13, the hands move from the high position 
to a resting position on the speaker’s leg in synchrony with the verbal pattern når 
vi tar (‘when we take’). Th e gesture realises the semantic structure Actor-Action-
Goal: the hands (Actor) act on the fl ock of sheep (Goal) by taking them (Frame 
12) and separating lambs from sheep (Frame 13). Th e resting position of the two 
hands as shown in Frame 13 is conspicuously maintained for 00.313 ms before 
the transition to the next sub-phase in Frame 14.
Frame 15 marks the beginning of a new gesture. In Frame 14, the right hand 
maintains the previous position (Frames 13–14) while Interviewee 4’s left  hand 
is extended left wards from the previous resting position and is raised upwards 
and then lowered again to the position shown in Frame 15. Th is movement is 
synchronised with the wording da driver (‘then [they/someone] do …’). In this 
case, the hand-arm realises the participant role of the mothers calling their 
lambs, which is continued in Frame 16 with a further up-down movement of the 
speaker’s left  arm in synchrony with the word mødran (‘the mothers’). In Frame 
16, the speaker’s right hand also begins to be raised from the previous resting 
position shown in Frame 15. Frame 17 shows the further development of the 
movement of the right hand initiated in the previous Frame. In Frame 17, the 
right hand is raised to a height that is comparable to that of the left  hand so that 
the two hands together enact an up-down fl ourish that is synchronised with the 
word svarer (‘answer’ – verb). Th e right hand movement is coordinated with that 
of the left  to portray the ‘dialogue’ between the calling of the mothers (left  hand) 
and the answering of the lambs (right hand). In Frame 18, the speaker’s two hands 
begin to converge in synchrony with the fi rst syllable of the word lamman (‘the 
lambs’). In Frame 19, the two hands briefl y converge, as the movement shown 
in Frames 18–19 in synchrony with the second syllable of lamman enacts the 
further development of the ‘dialogue’ between sheep and lambs initiated in Frame 
16. Frame 20 initiates the fi nal phase of the gesture under consideration here. In 
synchrony with the words skal de (‘they will’), the speaker’s hands continue their 
movement trajectory so that they pass each other and cross over. In Frame 21, 
the hands, in their respective semantic roles of mothers (left  hand) and lambs 
(right hand), separate in synchrony with the word fi nne (‘fi nd’) in the process 
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of being separated and then of fi nding each other when the hands again cross 
over in synchrony with the word hverandre (‘each other’) in Frame 22. Frame 
23 completes the transcription of this excerpt. In Frame 23, the speaker’s hands 
perform a complex sequence of movements that conclude the development of 
the dialogue between sheep and lambs: the two hands separate in synchrony with 
the words ikke sant (‘you know’) in a movement similar to that shown in Frame 
21; they then converge and overlap with the left  hand held above the right hand 
(Frame 23), and they are then retracted to a resting position close to the speaker’s 
abdomen on the conclusion of this gesture.
Further analysis of the interview excerpt with Interviewee 1 is provided in 
subsection 4.5 Extracting and analysing cultural themes in multimodal trans-
cription data below.
4.4. Sample analysis 2
Th is subsection is divided into two parts, one presenting observations on all four 
interviewees’ interpretations of Image No. 2 (cf. Figure 2 below), and one treating 
Interviewee 4’s dealings with Image No. 2 in depth (in excerpt). For the verbal 
transcript of the latter (in the Norwegian original plus English translation), see 
Appendix 2.
4.4.1. General observations
Figure 2 below shows the image that was perceived as the most ambiguous image in 
the display material in the pilot study. Th e image shows an adult female zookeeper 
looking at three socialised wolves in the Polar Zoo while they are play fi ghting, with 
one wolf demonstrating dominance physically and by displaying teeth.
One interviewee indicated that the human to the left  was an adult male, 
two interviewees simply identifi ed a human/human observer, whereas a fourth 
interviewee said it was a child. Th eir assumptions on whether or not the human 
person in the picture was a zookeeper, a zoo visitor, or something else also 
diff ered. Finally, not all interviewees were sure how many animals are in the 
picture or whether all of them were wolves – alternative explanations included 
“prey”, and “possibly a fox”. Two of the interviewees reported that the wolf that is 
visible frontally was looking at the human person, another interviewee reported 
that this wolf was looking at some other wolf in the picture. Finally, some of 
the interviewees were not sure whether the wolves were playing or fi ghting “for 
real” – though one interviewee concluded that since there was a child nearby, 
they were likely just play fi ghting.
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Figure 2. Image No. 2 in the display materials used in the pilot study. Photo: Morten 
Tønnessen.
Table 3 gives an overview over the interviewees’ diff erent interpretations of Image 
No. 2.
Table 3. Diff erent interpretations of image of fi ghting wolves.
Inter-
viewee
Interpretation Sample citation (in English translation)
1 A child and two wolves, probably 
young, that fi ght or play.
“Are they fi ghting, or playing?”
2 A human observer and at least 
two non-wild wolves that fi ght or 
play, plus possibly a fox.
“At fi rst I thought that one was a fox.”
3 A human and two wolves that 
play – or a wolf and a prey. Th e 
wolf on top gazes at the human.
“Th ere’s a human there, too – it can’t be that 
dangerous.”
4 A male adult human and a wolf, 
plus possibly one more wolf, the 
third one possibly being dead.
“So, is that a wolf that has been shot? Lying 
there. Because if it is a wolf, then the way it 
is lying is very strange […] But […] the main 
point […] must be the relation between the 
man and – I assume it is a man – the man and 
the animal.”
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4.4.2. Multimodal Transcription of Interviewee 4 – preliminary details
Participant: Interviewee 4; Pilot Study
Location: Kristiansand
Display Material Responded To: Visual Image No. 2
Event Type: Perceptual Problem Solving
Resources: Bodily Orientation and Body Posture, Gaze, Hand Point, and Verbal 
Patterns
Duration: 18.100 seconds (18 seconds and 100 milliseconds)
Th e Interviewer (I) is located on the left ; Interviewee 4 (I4) is on the right. 
4.4.3. Multimodal Event Transcription; Interviewee 4; Back camera 1
Frame 1: 00:02.100
Onset of orientation to display material on screen
I and I4 maintain initial orientation to the image on the screen
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Frame 2: 00:02.200
I: initiates postural shift : moves upper body towards screen; 
I4: maintains original posture
Frame 3: 00:03.000 – 00:04.000
I4: changes posture and moves towards screen
I: Hva ser du her?
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Frame 4: 00:04.000 – 00:05.000
I4: Ja, det var litt vanskelig å se …
Frame 5: 00:05.00 – 00:11.000
I4: … Det er et menneske der, og så, hva er det for noe han har i, hva er det foran der
I: mm
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Frame 6: 00:11.000 – 00:12.000
I4: points to animal on screen
I4: Kan du si det?
Frame 7: 00:12.000 – 00:14.000
I4: retracts point 
I4: er det en ulv til, eller hva er det for noe?
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Frame 8: 00:14.000 – 00:16.000
I: Ja, altså, det kunne jeg ha sagt, men jeg vil heller høre dæ …
I4: Nei altså, jeg 
Frame 9: 00:21.100
I4: … skjønner… jeg ser jo bare at de fl errer – at ulven
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4.4.4. Analytical discussion of the transcription
Th e transcription data of this episode shows Interviewee 4’s orienting to some 
of the perceptual diffi  culties which Image No. 2 (cf. Figure 2) presented for him. 
In Frame 1, Image No. 2 has just been displayed on the screen by the 
Interviewer. I and I4 are oriented to the display material but have not yet begun 
actively to engage with it. In Frame 2, I adjusts his posture by leaning towards the 
screen. I4 maintains his initial posture. In Frame 3, I4 begins to move towards the 
screen as I asks the question Hva ser du her? (‘what do you see here?’). In adjusting 
his posture in response to I, I and I4 achieve interactional synchrony. Frames 4 
and 5 show I4 attempting to interpret the display material and appealing to I for 
clarifi cation. In accordance with the established protocol, I declines to provide 
any clarifi cation and further prompts I4 to describe what he sees. In Frames 6 
and 7, I4 points to one of the animals in the display material and asks I to tell I4 
what it is. At the conclusion of this attempt, he retracts his point gesture (Frame 
7). Frames 8 and 9 feature I4 scrutinising the display material quite intensively 
as he makes a further attempt to resolve the diffi  culties of interpretation already 
mentioned. While maintaining the same overall postural orientation, the micro-
movements of his head evidence his continual visual scanning of the displayed 
scene as he comes up with a fi rst interpretation in Frames 8 and 9.
4.5. Extracting and analysing cultural themes in Multimodal 
Transcription Data
An important aspect of the research project outlined in this chapter is the 
explication of the cultural themes of the data that is obtained from the MEA. Th is 
approach requires reducing the transcription data to its essential cultural themes 
as accurately and as completely as possible (Ratner, 2002: 168). In this section, 
the excerpt from Interviewee 1 will be used to illustrate this approach.
As Ratner explains, the fi rst step in this process is the identifi cation of the 
meaning units in the data. Meaning units are concrete rather than abstract. Th ey 
may consist of a single word or a combination of several words. Th ey can be a 
part of an utterance, a whole utterance, or several utterances combined. Meaning 
units have no fi xed relationship to specifi c lexicogrammatical units of language 
or to any particular linguistic level though they are of course realised by linguistic 
(and other) units and combinations of units. Th ey are not confi ned to verbal 
patterns but may also combine these with, for example, gesture. 
For example, Interviewee 1, in the excerpt analysed, makes extensive use 
of verbal patterns in combination with hand-arm gestures. A meaning unit, as 
the name suggests, expresses a single idea or theme. It is both a psychological 
unit (it is salient and signifi cant for the speaker) and a cultural unit (its content 
derives from the cultural system of the speaker). Typically, an interviewee’s talk 
combines a number of diff erent meaning units in various ways. Meaning units 
99Human perceptions of animals: a multimodal event analysis of interview data 
are “coherent and distinct meanings” (Ratner, 2002: 169) that are embedded 
within the interviewee’s talk. Th e identifi cation of meaning units requires careful 
interpretation of the data, including a precise understanding of how meaning 
units relate to each other in a particular interviewee’s talk. Table 4 identifi es the 
meaning units of the excerpt from Interviewee 1 presented in the MEA in 4.3.2.
Table 4. Meaning Units and Central and General Th emes in Excerpt from Interviewee 1.
Meaning Units in 
Transcription
Central Th emes General Th emes
nå har jeg mest erfaring 
med villsau
Personal experience of wild sheep 
(in contrast to farm sheep)
Knowledge and insight 
of the sheep herder
de lager ikke så mye lyd 
hvis ikke det er et eller 
anna – galt, da + Gesture
When wild sheep vocalise: 
responsiveness to perceived 
trouble
Agency of sheep
når vi tar + Gesture Th e sheep herder’s interventions 
in the life of the herd
Human agency + 
management of sheep 
herd
når vi skiller lamman og 
sauane + Gesture
Th e sheep herder’s interventions 
in the life of the herd
Human agency + 
management of sheep 
herd
da er det veldig mye lyd i 
de, da driver de mødran og 
roper og – svarer lamman 
+ Gesture
When wild sheep vocalise: 
mothers and lambs calling each 
other
Agency of sheep
skal de prøve å fi nne 
hverandre + Gesture
Lambs and their mothers can 
fi nd each other
Agency of sheep
Th e next step in this process is to reduce the meaning units to a number of 
Central Th emes that represent the psychological signifi cance of the meaning unit 
(Ratner, 2002: 168–169). Th is involves paraphrasing the meaning units identifi ed 
in the analysis. Th e identifi cation of central themes requires sophisticated 
contextualisation and interpretation of meaning units. For example, when 
Interviewee 1 says, “nå har jeg mest erfaring med villsau”, she is doing more than 
making a simple factual statement about her personal experience of wild sheep. 
In the context of the interview, her utterance is a response to what she has just 
heard in the audio fi le featuring an ewe and its lamb calling to each other. She 
has understood that these are farm animals. Her utterance implicitly contrasts her 
interpretation of the audio fi le with her own experience as a herder of wild sheep. In 
this sense, her utterance functions as a category contrast, i.e., it implies a distinction 
between the two categories of sheep – farm sheep and wild sheep – and signals that 
the speaker is better able to draw upon her experience as a herder of wild sheep to 
discuss sheep calls in contrast to the farm sheep featured in the audio fi le. 
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Another example is the meaning unit “når vi skiller lamman og sauane + 
Gesture”. Interviewee 1’s use of the fi rst person plural pronoun vi (‘we’) indexes 
her membership of a particular social group  – herders of wild sheep. In this 
meaning unit, the interviewee is referring to a particular cultural practice of the 
sheep herder – the practice of separating lambs from their mothers – that she is 
familiar with as a member of this group. Moreover, the gesture that co-occurs 
with the wording (see 4.3.2, Frames 11–13) imagistically portrays the herder’s 
action of separating sheep and lambs. Interviewee 1 makes extensive use of 
complex gestures in the excerpt analysed. In our view, this refl ects on how her 
meanings are grounded in the rich, embodied experience and practices of her 
life as a sheep herder.
Central Th emes are grouped into a more encompassing category of General 
Th eme. General Th emes express more abstract meanings that a number of 
diff erent Central Th emes are interpreted as having in common. In Table 4, fi ve 
Central Th emes are identifi ed in the second column. Th ese fi ve Central Th emes 
are further grouped into the three General Th emes in the third column of Table 4. 
For example, three Central Th emes in this column are grouped under the General 
Th eme of “Agency of Sheep” in the third column. Th e General Th eme “Agency of 
Sheep” serves to show how, in the interviewee’s meaning system, sheep manifest 
their agency in a number of diff erent ways, including their calls to each other, 
their ability to sense and signal trouble, and their ability to fi nd each other when 
lambs are separated from their mothers.
5. Discussion
Th is study of human perceptions of wolves and other animals has focused on 
perceptions of animal behaviour and, to some extent, of human–animal inter-
action/relations. Th e researchers conducting the pilot study had background 
information on actors in the various display materials, including information 
on the species of involved animals. In three cases  – two images and a video 
clip – one of the researchers, Tønnessen, had photographed/fi lmed the depicted/
fi lmed situations and, therefore, had particularly salient background knowledge. 
Th roughout, the background information acquired by the researchers enabled 
them to assess the factual/erroneous character of the interviewees’ interpretations.
At all levels of the theme analysis proposed here, it is important that the 
themes identifi ed can be linked concretely to the cultural activities, artefacts, and 
concepts that shape the meaning systems of the interviewee (Ratner 2002: 174). 
In the case of Interviewee 1, Table 4 shows how her Recount embeds activities 
and practices of the sheep herder in ways that make salient the interaction of 
humans and sheep and the diff erent ways in which human and sheep agency are 
manifested in and through this interaction.
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As the analysis of the four interviewees’ interpretations of Image No. 2 
demonstrated, images can be highly ambiguous, and even highly educated people 
can make erroneous assumptions. All interpretations are fallible. People oft en 
try to interpret images and other mediating items by making use of contextual 
information. In this case, the identifi cation of the human observer as either male 
or female, and as either an adult or a child, played into how the interviewees 
interpreted the depicted situation. Furthermore, the proximity of the human 
observer and the wolves was taken by some to imply that the wolves could not 
be wild. Another example of the use of contextual information is represented 
in some interviewees’ statements that since this was a study on wolves, they 
assumed that the depicted animals in a specifi c image were wolves. It would 
make for an interesting comparison if a similar perception study with the exact 
same display materials was conducted, with the only diff erence being that the 
study was presented as a study on dogs. Quite likely, some of the depicted animals 
would then be perceived as dogs rather than as wolves, and their behaviour would 
probably in some cases be interpreted diff erently.
As the preliminary analysis of interviews conducted at the three other fi eld 
locations show, people’s ability to correctly assess situations mediated via audio 
clips, images or video clips depends on their familiarity with the featured study 
animals and/or shared local knowledge about these animals.3 Everybody’s an 
expert on one animal or another, but no one is an expert on all animals. Th e 
central role played by familiarity with the various study animals is demonstrated 
in the analysis of Interviewee 1’s interpretation of Audio Clip No. 3 (a bleating 
ewe and lamb). As the analysis shows, the interviewee attempts, in a narratively 
complex manner, to draw on her experience with wild sheep husbandry in her 
interpretations of the bleating (likely domestic) sheep. In this case, the animal’s 
vocalisations are interpreted by the interviewee by relying on her own experience.
Th is chapter has attempted to demonstrate the feasibility of Multimodal 
Event Analysis of video recorded interviews involving display materials. Th e two 
sample analyses have focused on one instance of a Recount of past experience and 
one instance of Perceptual Problem Solving, respectively. Although perception 
concerns much more than just recounts and problem solving, these are central 
themes. As we have indicated, human perceptions of animals are based among 
other things on direct encounters with animals, on recounts of such encounters, 
on associative guesswork, and on general knowledge acquired as part of a local 
culture or individually. 
We believe that the research method described in this chapter is suitable for 
studies of human perceptions of animal behaviour, animal representations, and 
3 As we have seen, professions and hobbies are oft en reliable indicators of people’s famili-
arity with various animals. On a larger scale, the familiarity of local people in an area 
with specifi c animals is oft en characteristic of the culture as such. In fact, any culture can 
be partially described by describing its signifi cant human–animal relations. 
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human–animal relations (including attitudes to animals and to conservation 
policies). In this context, non-verbal communication plays a central role in 
two respects: fi rst, in images (postures, indicated body movements, facial 
expressions, etc.) and video clips (postures, body movements, facial expressions, 
etc.) constituting part of the display material, and second, in the video recorded 
interviews where interviewees try to make sense of what they see and hear. Th is 
points to the obvious commonalities between human and animal communication, 
which are oft en overlooked in mainstream science. Given the dynamic nature of 
the methods applied, the methodology presented and exemplifi ed here is likely to 
be particularly suitable for analysis of novel and little-known objects and relations. 
Th e level, or depth, of these studies can be tailor-made, as it were, depending on 
whether the studies are initial and general, or advanced and detailed.
In conclusion, this chapter proposes a set of interrelated methods for 
deepening our understanding of the cultural meaning systems that are articulated 
when interviewees express their perceptions and experiences of wolves and some 
related study animals. Using a small-scale sample of the interviews that were 
video recorded during the pilot study that was conducted in Kristiansand, this 
chapter proposes and illustrates a triangulated method of analysis for identifying, 
analysing, and interpreting relevant meaning units and their wider cultural 
signifi cance. Th e triangulation of semi-structured interviews, Multimodal 
Event Analysis (MEA), and Cultural Th ematic Analysis (CTA) yielded a useful 
and comprehensive tool for the investigation of the interview data and for the 
development of a scientifi c approach that will be able to shed light on the meaning 
orientations of diff erent categories of interviewees in relation to the wider 
cultural, societal, and political factors in which their meanings are embedded.
Acknowledgments
Th is work has been carried out thanks to the support of the research project 
Animals in Changing Environments: Cultural Mediation and Semiotic Analysis 
(EEA Norway Grants/Norway Financial Mechanism 2009–2014 under project 
contract no. EMP151). We thank Laura Kiiroja for assisting us by cataloguing 
video recordings, and the University of Agder for providing us with localities in 
which we conducted the pilot study.
Compliance with ethical standards
Th is study is in conformity with required ethical standards for qualitative 
research in the social sciences. Th e interviewees were informed about the aims 
of the study, and interviews were conducted with the informed consent of the 
103Human perceptions of animals: a multimodal event analysis of interview data 
respondents. Prior to the pilot study, the project was reported to Norway’s Data 
Protection Offi  cial for Research, based at the Norwegian Social Science Data 
Services (NSD). Th e information letter distributed to interviewees was revised in 
accordance with feedback from Norway’s Data Protection Offi  cial for Research.
References
Alač, Morana; Hutchins, Edwin 2004. I see what you are saying: action as cognition in 
fMRI brain mapping practice. Journal of Cognition and Culture 4(3): 629–661.
Baldry, Anthony; Th ibault, Paul J. 2006. Multimodal Transcription and Text Analysis: 
A Multimedia Toolkit and Coursebook (with associated online course). London: 
Equinox.
Baldry, Anthony; Th ibault, Paul J. 2008. Applications of multimodal concordances. 
Hermes – Journal of Language and Communication Studies 41: 1–31.
Clark, Andy 1997. Being Th ere: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. 
Cambridge: Th e MIT Press. 
Clark, Andy 2008. Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cowley, Stephen J. 2007. Cognitive dynamics and distributed language. Language 
Sciences 29(5): 575–583.
– 2009. Distributed language and dynamics. Pragmatics and Cognition 17(3): 495–507.
Hollan, James; Hutchins, Edwin; Kirsh, David 2000. Distributed cognition: toward a 
new foundation for human-computer interaction research. ACM Transactions on 
Computer–Human Interaction 7(2): 174–196. 
Hutchins, Edwin 1995a. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge: MIT Press.
– 1995b. How a cockpit remembers its speeds. Cognitive Science 19(3): 265–288.
– 2010. Cognitive ecology. Topics in Cognitive Science 2: 705–715.
Morris, Charles W. 1946. Signs, Language and Behavior. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Ratner, Carl 2002. Cultural Psychology: Th eory and Method. New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Rovdata [Database on large predators in Norway]. http://www.rovdata.no.
SKANDULV [Scandinavian research project on wolves]. http://skandulv.nina.no.
Skogen, Ketil; Krange, Olve; Figari, Helene 2013. Ulvekonfl ikter – en sosiologisk studie. 
Oslo: Akademika forlag.
Skogen, Ketil; Mauz, Isabelle; Krange, Olve 2008. Cry wolf! Narratives of wolf recovery 
in France and Norway. Rural Sociology 73: 105–133.
Steff ensen, Sune V.; Th ibault, Paul J.; Cowley, Stephen J. 2010. Living in the social 
meshwork: the case of health interaction. In: Cowley, Stephen; Major, João C.; 
Steff ensen, Sune V.; Dinis, Alfredo (eds.), Signifying Bodies: Biosemiosis, Interaction 
and Health. Braga: Th e Faculty of Philosophy of Braga Portuguese Catholic 
University, 207–244.
Stibbe, Arran 2012. Animals Erased: Discourse, Ecology, and Reconnection with the 
Natural World. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
104 PAUL J. THIBAULT, MORTEN TØNNESSEN
Th ibault, Paul J. 2004. Agency, individuation, and meaning-making: refl ections on an 
episode of bonobo-human interaction. In: Williams, Geoff rey; Lukin, Annabelle 
(eds.), Language Development: Functional Perspectives on Evolution and Ontogenesis. 
London: Continuum, 112–136.
– 2008. Face-to-face communication and body language. In: Knapp, Karlfried; 
Antos, Gerd (eds.), Handbooks of Applied Linguistics (HAL) Linguistics for Problem-
Solving: Perspectives on Communication Competence, Language and Communication 
Problems, and Practical Solutions. Vol. 2: Interpersonal Communication. Berlin: 
Mouton, 285–330.
– 2011. First-order languaging dynamics and second-order language: Th e distributed 
language view. Ecological Psychology 23(3): 210–245.
Tønnessen, Morten 2010. Wolf land. Biosemiotics 3(3): 289–297.
– 2011. Umwelt Transition and Uexküllian Phenomenology – An Ecosemiotic Analysis 
of Norwegian Wolf Management. (Dissertationes Semioticae Universitatis Tartuensis 
16.) Doctoral dissertation. Tartu: Tartu University Press.
Tüür, Kadri; Tønnessen, Morten (eds.) 2014. Th e Semiotics of Animal Representations. 
(Nature, Culture and Literature 10.) Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Vilà, Carles; Sundqvist, Anna-Karin; Flagstad, Øystein; Seddon, Jennifer; Björnerfeldt, 
Susanne; Kojola, Ilpo; Casulli, Adriano; Sand, Håkon; Wabakken, Peter; Ellegren, 
Hans 2003. Rescue of a severely bottlenecked wolf (Canis lupus) population by a 
single immigrant. Proceedings of the Royal Society London 270: 91–97.
105Human perceptions of animals: a multimodal event analysis of interview data 
APPENDIX 1. Transcription of excerpts from interview 1
Back camera 1, excerpts
Th e original, in Norwegian:
INTERVIEWEE 1: Eh, altså, nå har jeg mest erfaring med villsau.
INTERVIEWER: Mhm.
INTERVIEWEE 1: Og de lager ikke så mye lyd hvis ikke det er et eller anna – galt, 
da – sånn for eksempel når vi tar, når vi skiller lamman og sauane,
INTERVIEWER: Mhm.
INTERVIEWEE 1: – da er det veldig mye lyd i de, da driver de mødran og roper 
og – svarer lamman, skal de prøve å fi nne hverandre.
INTERVIEWER: Ja.
English translation:
INTERVIEWEE 1: Eh, so, I have most experience with wild sheep.
INTERVIEWER: Mhm.
INTERVIEWEE 1: And they don’t make so much sound unless there is 
something – well, wrong – as for instance when we take, when we separate the 
lambs and the sheep,
INTERVIEWER: Mhm.
INTERVIEWER: – then there is a lot of sound in them, then the mothers are 
calling and – the lambs answer, they will try to fi nd each other.
INTERVIEWER: Yes.
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APPENDIX 2. Transcription of excerpts from interview 4
Back camera 1, excerpts
Th e original, in Norwegian:
INTERVIEWER: Hva ser du her?
INTERVIEWEE: Ja, det var litt vanskelig å se. Det er et menneske der, og så, hva 
er det for noe han har i, hva er det foran der. 
INTERVIEWER: Mm.
INTERVIEWEE: Kan du si det? Kan du si det – er det en ulv til, eller hva er det 
for noe?
INTERVIEWER: Ja, altså, det kunne jeg ha sagt, men jeg vil heller høre dæ …
INTERVIEWEE: Nei altså, jeg skjønner… jeg ser jo bare at de fl errer4 – at ulven 
INTERVIEWER: Ja.
English translation:
INTERVIEWER: What do you see here?
INTERVIEWEE: Yes, it was a bit hard to see. Th ere is a human there, and then, 
what is that that he has in, what is that there in front. 
INTERVIEWER: Mm.
INTERVIEWEE: Can you say that? Can you say what – is that another wolf, or 
what is it?
INTERVIEWER: Yes, so, I could have told you, but I would rather hear you …
INTERVIEWEE: No, so, I see …. All I see is that they are tearing – that the wolf
INTERVIEWER: Yes.
4 Th e interviewee says “fl errer (tenner)” [tearing teeth] but likely intends to say “fl ekker 
(tenner)” [displaying teeth].
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Shared human–animal households: 
the examples of Nordic bronze age longhouses and 
Estonian rehi houses
Kadri Tüür, Kristin Armstrong Oma
1. Introduction: the scope of the article
In this article we compare situations across time and space in which humans and 
animals live under the same roof. Th e main focus is on the use of space as a backdrop 
for human–animal interactions. By comparing data from diff erent time periods, 
19th century Estonia and the bronze age in Norway respectively, we seek to answer 
the following questions: 1) Where were the animals placed in the house, and how 
was their space organised? 2) How did the built structures allow for interaction 
between humans and animals? 3) What does this reveal concerning the pragmatic 
considerations of humans regarding animals (and vice versa)? 
On a more detailed level of inquiry, we also ask, is it possible to discern the 
rationale behind the spatial layout of animals in the houses? Upon which principles 
is it based? Is it based on increased economic and/or pragmatic benefi ts, or on 
animal welfare, or on religious considerations, or on the ontological status of 
the animals – or on a combination of these factors? Is there a seasonal dynamics 
inherent to the placing of animals in the house?
In order to track human–animal relations in the household, we are comparing 
ethnographic evidence from Estonia and archaeological evidence from Nor way. 
Th e two case studies diff er in time and geography, and the situations are not 
directly comparable. However, by looking at them together, we hope to highlight 
the specifi c relationality between humans and animals that fl avoured each of 
these two societies. We present a comparative analysis of the spatial distribution 
of the archaeological fi ndings of animal remains in the Norwegian Bronze Age 
longhouses and of the ethnographic descriptions of 19th century Estonian 
farmhouses (rehi)1. We have rich oral and written sources available in the Estonian 
1 Rehi is an indigenous word denoting an ancient Estonian-Livonian type of farmhouse 
where the functions of living, grain-drying and animal shelter were gathered under one 
roof. In the following, rehi is used as a term for reasons of shortness and clarity.
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case study and thorough archaeological data to account for the Norwegian case 
study. Th e Estonian case study, based upon historical sources, gives diff erent 
insights in comparison to the archaeological data. Historical sources are 
descriptive and can, beyond outlining an understanding of and interaction with 
aspects of the world, render insights into the minds and motivations of people. 
Th e material culture and its context that make up archaeological case studies are, 
however, direct and physical traces of practice, of what people actually were doing 
and how they were doing it (Barrett 2000). We ask whether the rich description 
of the historical sources of the Estonian case study could help us to interpret 
the Norwegian archaeological data, and vice versa. Based on empirical data, is 
it possible to understand the underlying positions in society of diff erent animal 
species in these two cultures? 
Keeping animals in the same house, under the same roof – the human living 
quarters – is a custom that persisted in Estonia until the end of the 20th century 
when structural changes in the economy put an end to individual, small-scale 
farming. Th erefore, the article works from recent times towards greater time-
depth in the more distant past. By comparing the knowledge and the practices 
of keeping animals in human living quarters to the archaeological evidence, we 
may be able to point out which common spatial arrangements have proved viable 
in diff erent regions and over longer periods of time. Th ese may also cast light on 
human–animal relationships at large, as both domestication and communication 
are always processes that work both ways (Westling 2014; Sebeok 1990). 
Spatial analysis and ecosemiotics serve as methodological tools for inter-
preting our data sets. 
2. Methodological framework: eco-field, umwelt, habitus 
and multi-species ethnography
In the case of human–animal interactions, we deal with what can be regarded as 
hybrid objects (see Latour 1993; discussed in detail in the second chapter of the 
present monograph). When diff erent species interact, as it happens in bronze age 
longhouses and in recent rehi houses, zoosemiotics can be used to describe and 
understand the relationships and the communication that takes place. Within 
close co-habitation, a new type of human–animal community is formed that, in 
turn, results in a special type of eco-fi eld. Th e term, as launched and explained 
in Farina and Belgrano 2006, denotes meaningful patches of landscape that 
are relevant to certain species in regard to their umwelt (see outline below), 
perception, and life functions, such as obtaining food or delineating home 
territory. Eco-fi elds are formed in the combination of the physical features of a 
landscape and of the particular needs a representative of a species has to meet. 
Meaning and meaningful ties between animals and their environment form the 
core of the notion of eco-fi eld. Th e concept of eco-fi eld allows for a description 
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of spaces where diff erent species meet and helps to pinpoint the grounds for 
confl icting relations between the species.
Traces of these meaningful ties and the associated species interactions can be 
observed in eco-fi elds that manifest as semi-natural environments, traditional 
agriculture, literary creation, etc. Studying these hybrid phenomena takes us to 
the sphere of ecosemiotic research and its focus on species’, including humans’, 
interactions with each other, as well as to the resulting interpretative communities 
where the environment plays an important role. In our case, we mostly deal with 
the built environment that shapes human–animal interaction.
As pointed out in the introductory chapters of the present monograph, 
analysing spatial organisation and the use of the space or landscape of a certain 
species is one of the basic approaches of the semiotic study of animals. Looking 
at the spatial organisation of inter-species relations induces the question: which 
features and objects have a meaning for an animal, and what is their meaning 
in communication situations? Or, in a wider perspective that necessarily also 
embraces the human species: where do our umwelten overlap with those of other 
species – in our case, with domesticated vertebrates? What is the common ground 
that enables humans to live immediately side by side with other animals? What 
are the biological, social, economic, and spiritual benefi ts and shortcomings of 
such a life? Th e umwelt theory as initiated by Jakob von Uexküll (in English, 
see Uexküll 2010) enables us to see all species, including humans, as complex 
agents with species-specifi c receptor organs and a certain behavioural repertoire 
for adjusting themselves to the surrounding environment. 
In umwelt analysis, four basic functional cycles (as elaborated in Tønnessen 
2011: 44) are taken into account in the discussion of the position of domestic 
animals. Th ese functional cycles are related to food, enemies, medium/environ-
ment and partners/sex. Th ey also provide a common ground for com parisons 
between the umwelten of diff erent species.
As Th omas Sebeok (1994) points out, most animals, including humans, 
possess by and large the same type of communication channels (visual, audial, 
tactile, olfactory), although animals do not exchange signs that are untied from 
the immediate context of the communication process. Th is enables us to make 
sense of a great deal of animal behaviour and animal communication, especially 
in domesticated animals. Increasingly (although probably to a little extent early 
in the domestication process), they have been bred to be tame and predictable, 
shaped to suit the needs of humans. In turn, they have also shaped humans to 
meet their needs related to livelihood and well-being. Opting to live with animals 
has a profound impact on the lives of humans, as animals through their demands 
of being tended and taken care of create specifi c patterns of living in the human 
society. Humans and animals become naturalised parts of each other’s experience 
of life. Th is implies that not only do humans domesticate animals but humans 
themselves are to a certain degree domesticated by animals. 
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Th e eco-fi eld, and also the umwelt, can in the context of our case studies 
be linked with Bourdieu’s theories of practice and habitus. Bourdieu (1977, 
1990[1980]) outlines practice as that which constitutes how life is lived, according 
to structuring principles that together form the habitus of society. Shared living 
spaces for humans and animals are also performed as sets of practices. Bourdieu, 
somewhat densely, described habitus as being in its own nature an assemblage 
of dormant dispositions; it is constituted to, and oriented towards, practice, 
structured within structuring dispositions; it is orchestrated, but without a 
conductor (Bourdieu 1990: 52–53). More precisely, it is “systems of durable, 
transposable dispositions”, and “the mode of generation of practices” (Bourdieu 
1977: 72) within any society. Th e habitus is the everyday actions that we carry 
out, the choices we make without refl ecting on them, and the way that our past 
actions are carried into the future. It follows that, for example, members of a 
group habitus organise their life according to their embodied dispositions, which 
are, simultaneously, experienced history inscribed within their bodies and the 
templates that structure the way future practices are generated. 
Vital within the argument of this chapter is that the habitus provides the 
funda mental framework within which the human–animal relationship is 
situated – habitus is formed in the day-to-day interactions between all partici-
pants. Within this setting, practice is anchored by structuring principles, such 
as architectural layout, activities, material culture and agents (both humans and 
animals). Structuring principles are a way of organising one’s actions and dealings 
with the world within a framework (Barrett 2000). Rather than a passive form of 
structuralism, it is a system of active categories that forms a drive in which agents 
can operate in their own life-space and with the world at large (Giddens 1984). 
Life-space here denotes the choice of living arrangements and the structuring 
of these, such as whether to live with animals or to live apart from them – here 
termed shared or non-shared life-space. 
What we aim to achieve in this chapter is multi-species ethnography (see 
Kirksey, Helmreich 2010). Th is entails regarding other species not merely as 
biomass (zoe), but as bios – as living subjects with their individual and unique 
lives. Multispecies ethnography works in the contact zone of humans and 
other living beings, where “encounters between Homo sapiens and other beings 
generate mutual ecologies and coproduced niches” (Kirksey, Helmreich 2010: 
546). In the case of the Estonian material, all the main sources stem from an 
ethnographic approach. Spatial analysis of the humans’ living space has been a 
topic for ethnographers for several decades. Th e question of how animals are 
positioned in regard to human locations and activities has not received much 
attention so far (but see Armstrong Oma 2007, 2013a,b for such studies within 
archaeology). It has been agreed that the location of objects and people are loaded 
with semiotic signifi cance (see, for example, Lagopoulos, Stylianoudi 2004), but 
domesticated animals have oft en been overlooked in the discussions of human 
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spatial arrangements. In the present article, we attempt to look at the locale and 
use of space, and therefore also at the position and the semiotic signifi cance of the 
domestic animals fi rst through human eyes. Th en we want to take the study one 
step further and ask, how might the animals themselves perceive the situation of 
living under the same roof with and, in some cases, even in the same rooms as 
the humans? Th e latter question is asked within the framework of understanding 
animal umwelten as species-specifi c forms of perception of, and reaction to, the 
environment. At the same time, much of the corporeal basis for establishing the 
connections with one’s surroundings is shared by humans and other animals. 
Over the course of evolution, domesticated animals have learned to know, and 
in some instances most probably even appreciate, the human umwelt. Th erefore, 
in our understanding of the multi-species ethnography, humans are regarded as 
one among the many animal species who act as agents in a traditional small-scale 
farming situation. Longhouses and rehi are sites of signifi cant importance that 
enable these relational stories to unfold. 
3. Material framework: the rehi houses in Estonia
Th e rehi houses are used for living by the Estonian rural population even today.2 
Th e construction of the rehi houses ceased in the 1930s, as the structure of the 
economy and people’s living habits changed in the course of the industrialisation 
and urbanisation of Estonia. Th e rehi as a house type has, probably for more 
than a millennium by now, been known in the territories that presently form 
Estonia and Northern Latvia. Ethnographers agree that this type of house is the 
result of a long-term local development that is related to the development of 
agriculture. However, not much archaeological evidence remains of the houses 
themselves, as they are constructed of logs that decay without leaving noticeable 
traces in the ground. Th e rehi houses have developed because of the need to dry 
grain for preservation in a dry and warm place in autumn. In the neighbouring 
areas, grain-drying houses are always built separately from the living houses, but 
consistently in this region, these functions have been joined under the same roof 
(Pärdi 1998: 282). In winter, the threshing ground has been used as a seasonal 
shelter for animals. 
In its earliest stages of development, the rehi consisted of a larger rectangular 
wooden construction, inside of which was another rectangular construction that 
also included a stove (Ränk 1939; Peterson 1967). 
Rehi (see Fig. 1), the traditional Estonian peasant dwelling house, consists of 
three main parts, namely:
– rehetuba, the heatable family space where grain was dried;
– rehealune (threshing barn), the non-heatable part of the house where grain 
2 See the rehi house database at https://register.muinas.ee/public.php?menuID=rehemaja. 
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was threshed. Carts and sleighs were kept there along with the draught 
animals;
– kambrid (chambers), clean rooms exclusively for human use; a later develop-
ment that spread during the 19th century. 
Rehetuba had three doors, leading to 1) threshing barn; 2) chambers; 3) outside 
(Pärdi 1998: 274). Th ese directions point to three semiotically relevant realms 
that radiate, as it were, from the central working-room: the threshing barn 
where the most important tools and animals were kept and where the crops were 
processed, the intimate family space, and the open grounds surrounding the farm 
where most of the work related to sustenance was done. Th e construction of the 
rehi effi  ciently maps the spatial organisation that was signifi cant to a traditional 
peasant household. Th is forms the eco-fi eld of all the household members 
belonging to diff erent species and is a framework for their habitus. Th e particular 
needs of all the inhabitants of the house are embedded in the physical structure 
of the house and into its inner logic of connections. 
Figure 1. Ground plan of a typical rehi house from Southern Estonia. In addition to the 
main room (rehetuba) and the threshing ground (rehealune), sheds for animals were 
attached to the walls of the rehi house (1 – shed for cows and calves; 4 – hen coop). A 
separate stall for horses can be seen inside the house, located at the threshing ground 
(3). A chaff  loft  was also attached to the outer wall of the rehealune (2). Re-drawn from 
Pärdi 1998: 276; based on the collection of ethnographic drawings in the Estonian 
National Museum.
Th e rehealune, the threshing ground, usually has two wide doors or gates in 
opposite walls. It was convenient to drive the horse-drawn carts of grain through 
these for unloading during the harvesting. Here the grain was unloaded, threshed, 
and winnowed to clean it of chaff . Aft er the processing of grain was done, the 
big rehealune space was used as a shed for domesticated animals, especially 
horses and pigs, but in Western Estonia, cattle and sheep were also included. Th e 
animals’ winter fodder, comprised of chaff  and hay, was stored under the roof 
of the rehi house, immediately above the rehealune where the animals stayed in 
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winter. Th is served as insulation as there were no other heating options than the 
heat produced by the animals’ bodies (Jaagosild 1967). For the same reason, litter 
was stored alongside the walls of the rehi, which also explains the placement of 
the chaff  loft s: in addition to practical considerations, it also matters that they 
served as temporary insulation in case of cold winter weather (Põllu 2005: 224). 
Depending on the season and the need, the rehealune could be used as a 
storage space for carts and sleighs, harnesses, etc. During big festivities, such as 
wedding parties or the completion of communal work, the rehealune could be 
emptied of stored items, cleaned, and turned into a dance hall. In summer, when 
most activities took place outdoors, the family’s eating table and other bulky 
items could be placed in the rehealune (Viires, Vunder 1998; Põllu 2005).
Aganik, or the small chaff  loft , was usually located at a nook between the 
northern back wall between the rehealune and the rehetuba (Troska, Viires 1998: 
279). Aleksei Peterson, a long-time head of the Estonian National Museum, pointed 
out the practical need for such spatial arrangements: as horses and cows were kept 
in the rehealune during the cold season, it was convenient to keep a certain amount 
of their food and ‘bedstraw’ close at hand. As aganik was a remarkably widespread 
element in the construction and the spatial division of the rehi, Peterson concluded 
that keeping animals in rehealune would have had to be a regular practice, as it 
left  its traces in the traditionally built environment. Aganik is connected to the 
seasonality of the shared living: in summer when animals were let out to graze 
in the open, they stayed in other buildings, and aganik could be used for other 
purposes, such as temporary storage (Peterson 1967: 21). 
Little attachments could be erected for pigs and smaller animals against the 
outer walls of the rehi. In cases of extreme weather conditions, animals could also 
stay inside the main house at diff erent locations. Details of such an organisation 
are discussed at length below.
4. Material framework: three-aisled houses in early bronze 
age Scandinavia
Th e bronze age longhouses from northern Europe could be termed post-
domestication household arenas. Th ese houses provided for animals that were 
fully domesticated and came from a long line of domestic animals, stretching 
back thousands of years in time. Th e post-domestication household arena thus 
signifi es the physical environment where people and animals lived together. We 
suggest that the built environment provided pre-conceived choices determining 
how relationships could be performed within the household arena (see also 
Armstrong Oma 2007, 2010, 2013a). Th ose choices were probably made with 
particular reference to human–animal relationships, and created a framework 
for the inherent habitus. 
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We outline an argument to propose that by investigating the spatial orga-
nisation of the material remains of the household, it is possible to extrapolate 
the physical meeting points between humans and domestic animals. Further, we 
suggest that these meeting points could render clues towards the understanding 
of human–animal relationships.
In the following, we examine how human and non-human membership in 
bronze age households came into being, and examine the ontological status of these 
beings. Specifi cally, we look at case studies in the area of Jæren in southwestern 
Norway, since a large number of house remains have been excavated in this area, 
with datasets that have been thoroughly examined and are well presented (Horve 
2009; Juhl 2001; Løken 1987, 1988, 1989, 1998, 2003; Pilskog 1998a, b; Soltvedt 
et al. 2007). Of particular interest is a development in the way the house was 
built and shaped that took place over a shorter period of time, more specifi cally 
a change that concerned how the layout of the house was designed. Looking at 
developments over time makes diff erences evident.
In the early bronze age, a monumental change in the planning and building 
of houses happened that led to a transition from two-aisled to three-aisled 
longhouses (see Figure 2, the two top left  house plans are two-aisled houses, and 
all the others are three-aisled longhouses). Architectonically, the construction of 
the longhouse changed from three rows of post-holes to four rows that provided 
the three-aisled longhouse with three long rooms lengthwise. Th is architectural 
change is believed to be associated with a change in how animals were kept; they 
were moved into the three-aisled house and lived in the same house as humans 
(Årlin 1999; Lagerås, Regnell 1999; Rasmussen, Adamsen 1993; Rasmussen 1999: 
281; Tesch 1992: 290). Th e transition is normally dated to bronze age period II 
(Montelius), see Table 1 below. Factors that caused this change are not known, 
nor properly accounted for in the archaeological discourse.
 
Table 1. Th e table correlates Montelius’ periodic system with radiocarbon dates. Note 
that transitions are not always clear cut in terms of dating.
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A common assumption is that a result of the architectural change was the indoor 
stalling of domestic animals in one part of the house. Some archaeologists (Årlin 
1999; Armstrong Oma 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013b; Rasmussen, Adamsen 1993; 
Rasmussen 1999: 281) have previously suggested that the change happened due to 
a change in the human perception of domestic animals, leading to their becoming 
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more intimate human–animal relationship developed. Th is is aptly demonstrated 
by the remains of a house that burnt some centuries later, in which the bones 
of animals were unearthed in the byre part of a longhouse, Nørre Tranders in 
Jutland (Nielsen 2002, see Figure 3). Th e postulated change in perception of 
domestic animals would also inherently mean a change in their socio-economic 
status. According to Årlin (1999), household membership for domestic animals 
entailed that animals were perceived as producers (i.e. as workers, similarly to the 
farmers themselves) rather than mere products.
Fi gure 3. Th e drawing shows the in situ position of the bones of humans and animals in 
a house that had burnt to the ground. Th e site is in Nørre Tranders, Jutland (Denmark), 
and is dated to the Pre-Roman Iron Age. Note the sheep in the top left  corner; there are 
no stalls where they are kept. Lerklumper = lumps of clay, tagstolpe = roof-bearing post, 
uidentifi ceret = unidentifi ed. Source: http://www.denstoredanske.dk/Danmarks_Oldtid/
Ældre_Jernalder/Bag_hegn_og_palisader_250_f.Kr.-Kr.f/Bonden_og_hans_dyr. 
Although evidence from later periods confi rms this to be the outcome of the 
changes in ways of living, it does not account for what instigated the process 
of granting the animals ontological status as household members. Such changes 
are most oft en complex conundrums made up of a number of factors, such as 
for example new social relationships, changes in environmental circumstances 
(climate, disasters, vegetation, etc.), novel economic strategies, changes in power 
structures, and so on. 
Two-aisled longhouses are understood as having been for human habitation 
only, based upon the lack of internal divisions, which signifi es that the whole 
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house was used for human habitation (Ethelberg et al. 2000; Tesch 1993). Th e 
development of architectonic articulations is rather abrupt, with one type of 
house  – the two-aisled  – supplanted by the three-aisled longhouse. Th e latter 
was rectangular and oft en large, varying between 20–50 m long and 7–12 m wide 
(Harding 2000: 45–48). Th e transition from two-aisled longhouses with exclusive 
human occupation to a shared living-space where humans and animals occupied 
diff erent parts of the three-aisled longhouse occurred in the period between 
1800–1500 BCE (early bronze age period I  – period II) in northern Europe 
(Rasmussen 1999). Traces of byres and internal divisions appear ca. 1500 BCE 
(Fokkens 1999: 36). Th ese houses are probably designed to stall animals indoors 
(Ethelberg et al. 2000: 203), and this is the main reason for why the transfer from 
the two-aisled house to the three-aisled longhouse is associated with moving 
domestic animals into the house. Th ree-aisled longhouses were common in 
southern Scandinavia, northern Europe, the Low Countries, and at the Alpine 
lake sites (Harding 2000: 38). Th e break in the conservative building tradition 
of two-aisled longhouses has been suggested to represent “radical or gradual 
changes in society”, presumably of an economic, social and political character, 
according to Tesch (1993: 145). In addition, following Rasmussen (1999) and 
Årlin (1999) we argue that this shift  was, at heart, a change in the ways humans 
and animals perceived one another, related to each other and shared their world 
(see also Armstrong Oma 2007, 2010, 2013a, b). Th ese connections are facilitated 
by the fact that humans’ and domesticated animals’ umwelten overlap to a 
considerable degree. Th e need for (at least seasonal) shelter is one of the central 
nodes in the web of mutual interests. On an evolutionary scale, the long process 
of domestication has changed the behaviour of the respective species so that they 
are more predictable for each other, and a long-time cooperation in agricultural 
activities has only strengthened this mutual understanding. 
In southern Scandinavia, not all longhouses have byres, the houses show 
great diff erences, and only a few examples have clearly defi ned stalls (Rasmussen 
1999). Where byres are found, they are introduced as a visible and separate part. 
All traces of activities in these houses seem to respect the partitions of the rooms; 
this does not only hold for the internal divisions across the houses, but also for 
the aisles partitioned by the presence of the roof-bearing posts (Rasmussen 1999: 
283). Th e house types that most likely contain byres are long and narrow houses 
with partition walls that probably had animals inside in the clearly defi ned parts 
of the house interpreted as the byre (see Figure 4). Wider houses with partition 
walls indicate that larger groups of people lived under one roof. Th e trend clearly 
shows that houses with internal partitions where no outbuildings are present 
contained byres for stalling animals, whereas smaller houses with outbuildings 
show an arrangement where humans lived in the house and animals lived in the 
outbuildings (Rasmussen 1999: 285).3 Th us, to a certain extent, animals were 
3 See also the discussion of outbuildings vs. rehi houses in diff erent regions of Estonia below. 
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brought into the house in the early bronze age, but other buildings and structures 
were also a part of animal husbandry management. However, this argument 
is based upon the oft en tacit (but sometimes outspoken) assumption that the 
domestic animals that entered the house were cattle, located in stalls along the 
long walls (e.g. Rasmussen 1999; Horve 2009; Holst, Rasmussen 2013). Th e houses 
with clearly defi ned stalls do indeed demonstrate that cattle were stalled indoors 
in some houses. But there are other ways of keeping cattle inside human living-
spaces, such as tethering them.4 And what about the smaller domestic animals, 
such as sheep, goats and pigs? Penning them obviously makes more sense than 
stalling them. Th e distribution of bones and architectural features within the 
house from Nørre Tranders (see Figure 3) demonstrates that sheep and pigs were 
not kept in stalls. Comparably, in the Estonian rehi, smaller animals could be 
penned to one corner of the room also by means of light, temporary wooden 
hurdles or ladders that were easy to remove (see discussion below). Th us, we 
argue that houses with stalls are but one way of accommodating animals indoors, 
and the lack of stalls does not necessarily mean that animals were not housed in 
three-aisled longhouses. 
Fi gure 4. House plans from Jutland (Denmark) with possible byres in one section of the 
house. Note the traces of stalls – smaller posts or remains of planks between the trestles 
and the wall posts. Aft er Rasmussen, Adamsen 1993; Mikkelsen 1997; Ethelberg 1995.
4 Estonian ethnographic material clearly shows that cows could be tethered by means of 
slings attached directly to the wooden walls; see the following discussion of the place-
ment of each individual animal species in the rehi house. 
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5. Animals as agents within a shared life-space
To study human–animal relationships, it is imperative to start with the actual 
physical encounters. Within the frames of archaeology, this means beginning 
with an understanding of the spaces where the relationship happened. Humans 
and animals carried out their lives together in and around buildings and in pens 
and fi elds in the landscape. 
Space is constructed according to preconceived choices, made before the 
building process proper commences. Preconceived choices give rise to particular 
life-spaces that are shared by its members – which could include both humans 
and animals. Life-spaces are, simply, spaces where life is made to happen. As 
such, it goes beyond Tim Ingold’s (2000) concept of dwelling (a term he in later 
years has abandoned, see Ingold 2011: 12), to rather embody what he has recently 
termed meshwork  – the web of life, comprised of entangled, enmeshed and 
interwoven lines, where primacy is given to the lines in-between the nodes in the 
network rather than to the nodes themselves (Ingold 2011: 63). Life is lived along 
lines rather than in points, constantly unfolding, ever surpassing itself. Th ere 
is no beginning nor end, only a middle. And this middle is “an endless path, 
along which wayfarers travel” (Ingold 2011: 12–14). Meshwork can be regarded 
as threads of relationships that allow a focus upon the act of relating, a shift  away 
from perceiving agents as freestanding monolithic nodes. Life-space is a strategy 
to study relationships, and relationships happen in a meshwork – here, there and 
everywhere; both in-between and across the walls, fences, and pens that humans 
build to create the framework for their lives. For example, when a life-space is 
shared by humans and animals together, their actions become intermingled and 
fl ow through space and time together (Armstrong Oma 2007: 161–163). Life-
space is thus both an analytical tool and a physical phenomenon.
Life-space can be studied archaeologically by considering architectural 
choices embedded in excavated remains of houses and their layouts. House plans 
can reveal structuring principles for the habitus of society, and since these act as 
anchors for practices, they are fundamental to the construction of space and the 
choices integrated in that construction.
Friction arises when the preconceived space is put into use and becomes 
a place of experiences. Out of this tension, relationships grow, sometimes in 
novel and unforeseen ways. Building upon this, one way of studying human–
animal relationships in the past is to look at spatial constructs that accommodate 
human and animal agents alike. Investigating kinds of spatial designs allows 
for a consideration of the preconceived notions  – dispositions  – that underlie 
social choices. Eff ectively, spatial constructions would restrict or allow access for 
human and animal agents, thus regulating the degree of proximity between them, 
and ultimately create the framework for how their relationships would develop 
through the process of living together – or not.
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As relationships are not static but rather emerge in a processual manner, 
we need to take into account the seasonal and daily movements of humans and 
domesticated animals. On the basis of Estonian data, we know that during the 
growth seasons for vegetation, animals roamed around freely; only the areas 
where they should not go were separated from the rest of the landscape by 
means of fences. Herding animals in Estonia was subject to weak regulations for 
centuries. Animals grazed in big herds (all of the animals of the whole village in 
one herd) in open spaces that had no other immediate practical use – on coastal 
meadows, fallows, and village greens. Th ey were looked aft er by an appointed 
member of the village community. Th e practice of keeping domestic animals on 
fi xed premises started to spread only in the 1920s (Pärdi 1998: 106–107). Until 
then, the human keepers more or less followed in the footsteps of the animals, 
thus creating meshworks of paths in the landscape (on this topic, see also 
Gooch 2008: 67–80). Occasionally, these paths would cross with those of wild 
animals and predators; therefore, the human presence in the herds was of great 
importance. Whereas elderly people and youngsters were considered suitable for 
daily cattle herding chores, young and strong men were used for the nocturnal 
herding of horses. Th is had to do with the presence of prospective predators 
as well as with the distance of the herding grounds from human settlements. 
Human herd-keepers inevitably adjusted to the needs of both domestic and wild 
animals. Th ese arrangements indicate that animals determined the life-spaces 
and movement patterns of humans no less than humans determined theirs. 
Th e animal species in Estonian agriculture were of no special breed or pedigree. 
Th e animals (cows and horses) were relatively small and patient by nature (Pärdi 
1998: 102–103). As the enthusiasts of local breeds have remarked, such qualities 
facilitated the human–animal interaction and probably also contributed to the 
close seasonal co-habitation. Animals who fi t the “human scale” measurement-
wise were probably easier to keep indoors than the larger contemporary breeds 
of horses or bulky meat cows. 
Historically, the mutually benefi cial relations between humans and large 
domesticated mammals, as well as their co-habitation patterns, have emerged 
hand in hand with the development of agriculture. Sustainable cultivation of 
land in Estonia (and in Norway) is possible only when fertilisers are given to 
the cultivated land (Lang 2005: 19–21). Animal manure is the most convenient 
organic fertiliser. A British researcher of human–animal contacts, Arthur 
MacGregor, quotes an 18th century source which states that sheep dung “assists 
all Grounds more than any other” (MacGregor 2012: 464). Even immediately 
before WWII, manure still accounted for 90% of all fertilisers used in Estonia 
(Pärdi 1998: 85). Th is also indicates the importance of domesticated animals in 
the lives of the rural people up until the middle of the 20th century. In addition 
to providing organic fertiliser for the fi elds, animal power was needed for pulling 
such farming tools as ploughs and harrows, for moving stones and logs, and for 
moving the harvest from one place to another (Pärdi 1998: 79, 100). 
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Before the practice of using scythes for cutting grass emerged, animals 
spent winters outdoors, searching for food themselves. Th e fi rst documented 
archaeological fi nds of scythes in Estonia are dated back to the middle of the 1st 
millennium (Kriiska 2004: 38). Th is tool enabled humans to gather extra winter 
fodder for animals; thus, winter barns were erected for animals on the pastures. 
As the importance of agriculture rose, the main reason for managing animals 
indoors and close to the villages was to gather more manure for the fi elds (Pärdi 
1998: 100–101).
Th e renowned Estonian ethnographer and specialist of rural material culture, 
Gea Troska, indicates that villages in Estonia started to emerge in relation to 
agriculture. Th e size of a farm was calculated according to the land cultivated with 
one horse or a pair of oxen, i.e. animals were the measurement base for the main 
economical unit (Troska 1998: 248). A village as a traditional unit (Dorfmark) 
embraces not only the human living area, but also all the cultivable lands used in 
the economic activities of the village: fi elds, pastures, hay grounds, forests, and 
slash-and-burn areas (Troska 1998: 255). Consequently, we may conclude that 
village grounds inevitably included both animal and human activity; people were 
sharing the same working and leisure areas as their domesticated animals. Th is 
means that a traditional village can be conceptualised both as a life-space and as 
an eco-fi eld, where the agencies and interests of diff erent species meet. 
6. Shared spaces: three-aisled longhouses 
A closer look at the wider context of the transition from two-aisled to three-aisled 
houses is useful to delve deeper into the reasons underlying the shared life-space. 
During the last 20 years, a stronger emphasis has been placed on social processes 
in settlement patterns of the bronze age among archaeologists (Armstrong Oma 
2007, 2010, 2012, 2013a; Barker 1999; Fokkens 1998; Grön 2004; Olausson 1999; 
Rasmussen 1999; Roymans 1999; Streiff ert 2001; Ullén 1996, 1997; Zimmermann 
1999). One such process is the innovation of sharing a living space with animals 
and the resulting human–animal relationships. 
Usually the transition is explained in terms of how everyday life was facilitated 
for bronze age farmers. Th e three main functional arguments for stalling animals 
in houses are (Fokkens 1999: 36): 
climatic reasons – protecting the livestock from the cold winters (Behre 
1998: 94); 
providing a means of protecting cattle against raids (Harsema 1993: 106; 
Roymans 1999);
enabling the collection of manure (Fokkens 1991, 1999; Gaillard, et al. 1994: 
60; IJzereef 1981; Karlenby 1994: 31).
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To these, it is common to add two others:
having animals in the house helps to heat it; 
keeping animals indoors protects them from predators.
None of these arguments explain why it was necessary to bring the livestock into 
human living spaces, as these benefi ts could also have been achieved through 
other means or are simply unnecessary. For example, Zimmerman (1998) says 
that heat from animals does not reach beyond the byre part of the longhouse 
and has no eff ect on the human living section. On the contrary, the presence of 
animals creates a more humid and unhealthy indoor environment that leads the 
posts and planks to rot quicker.5 Th e sturdy, small, quick domestic animals of 
the early bronze age would be superiorly equipped to fend for themselves both 
against the weather – particularly taking into account that the early bronze age 
was a very mild period – and against predators. 
Several authors (Årlin 1999; Fokkens 1999; Rasmussen 1999; Roymans 
1999; Zimmerman 1999) argue that other factors were crucial in choosing to 
share the house with animals. Rasmussen (1999: 287) suggests that a human-
to-animal relationship developed in this period, and she advocates a point of 
view in which taking animals into the house was an expression of relations of 
affi  liation with or ownership of the livestock. In southern Scandinavia, very 
few, small faunal assemblages have been recovered from house contexts in this 
period; interestingly, the evidence comes mainly from the architectural features 
of the longhouse. Th e visible internal divisions in the houses are important to 
manifest the human-to-animal relationship, as it suggests that animals were not 
perceived as humans. Th e physical separation of animals into a sphere apart from 
but still in the house nonetheless signals that the animals were perceived as a 
valuable part of the household, and in being taken into the house, they were given 
status as household members. In terms of the ownership of animals, this was 
defi ned by the building that housed them, and the building was defi ned by the 
humans living in it. Further, Årlin (1999) argues that by living inside houses, 
domestic animals were perceived as categorically pure, following Douglas’ (1966) 
structural separation between purity and danger as a cultural construction. 
Implicitly, animal products, even dung, were perceived as pure, which gives 
animals the role of producers and, implicitly, as agents rather than as food and 
territory (Årlin 1999: 300).
Although this discourse refers to animals as a generic category, and some-
times to the slightly more specifi c but derogative term ‘livestock’, what is meant 
by ‘animal’ is frequently cattle (Barker 1999; Fokkens 1999; Rasmussen 1999; 
Roymans 1999; Zimmermann 1999). For example, when considering the 
development of the byre, both Zimmerman (1999: 133) and Waterbolk (1975) 
discuss the width of stalls and cattle size. Cattle is also clearly what Rasmussen 
5 Heiki Pärdi has expressed similar reservations on the basis of Estonian material in regard 
to the practical considerations of keeping animals in rehi houses (see Pärdi 1998: 109). 
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(1999) has in mind when she suggests that a management strategy of animals is 
tied to agricultural activities, not only dung collection. Th e agricultural strategy 
of the early and middle bronze age in southern Scandinavia seems to have been 
founded upon extensive cultivation, where new ground was constantly laid under 
the plough, requiring draught animals (e.g. Kristiansen 1993). Th e symbolic 
presentation of the relationship between humans and cattle on rock art always 
shows ploughing, but rarely pastoral activities such as herding (but see the Holst, 
Rasmussen (2013) argument in favour of extensive cattle herding). Th erefore, 
economic and social aspects joined together in creating a new way of living for 
humans and cattle in the early and middle bronze age in southern Scandinavia 
(Rasmussen 1999: 288). 
Th is suggests how pervasive livestock management had become in people’s 
everyday lives. Husbandry was a very important task in the lives of early bronze 
age farmers (Grön 2004: 370; Rasmussen 1999: 286). Rasmussen (1999: 287) 
suggests that the symbolic representation of this “human-to-animal relationship” 
is refl ected in graves where the dead are laid on or wrapped in cowhide, and in 
animal off erings at settlement sites. Th us, the relationship between the people 
and their animals created the longhouse as we know it (Armstrong Oma 2013b).
7. Shared spaces: the rehi house
A specialist in Estonian peasant architecture, Tamara Habicht, has expressed 
her conviction that the rehealune has been used for keeping animals indoors 
in winter as long as domesticated animals have been kept in Estonia (Habicht 
1973: 56). Th is custom has persisted the longest in Western Estonia. Ildike 
Jaagosild, an Estonian ethnographer, has published a thorough overview on 
the threshing ground as a winter shed for animals (1967: 40–62), as well as an 
article on the reasons behind the habit of bringing animals occasionally to the 
rehetuba (Jaagosild 1965: 87–106). She admits that there is very little material 
that concerns animals’ wintering conditions or the placement of animals in the 
rehealune. Field work and written notes originate from the middle of the 20th 
century. Some written documents indicating the usage of the threshing ground as 
a winter shed for domesticated animals date back to the end of the 18th century, in 
association with the advice that peasants should keep animals further away from 
their living rooms. Th e practice itself, however, must be ancient, as it is strongly 
associated with seasonality. In the summer time, animals were not kept in the 
rehi house, but remained in summer pastures (horse, sheep). Cows that had to be 
herded back home for milking every evening stayed at summer sheds that were 
light constructions at a little distance from the main rehi house. Jaagosild (1967: 
44) indicates that there is a strong correlation between the occurrence of summer 
sheds and keeping animals in the rehi house. 
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Cattle and sheep had diff erent pasture lands and were also kept separately 
indoors. Th e same is true concerning pigs (Jaagosild 1967: 43–44). Horses have 
been kept in the threshing grounds all over Estonia. 
Th e rehi house oft en had so-called half-doors in the threshing ground walls. 
Only the upper half of such a half-door could be opened, in order to let in some 
light during the tending of the animals. Th e lower part of the door could be kept 
closed to keep the animals from going outside (Jaagosild 1967: 47). 
For a long time, threshing grounds had no windows. When they started to 
emerge at the end of the 19th century, it was mostly in the name of improving 
the conditions for animals in the threshing grounds. No windows were needed 
for the room’s threshing function. Improvements in this part of the house were 
in direct relation to its function as an animal shed, but they also brought along 
new problems. Stronger ceilings instead of the tari6 constructions meant that the 
natural ventilation became poorer and that the logs in the walls began to rot 
more intensely, as they became covered with dung and room humidity increased 
(Jaagosild 1967: 55). Th is is similar to the assumed climatic conditions inside the 
animal part of the bronze age longhouses.
Th e average size of a traditional threshing ground was approximately 80–
100 m2. An average farm from the 19th century had 2 horses, 4–6 bovines 
(among them 3–4 milking cows and a pair of oxen), some sheep and pigs. Th e 
placement of animals followed practical considerations that made life easier 
for the farmers. Milking cows were placed close to the rehetuba to shorten the 
distance of carrying the milk aft er milking. Horses and oxen were placed next to 
the main gates so that it would be easy to take them outdoors when necessary. 
It was also practical in relation to fi re hazards: the most valuable animals could 
be saved fi rst. In winter, horses were used rather intensely, as major collective 
draught works took place in winter when straight routes across frozen sea ice, 
swamps, and rivers could be used.7 Kaljo Põllu describes the trustworthiness 
of the native horses, especially during the long travels across the sea in winter 
conditions: “Th e islanders’ horses had the especially admirable courage to jump 
over the cracks in the sea ice, even with loaded sleighs” (Põllu 2005: 231). In 
extreme weather conditions, humans oft en relied on the senses of animals, in 
this case horses, who were able to assess the environmental conditions much 
more aptly than the humans could themselves; humans were able to appreciate 
this. Preferably, horses were also placed underneath the opening in the ceiling 
through which dry hay was pushed down daily to feed the animals. Horses, then, 
6 According to Pärdi (1998: 291), separate summer sheds for seasonal use were construct-
ed as light buildings of log poles at the corners and were bound together with light walls 
made of interwoven wooden sticks (tari). Th e same technique was used for constructing 
the ceilings of the rehealune, because it guarantees good ventilation and thus prevents 
the building from rotting.
7 About winter roads, articles are available in Estonian, such as Mardiste 1971, Joandi 
1990.
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had the privilege of receiving the hay fi rst. Cows were placed along the walls with 
their heads facing the walls, attached to their places by means of shackles that the 
animals wore around their necks and that were fastened directly to the log walls. 
In many areas in Estonia, people divided the threshing ground into a front 
and back space. In the front space, located next to the rehetuba, horses moved 
around without any tethers. In the back space, cows were attached to the walls. 
Th is arrangement embraced both practical and sanitary considerations: horse 
dung is dry, and its smell is not sharp. It was convenient to feed the animals 
next door in the morning before humans and horses went to work together. 
Bringing water to horses was also easier as they could drink from the threshing 
ground while bending over the half door. Only the young colts were tethered in 
temporary stalls in the case of such an arrangement. 
Keeping animals in threshing grounds had several practical reasons: it 
enabled people to save valuable construction material and was a convenient 
arrangement for tending animals during winters, with only a short distance to 
the animals and no need to go outdoors into the deep snow. Jaagosild (1967: 40) 
claims that connecting the human and animal living spaces under the same roof 
has historically been a widespread practice throughout the northern European 
forest areas. It is an economic and convenient solution. Th is is certainly true for 
Scandinavia until the late Iron Age, around 600–1000 ACE (depending on the 
exact region).
In some cases, keeping animals in threshing grounds was a necessity, not 
the primary choice of the peasants. Habicht (1967: 63–100) remarked that 
regarding the Estonian settlers in the Pskov region in 1860s, the rehi house 
was always erected fi rst. Animals were kept in this house until separate sheds 
were constructed. Th e latter were also shared spaces, combining the cattle shed 
and chaff  loft  or the horse stall and pigsty. When the weather was not too cold, 
animals lived on the threshing grounds, but during bitterly cold times, they could 
also be taken to the rehetuba (the human living quarters). In both cases, cribs 
were attached to the walls for the animal fodder, and troughs were placed on the 
clay fl oor. When the weather became milder, animals were moved again from the 
rehetuba to the rehealune, until the vegetation season began and they could be led 
to pasture outdoors. Jaagosild writes that the most common human companions 
admitted to the rehetuba were hens and a rooster. Th ey would live in a hen coop, 
stationary or improvised (under the plank bed), or perch by the big rehi stove. 
Newborn animals, such as lambs and piglets, could be taken to the rehetuba for 
their fi rst days of life so that they could gain strength in a relatively warm and safe 
place, under the attention and nursing of the human peasant family.8 Animals 
that were about to deliver could also be taken to the rehetuba so that it would be 
easier to keep an eye on them and their off spring. Such episodes did not usually 
8 Such an arrangement of things reinforced the bonds between humans and animals from 
the start; in some cases, it most probably even resulted in imprinting.
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last more than a couple of days, aft er which the animals were returned to the 
threshing ground – hens being an exception. When the weather was harsh and 
the horses needed to be out for draughts on winter roads, even shoeing took place 
in the rehetuba (Jaagosild 1965: 89–91). 
In the following, some remarks about the placement of individual animal 
species in the threshing room are provided. 
Habitually, horses had to be kept close to humans (especially to men who 
were their main caretakers). Th is served several purposes. Horses were the most 
valuable domestic animals, and they had to be protected from theft . As horses 
worked in close co-operation with humans, they had to be in constant contact 
with their co-operation partners in order to maintain a trustworthy relationship. 
Horses served as assistant animals9 to humans in many regards. Living literally 
side by side has probably facilitated the establishment of mutual bonds of trust 
and understanding between humans and horses. Unlike cows, horses were always 
kept in the rehi building, in the same house where humans lived. Separate stall 
buildings for horses were fi rst erected only at the end of the 19th century, in 
association with the buying of farms by the former tenants (Jaagosild 1967: 225). 
Th e rehi was the most common space for horses until the 1960s (Pärdi 1998: 109). 
Horses seem to have a somewhat special status, as they could be placed in 
separate stalls against the wall of the rehealune. Peterson claims that the horse 
stalls were of a temporary nature. Permanent stalls could not have been built 
in the rehealune because the additional constructions would have hindered 
threshing (Peterson 1967: 21–25). 
Th e threshing room was also the space where all draught equipment – carts, 
sleighs, wagons, etc.  – was stored. Th us, we can regard keeping horses in the 
same room also from the point of view of technology: as animals and draught 
equipment formed functionally an inseparable unit, it made a lot of sense to keep 
them in one and the same space. Th e Estonian vernacular metaphor for horse, 
“oat engine”, also reveals the understanding of the animal as a part of a bigger 
technological entity. 
On the other hand, there is evidence for humans abusing such mutually 
trusting relationships, too. Historian Ken Ird has studied the court cases 
dealing with sodomy in the Early Modern times in Livonia (Ird 2013). One 
peculiar result is that most oft en, the accused men have engaged in forbidden 
relationships with their horses. Whereas tending cattle and taking care of the 
sheep were traditionally women’s tasks, men were typically the ones working with 
and taking care of horses; one result was that men used to spend considerable 
amounts of time together with their horses, but had probably less contact with 
other domestic animals. Such bestiality between men and horses could have a 
long history, and knowledge of such practices (real or imagined) is also attested 
in Swedish bronze age rock art (e.g. the rock carvings inside the grave mound at 
9 About the concept of assistant animals, see Magnus 2015. 
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Sagaholm, see Goldhahn 1999). However, in bronze age discourse, such images 
are seen as examples of how animals were perceived as enormously powerful; 
the myths portray them as partaking in the creation of the universe (Kristiansen, 
Larsson 2005: 320; Kaul 1998: 53; Fredell 2004: 437). Th erefore, it was important 
to have access to the power of animals: “[g]ods take animal shape to achieve their 
special powers and abilities, or animals take over part of the human soul. Animals 
in nature are spirited” (Kristiansen, Larsson 2005: 320). Th is way of thinking 
might be the foundation of the sexual human-horse relationship thought to be 
related to the initiation of the new king, and can be found in diff erent sources, 
depicted on Scandinavian rock art and also accounted for in Hittite laws and 
Irish sagas (Kristiansen, Larsson 2005: 324–328).
Cows, as has been indicated above, were kept in the threshing room either 
as fi xed along the walls or at the far end of the room. Cows were attached to the 
walls of the sheds or to the walls of the rehi by means of shackles. Small holes 
were drilled through the wall. Shackles were attached to these holes and secured 
from the other side of the wall with a wooden stick, oft en made of oak (Pärdi 
1998: 85). Fodder for cows was placed directly on the ground. When cribs started 
to be used in the rehealune, cows could be attached directly to the cribs. Th is 
probably required the animals to be relatively tame because such an attachment 
is weaker than when fastening animals directly to the walls by means of a tether. 
Cows having calves could be separated from the rest of the cattle.
Finnish researcher Taija Kaarlenkaski has studied the human/cow 
relationship on the basis of a Finnish collection of life histories about cattle-
keeping (Kaarlenkaski 2014: 191–216). She argues that in the case of small-scale 
farming, it is very important to have a trusting relationship with the cows. Cows 
are regarded as colleagues and family members in these stories, and many of 
their authors claim, based on their personal experiences, that women are better 
at building empathetic relationships with cows than men are. 
Sheep oft en had a separate shed attached to the outer wall of the rehi house. 
Ränk (1939: 305) writes about the custom of keeping sheep in the anteroom of 
the sauna and mentions that this arrangement has been preserved mostly on 
the islands, especially in eastern Saaremaa and the Muhu islands. During sauna 
evenings, the sheep were either driven out from the sauna or penned in one 
corner of the anteroom by means of a hurdle.
Jaagosild (1967: 44) writes that pigs were kept outside of the threshing room 
in a separate shed erected against the outer wall. Th e practical reasons for this 
are that the pig dung is liquid in its consistency and that it smells worse than 
the dung of many other domestic animals. Pigs also produce a lot of dung. If the 
pigsty was small, pigs could be taken indoors to the threshing ground at the end 
of the winter when the shed was too full of dung already. Being located “beyond 
the city walls” also made pigs more suspect to predators like wolves. Evidently 
pigs were not considered as valuable animals as horses, oxen or cows, given that 
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the precautionary measures for protecting them from being lost were not as 
strong as those exercised with other domestic animals. 
Th e few hens and cocks that were kept for the whole winter were usually kept 
in the same room as humans, since they are small birds and very sensitive to cold. 
In some cases, hens could also live in the threshing room. 
It is curious to fi nd that in Estonian ethnographic material, there is no 
mention of cats and dogs among domestic animals. Dogs were helping to herd 
the bigger animals, and they also repelled wild animals, such as wolves, from 
around the farms. Dogs roamed around freely and had a special place in the life-
world of the rehi dwellers. Unfortunately, this relationship has not been studied 
much and must therefore remain outside of the framework of the present article.
As a parallel to the Estonian material from Great Britain, MacGregor (2012: 
418) provides an observation from the 17th century, stating that “farmers and 
poor people [made] very little diff erence between themselves and their beasts” 
because they had to work daily, side by side. Treating animals bad would do harm 
to both the animals and to the humans whose daily lives depended on them. 
Figure 5. Animal positioning in the rehetuba from western Estonia. Th e door on the 
left  leads to the anteroom. Th e hen coop (1) and the drinking vessel for horses (2) are 
located next to the door that leads to the threshing ground (rehealune; 8). Th e hen coop 
could be sat or even slept on. Th e trough for pig food (3) is close to the drinking water 
buckets (4) and to the hearth where the food was prepared. Also indicated are the stove 
(5), the table (6), and a plank bed (7). Re-drawn from Jaagosild 1965: 93; based on the 
correspondents’ archives in the Estonian National Museum.
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Poor conditions in the rehi and harsh winters10 sometimes resulted in humans 
and animals literally sharing the same living space, as animals were temporarily 
transferred to the rehetuba – it was simply warmer together, and it was convenient 
to keep an eye on the sick animals. For hens and roosters who were kept with 
humans throughout the winter, special hen coops were established to keep the 
birds both warm and confi ned (Troska, Viires 1998: 278). Temporary latrines 
were made for young animals, too, so that they would not intertwine with the 
household activities of the humans. In Saaremaa and in western Estonia, cattle 
about to give birth were occasionally brought to the rehetuba (Pärdi 1998: 109). 
In case the delivery was problematic, even the sheep preparing to give birth 
could be brought into the living room until the critical event was over. Th e same 
is true regarding weak and sick animals: people preferred to take care of them 
in the warm rehetuba where it was also easier to keep an eye on them and to 
monitor their health situations (Troska, Viires 1998: 279). Gustav Ränk, the most 
prominent researcher on the functional aspects of Estonian peasant culture, has 
written in his concise overview of peasant houses in Saaremaa that 
In addition to humans, the rehetuba has sometimes also served as a space for 
domestic animals, but this habit has left  no traces in the construction of the 
room. Th e hurdles and ladders that were used to fi x small animals to some 
corner of the room – preferably behind the big stove – were a temporary 
feature in the room, as were the animals themselves. Th e beam that was 
attached to the wall for the hens and the rooster to roost upon, was removed 
as soon as the weather was warm enough to have the birds outside of the 
living room. During great winter colds, horses have sometimes been shoed 
in the rehetuba. Th is is testifi ed to by the iron rings attached to the side-post 
of the door between the living room and the threshing room in the rehi. 
(Ränk 1939: 184–185).11 
Th is indicates that domesticated animals were regarded as family members just 
as much as a resource on a traditional peasant farm. Especially those animals 
who were weak for some reason were admitted to human living quarters for the 
sake of better care. Th eir survival and well-being was an incorporated part of the 
habitus of the whole household. 
A poem in the Muhu dialect, written by Meeli Kokk in 2009, sums up the 
topic as follows:
10 Heiki Pärdi (1998: 109) argues that the threshing fl oor is actually not suitable for keeping 
animals in winter: it is too big and too cold a space. In order to keep the warmth emerg-
ing from animals inside the room, the doors were insulated with straw, fi r branches, etc. 
11 Translation from Estonian by K.T. 
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Nüüd oo müödas kõik nie aad,
luomi põle elus-moas.
Kümneid voastud tagasi
köis sie elu sedapsi –
et kut talve põrsas tuodi
taale tuppa tehti vuodi.
Ja viel oma silmaga 
ole seda koa näin ma, 
et laps makab oetel tallega.
Now these times are gone 
No animals around. 
It was tens of years ago
When it was a common lifestyle
When a piglet was in the house in winter
A bed for it was made in the living room.
And I have seen it 
with my own eyes – 
a child and sheep sleeping in the same bed.12
Conclusion12
Th ere is both archaeological evidence from Norway and ethnographic evidence 
from Estonia to the eff ect that domesticated animals and humans have shared 
their shelter, living under the same roof and occasionally even in the same room. 
By juxtaposing the data and comparing the comments of earlier researchers, we 
can say that the historical human–animal cohabitation is a topic that has not yet 
received a completely exhaustive analysis. Our contribution to the discussion 
stems from the semiotic understanding that life as such is communication-based. 
In order to be able to live closely together, a special habitus emerged, and even 
the umwelten of the engaged species grew more adjusted to each other. Th e areas 
where humans and animals worked and lived together, both indoors and outdoors, 
could be conceptualised as special eco-fi elds that met the needs of diff erent species. 
Animals most probably lived in human houses on a seasonal basis, mostly 
during the cold Nordic winters when it was not possible to herd the animals 
onto pasture lands and when the predation pressure was highest. Animals were 
located in human houses according to a certain order, taking into account their 
value, their movement and tending needs, and their health condition (such as 
delivery). In either case, the building structure of Norwegian longhouses and 
Estonian rehi houses does not give strong indications in their very construction 
of the animal placement. But as the Estonian example shows, such practices 
would not necessarily leave material traces. One possible reason for this is that 
the animals stayed indoors only seasonally, and the constructions that were built 
to meet their needs and the needs of the humans were rather ephemeral. Animals 
were fastened to their places by means of light wooden constructions that did not 
leave any permanent traces in the buildings or in the archaeological record. 
Th e fact that humans and domesticated animals have shared their overlapping 
life-worlds indicates that animals occupied an important position in the humans’ 
daily lives, in their well-being and in their umwelt in general. Perhaps our modern 
12 Translation from Estonian by K.T.
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human umwelt is much poorer because of the absence of other species next to 
our own?
Our brief comparison of this study material indicates that, in the past, animals 
were considered to be important counterparts in human life, and that animals 
and humans alike could be household members that each served cultural, social 
and economic ends for the good of all. Further, trust is important to the human/
animal relationship and is brought on by the proximity and ensuing intimacy 
of the shared life-space. Humans trust animals to be docile and cooperative, 
whereas animals trust humans to protect them, feed them and care for them. 
Mary Midgley highlights the social spark necessary to create such relationships: 
“All creatures which have been successfully domesticated [...] were originally 
social. Th ey have transferred to human beings the trust and docility which, in the 
wild state, they would have developed towards their parents, and, in adulthood, 
towards the leaders of their pack or herd” (Midgley 1983: 112). Fundamental 
trust forms the basis for animals to give up some of their autonomy and for 
humans to claim responsibility (Armstrong Oma 2007: 64, 2010).
In order to more fully understand the nature of such co-habitual relationships, 
the application of an umwelt-centred semiotic approach in the interpretation of 
archaeological and ethnographical data may provide further insights into this 
very interesting question. 
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Semiotics and the species management discourse: 




Th e present era of anthropogenic environmental change creates conditions for 
many species to spread beyond their initial living ranges – a process that may have 
further eff ects on local ecosystems, human societies and cultures. Th e purpose of 
this chapter is to map the semiotic and temporal dynamics of these processes by 
focusing on the semiotic activity and dynamics of the new species and diff erent 
interest groups in human societies. A specifi c feature of human discourse on new 
or invasive species appears to be its dynamic nature, with new species adapting 
to the local ecosystem, thereby changing knowledge of the interested human 
parties, with no participant having full information of the process. In order 
to study such dynamical interactions between culture and nature, the present 
chapter synthesises understandings of the semiotics of cultural change (Lotman 
2009), of the semiotics of environmental communication (Low 2008), of the 
social studies of species management, and of Actor-Network Th eory (Callon 
1986; Law 2008; Latour 1997), as well as of the semiotics of animal modelling 
(Uexküll 1982; Sebeok 1990, 1991) and culture-nature relations (Kull 1998).
From the biosemiotic/zoosemiotic perspective, it is important to take into 
consideration the semiotic activity and subjectivity of the individuals of the new 
species itself when describing their relations with other biological agents, with 
human interest groups, and with underlying human cultural factors (e.g. the 
general cultural models and distinctions used to make sense of animals). Th e 
general methodological principles of a semiotic approach to species management 
could be mapped as follows:
1.  Natural processes, nonhuman animals and human social groups are all 
con sidered to be agents that are able to initiate change and which can be 
infl uenced by changes initiated by other parties.
2.  All living parties (species, diff erent social groups) are considered to be semiotic 
subjects. Semiotic subjects seek to understand their environment. In order to 
do this, semiotic subjects use their abilities of modelling (that is, making sense 
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of surrounding environments, processes and actors on the basis of analogical 
relations) and self-modelling (Lotman 1967: 130–131; Sebeok 1991).
3.  Th e process of species conservation is seen as an ongoing negotiation of self-
modelling and modelling processes between diff erent human parties and 
biological species. In this process, various means of communication are used. 
Th ese methodological principles emphasise both the activity of semiotic 
subjects as well as communicative interactions and regulation between 
diff erent parties (cf. Maran 2015).  
As a practical research object to exemplify the proposed theoretical approach 
and methodology, this chapter is based on the case study of the emergence of 
the golden jackal (Canis aureus) in Estonia, its cultural interpretations and the 
dynamics of the developing discourse. As far as we know, the golden jackal is not 
a native species in the Baltic region. Th e closest stable populations of the golden 
jackal to Estonia are in Hungary and in the Balkans. In recent years, jackals 
have also been found in Austria and Slovakia, and the geographical range of the 
species appears to be moving northward (Arnold et al. 2012). Th e fi rst specimen 
of the golden jackal in Estonia was hunted down at the end of February 2013 in 
the Hanila parish, western Estonia. Anecdotal evidence about encounters with 
the new species followed from other regions. In this context, the new species, its 
trajectory of arrival and its possible infl uence on the local environment became a 
topic of vivid discussion among zoology specialists, environmental offi  cials, the 
local people of the Hanila parish, and the general po pulation. 
In order to study the opinions about golden jackals and to detect underlying 
cultural motifs, nine semi-structured interviews were conducted in the autumn 
of 2013 with local inhabitants of the Hanila region and of western Estonia, as 
well as with people with some professional involvement (professional zoologists, 
offi  cials at the Ministry of Environment and state environmental agencies). Th e 
interviews were arranged around the following topics: participants in and the 
nature of the discourse on the golden jackal, the position of the golden jackal 
with regard to Estonian nature, the concept of non-native species, cultural and 
ethical issues related to the golden jackal, and personal familiarity with the 
golden jackal. Th e interviews lasted from thirty minutes to one hour and fi ft een 
minutes, and were later fully transcribed and coded by keywords. In addition, 
biological research articles on the golden jackal, popular articles in public media, 
and internet commentaries were used as sources of supporting information. 
In discussion among specialists as well as in public discourse in newspapers, 
considerable attention was paid to the issue of how the golden jackals arrived 
in Estonia: whether by natural migration or by being brought in by humans 
and released into the wild. Th e latter option would justify seeing these as alien 
or invasive species. In May 2013, the Estonian Ministry of Environment took 
the position that the golden jackal in Estonia is a non-native species. Th is was 
followed in September 2013 by a statement from the Environmental Board 
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(Keskkonnaamet, a state offi  ce for environmental issues) granting to local hunters’ 
organisations the right to shoot golden jackals for regulating the species. Th at 
decision gained mixed responses from diff erent interest groups.
Th e case study of the golden jackal in Estonia provided knowledge about 
diff erent aspects of environmental communication and culture-nature relations 
in regard to novel species. Th e results on the semiotic activity of the golden 
jackals, as well as their cultural modelling, were published in Maran 2015. Based 
on the same case study, in this chapter I analyse the temporal dynamics and 
diff erent stages of the discourse on this new species.
2. Temporal dynamics of the novel species discourse
2.1. Theoretical framework
Th e emergence of golden jackals in Estonia has been defi nitely not a static 
situation. Both the ecological situation and the discourse surrounding golden 
jackals has changed quickly without many fi xed points of reference. Th e living 
range of golden jackals was in fl ux, as they supposedly spread from the Hanila 
parish to other areas in Estonia. Scientifi c understanding of golden jackals has 
not been reliable, as there was a lack of data about the behaviour and ecology 
of golden jackals in the Nordic climate. Th eir relations to other species (prey, 
competitors, predators) has gradually become better known. Th e discourse 
surrounding the golden jackals appeared to be in development, with a lot of 
information about jackals existing in the form of rumours, anecdotal evidence, 
and personal opinions. 
For analysing such dynamical processes, approaches in semiotics and cultural 
theory can be useful. From a cultural semiotic viewpoint, Juri Lotman (2009) 
has described the interchanging eras of culture in terms of normal development, 
and explosion. In the explosive stage, the transformations of culture are 
unpredictable, and the self-description of the culture is hindered. Th e description 
and evaluation of the unpredictable rupture is constructed post-factum, aft er the 
explosive stage, when the cultural communication becomes normalised again: 
“Th e moment in which the explosion is exhausted represents the turning point 
of the process. In the sphere of history this is not only the originating moment 
of future development but also the place of self-knowledge: the inclusion of 
those mechanisms of history which must themselves explain what has occurred” 
(Lotman 2009: 15). In the context of the present topic, it is relevant to perceive 
that diff erent forms of environmental change can also act as explosive situations 
that disturb the development of cultural discourse. Environmental change is an 
externally induced alteration of culture, and its full meaning and eff ect oft en 
becomes clear only retrospectively. Another useful tool to describe the dynamical 
processes between culture and environment is Kalevi Kull’s (1998) ecosemiotic 
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typology of diff erent natures in the semiosphere. Th is typology distinguishes 
between four dynamical stages of nature mediated by human cultures as follows: 
0-nature is nature as it is in itself, 1-nature is nature as perceived and verbalised 
by culture, 2-nature is nature altered on the basis of cultural perceptions and 
3-nature is nature represented as a part of culture. For the following discussion, 
it is relevant to note that there exist dynamics between diff erent forms of nature 
in human culture  – that is, one type can change into another. With some 
adjustments, Kull’s typology can also be used to describe relations between an 
animal species and human culture (cf. Maran 2008, 2014).   
Th e temporal dimension of human environmental confl icts has been also 
theorised by the French sociologist and Actor-Network Th eory scholar Michel 
Callon (1986), who distinguishes between four subsequent stages of human 
involvement in the environmental confl icts. With some simplifi cation, these 
stages can be called
1.  the problematisation, where the original problem is perceived and verbalised;
2.  ‘interessement’, or activities by which identities will be attached to the 
participants and the meaning of the situation will be fi xed;
Callon interprets environmental confl icts in terms of the pursuit of the social 
group to establish, propagate and protect its interpretation of the situation.
From the biosemiotic/zoosemiotic viewpoint, we should emphasise the role 
of the biological agent. Th e four stages of the temporal dynamic of environmental 
confl ict could be described as follows: 1) an expression of the activity of the 
biological agent, 2) a counteraction by the cultural-social discourse in an attempt 
to control the situation, 3) a perceivable discrepancy between the self-organisation 
of the biological agent and the meaning attribution by the cultural discourse, 
and 4) an emerging new layer of interactions between biological and cultural 
agencies, normalising the cultural discourse. Th e major diff erence from Callon’s 
typology is that while he emphasises the position and activity of the human agent, 
for the present biosemiotic approach the semiotic eff ects of biological agents in 
the environment are also taken into account. Such a view is supported by David 
Low’s (2008) analysis of semiotic environmental communication, in which he 
makes a distinction between a knowledge approach and an enquiry approach 
to environmental communication, the latter of which is concerned with seeking 
out the truth about the communicative processes in the environment itself. In 
both approaches, Low emphasises the role of dissent (disagreeing perceptions 
or activities) by ecological and cultural agents as an essential property of 
environmental communication. Drawing from Peircean semiotics, for him 
human assertions about environmental processes (interpretant) are always 
approximations of what is happening on the actual object level, and the essential 
3.  enrolment, or the problematics and strategies of how to make participants 
stay in their particular roles;
4.  mobilisation of allies, or the question of how to fi nd and choose representatives 
of diff erent parties and engage them in the process. 
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cause of the dissent is the diff erence between the dynamic and the immediate 
object (Low 2008: 56).1
In the following subchapter, I will discuss how the four stages of environmental 
confl ict were perceptible in the emergence of the golden jackal in Estonia. As part 
of human cultural activity (corresponding to the second stage of the typology 
mentioned above), some authors have also used the concept of “enactment” as a 
“performative aspect of knowledge – how, that is, objects are “done” or “enacted” 
in diff erent ways by diff erent interested parties” (Knudsen 2014: 62). To trace 
the dynamical relations between the biological agency of golden jackals and 
human agency, I make a methodological simplifi cation and limit the following 
discussion of human agency to the state policy makers and environmental 
offi  cials. In the case-study, the interrelations between zoologists, environmental 
offi  cials and local inhabitants formed a complex web of interactions. For example, 
the co-operation between fi eld biologists and their endeavours in determining 
the new species formed a dynamic discourse of its own. Th ese interrelations 
between diff erent human interest groups (environmental offi  cials, local farmers, 
professional zoologists, hunters, etc.) that may have diff erent complex confl ict 
dynamics (e.g. Gerner et al. 2011) are thus not included in the present analysis.     
2.2. Application in the case study of the emergence of the golden 
jackal in Estonia 
To include the jackals’ agency, we need to adopt a biosemiotic/zoosemiotic 
perspective that treats semiotic utterances of humans and other species on the 
same grounds (following e.g. zoosemiotics, Sebeok 1990). It may be claimed that 
the golden jackals’ semiotic activity itself had a considerable infl uence on the 
initiation and development of the discourse. Th e fi rst rumours of the unknown 
species were based on local farmers of the Hanila region hearing the golden jackal’s 
howling. In physical encounters, the golden jackals had a certain character and 
behaviour which appealed to local people. Such experiences were reported by the 
local people of Hanila as important aspects in their interactions with the golden 
jackals. As told by a local informant (M, 1955), “[the Jackal] is very sensitive, 
very lively. Th e fox is clever, they say, but the fox is stupid in my mind. But this 
is something else... [the jackal] is beautiful, slender, alert [...] still lovely and 
interesting or so. And sometimes we look each other in the eye”. 2 Th e golden 
jackal’s visual appearance, with its long legs, slim body and seemingly eff ortless 
1 Th is distinction is based on the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce. According to him, objects 
can be further divided into two aspects: the “immediate object”, which is the object as it is 
revealed within the sign itself, and the “dynamical object”, which is the object that exists 
outside the sign. Th e dynamical object we know by “collateral”, that is, through indirect 
knowledge (CP 8: 314).
2 All interview excerpts are translated from Estonian by the author. Respondents are re-
ferred to anonymously as (gender [M/F], year of birth).  
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movement in photographs and videos, has probably also had an infl uence on the 
general public discourse.  
With regard to the four semiotic stages of the confl ictual process of new 
species, the fi rst stage – an expression of the activity of the biological agent – 
would cover the events from the emergence of the golden jackals in Estonia to the 
offi  cial recognition of the species as a part of biological taxonomy: golden jackal. 
Early imaginations of the golden jackal included naming it as a “strange creature” 
(imeloom in Estonian) and as the “howling fox”, based on the analogical relation 
to the red fox. Th e information that was available about the unknown species 
in this stage was episodic, ambivalent and largely anecdotal. People’s opinions 
varied to a great extent. Th e offi  cial recognition of golden jackals took time, 
and the local people who had had personal experiences with the animal were 
somewhat stressed that their observations were not taken seriously.
Th e second stage  – counter-action by cultural discourse in an attempt 
to control the situation  – started with the confi rmation of the new species by 
environmental offi  cials and by their labelling it as a non-native species. Interpreting 
the golden jackal as a non-native species was in fact one among several existing 
interpretations. Interviewees also perceived golden jackals as representing an 
increase in biodiversity, or as a tourist attraction; they were also curious due to 
their naturalist or research interests, and expressed emphatic attitudes derived 
from the cultural image of the settlers’ narrative (cf. Maran 2015). Th e decision 
to interpret the golden jackal as a non-native species was made promptly by 
environmental offi  cials in order to avoid the possible negative eff ects of golden 
jackals on the local nature, as well as to prevent jackals from spreading. On the 
cultural-discursive level, the environmental offi  cials refused to interpret golden 
jackals as having any subjectivity. Th e hunting process was offi  cially described in 
neutral terms as the “removal of the non-native species from Estonian nature”,3 
with offi  cials saying that “the Estonian Hunters’ Society asked what we are going 
to do about this non-native species and we answered that, yes, we consider it 
to be a non-native species” (F, 1983). A neutralising and in some cases even a 
demonising approach (see fi gure 1) prevented jackals from entering the public 
discourse as subjects but, at the same time, laid the basis for the future discursive 
confl ict between the golden jackals and policy makers. Applying Michael Callon’s 
concept of ‘interessement’ to the second stage, an attempt was made to fi x the 
meaning of golden jackals as not being part of Estonian nature and cultural 
discourse. 
3  Amet: šaakalid tuleb eemaldada, Eesti Päevaleht, 21. May 2013.
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Figure 1. Golden jackal labelled as a “dangerous non-native species” in an article in the 
Estonian daily newspaper Eesti Päevaleht, 12.09.2013.
We could also perceive that in order to stage golden jackals as a non-native species, 
several conceptual and factual problems needed to be overcome, and fi xing the 
meaning of non-nativeness for the golden jackal required intentional eff ort. Th is 
was so from the very beginning, as the concept of a non-native species is itself 
formally diffi  cult to defi ne. For example, it is not easy to determine the scope of 
human activities (do indirect activities, such as human-induced environmental 
change, count?) and what are the spatial and temporal limits of “local nature” 
(are these the state borders of Estonia, or rather a wider geographical region? For 
discussion concerning the ambivalence of the “non-native species” concept, see 
Warren, 2007). Second, the position of the golden jackal was especially problematic 
in relation to the native/non-native divide, since scientifi c evidence was missing 
about whether humans have transported and released specimens of golden jackals 
into Estonian nature or whether they were spreading on their own. Th us, the 
concept of “non-native species” appeared to be used as an “operational concept” 
according to the custom and need. Th is understanding was also supported by the 
opinions of people interviewed: “this entire concept of non-native species is really 
diffi  cult to settle” (M, 1959); “it is such a purely anthropocentric concept that ... and 
well, those borders are so fuzzy” (F, 1972) (cf. Maran 2015).
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In interpreting the cultural perception of the golden jackal, it should be taken 
into account that the cultural perceptions themselves were framed by a broader 
change of environmental conditions. Th at is, they could be interpreted in the 
framework of a shift ing balance between the global environmental change and 
cultural auto-communication and a drive towards stability. As expressed by 
respondents, “If indirectly climate warming is the reason for why certain species 
are moving up north, then what are we going to do? Shall we start building a 
Chinese wall on the Estonian border to prevent species from entering? What’s the 
point?” (M, 1959); “As there is this climate warming and soon turtles will also be 
here, then this is inevitable, we cannot do much about this. We can be rude and it 
can be good for a while or it can also be catastrophically bad” (M, 1955).
At the present moment, the fourth stage of the process is still a matter of 
speculation. I would expect some normalisation of the interactions between the 
golden jackals and human agents to occur, which would lead to an acceptance of 
golden jackals as members of Estonian fauna, accompanied by the use of normal 
measures of wildlife surveillance and species regulation. It can also be expected 
that in the fourth stage, the topic of golden jackals will lose its exceptionality and 
special meaning, and golden jackals will be treated as one among other non-native 
mammalian species in Estonia (e.g. the raccoon dog [Nyctereutes procyonoides], 
the American mink [Neovison vison], and the muskrat [Ondatra zibethicus]). In 
In the sequence of the semiotic stages of environmental confl ict as presented 
above, the third stage was characterised by an increasing discrepancy and confl ict 
between the self-organisation of the biological system/agency and the meanings 
attributed by the cultural discourse. At the time this chapter was written (March 
2015), the third stage of the process was still in development, but we can already 
witness how the activities of the golden jackal, as well as diff erent social factors, 
do not support the dominant cultural discourse of the golden jackal as a non-
native species. Th ere have been new fi ndings of golden jackals in various regions 
of Estonia: western (Hanila, Taritu), southwestern (Häädemeeste) and the 
eastern (Kiviõli) region (altogether 9 confi rmed specimens shot or found dead), 
as well as in Latvia (8 individuals). Th is suggests that the jackals have spread 
more widely than expected by environmental offi  cials and that their quick 
removal as a non-native species is becoming problematic. Th e several fi ndings of 
jackals in the Baltic region also question the hypothesis of human agency (that 
is, the deliberate introduction by transportation/translocation) as the cause of 
the emergence of the golden jackals. Th e hunting measures have not turned out 
to be very successful, and at least in some cases, local inhabitants empathetic 
toward golden jackals have ceased giving information about the whereabouts 
of golden jackals to offi  cials. Th e self-organisation of the biological agency (the 
jackal as well as other ecologically related species) creates conditions for dialogue 
and “negotiation” that may lead to a more interactional and balanced cultural 
discourse. 
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the case of carnivorous species, this would probably mean establishing a shift ing 
balance between species abundance and predatory activity on one hand and 
human regulative hunting measures on the other. Th is would produce a hectic 
and emotional yet relatively stable discourse.
In applying the temporal model proposed above to the case study of the 
emergence of the golden jackal into Estonia, it is also relevant to recognise that 
the temporal stages of environmental confl ict are probably not exclusive to one 
another but instead overlap partially. In a temporal sequence, we can depict this 
as a series of subsequent waves. Th e discourse is triggered by an activity of the 
biological agent. Th ereaft er the counter-activity by the human cultural-social 
agent commences, diff erent interpretations emerge and the dominant discourse 
makes an attempt to overcome and suppress the activity of the biological agent. 
If human actions are eff ective, the biological agent may be excluded from the 
environment and from the discourse. If they turn out to be ineff ective, the activity 
of the biological agent will be expressed in ways that do not fi t in the existing 
cultural-social discourse and will endanger its stability. In the third wave, some 
sort of balance will be found between the activities of the human and biological 
agent, and the discursive system will incorporate both of them. 
3. Further perspectives
Four temporal stages of environmental confl ict in non-native species discourse 
were distinguished above: 1) expression of the activity of the biological agent; 2) 
counter-action by the cultural-social discourse in an attempt to control events; 
3) perceivable discrepancy between the self-organisation of the biological agent 
and the meaning attributed by cultural discourse; 4) emergence of a new type of 
semiotic interaction between the biological and cultural agents. Although this 
typology has not been tested in other cases besides the emergence of the golden 
jackal in Estonia, it can be expected to map the general dynamics of environmental 
confl icts. In this subchapter, I will discuss some further theoretical and practical 
possibilities of this typology with regard to other sources in biosemiotics.
We can notice a remarkable parallel between the temporal typology of the 
environmental confl ict and Kull’s (1998) typology of diff erent natures in the 
semio sphere (fi gure 2). Both typologies consist of four entities, and it is possible 
to map one-to-one correspondences between these. Expression of the activity of 
the biological agent corresponds to the interaction between Kull’s 0 and 1 nature 
(that is, nature from nature interacting with culture from nature); counter-action 
by the cultural-social discourse in an attempt to control would correspond to the 
interaction between Kull’s 1 and 2 nature (that is, culture from nature interacting 
with nature from culture) and so on (Table 1). Th e interactional nature of Kull’s 
typology as juxtaposed with the typology of temporal dynamics comes from 
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the fact that the original typology by Callon describes diff erent aspects of the 
confl ict, whereas Kull’s typology describes mediation stages of nature in human 
culture. Kull’s approach can be seen as a general typology of culture-nature 
relations, whereas the temporal typology of the environmental confl ict is suitable 
for special dynamical cases where biological agency plays an important part in 
the process.
Figure 2. Th e processes which generate the 0th, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd nature. N – nature, 
M – image (Kull 1998: 357, published with permission).
Table 1. Possible correspondences between the typology of the temporality of 
environmental confl ict and Kull’s typology of diff erent natures in the semiosphere.
Stages of environmental confl ict Kull’s (1998) typology of diff erent natures in 
the semiosphere
Expression of the activity of the 
biological agent
Interaction between 0 and 1 nature
Counter-action by cultural-social 
discourse and an attempt to control 
events
Interaction between 1 and 2 nature
Perceivable discrepancy between the 
self-organising force of the biological 
agent and meaning attribution by 
cultural discourse
Interaction between 2 and 0 nature
Emergence of a new type of semiotic 
interaction between the biological and 
cultural agencies.
Interaction between 3 and 0 nature
Juxtaposing the typology of environmental confl ict and Kull’s typology of diff e-
rent natures in the semiosphere could help us understand the discrepancies of 
human activities in the situation of environmental change. For instance, it was 
proposed that the counter-action by the cultural-social discourse corresponds to 
the interaction between Kull’s 1st and 2nd nature (culture from nature interacting 
with nature from culture). If this is correct, then in Kull’s conceptual framework 
the counter-action by the cultural-social discourse would be connected with the 
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incompatibility of human perception and action towards nature. Th e environ-
mental relationship (especially with regard to some natural agency) would include 
the confl ict between the parts of culture that are aligned with the perception of 
the environment (Merkwelt, Uexküll 1982) and those that are more aligned with 
action toward the environment (Wirkwelt). In the case of the emergence of the 
golden jackals in Estonia, diff erences were indeed observable in the attitudes 
between the local inhabitants and environmental offi  cials (e.g. with regard to 
the positioning of agency to human culture/environment, in the belief of the 
eff ectiveness of hunting measures, see Maran 2015). Th us it seems reasonable to 
propose that the temporal dynamics between the new species and human cultural 
discourse also brings along certain dynamics within the culture itself: namely, a 
discrepancy between environmental perception (human Merkwelt) and action/
regulation (human Wirkwelt). Furthermore, diff erences in the ways that humans 
arrange and attach to nature in the semiosphere are accentuated.   
Conclusions
Based on the case study of the golden jackal in Estonia, the emergence of the 
novel species appears to cause an environmental confl ict with specifi c temporal 
dynamics. In such a confl ict, the activities of the animal as a semiotic subject 
and as an agent have an important eff ect on the development of the discourse. 
Th e emergence of the new species may create instabilities in culture and in 
culture-nature relations. Th e cultural discourse appears to go through diff erent 
stages of development, with a potential for confl ict rising from the dynamical 
structure of the process itself (as discrepancies between the biological agent and 
the human agent as well as between perception and action in the environment). 
For culture, the emergence of the new species creates an unpredictable situation 
(sensu Lotman’s explosion) that makes it diffi  cult to describe and also to analyse 
the events. Instead, in the process of the emerging new species, the discourse 
is overfl own with ambivalent and partly contradictory information, and a 
reliable understanding emerges retrospectively (cf. Callon et al. 2011). In such 
processes, a successful management practice as well as an analysis would depend 
on a broad framing of the communicative process that acknowledges the agency 
of both humans and of non-humans and the role of dissent in environmental 
communication. In such a situation, including diff erent interest groups (fi eld 
biologists, local inhabitants, etc.) in the decision-making process and making use 
of integrative communication practices could be suggested as a way to a more 
reliable and long-lasting environmental communication practice.
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The semiotics of predation 
and the umwelten of large predators
Morten Tønnessen
1. Introduction
Carnivores are emblematic of the brutality of nature in that, apparently, in order 
to live, they have to take lives  – as, at the very least, most animals do.1 Th is 
is not strictly speaking the case, since various scavengers and vultures feed on 
dead animals without necessarily killing them. Even herbivores – animals that 
eat plants and perhaps fungi – might to some extent be taking lives, even though 
herbivores oft en feed on plants, or rather plant parts, without necessarily killing 
the plant organism.2 But predators kill.3 And carnivores are generally associated 
1 Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016) defi nes a carnivore as (1) “an animal that eats 
meat”; “a meat eater” (simple defi nition), with the full defi nition (1) “any of an order 
(Carnivora) of typically fl esh-eating mammals that includes dogs, foxes, bears, raccoons, 
and cats”; “broadly: a carnivorous animal”, with the secondary meaning “a carnivorous 
plant”. “Carnivorous”, in turn, is primarily defi ned as “subsisting or feeding on animal 
tissues”. In this chapter, by “carnivore” I mean a meat-eating animal, i.e. an animal that 
sustains itself to some extent (and in most cases primarily) by digesting animal tissue. As 
we see in Merriam-Webster’s defi nition, the notion of carnivore is sometimes used in a 
stricter sense to refer only to animal species belonging to the mammal order Carnivora. 
But not all species in the order of Carnivora are carnivores in the sense of meat-eaters 
(the almost exclusively herbivorous panda is one example), and there are several meat-
eating animals – and indeed some carnivorous plants and fungi – that do not belong to 
this order of mammals. I thus use the term “carnivore” in its broad scientifi c sense, but 
limited to carnivorous animals. 
2 Taking a plant life is usually thought of as being radically diff erent from taking an animal 
life, at least if the animal in question is sentient. Nevertheless, in the bigger picture the act 
of taking a life, or even feeding on plant parts without killing the plant organism, always 
has ecological repercussions, notwithstanding the fact that carnivorous behaviour typically 
leads to diff erent population dynamics when compared with herbivorous behaviour. 
3 In Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016), a “predator” is defi ned as “an animal that lives 
by killing and eating other animals” (i.e., among carnivores in a broad sense, unlike car-
nivorous plants and fungi, only carnivorous animals are predators); “an animal that preys 
on other animals” (simple defi nition 1), with the full defi nition (2) “an animal that lives 
by predation”, and with “predation” defi ned as “the act of killing and eating other ani-
mals”; “the act of preying on other animals”.
151The semiotics of predation and the umwelten of large predators 
with predatory behaviour, although, as we see, not all carnivores are predators. 
Predators thus form a subcategory of carnivores, and are correctly associated 
with killing – causing death, fear and, to varying degrees, suff ering. 
Th e act of killing can oft en, but not always, legitimately be associated with 
violence.4 Th is is because the act of killing is not synonymous with an act of 
violence. Depending on the animal’s cognitive capacity and overview of the 
situation, an act of violence may or may not be perceived as violent and/or life-
threatening by the animal that is a victim of predation. A crucial diff erence between 
the taking of animal lives and the taking of plant lives is that whereas in the case 
of animals the feeding-related act is almost always perceived by the victim of the 
feeding, in the case of plants the feeding-related act is systematically perceived only 
by the eater. Any reference to ‘violence’ in the context of feeding presupposes that 
the feeding-related act can, at least in principle, be perceived both by the eater and 
by the victim of the eating. On the other hand, it does not necessarily presuppose 
that the animal being killed and/or eaten understands who or what it is that eats it.
Surely, some of the most severe acts of violence are concluded by morphing 
into acts of killing. But in the context of violence, it is crucial to distinguish 
between malicious intentions and, for example, feeding-related intentions. In 
general, when preying on other animals, predators intend to kill, but they do not 
kill because of any malicious intentions. Historically, predators have a reputation 
for being beasts ruled by hunger and are still looked upon as iconic murderers. But 
given the facts of the matter and considered in relation to predators’ intentions 
in preying situations, it is unfair to regard them as icons of murder, and of 
murderers – for a murderer is, as tradition would have it, a killer with malicious 
intentions. Generally, an animal’s motivation for killing another animal may be 
related, for example, to 1) defending oneself or one’s kin, 2) competition with 
conspecifi cs or others, 3) feeding, or 4) exploration or fun – or a combination of 
some of these categories5 (see Tønnessen 2009b for an analysis of domestic cats’ 
cruelty play, e.g. with mice). Up to three of these four categories of motivation for 
killing another animal (1, 2, 3) are related to matters of life and death. In the cases 
where animals kill for fun, there is usually an element of learning involved. Both 
when animals kill for fun and when they kill to feed, they tend not to empathise 
4 “Violence” is in Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016) defi ned, among other things, as 
“the use of physical force to harm someone” (excerpt of simple defi nition 1), or “exertion 
of physical force so as to injure or abuse” (excerpt of full defi nition 1a). However, the 
term is very oft en applied only to humans. Coincidentually, in a seminar at the Univer-
sity of Oslo on November 11th 2010, the internationally prominent criminologist Nils 
Christie (1928–2015) claimed that the term only makes sense with reference to human 
victims. However, if animal sentience is to be taken seriously, then animals, too, must in 
principle qualify as victims of violence.
5 For instance, in some species infanticide may be motivated (to the extent that the ration-
ale behind the act is somehow understood or felt by the animal itself) by a combination 
of 1) defence and 2) competition.
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with their victims. Predators generally have selective empathy (though this claim 
may perhaps be made about any empathic creature whatsoever, since no creature 
on this planet is in every respect empathic). Most predators engage in radically 
diff erent social relations (the term ‘social relation’ is here used so as to envelop all 
signifi cant ecological relations with others, no matter of what nature), including 
social relations where empathy with kin and possibly others are central. But in 
killing situations, empathy is usually turned off , as it were.6
It is no mystery that farmers, hunters and others are provoked by predators 
when these attack animals in the care of humans. Naturally, people tend to 
empathise with “their animals”, and to see them torn apart, killed or wounded 
by predators can leave mental scars, as it were, and can lead to hostile attitudes 
towards the perpetrators. Generally, confl icts related to predator management are 
oft en caused, in material terms, by depredation on humans (this hardly happens 
anymore in contemporary Europe), depredation on livestock or companion 
animals, and competition for prey or territory (see 4.1 Confl icts of interest: Whose 
prey?). Additionally, many of those who are opposed to conservation policies are 
motivated by fear for their own safety or that of their loved ones.
Th e conservation of predators is oft en controversial, among other reasons 
because some predators hurt economic interests and livelihoods, and because 
they attack animals that are in our care and that we empathise with. At the same 
time, from the vantage point of ecology, predators are important components 
of functioning ecosystems, and, partly in consequence of this, are central 
in the context of biodiversity. If we were to draw a detailed global map of all 
the signifi cant ecological relations of contemporary humans (cf. Tønnessen 
6 In Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016), the secondary simple defi nition of “predator” is 
“a person who looks for other people in order to use, control, or harm them in some way”. 
One might argue that even human killers are as a rule motivated by either 1) defence, 
2) competition, 3) fun/exploration, or 4) feeding, or a combination of these factors. Th is 
would involve a desire to 1) defend oneself, kin, loved ones or core values, 2) defeat/
overcome someone, 3) see what happens, or 4) feed, respectively. In the context where 
humans kill humans, being motivated by fun/exploration (3) or feeding (4) would gener-
ally be thought of as pathological, i.e. out of the ordinary. Being motivated by defence 
(1) and/or competition (2) would be much more common. While rape murders could 
be motivated by (1) and/or (3), and the act of killing oneself  – suicide  – most oft en 
as (1) (core values), examples of kills motivated by (1) and/or (2) include gang-related 
murders, robbery-related killings, revenge killings, honour killings, partner homicide, 
and war killings. One can observe that murderous intentions (that is, intentions to kill 
someone, for whatever reason), do not usually appear to involve malicious intentions as 
such – possible exceptions are represented by (3) and (4). In other words, though it might 
conceivably oft en occur as emotional fl avouring of deeper motivations, a desire to harm 
does not, as a rule, seem to be the main motivation for killing another human being. 
Murders rather seem to be caused by too low regard for human life, by brutal/simplifi ed 
value-related reasoning, and/or by misplaced loyalty. Th ese observations make no claim 
on the validity/soundness of ‘reasons to kill’, but simply categorise diff erent perceived 
motivations for killing another human being.
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2011b: 102–103), we would realise that in eff ect we as a species predominantly 
have a highly negative relation to predators (see also section 4. Th e semiotics of 
predation). Th is is, for one thing, because species that prey on animals that are 
of economic or emotional value to humans are generally treated as threats, pest 
species, etc., and because we tend in practice to care most for animals that we 
have some specifi c interest in. Conservation practices work like a counterweight 
to these deep-rooted tendencies. 
Over the last generation or so, large carnivores have made a comeback of sorts 
in Europe aft er decades and centuries of extermination campaigns.7 Given that 
conservation biology is of great importance to the future of large predators, I will 
in this chapter pay attention to various issues concerned with how conservation 
practices are carried out, as well as how ethology is conducted. “At the beginning 
of the twenty-fi rst century”, as King (2013: 153) observes, “behavioral research 
conducted by direct observations on wild animals appears to have fallen out of 
fashion”. She explains this by the contemporary interest in technological means, 
such as trail cameras and telemetry collars. While the latter can give relevant 
information on habitat use and so on, such technological aids “provide few fi ne 
details of an animal’s life” (King 2013: 153, cf. also p. 157). In King’s view, “it is 
necessary to actively watch animals outside and be receptive to subtle environmental 
variations to understand their behavior” (King 2013: 153). Th ese activities are time-
consuming, but as she argues, nothing can replace them with regard to knowledge 
acquisition. In my experience, many zookeepers involved in the socialisation of 
wild animals are typically more knowledgeable of their behaviour than wildlife 
management professionals are. Th is is no mystery, given the time they have at their 
disposal with the animals and given the close contact they have with them. Such 
zookeepers also tend to get to know the animals individually.8 
In this chapter, I will start out by describing or listing some of the study 
animals covered in the theme of large predator management. I will then outline 
the umwelten of large predators (which are today signifi cantly aff ected by 
various management practices), with a focus on signifi cation, communication 
and representation in the management of large predators. Next follows a case 
study on the wolf, one of the most emblematic large predators. Th is case study 
includes work on the symbolism of the wolf in the Norwegian context, as well 
as a more general sketch of the cultural semiotic of wolves and sheep (an animal 
that is oft en associated with the wolf). A fourth section addresses the topic of 
7 For a review of the recovery of large carnivores in Europe, one which argues that “large 
carnivores and people can share the same landscape”, see Chapron et al. 2014: 1517. See 
also Boitani et al. 2015. For a recent paper on wolf resurgence, which refers to both eco-
semiotics and landscape hermeneutics, see Drenthen 2016.
8 Many tend to think that only some animals have personalities. But it is a telling fact that 
if you ask zookeepers that are attentive to the captive animals they look aft er, they will 
almost without exception report that they observe individual diff erences among the ani-
mals in their care, if only they spend enough time with them.
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the semiotics of predation, with an emphasis on killing. Th is section treats the 
phenomena of predators killing prey, humans killing predators, humans as prey, 
humans as predators, and confl icts of interest. A fi ft h, concluding section deals 
with long-term vs. short-term goals for large predator management.
1.1. Study animals
Describing the study animals covered by a specifi c study always involves de-
lineating, and usually involves justifying, why exactly the animals included in an 
analysis have been chosen, and not other but related animals. Th e study animals 
of this work are large predators among carnivorous mammals. Th ey thus belong 
to the order of Carnivora in biological classifi cation, but not all species of this 
order are included. Examples of predators that are excluded from this study 
include snakes, such as boas, cobras and pythons; birds of prey; crocodilians; 
and small carnivores, such as marten and the least weasel, among many others. 
All these animals feed by preying on other animals. But in terms of ecology and 
behaviour, large predators of the order Carnivora have a quite distinct footprint 
when compared to some other carnivores. For instance, large predators generally 
require larger territories than small predators, and they tend to be capable of 
attacking and killing larger prey. Furthermore, predatory mammals usually have 
some behaviours in common with humans, given that we as a species are also 
predatory mammals. Overall, this tends to mean that large predators among 
carnivorous mammals are more likely to get involved in confl icts with human 
interests than small predators are  – and to get noticed by humans. Th ey are 
therefore typically central players in human ecology and in the context of the 
contemporary environmental crisis.
In the Norwegian context (my home turf), large predatory mammals are repre-
sented by wolves, brown bears, wolverines and lynx (other noticeable carnivores 
include the Arctic fox and the golden eagle). In other parts of the world, large 
predatory mammals include tigers, lions, jaguars, leopards, cougars, coyotes and 
jackals, polar bears, and hyenas. Generally, predators may be divided into various 
subcategories, including omnivores (i.e. animals with a diet consisting of animals, 
plants, fungi and/or bacteria) and apex predators (i.e. predators on top of the 
food chain that are not preyed on by other predators). Notably, several animals 
sometimes act as a predator, other times not. Th is is the case, for example, with 
predators that alternate between predatory and scavenging behaviour – examples 
include wolverines and foxes. It is also important to note that the ecological roles of 
predator and prey are fl exible in principle. Rumm (2015) tells the story of a captive 
tiger at a Siberian zoo and a goat that was originally left  in his enclosure to be eaten. 
As this article shows, “predator and prey, stripped of the rules of the natural world, 
are actually well situated for friendship”, since they “are already set up to know how 
to read each other”, as Donna Haraway comments in Rumm’s article.
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Th e ecology of large predators among carnivorous mammals in the wild, 
whether or not they are to some extent managed by humans, is quite diff erent 
from the ecology of large, predatory carnivorous mammals in captivity. For one 
thing, free-roaming carnivores live in much larger areas, and their interaction 
with the natural environment is less constrained by anthropogenic intervention 
than that of captive predators. Furthermore, captive predators are oft en not 
allowed to act on their predatory nature, but are instead fed by humans. Th is 
chapter deals with large, predatory carnivorous mammals in the wild that are 
subjected to various degrees of human management.
2. The managed umwelten of large predators in the wild
What all carnivores have in common is that they eat meat and that they hunt and/
or scavenge. As a subcategory of carnivores, besides eating meat, large predatory 
carnivores – i.e. large carnivorous predators – have in common that they hunt and 
kill other animals. In terms of the four main functional cycles referred to by Jakob 
von Uexküll (cf. Uexkü ll 1928: 101) in his umwelt theory, predators are thereby 
characterised by the functional cycle that involves food. Th e key contrapuntal 
relation (Uexküll 2010: 171–181) involved in the umwelten of large predators is, 
from this perspective, that of predator and prey.9 However, most carnivores eat 
plants, too, to a varying extent. Mesocarnivores are animals that predominantly 
9 Th is does not necessarily imply that the predators themselves experience relations with 
prey as more signifi cant than relations with a partner or with kin, for example. From an 
intraspecifi c social perspective, it might very well be the case that as predators perceive 
it, those latter relations are of the greatest importance, whereas prey relations are more 
matter-of-fact.
Domesticated animals may be a diff erent story. Price (1984: 3, cf. 1998) 
defi nes domestication as “that process by which a population of animals becomes 
adapted to man and to the captive environment [he provides] by genetic changes 
occurring over generations and environmentally-induced developmental events 
reoccurring during each generation”. In light of this defi nition, even companion 
animals such as the domestic cat, or dogs, may be regarded as to some extent 
wild and to some extent domesticated (with individual variation). Generally, 
large mammalian predators are quite prominent among captive animals in zoo 
environments (cf. Mäekivi’s chapter in this volume), whether or not they are 
socialised (cf. Kiiroja’s chapter in this volume). A special case, treated by Maran 
in this volume (“Semiotics and the Species Management Discourse”), concerns 
migrating carnivores that arrive in countries where they have not previously 
been present. In this latter case, the overall ecology might be somewhat diff erent 
from that of residing free-roaming carnivores, and human perceptions of these 
animals might in some cases be radically diff erent.
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eat meat but that eat substantial amounts of fungi, fruit or other plant material 
as well (30 to 50%). Examples of mesocarnivores include coyotes and foxes. 
Hypercarnivores predominantly eat meat to an even higher degree (at least 70% 
meat). Even wolves, however – one example of hypercarnivores – eat plants. In 
the Scandinavian context, it has been documented in practically all examined 
wolf territories that wolves eat berries and plant material, along with insects and 
small and large animals (Knappwost 2006; Müller 2006). Nevertheless, among 
large predators, the predominance of animals as a food source implies, for one 
thing, that animal-animal relations (including relations to other animal species) 
are central in large predator umwelten.
In general terms, Jakob von Uexküll (2010: 172) describes contrapuntal 
relations – for which predator-prey relations serve as a prominent example – in 
the following way:
When two living beings enter into a harmonious relationship to each other, 
it is necessary fi rst to make the decision as to which of the two organisms we 
want to speak of as the subject and utilizer of meaning and to which we assign 
the role of carrier of meaning. Th en, we shall search for the mutual properties 
that behave toward each other as point and counterpoint. If, in a given case, we 
possess enough knowledge of the functional cycles that connect the respective 
subjects with their carriers of meaning and which can count as circuits of 
meaning, then we are enabled to search for the counterpoint on the perception 
side as well as on the eff ect side, in order to establish fi nally according to which 
specifi c meaning rule the composition was done.
Th e relationship between predator and prey might not appear to most people as 
an instance of “a harmonious relationship” (for a critique of Uexküll’s outdated 
view on the balance of nature, see Tønnessen 2009a). However, when Uexküll calls 
predator-prey relationships “harmonious”, his point is that from an ecological 
point of view, predator-prey relationships do contribute to maintaining ecological 
balance between diff erent species, and even to the soundness of prey species (see 
below). As we see, in Uexküll’s ‘subjective biology’, in each specifi c case we have 
to choose what animal’s perspective we want to adopt. Th e fact that predators and 
prey participate in contrapuntal relations implies that their biological functions 
are sustainable, as it were. Predator X feeds on prey Y, and supposing that this 
practice can result in fairly stable populations of both predators and prey, such 
predation practices can be viable for very long indeed, if not literally indefi nitely 
(since all animal species eventually go extinct). In what has been stated so 
far, Uexküll merely confi rms common ecological knowledge. But moreover, 
Uexküll’s claim that predator and prey are connected via a contrapuntal relation 
implies that their relation is not arbitrary but complementary and mutually 
(if asymmetrically) meaningful, and that the behaviour and perception of one 
is, through this relation, mutually adjusted to that of the other animal. Th is 
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exemplifi es how an animal’s behaviour and perception can never be studied in 
strict isolation, but rather must be studied in light of ecological relations that can 
explain the origin and development of both animal behaviour and perception.
Given that in Uexküll’s scheme we can take, or investigate, the perspective 
of either the predator or the prey, it is quite obvious that the value or function 
of the act of predation is not similar in these two interrelated but very diff erent 
cases. While the predator thrives when predation occurs, the individual prey 
suff ers and perishes. In simple functional terms, the predator wins (temporarily), 
the prey loses (permanently). Just like the predator, the prey is also a utiliser 
of meaning  – it is in all cases a subject, and at least in most cases a sentient 
subject.10 Th is implies that the perception that is involved in the umwelten of 
predators and prey respectively has a radically diff erent character in each of 
the two cases. While predators and prey usually recognise each other mutually 
(i.e., they perceive the other as a carrier of meaning belonging to the predator-
prey contrapuntal relation), the character of the perception of the other diff ers 
fundamentally. Correspondingly, whereas the predator hunts and ultimately 
attacks, the typical behavioural reaction of prey is to either fl ee or fi ght back in a 
defensive fashion. In these terms, too, the experience of predation is very much 
distinct and asymmetrical, given the two respective perspectives: the predator 
prepares for a meal; the prey fi ghts for its life. 
To return to von Uexküll’s notion of functional cycles, in the case of predators, 
the umwelt object in the functional cycle of food – i.e. the prey – perishes as an 
object in the umwelt of the predator either by escaping, by holding its ground, or, in 
successful depredation attempts, by being eaten (i.e. by literally being consumed). 
From the point of view of the prey, however, the predator perishes as an umwelt 
object in the functional cycle of the enemy either by being outrun or outsmarted, 
or by death or loss of consciousness (which might occur before being eaten by the 
predator, or during the predator’s consuming act, depending on circumstances). 
If the prey animal dies, its whole umwelt collapses, as it were, and ceases to exist.
Von Uexküll distinguishes quite clearly between the subjective worlds of 
predators and prey, and other asymmetrical ecological relations. He stresses that 
10 One could argue that all prey animals are sentient. By defi nition, a ‘prey’ is an animal that 
some other animal is preying on, i.e. utilising as food. Th e prey animal is thus necessar-
ily a victim. But can it suff er? Th e answer to this question is not one that can be given a 
priori, as some animal rights-inclined thinkers have done. In empirical terms, it is not 
the case that all animals are sentient (given that the term ‘animal’ is used in its scientifi c, 
biological meaning, and that ‘sentience’ is taken to imply consciousness and the ability 
to suff er as well as to feel well). Th e reason why one could claim that all prey animals are 
sentient is that when we think of prey, we think of an animal that is capable (in principle) 
of escaping the threatening predator. In order to display escape behaviour, an animal 
must arguably be sentient, since having conscious experience, and suff ering when being 
physically hurt, might be a prerequisite for the ability to recognise something as a life-
threatening predator, and then in response to try to avoid it. Th is would imply that all 
animals that display genuine escape behaviour – including fi shes – are sentient.
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in some cases, the prey species (or generally the apparently subordinate party) 
is not active as a utiliser of meaning, but only the predator (or generally the 
apparently superior party) is. At the face of it, the prey species is simply subjected 
to a meaning rule that makes sense to the predator. Th ese kinds of meaning rules 
are in many cases related to what von Uexküll (2010: 182–185) refers to as the 
“suff erance of meaning”. From the way things look, the apparently subordinated 
party is left  to simply tolerate or suff er the apparently superior party’s meaning. 
Von Uexküll thus refers (Uexküll 2010: 183) to “the great signifi cance of the 
suff erance [tolerance] of harmful factors which exclude the weaker individuals 
again and again from the production of weak off spring”. As an example, he writes 
(ibid.): “Hawks and foxes become benefactors of the species they hunt by snatching 
away the weak prey animals. Where foxes are eliminated, hares go under due to 
epidemics, because the sick animals were not culled at the right time”. On a more 
general note, von Uexküll (2010: 185) observes that “[t]he suff erance of meaning 
wipes out the excess of individuals in the interests of the species, whereby all 
unhealthy and poorly resistant individuals are cast off ; or the removal of the 
excess individuals happens in the interests of Nature’s economy”. Von Uexküll’s 
main point here is that in the bigger (i.e. ecological and evolutionary) picture, 
meaning rules in predator-prey relations make sense for both parties involved, 
even though the individual prey suff ers and perishes.11 
Th e rest of this section deals with the semiotic phenomena of signifi cation, 
communication and representation in the management of large predators, and 
in the umwelten of large predators in the wild. Human management may have 
an impact on the lives of large predators in numerous ways, directly through 
management of predators and indirectly through human management of prey 
species or other wildlife or through human practices that aff ect the landscape. 
Furthermore, given that humans are perceived as enemies by many predators, 
humans impact the lives of large predators by their very presence and activities 
in nature. 
2.1. Signification in the management of large predators
Before embarking upon the sketching of signifi cation, communication and 
representation in the management of large predators, these three semiotic notions 
should be defi ned. In Tønnessen and Tüür (2014: 12), which draws on Martinelli 
(2010, part 1.1), semiosis, or sign exchange, is understood in terms of senders 
and receivers of signs. In this perspective, communication can be understood as 
a sign exchange between a sender and a receiver, signifi cation as semiosis in the 
11 Von Uexküll (2010) remarks that Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) made a “fundamental 
error” in his evolutionary theorizing. “[A]nnihilation of surplus off spring […] is hardly 
a matter of the survival of the fi ttest, but rather, of the survival of the normal in the inter-
ests of an unchanging further existence of the species”.
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absence of a true sender, and representation as semiosis absent of a true receiver. 
Th is implies that whereas communication involves at least two subjects, a sender 
and a receiver, signifi cation involves semiosis that is accessible fi rst-hand only to 
the receiver (and that there is only a receiver in the meaning-making situation), 
while representation involves semiosis that is accessible fi rst-hand only to the 
sender (and that there is only a sender in the meaning-making situation). Th e 
fundamental diff erence between signifi cation and representation is that while 
in signifi cation meaning is experienced and possibly explored by the animal 
or human (but is not of its own creation), in representation meaning is actively 
construed by the representing subject.12
According to Uexküll (2010: 27), 
[t]he mute interaction of one thing with another opens the possibility 
of signifi cation, especially in the living, where material complexity and 
thermodynamic lag ensures that the appearance of one substance will follow 
another. Th e simplest and best example of this is food, as it “represents” the 
attended-to substrate on which an organism’s continued livelihood depends.
Food, in other words  – or nutrition  – is no random example of objects of 
signifi cation, i.e. perceived objects. When von Uexküll portrayed food as the 
object of one of four generally occurring functional cycles, it was exactly because 
practically all living organisms depend on tracking down and recognising what 
they can utilise as food. Th is is clearly applicable to predator-prey relationships. 
However, whereas for predators, prey have the functional tone of food (i.e., when 
predators encounter prey, they associate the prey animal with food and eating), 
for prey, predators have the functional tone of an enemy, a lethal threat (so when 
prey encounter predators, they associate the predator with danger and a need for 
escape or defence). In some cases, such as when a moose defends itself against a 
wolf attack by kicking a wolf, the roles can change, to the eff ect that the predator 
perceives an enemy and not simply latent food. Depending on whether or not 
the predator in question is a social hunter, the predator may or may not perceive 
fellow, conspecifi c hunters as part of the whole depredation experience. For social 
hunters, the hunt is as a rule always a social event besides being feeding-related 
(the same holds true for most human hunters, and no less so in contemporary 
times, given that modern hunters’ survival does not depend on their hunting 
practices).
Th e topic of predators and prey (and of their management by the human 
hand) involves a lot of diff erent umwelten, and no satisfying account of all these 
12 However, in practice this diff erence is oft en blurred, since some representations are in 
turn perceived and interpreted by others (especially in the context of human culture). It 
is arguably the case that e.g. human ”reading” of representations of animals involves an 
element of co-creation based on one’s own experience.
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can be given here. Constellations of perceiving subjects and perceived objects 
include wildlife manager-predator, wildlife researcher-predator, representative 
of the public-predator, prey-predator, predator-prey and predator-humans. In the 
following, I will focus for the most part on giving a rough outline of how predators 
perceive and relate to humans. As mentioned, humans are treated as enemies, 
threats, by many predators. Th is can cause confl ict, but more oft en results in 
avoidance behaviour, which can aff ect a broad spectrum of behavioural patterns. 
As Bouyer et al. 2015 have found, anthropogenic environmental change, 
including forest fragmentation and transport infrastructure as well as the mere 
presence of humans, signifi cantly infl uences lynx behaviour. Previous studies, 
they claim (ibid., 291), “have not examined the extent to which lynx modify their 
fi ne scaled avoidance behavior of anthropogenic landscape features according 
to the specifi c behaviors (resting sites, kill sites, movement) in which they are 
engaged”.13 On a more general note, they observe that “[t]he response of large 
carnivores to human activity is conceptually similar to a prey species’ response to 
predation risk” (ibid., 291; cf. Samia et al. 2015: 2). 
In wolf ecology, Wam (2003) found that almost all wolves that are approached 
by a human in the wild run away immediately. She estimates the chance of a hiker 
being confronted by a wolf in Scandinavia as practically nil. In eff ect, whereas 
wolves quite oft en perceive the presence of a human, humans seldom perceive 
that there is a wolf nearby (unless they are researchers or wildlife managers with 
special equipment). “Human disturbance”, Samia et al. (2015: 1) remark, “drives 
the decline of many species, both directly and indirectly. Nonetheless, some 
species do particularly well around humans”. Th ey suggest that a decisive factor 
in this context is “the degree to which a species tolerates human disturbance” 
(ibid.), and found that “[h]erbivorous and omnivorous species were more tolerant 
[of human disturbance] than carnivorous species” (ibid., 2–3). Th is confi rms 
the impression that carnivores generally avoid humans. In large predator 
management, the extent to which predators encounter managers or researchers 
(as opposed to hunters or other representatives of the public) depends on the 
management methods applied, especially with regard to tracking and technology. 
In the North, large predators can be tracked on snow in the winter season. Other 
non-invasive methods include genetic sampling based on “genetic sources left  
behind by wildlife (such as hair, feathers, urine, or feces)” (Bischof et al. 2015: 
2). Th e latter methods are now widespread “for monitoring large terrestrial 
carnivores, especially members of the Felidae […] Canidae […], and Ursidae 
[…], without the need to physically capture individuals” (Bischof et al. 2015: 2). 
Unlike with invasive, capture-based methods such as GPS-tagging, non-invasive 
methods allow for tracking and monitoring large predators without invading, as 
it were, the umwelten of those predators.
13 For more information on their fi ndings, see subsection 4.1 Confl icts of interest: Whose 
prey?
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2.2. Communication in the management of large predators
Communicative relations occur in several diff erent confi gurations in the context 
of the management of large predators. Among predators, communication may 
occur among conspecifi cs that either cooperate in hunting situations (this is 
particularly relevant if the predators attack in groups) or compete for prey (this 
is particularly relevant if the predators hunt individually, or if prey animals are 
attacked by competing groups of predators). Of course, predators have a life 
beyond depredation situations as well, and unless the predators are solitary (or 
in a solitary phase), this usually involves close social relations with conspecifi cs, 
where nuanced and rich communication is key to establish, uphold and develop/
challenge relations. For carnivorous large mammals, social phenomena include 
breastfeeding, and signifi cant social relations of at least a temporary nature 
include that between mother and off spring.
Among prey animals, communication may precede predatory attacks, as in 
the case of warning signals, or it may coincide with the act of predation. Several 
animal species also take advantage of, for instance, the warning cries of other 
species by gathering information and acquiring situational understanding. 
Between predator and prey, the predator may in some cases try to fool the prey 
by communicating on false, deceptive terms, and some prey may likewise try to 
get out of the situation either by communicating deceptively or by evoking the 
impression of signifi cant defensive abilities.
When humans are involved, human–animal communication might occur, 
e.g. between a human hunter and a hunted animal, between wildlife managers 
and managed animals, or between representatives of the general public and large 
predators under offi  cial management in the rare cases where people encounter 
large predators in the wild. In modern large predator management, humans 
oft en have the upper hand. When a large predator is GPS-tagged and traced by 
helicopter, it does not stand a chance. In such situations, there is a breakdown 
of normal communicative relations, and the animal is overrun, as it were 
(see Tønnessen 2010b). Finally, there is a whole range of interspecifi c human 
communication, i.e. communication among humans (including both in-group 
and inter-group communication), about large predators. Th is is a topic in its own 
right. 
Since communicative relations occur in so many diff erent confi gurations in 
the context of the management of large predators, it is hard to say something 
substantial of a general nature. But humans and animals alike depend on 
communication, each in their own context. And when communication is cut 
off , relations may suff er. Th is might perhaps be a guideline for large predator 
management as well, with validity for relations to the public, as well as for 
human–animal communication in the fi eld.
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2.3. Representation in the management of large predators
“Animal representations” might be taken to mean human representations of 
animals  – of which there are plenty, and on which any culture is arguably in 
part based. However, if one regards animals as cognitively capable of forming 
representations, there are of course animal representations in a diff erent sense, 
too – namely animal representations of humans, 
encapsulating the ways in which we humans are collectively or individually 
represented by certain fi gures in the umwelten of various animals. Th ese 
perceptions, too, are in a sense anthropogenic. Many of these ‘human 
representations’ are arguably “signs of danger” – at least in the case of many 
wild animals. Friendly, responsive human representations held by animals 
must as a rule be contingent on animals’ experience with comparably 
friendly human behaviour in encounters with the human kind. (Tønnessen, 
Tüür 2014: 17)
Human representations of large predators constitutes a corpus of gargantuan 
proportions (see subsections 3.1 Th e wolf as symbol and 3.2 Th e cultural semiotic 
of wolves and sheep for a few examples). In conservation discourses, relevant 
keywords include fl agship species, charismatic mammals, and more generally 
symbols and icons of conservation. Management discourses are oft en focused 
on political confl icts related to predators. “Large carnivore confl icts”, sociologist 
Skogen (2015) observes, “are embedded in deeper societal tensions, and this 
is particularly obvious concerning the confl ict over wolves”. In consequence, 
representations of wolves and other large predators are oft en infl uenced by 
representations in entirely diff erent discourses. “People who oppose wolf 
protection”, writes Skogen (2015), “are oft en much angrier with their human 
adversaries than with the animals, and the confl icts reach beyond controversies 
over management practices […] Th ese attitudes are not always  – or even 
predominantly – related to adverse material eff ects of wolf presence”.
In a narrower sense, management discourse addresses practical issues related 
to management practices, e.g. the monitoring of large predator populations. One 
question in this context is whether the population estimates that conservation 
policies and management practices are based on are accurate. One diffi  culty, in 
the European setting, is that the monitoring of predators, and indeed management 
aims and measures, tend to follow national borders, whereas several large 
predators, including wolves and bears, do not. As Bischof et al. (2015: 1) point 
out, “wild animals oft en move freely between jurisdictions”. Th eir key example 
is brown bears in Norway. Comparing population models that either ignored or 
recognized the diff erence national borders can make, these researchers found 
(ibid.) that “[n]ot accounting for detections of ‘foreign residents’ resulted in 
abundance estimates that were inflated by as much as 119%”. Up to half of all 
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female bears appearing in Norway turned out to “have their center of activity in 
neighboring countries (Finland, Russia, and Sweden)” (ibid.). Bischof et al. (ibid., 
5) warn that “[n]aïve estimates on each side of a political border may easily lead 
to double-counting of a substantial portion of individuals in a transboundary 
population”, and they conclude (ibid., 7) that “[g]iven geopolitical reality, 
widespread population-level management of transboundary wildlife populations 
may be an ambitious, possibly utopic, long-term goal, but quantifying, and thus 
managing, wild populations with the recognition that they are shared with other 
jurisdictions is a step that can be taken today”.
3. Case study: wolves14
Th is section, featuring a case study on Scandinavian wolf management, will 
briefl y present the wolf as a symbol, with emphasis on the Norwegian context, 
and will also give a more general overview of the cultural semiotic of wolves and 
sheep. Th e section on the symbolism of the wolf is focused on confl icts with sheep 
husbandry, despite the fact that confl icts with hunters and, notably, hunting dogs 
might be equally important as persistent triggers of controversy. Th is is because 
it is arguably fi rst and foremost the wolf/sheep symbolism related to open 
landscapes that in the Norwegian context have molded public perceptions of the 
wolf. First, however, I will present a little background on the situation for wolves 
in Norway and Scandinavia.
According to Svensson et al. (eds.) 2015, on the last count there were ca. 460 
wolves in Scandinavia, most of whom were on Swedish territory. Th ere were 
41 family groups in Sweden, fi ve on the border between Norway and Sweden 
and three in Norway. Practically all of these wolves, apart from a few migration 
events further north, are located in southern Scandinavia. Th e Norwegian wolf 
population amounted to 33–35 individuals in Norway and an additional 40 wolves 
on the border. Policy reviews have recently been conducted in both Norway 
and Sweden. In Norway, the population target (three litters per year inside the 
“management area for breeding wolves”, popularly called the ‘wolf zone’) was 
reached for the fi rst time in 2010. Th e ‘predator settlement’ of June 2011 garnered 
support from all parties in parliament  – and yet the controversy around wolf 
management has far from abated. Th e offi  cial Norwegian policy remains that the 
country should sustain populations of wolves as well as of brown bears, lynx and 
14 Th is section is largely based on chapter 4 in Tønnessen 2011c (pp. 49–73). Specifi cally, 
the introduction to 3. Case study: wolves is for the most part adapted from Tønnessen 
2011c: 49–51 (4. Case study: Norwegian wolf management), 3.1 Th e wolf as symbol is 
adapted from Tønnessen 2011c: 71–73 (4.5 Th e symbolic construction of the Big Bad 
Wolf in contemporary Norway), and 3.2 Th e cultural semiotic of wolves and sheep is 
adapted from Tønnessen 2011c: 56–66 (4.2 Th e cultural semiotic of wolves and sheep). 
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wolverines, while simultaneously safeguarding grazing livestock, notably sheep 
and reindeer. Norwegian and Swedish management is quite closely coordinated, 
although policy diff erences have occurred, including those concerning hunting 
measures. Among the questions still to be solved is whether wolves living on 
the Norwegian-Swedish border should be counted as part Norwegian. Th e wolf 
zone, which covers only 4% of Norway, is also currently under review, with small 
adjustments being considered.
Relations between wolves and other involved parties, such as sheep, dogs 
or humans, may be described by using Uexküllian models of the umwelt. Of 
particular relevance here is the modelling of changes in relations. An umwelt 
transition (Tønnessen 2009a) is defi ned as “a lasting, systematic change, within the 
life cycle of a being, considered from an ontogenetic (individual), phylogenetic 
(population-, species-) or cultural perspective, from one typical appearance 
of its Umwelt to another” (ibid., p. 49; cf. chapter 2 in this volume). Umwelt 
transitions can in principle be depicted fi guratively very easily by juxtaposing 
While in the initial umwelt situation a wolf relates to humans as enemies, in 
the eventual umwelt situation a dog (the evolutionary product, aft er numerous 
generations) relates to humans predominantly as a partner, as in ‘social 
companion’, and only marginally as an enemy. Much more detail could have been 
depicted by presenting a more extensive series of fi elds in gradual transition.
Figure 2 depicts a summary of fairly recent changes in the way in which 
humans, more specifi cally Norwegians in contemporary times and the near 
future, relate to wolves and to sheep. Th e wolf has become less of an enemy 
(though in the eyes of a substantial minority it remains an enemy) and has 
become a partner, as in a conceptually perceived social companion, to many 
contemporary Norwegians. Th e sheep, which has traditionally been both food 
and partner (as in social companion), is now becoming less of a partner due 
to steadily increasing ratios of the number of sheep to number of sheep farmers. 
Th is is related to the ongoing industrialisation of animal husbandry. As we see 
in Figure 3, this latter development points in the direction of a future in which 
humans might ultimately vanish altogether as umwelt objects in the umwelten 
of sheep.
  
the four main phenomenal fi elds (cf. Uexküll 1982[1940]: 33; Brock 1939) 
representing functioning before a specifi c change and another set of phenomenal 
fi elds representing functioning aft er the change has occurred. Th e evolutionary 
phenomenon of wolves becoming dogs is depicted in Figure 1. 
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3.1. The wolf as symbol
Th e backdrop for the marginal but considerable resistance to the conservation 
of wolves and other large predators in Norway is the fact that industrialisation 
in agriculture is threatening traditional animal husbandry practices. “In reality”, 
as stated in Tønnessen 2011a (p. 318), “the wolves are not blamed for the sheep 
they kill – they have come to symbolise the threats, dangers and decline facing 
Norwegian agriculture. Th e wolf, in short, has become a scapegoat”. 
In cultural terms, hardly any animals are as loaded with symbolic value as the 
wolf and the sheep (see also the next section, 3.2 Th e cultural semiotic of wolves 
and sheep). And the shared importance is no coincidence, since the symbolism of 
the two animals has frequently developed in explicit opposition to each other. In 
the Scandinavian context, the wolf ’s vivid symbolism in current times is enforced 
by the occurrence of conspiracy theories (cf. the quite widespread conviction that 
Scandinavian wolves have been secretly and purposefully reintroduced, described 
in Tønnessen 2010a: 292). Many of the fi ercest opponents of wolf conservation 
believe that researchers and the authorities intentionally misrepresent the 
population number of wolves, and they distrust offi  cial reassurances that the wolf 
does not pose much danger to people. In result of this and other developments, 
human perceptions of wolves have in large measure decoupled from ecological 
reality. 
It is telling that whenever national Norwegian media cover predation on 
sheep, the wolf is typically pictured for illustrative purposes – despite the fact 
that wolverines, lynx, and brown bears all account for a much greater percentage 
of predation on sheep. According to Rovbase, a public database for predator 
monitoring in Norway, in the period of 2010–2014 wolves accounted for only 7% 
of predation on sheep, whereas the other large predators combined accounted 
for 93%. What this shows is that the wolf has become a poster boy, as it were, 
for large predators in general. What wolves are taken to signify depends not so 
much on actual wolf ecology as it does on certain cultural/societal developments. 
Th ese are, justly or unfairly, associated with the presence of wolves and with 
governmental conservation policies. For many rural dwellers, wolf management 
has come to symbolise the alleged ignorant hostility and unjustly interventionist 
tendencies of the urban elites.
Th e sheep’s symbolism is, in the Norwegian context, grounded in open 
landscapes, which are typically taken to be intrinsically Norwegian. Th e idea of 
the Norwegian nation is built on the memory of an initial clearing and cultivation 
of the original (pre-Norwegian) landscape. We see this plainly in the two fi rst 
verses of Ivar Aasen’s “Th e Norwegian”, which is in eff ect treated as a national 
anthem (my translation, in literal form).
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Between hills and mountains out by the sea
the Norwegian has been given his home,
where he himself has dug the foundations
and himself put their houses on top of them.
He looked out at the rocky beaches;
there was no one, who there had built.
“Let us clear a place and build dwellings,
and so we own the clearing safely.”
Th e symbolism of sheep in Norway is eff ectively associated with the symbolism 
of outer pastures, which have been crucial in Norwegian sheep husbandry but are 
now under pressure. A key reason is the general move from extensive to intensive 
farming practices. A common perception in rural areas is that outer pastures are 
being devalued, and that traditional, small-scale Norwegian farming practices 
are under threat. In visual imagery, this is best expressed by a phenomenon called 
‘gjengroing’, imperfectly translated to English as ‘overgrowth’ and content-wise 
accurately translated as ‘reforestation’. Overgrowth in this sense implies that an 
originally open, cleared landscape is taken over by weeds and other vegetation 
with no direct agricultural value. Such a landscape, with growing irrelevance 
(so to speak), reduced utility and – notably, in perceptual terms – an obstructed 
view, has become a symbol of the hardships of rural areas and of Norwegian 
agriculture. A sound hypothesis is that it is the idea of the changing landscapes 
as being symbolic of rural troubles and the loss of traditional livelihoods that 
is fuelling and reinforcing the wolf ’s negative symbolism and the apparently 
neverending confl ict over wolf management. In short, the return of large 
predators, and especially the wolf, is oft en blamed for this ‘overgrowth’, i.e. for the 
disappearance of open landscapes as outer pastures are going out of use, partly 
due to fear of predation. Without grazing animals – so the idea goes – cultural 
landscapes that have traditionally been used as outer pastures ‘overgrow’ (or are 
“rewilded”, as we could say with a more positive emphasis).
Even though there is indeed an actual process of reforestation in contemporary 
Norway, it should be noted that it is not at all reasonable to assume that this 
phenomenon is predominantly caused by predator management in general or 
wolf management in particular. Th e fact that Norway as a whole is gradually 
being reforested is fi rst and foremost a result of natural growth in the wake of 
deforestation that took place until late in the 1800s, and secondarily a result of 
anthropogenic climate change. Regardless of these factual matters, a landscape 
in transition has become a powerful symbol of the defeat which many in rural 
Norway feel subjected to – a defeat for lifestyles and farming methods alike, in 
local communities that tend to be in areas that are abundant in space and natural 
diversity but less so in people and immediate opportunity.
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3.2. The cultural semiotic of wolves and sheep
Th e noun ‘wolf ’ refers in its primary sense to various predatory carnivorous 
mammals of canid species of North America and Eurasia that usually hunt in 
packs, or, in a narrower sense, only to Canis lupus, the grey wolf. In Greek the 
word for wolf is transcribed as ‘lykos’ (as in λύκος), in Latin the word is ‘lupus’, 
in Spanish and Portuguese ‘lobo’, in French ‘loup’, in Italian ‘lupo’, in Danish, 
Norwegian and older Swedish ‘ulv’ (but in contemporary Swedish ‘varg’), etc. 
A second meaning of the word wolf is, in the words of the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary (2016), “a man given to seducing women”  – synonyms include 
‘Casanova’ and ‘womaniser’, related words and phrases include ‘ladies’ man’, 
‘seducer’, ‘whoremaster’ and ‘whoremonger’. Wolves have symbolised lust for 
more than two thousand years. In Roman slang, lupa, literally female wolf or she-
wolf, meant ‘whore’, a connotation that is found even today in the Spanish loba, 
the Italian lupa and the French louve. In Anglo-Saxon culture, ‘wolf ’ was equated 
with ‘prostitute’ or a ‘sexually voracious female’, but later it came to signify 
a ‘sexually aggressive male’. Th is latter use was fi rst recorded in 1847 (Online 
Etymology Dictionary). In this context, we should also recall that bitch (cf. the 
insult “son of a bitch”) literally means ‘female dog’ or the female of other canines, 
such as wolves and foxes.
A third meaning of the word wolf is, according to the same dictionary, “a person 
who habitually preys upon others”  – synonyms include ‘bloodsucker’, ‘shark’, 
‘vampire’ and ‘vulture’, related words include ‘exploiter’, ‘destroyer’ and ‘devourer’, 
while the antonym is said to be ‘prey’. Th e verb to wolf, which might be taken to 
mean “to eat like a wolf ”, is defi ned by Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2016) as “to 
swallow or eat greedily” – synonyms include ‘devour’, ‘gulp’, ‘inhale’, ‘scoff ’ and 
‘slop’. In Old Norse, vargr (cf. the Swedish varg) meant ‘outlaw’, almost as in the 
Old English wearg, ‘criminal’, ‘felon’. It was also used in the sense of ‘murderer’, 
‘slayer’. In Norse society, varg signifi ed not only the particularly murderous ‘slayer 
wolf ’ that wreaked havoc on herds, but also a human outlaw, a person one would 
not be punished for killing. Another term that due to its cultural impact must be 
mentioned is that of the werewolf, also known as a ‘lycanthrope’ (from the Greek 
‘lykos’, ‘wolf ’, and ‘anthropos’, ‘man’). In contemporary times, terrorists that act 
on their own are oft en referred to as ‘lone wolves’.
People whose names draw on the wolf include the Cheyenne war leader 
Little Wolf, the author Virginia Woolf (1882–1941), posthumanist Cary Wolfe, 
American journalist Wolf Blitzer, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–1791), 
Adolf Hitler (1889–1945), Adolf of Nassau (1255–1298) and various kings of 
Sweden and European dukes and princes, and three saints (Spanish, German and 
Ugandan), among countless others. During the Second World War, ‘Werwolf ’ 
signifi ed a Nazi plan designed by Joseph Goebbels from 1944 and gone public by 
March 1945. Th ere are also numerous place names that make reference to wolves, 
e.g. Wolverhampton (UK).
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In the works of William Shakespeare, the word “wolf ” appears in no less than 
20 of his plays, fi rst of all as embodying hunger and as the iconic predator (for 
example, in Twelft h Night): “If one should be a prey, how much the better / To 
fall before the lion than the wolf!”). Th e wolf is embodied hunger – predatory 
hunger  – pure hunger. Generally, a majority of expressions making reference 
to the wolf are implicitly morally condemning or otherwise portray the wolf 
in bleak terms. Th e wolf is an animal associated with violence, plotting, unruly 
hunger, and loneliness. Th e wolf-whistle, a two-toned sound that might or might 
not be made by ‘wolf-whistling’, i.e. inserting two fi ngers into the mouth in order 
to produce a loud and penetrating tone, is one of the examples that do not fi t 
with this picture. Being used to approach, to compliment, or possibly to mock 
a sexually attractive person, the wolf-whistle belongs instead to the category of 
sexual connotations. 
Th e mythical founders of the city of Rome, Romulus and Remus, had according 
to tradition been suckled by a wolf before they were found by a shepherd. Here, 
then, we face a narrative in which a wolf saves the lives of two children who 
would later grow to be great men. It is also noteworthy in our context that the 
two twins were later retrieved by a shepherd, a caretaker of sheep – and brought 
up to become shepherds themselves. In Norse mythology, Fenrisúlfr, or Fenrir, is 
the name of a wolf, a son of Loki (by birth a gargantuan troll of sorts, later a god 
and certainly a trickster – a shape-shift er for sure). Great malice was expected 
from Fenrir. He is foretold to kill the god Odin during Ragnarok, the Norse end 
of times, and one of Fenrir’s sons would swallow the sun and another the moon. 
Th e imagery of the Bible has certainly been infl uential in shaping Western 
perceptions of the wolf, especially when contrasted with the Bible’s treatment of 
sheep and lambs (all quotes in the following are, unless otherwise noted, from the 
New International Version, 2010). Th e phrase “wolf in sheep’s clothing” originates 
from the Gospel of Matthew, 7:15, where Jesus is recorded as having said in a 
sermon, “Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but 
inwardly they are ravening wolves” (King James Version). In John 10:11–16, 
where Jesus presents himself as the good shepherd, the wolf is again juxtaposed 
with sheep.
I am the good shepherd. Th e good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. 
Th e hired hand is not the shepherd and does not own the sheep. So when he 
sees the wolf coming, he abandons the sheep and runs away. Th en the wolf 
attacks the fl ock and scatters it. Th e man runs away because he is a hired hand 
and cares nothing for the sheep. 
I am the good shepherd; I know my sheep and my sheep know me – 
just as the Father knows me and I know the Father—and I lay down my life 
for the sheep. I have other sheep that are not of this sheep pen. I must bring 
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them also. Th ey too will listen to my voice, and there shall be one fl ock and one 
shepherd.
Later on, in John 10:25–28, Jesus says that “[t]he works I do in my Father’s name 
testify about me, but you do not believe because you are not my sheep. My sheep 
listen to my voice; I know them, and they follow me. I give them eternal life, and 
they shall never perish; no one will snatch them out of my hand”. In the book 
of Isaiah, there are two passages where mention of the wolf is made to portray 
paradise, fi rst Isaiah 11:6: “Th e wolf will live with the lamb, / the leopard will 
lie down with the goat, / the calf and the lion and the yearling together; / and 
a little child will lead them”. Isaiah 65:17–25 off ers a similar image, in partial 
repetition of Isaiah 11: “See, I will create / new heavens and a new earth […] 
Th e wolf and the lamb will feed together, / and the lion will eat straw like the 
ox […] Th ey will neither harm nor destroy / on all my holy mountain, / says 
the LORD”. Given that the wolf is associated with unruly, violent hunger, it does 
make sense to envision a vegetarian wolf as symbolic of heavenly peace and an 
end to all confl ict. Vegetarian predators might be a contradiction in terms, but 
this succinctly symbolises an otherworldly state of aff airs.
Both the adult sheep and the lamb play a decisive role in Christian imagery. 
Jesus is not only likened to a shepherd but also to a lamb. Th e Latin term Agnus 
Dei, lamb of God, refers to Jesus Christ in his role as a global paschal lamb, 
off ering – sacrifi cing – himself for the sake of humanity. In Christian iconography, 
he is sometimes depicted as a lamb, occasionally as a bleeding lamb. In English-
speaking liturgy, there are several variations over a theme such as this one: “Lamb 
of God, you take away the sin of the world, have mercy on us”.
In “Th e Parable of the Lost Sheep” (Luke 15:1–7), a ‘lost sheep’ is likened to a 
sinner who repents. In Matthew 25:31–46, a decisive distinction is made between 
sheep and goats in a discourse by Jesus. Th is time around, the sheep represent the 
blessed, those who will inherit heaven, whereas the goats represent the cursed, 
those who will not (or worse) – cf. the iconic image of the devil as a man with 
“goat-beard” and horns.
When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, he will 
sit on his glorious throne. All the nations will be gathered before him, and he 
will separate the people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep 
from the goats. He will put the sheep on his right and the goats on his left . 
Th en the King will say to those on his right, ‘Come, you who are blessed by 
my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the 
creation of the world.’ […] Th en he will say to those on his left , ‘Depart from 
me, you who are cursed, into the eternal fi re prepared for the devil and his 
angels.’ […] Th en they will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous 
to eternal life.
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As we have seen in these last two sections, the wolf ’s symbolism is rich and 
complex, with room for historical and local variations. It is very likely that some 
of the age-old sheep/wolf symbolism comes into play in the contemporary 
Norwegian discourse on wolf management, at times perhaps as part of the 
“collective unconscious” currents of our culture. At the same time, we have 
seen, in 3.1 Th e wolf as symbol, that the wolf ’s symbolism is in the Norwegian 
context predominantly landscape- and culture-specifi c, and is related to recent 
and contemporary economic and ecological changes. Generally speaking, we can 
observe that symbolism formation related to human–animal relations tends to 
occur at diff erent scales simultaneously, with regard to both time scales (long-
term vs. short-term, historical vs. contemporary, etc.) and cultural-geographical 
scales (Western vs. Norwegian, national vs. regional, urban vs. rural, etc.). 
Conceivably, any culture has a reservoir of symbolic representations that may 
for the most part be latent but where specifi c representations may at some points 
be resuscitated (activated) by current events and developments, whether these 
events are natural, as it were, or deliberately framed so as to provoke changes. 
4. The semiotics of predation
As we have observed, predators kill. More oft en than not, so do human beings 
in their large predator management. Ethical dilemmas arise when individuals of 
threatened species are killed in the name of conservation of the species. At any 
rate, the semiotics of killing concerns not only large predators but also people 
involved in large predator management.
Large predators kill because they have to kill in order to sustain themselves. 
Why do people involved in large predator management kill or facilitate the killing 
of large predators? Oft en because they think it is inevitable, necessary. Here we 
must bear in mind that Homo sapiens, too, is a carnivore – even if an omnivore 
in principle and by physiological design – and, in extension of this, is a predator. 
We too have been killing other animals for ages – most oft en as a way to sustain 
ourselves, but also extensively in contexts of competition with other species. As a 
result, several species of large predators have been driven to extinction. In current 
times, however, when we kill specimen of threatened large predators in the name 
of conservation, our intent is not to harm the species, even though the individual 
specimen is killed. Individuals that are killed off  are oft en referred to as “problem 
individuals” that have caused material damage or human hostility (or they are 
killed for the sake of the conservation of another, competing species, which is 
especially the case with exotic and so-called “invasive species”). However, the 
“problem” associated with so-called problem animals might in many cases have 
its origin in human perceptions just as much as in actual animal behaviour.
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Th e starting point for a new conservation movement that has surfaced in 
the last few years, in favour of compassionate conservation, is to “fi rst do no 
harm” (see Bekoff  2013: xxi). As a matter of fact, as Bekoff  (2013: xiv) points 
out in reference to Collins and Kays 2011, humans are today “the major cause of 
mortality in North American populations of large- and medium-sized mammals 
[51.8%]”, and this accounts for “the most deaths in larger North American 
mammals, including those living in protected areas (34.6 percent)”. In the context 
of Scandinavian wolf management, Olsen (2003) found that about four out of 
fi ve wolves covered by her study had died due to legal or illegal hunting, traffi  c 
accidents or other human causes. Fox (2013: 119) writes that in 2010, “the USDA 
Wildlife Services killed more than fi ve million animals in the United States  – 
including 113,000 mammalian carnivores”. Of the latter, a majority occurred in 
so-called lethal coyote control. 
Bekoff  (2013: xx) states that we need to ask some hard questions, including 
these: “Should we kill in the name of conservation or research? Should individuals 
be traded off  for the good of their own or other species or for ecosystem 
integrity?” Th e slogan of the compassionate conservation movement, “fi rst do 
no harm”, generally indicates that it favours minimising anthropogenic mortality 
(see section 5. Long-term vs. short-term goals for large predator management). 
Th is would, on an ideological level involving normative ethics, encompass 
systematically combining environmentalism (including conservationist thought) 
with concerns for animal protection, or in other words combining an attribution 
of moral status at systemic levels with an attribution of moral status to individuals.
As Vucetich and Nelson (2013: 15) state, 
one of the greatest developments in twentieth-century ethics has been the 
development of reasons to think that nonhuman animals and ecological 
collectives deserve direct moral consideration. Society’s appreciation for 
these reasons is increasingly apparent (e.g., Animal Welfare Act and En-
dangered Species Act). Th e ethical thing to do is not to deny the validity 
of one of these moral developments but to work toward an ethic that 
accommodates [the confl ict between the needs of conservation and the 
welfare of individual animals].
Baker (2013: 163) indicates that resolving both animal welfare and conservation 
challenges is made easier by attending to animals as individuals in conservation 
practices also. In her understanding, conservation biology’s neglect of the 
individual animal “reinforce[s] the conservation movement’s traditional 
emphasis on ‘ecological collectives’ (populations, species, ecosystems) rather 
than individuals” (ibid., 160). Vucetich, Bruskotter and Nelson (2015) observe 
that “[t]he origins of conservation biology as an academic discipline are explicitly 
rooted in the notion that nature possesses intrinsic value” (ibid., 1), and they 
“conclude that nature’s intrinsic value is not a vacuous concept or adequately 
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accommodated by economic valuation” (ibid.). Th is latter point is shared by 
Darimont et al. (2015: 858), who remark that “[p]aradigms of sustainable 
exploitation focus on population dynamics of prey and yields to humanity but 
ignore the behavior of humans as predators”. Vucetich, Bruskotter and Nelson 
note (ibid., 7) that “believing that a bear, for example, possesses intrinsic value 
does not mean killing a bear is always or necessarily wrong, but it does mean one 
would have to provide a compelling reason for doing so”.
Th e hunting pressure that large predators are subjected to can be divided into legal 
and illegal hunting. Th e extent of both types of hunting by humans is considerable 
for most species of large predators.15 Overall, the ecological impact of humankind 
globally is now so considerable that more and more researchers are referring to our 
current geological epoch as the Anthropocene, the era of mankind.16 Darimont et 
al. (2015) discuss the unique ecology of human predators in comparison with other 
predators. Th eir global survey found that “humans kill adult prey, the reproductive 
capital of populations, at much higher median rates than other predators (up to 14 
times higher), with particularly intense exploitation of terrestrial carnivores and 
fi shes” (ibid., 858). Th e data shows that human hunters exploit mesocarnivores at 
4 times higher rates than do nonhuman predators, and large carnivores at 9 times 
higher rates. According to the study, nonhuman predators typically target juvenile 
prey (ibid., 859), which does not have the same ecological eff ects. Our impact on 
predators in particular, and our high exploitation rates overall compared to other 
predators, are among the factors that lead Darimont et al. 2015 to conclude that 
“humans function as an unsustainable ‘super predator,’ which – unless additionally 
constrained by managers  – will continue to alter ecological and evolutionary 
processes globally” (ibid., 858).
 
Humans have diverged from other predators in behavior and infl uence. 
Geographic expansion, exploitation of naïve prey, killing technology, 
symbioses with dogs, and rapid population growth, among other factors, 
have long imposed profound impacts  – including widespread extinction 
and restructuring of food webs and ecosystems – in terrestrial and marine 
systems […] [C]ontemporary humans can rapidly drive prey declines […], 
degrade ecosystems […], and impose evolutionary change in prey […] 
[T]hese are extreme outcomes that nonhuman predators seldom impose. 
(Darimont et al. 2015: 858)
15 For a review of legal and illegal wolf hunting in Scandinavia, see Tønnessen 2010c.
16 On the topic of animals in the Anthropocene, see Tønnessen, Armstrong Oma & Ratta-
sepp (eds.) 2016.
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4.1. Conflicts of interest: Whose prey?
In historical times, people occasionally fell prey to predators, but in modern, 
economically developed countries, this hardly happens anymore. In some 
regions of India, however, depredation events involving wolves have happened 
quite recently, and every year a few people are killed by tigers (though elephants, 
for example, may be just as dangerous in terms of the number of people killed per 
year). Even so, Indian conservationists tend to argue that even man-eating tigers 
should not be culled. 
Apart from such exceptions in the bigger picture, human hostility toward large 
predators is more oft en motivated by confl icts of interests related to prey animals. 
Th is can concern either animals in our care, typically livestock, or animals that are 
hunted both by large predators and by humans – for instance, ungulates in Europe. 
A striking fi nding in the study of Darimont et al. (2015: 858) is that globally, human 
“hunters exploited large carnivores at 3.7 times the rate that they killed herbivores”. 
Th is is quite remarkable, given that herbivores constitute natural prey for humans, 
whereas large predators generally do not. Even though large carnivores are in this 
sense overexploited by humans to a larger degree than herbivores are, there is not 
much doubt that competition for prey animals is an important motivating factor 
explaining the enmity between humans and other large predators. Darimont et 
al. (2015: 858) refer to “competitive reasons [intraguild predation]”. Th ey further 
note (ibid.) that “agri- and aquaculture, as well as an ever-increasing taxonomic 
and geographic niche, leave an enormous and rapidly growing human population 
demographically decoupled from dwindling prey”.
In their study of anthropogenic infl uence on lynx behaviour, Bouyer et al. 
(2015: 291) observe that
[o]f all the species negatively aff ected by human developments and activities, 
large carnivores are generally considered as particularly sensitive because 
of their large spatial requirements and low densities […] Th ese spatial 
requirements imply that large carnivore conservation, especially in crowded 
areas like some parts of Western Europe, require their integration into 
human-dominated landscapes because protected areas are too small. 
In response to the presence of humans or of human constructions etc., predators 
may change habitat use. “However, in Europe, the ungulates that are the main 
prey of large carnivores oft en occur at higher densities close to artifi cial feeding 
sites and human modifi ed landscapes […] Th is distribution of prey can induce 
potential trade-off s between risk avoidance and prey access” (Bouyer et al. 2015: 
291–292). Th e study was focused on southeastern Norway, which includes some of 
the most populated areas in Norway (ibid., 292). It shows that lynx, whose diet in 
southern Norway is dominated by roe dear and other ungulates (ibid., 293), “seem 
to select rural areas of medium to high human modifi cation and avoid unmodifi ed 
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semi-natural habitats” (ibid., 294), whether they want to rest, kill, or move. In other 
words, they get quite close to humans. Th e lynx studied preferred both resting sites 
and kill-sites located in rugged areas (ibid.). “Lynx clearly select for, and move, in 
rugged areas for all the diff erent classes of human habitat modifi cation” (ibid.). Th is 
suggests that lynx try to combine getting close to potential prey in typically human-
modifi ed areas with hiding from humans. In support of this hypothesis, the authors 
point out that lynx tended to move at low elevations “in forested areas and in rural 
landscapes with low human modifi cation, but […] moved at higher elevation when 
they were in rural landscapes with medium to high human modifi cation” (ibid.). In 
conclusion, Bouyer et al. (2015: 298) claim that “the presence of people, roads and 
fi elds are not automatically an obstacle to lynx presence as long as there is some 
cover (forest and terrain) and prey”. Th is makes lynx conservation feasible “across 
vast areas of the European landscape” on a continent which is largely “a mosaic of 
small forest patches and agricultural habitats crisscrossed by roads and with high 
human densities” (ibid.). Similar arguments have been made about the other large 
mammalian predators.
5. Long-term vs. short-term goals for large predator 
management17
It is conceivable that an animal can die by the hand of man and still have lived 
a life as a wild animal. Nevertheless, considerable anthropogenic mortality is no 
doubt a sign of a level of human intervention that conservation biology should 
aim to overcome. In the short-term, some measures might be warranted for 
emergency reasons, as it were, that are not desirable in the long-term.18 
What should the long-term goals of the management of large predators be? 
In my opinion, conservation biology should aim to restore the independent 
viability of threatened or marginalised populations of wild carnivores. Viability 
in general concerns the population’s resilience and vigor  – its chances to 
continue to exist in the long run. Viability on the population and species level 
is supported by individual animals’ pursuit of survival and well-being, which is 
dependent on suitable ecological conditions as well as on individual ingenuity. 
Th e qualifi er ‘independent’ in ‘independent viability’ refers to the normative idea 
that a large predator population’s viability should not depend on neverending 
human management. If a wild animal is viable only given continued human 
management, then it is not truly viable. In this perspective, it is very important, 
crucial actually, that contemporary management measures should support the 
17 Parts of this section is based on Tønnessen (2013: 92–94).
18 Emergency measures can possibly be required, such as when a species is close to extinction 
or when one animal species is threatened due to competition with another animal species 
whose presence has been signifi cantly favoured by anthropogenic environmental change.
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long-term, independent viability of predators and not result in dependence on 
continued human conservation actions.
An implication of this stand on conservation practices is that in the long-
term, large predator management as we know it today should seek to make itself 
redundant. To many wildlife managers, such a claim might appear to be surprising, 
if not outright shocking. In our current ecological and societal situation, an end to 
extensive large predator management is not in sight. How could we do without it? 
And, one might add, has there not always been something akin to large predator 
management in practically all human societies throughout the ages?
An end to today’s oft en invasive and lethal large predator management is only 
feasible given deep societal changes with regard to how we relate to predators 
and other animals. In such a new culture, humankind will no longer assume a 
monopoly on prey or on the use of land and resources. Th e scenario presupposes 
that large predators have, by that point, achieved independent viability, and this 
in turn presupposes that poaching has been reduced to a minimum. It further 
presupposes that humans and large predators can fi nd ways to coexist without 
extensive damage to human interests, such as livestock. People will come to look at 
a distant relationship with large predators as natural, desirable, or at least tolerable. 
From a conservation standpoint, it appears to be intuitively true that the more 
we do in a large predator’s favour, the better. However, this is not necessarily 
true. Th e long-term goal for large predator management should be that human 
society seen as a whole neither works particularly for nor against large predators. 
Th is can only be achieved by marginalising the human infl uence on the living 
conditions and thus on the umwelten of large predators. Th us, instead of seeking 
to balance harmful human infl uence on large predator ecology (e.g. illegal 
hunting) with benefi cial human infl uence (e.g. legal hunting, presumably), 
we should, in the long run, seek to maximise the semiotic autonomy of large 
predators. Th is is a sound aim because, by nature, any animal lives and survives 
by use of its own capacities, including their semiotic capabilities, and because 
the currently excessive anthropogenic infl uence on wildlife radically disturbs 
semiotic autonomy. Th e semiotic autonomy of animals presupposes relatively 
intact ecosystems and a minimum of human disturbances. Importantly, an 
end to large predator management as we know it today in eff ect presupposes 
that today’s lethal management measures, and those management measures 
that are invasive, are replaced by non-lethal and non-invasive or less invasive 
management measures.19 In the case of Scandinavian wolves, tracking of wolves 
on snow and collection of excrement etc. for DNA analysis (cf. Wabakken et al. 
2012: 15–16; cf. also Bischof et al. 2015), and other non-invasive observations 
19 In a wild carnivore management Utopia, the carnivore management could be carried out 
in a more informal way and might not have to rely on law-based public predator man-
agement. Th e substance that has to change – and that is decisive no matter what the law 
and offi  cial regulations say – consists of the norms, perceptions and actions of individual 
human stakeholders.
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could still be carried out even in this wild carnivore Utopia in order to keep an eye 
on population trends and so on.
At the seminar of the Scandinavian Wolf Project (SKANDULV) in the 
autumn of 2010, I presented thoughts such as these on the long-term goals of wolf 
management for an audience consisting of researchers and wildlife managers (for 
information on and from SKANDULV, see SKANDULV). Th e opposition to my 
remarks on this point was quite massive. Th is might not come as any surprise, given 
that the researchers and wildlife managers present had no economic self-interest in 
making themselves redundant. Several in the audience did not share my vision of a 
world with minimal intervention in the lives of wolves; this may be because they did 
not see it as feasible or because they did not see it as desirable. But I sincerely think 
this is the direction in which we should go. In the discussion, counterarguments 
were not fully articulated, but some were indicated by exclamations such as “If 
we stop hunting wolves, then what is next? Will we stop hunting moose too?” 
Th is was clearly intended as an absurd question, a self-defeating argument, for 
an end to moose hunting appeared to be entirely inconceivable. Apparently a 
wholly nonviolent or vegetarian humanity is just as utopian an idea as, within the 
framework of new heavens and a new earth, vegetarian predators.
Th is vision of a world where lethal large predator management is ultimately 
redundant implies that anthropogenic mortality should be minimised.20 Th is 
would by and large be in line with the proposals of Darimont et al. (2015: 859), 
who suggest “[a]ligning exploitation rates on adults [within large predators] 
with those of competing predators”. As they observe, “aggressive reductions in 
exploitation are required to mimic nonhuman predators, which represent long-
term models of sustainability”.
Th is particular benchmark  – minimising anthropogenic mortality in large 
predators – is arguably suitable both in the long-term and in the short-term. In 
the long-term, the goal should be to achieve an anthropogenic mortality as close 
to zero as possible. In the short-term, anthropogenic mortality – calculated and 
read as the share of all large predator deaths caused by humans – can serve as a 
telling measure of how far we are from establishing a specifi c carnivore species’ 
independent viability. Th e higher the anthropogenic mortality, the further away 
from this goal are we.21 And conversely, the lower the anthropogenic mortality, 
20 Th is concerns both legal kills (including management-related culling, etc.) and illegal 
kills (poaching and the like).
21 It should be noted that I propose (1) promoting independent viability and (2) preserving 
(bio-)semiotic autonomy as management goals, and (I) marginalising human infl uence on 
the umwelten of large predators and (II) minimising anthropogenic mortality as important 
measures to reach those goals. However, given my Gandhian inclinations, I must admit 
that for me not killing large predators (II) is something that has intrinsic value. In other 
words, I regard refraining from killing – nonviolence – as an activity that has value in 
itself. Th is is telling of my values. But as the arguments of Darimont et al. (2015) show, 
it is fully possible to favour minimising anthropogenic mortality in large predators on 
ecological grounds, without sharing my nonviolent values.
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the further we have likely come towards accomplishing independent viability. 
Intermediate goals can of course be set, as long as they take us in the right 
direction. In the context of Scandinavian wolf management, an intermediate 
goal could be that a few years from now, less than half of all wild wolves should 
die as a direct result of human actions – in other words, that at least half of all 
wolves will die of natural causes. Th is would at least change the balance in the 
developing state of wolf mortality from being predominantly anthropogenic to 
being equally anthropogenic and natural (i.e., human agency would “only” equal 
natural forces, instead of dominating over them). Lower anthropogenic mortality 
would enable many Scandinavian wolves to take control over their own lives, as it 
were, and give more room for natural migration, courtship, and maintenance and 
establishment of social relations and wolf territories.22 But even accomplishing 
this intermediate goal will require considerable eff orts, given that today only one 
in fi ve wolves, as we have seen, experience a natural death, according to Olsen 
(2003).
In semiotic terms, the goal of minimising anthropogenic mortality for 
wild carnivores implies that the functional cycle of killing should be made as 
insignifi cant as possible in the bigger picture. Given the extent of today’s lethal 
large predator management, this would in most cases amount to a fundamental 
umwelt transition (see Tønnessen 2009a) in how we relate to wild carnivores. Th is 
would be refl ected in changes in our human umwelt with regard to how large 
predators are perceived and treated, as well as in the umwelten of wild carnivores. 
Overall, humans would likely over time (in the really long run) become less 
prominent umwelt objects in large predator umwelten, noticeably as enemies. 
Th e implied presuppositions would also entail changes in the relationships 
between large predators and several animals in human care, particularly grazing 
livestock (which would, again, be refl ected in umwelt transitions in the case of 
many animals), while basic predator-prey relations in the wild were safeguarded.
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Semiotics in animal socialisation with humans
Laura Kiiroja
Th e Five Freedoms1 that represent the basic needs of all captive animals could 
be interpreted very diff erently depending on the cultural and institutional 
backgrounds of the people involved. Some of the many scientists who have 
drawn attention to this problem are animal behaviourists Geoff  Hosey, Vicky 
Melfi  and Sheila Pankhurst. In their book “Zoo Animals: Behaviour, Management 
and Welfare” (2009), they off er a more objective and specifi c approach to these 
Five Freedoms. In addition to pointing out the importance of the animals’ 
ability to thrive in captivity and viewing the behaviours of the animals’ wild 
conspecifi cs as a template for good welfare (Hosey et al. 2009: 218), they ask 
for more empathy from animal caretakers. Namely, they emphasise considering 
animals’ subjective experiences and emotions, and “drawing analogies from 
ourselves about the needs and abilities of other animals” (Hosey et al. 2009: 
218). Th is shift  of thoughts, conjointly being suggested and supported by many 
scientists, has brought up a brainstorm on new ideas to improve animal welfare 
from the minimum standards to the highest possible levels. Th ese ideas vary 
from new environmental enrichment methods and training plans to enclosure 
designs and husbandry routines. One of the rather novel methods of improving 
animal welfare is the socialisation of captive animals with humans. Th is process 
certainly requires focusing on the individual animal (as a subject), considering its 
emotions, relationships, and consciousness – its subjective lifeworld (Umwelt).
Th ere exist several types of captive animals, such as pets, livestock, laboratory 
and research animals, working and performing animals, circus animals, and 
residents of zoos and aquariums. Although proper socialisation with humans 
is important for the welfare of all captive animals (including dogs, horses or 
cattle), it is much more diffi  cult and crucial with captive wild animals. Namely, 
domesticated animals have gone through a long process of selective breeding 
towards being suitable for living with humans and are, therefore, genetically prone 
to be more accepting and less fearful of humans. Th is means they are genetically 
1 Th e Five Freedoms stated by the British government Farm Animal Welfare Advisory 
Committee in 2012 (originally announced in 1965) are: Freedom from Th irst, Hunger 
and Malnutrition; Freedom from Discomfort; Freedom from Pain, Injury, and Disease; 
Freedom to Express Natural Behaviours; and Freedom from Fear and Distress. Refer-
ence: Farm Animal Welfare Council 2012. Five freedoms. [WWW] http://www.fawc.org.
uk/freedoms.htm (16.04.2014).
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predisposed to be easier to socialise (Goodmann 2015).2 Also domestic animals 
usually receive some amount of socialisation as part of their upbringing (ibid.), 
while the proper socialisation of captive wild animals is quite exceptional. For 
this reason, the following chapter concentrates on the socialisation of captive 
wild animals (taking the zoo as an example), although the principles of the pro-
cess would be similar with domesticated animals.
Th e goal of socialisation of an ex situ wild animal with humans is to reduce 
the animal’s fear of humans as much as possible and thus make the animal more 
comfortable living in a human environment. While fear of humans is a crucial 
survival strategy in the wild, it is not relevant (and defi nitely not in the animal’s 
best interest) in captivity. An animal that is not suff ering3 from fear exhibits a 
much wider and more natural range of behaviours compared to an unsocialised 
animal whose whole behavioural repertoire is infl uenced by fear. Considering 
the above-described requirements, socialisation has a doubly benefi cial eff ect on 
improving animal welfare as it decreases the animal’s fear and enables it to exhibit 
a wide range of natural behaviours (with the exception of fear of humans).
Although fear is to some extent learned, animals’ fear of humans has been 
proven to be species-specifi c (Carlstead 2009: 600). It depends on the essence of 
the species’ history of interactions with humans as well as its ability to recognise 
man as an ecosystem’s top predator. Th erefore, it is most important to socialise 
animal species that have a genetically induced high fear level of humans. Th ese 
would include large carnivores (e.g. wolves and big cats) but also other species 
(e.g. foxes), whom people have been extensively hunting for centuries, in many 
cases almost to extinction. Th ese animals’ predecessors who feared people had a 
better chance of surviving and were thus selected. Over thousands of generations, 
these species have developed a genetically forwarded fear of humans, which 
makes it very diffi  cult for them to adapt to life in captivity. Th ese animals 
would be suff ering from the stress of being surrounded by visitors4 and handled 
2 Goodmann, Patricia A. 2015. Why Hand Raise Captive Wolves? [WWW] http://www.
everythingwolf.com/news/readarticle.aspx?article=38 (31.07.2015).
3 Not just any negative subjective state means the animal is suff ering. British animal be-
haviourist Christopher John Barnard has distinguished suff ering as “a causal mechanism 
that triggers adaptive aversive responses in the animal” (Barnard 2004: 213). He has also 
explained that negative functional consequences for the individual can result in one of 
two ways: from “adaptive self-expenditure, where negative subjective states refl ect adaptive 
cost-gauging” (for example fatigue while foraging or pain indicating an injury) or from 
“non-adaptive self-expenditure” (for example hunting fruitlessly in an inappropriate envi-
ronment or mounting an ineff ective immune response against a novel parasite) (Barnard 
2004: 214). It is important to comprehend that only the non-adaptive self-expenditure 
qualifi es as suff ering (ibid.), whereas short-time stress could even be good for the animal.
4 Th e widely held view according to which zoo animals habituate with the public and no 
longer respond to their presence is now abandoned (Hosey et al. 2009: 479). Studies have 
shown that the eff ect of zoo visitors on animals is generally negative, resulting in dis-
plays of behaviour that are associated with stress response, such as stereotypies, increased 
intraspecifi c and interspecifi c aggression, increased activity, and, sometimes, decreased 
affi  liative behaviours (Hosey et al. 2009: 475–476).
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by caretakers. Also they would be too fearful to participate in the majority of 
enrichment programs (or they would rather gain negative experiences from 
it). Th e problem would be even more severe if the species is known for being 
neophobic (e.g. wolves, foxes). Such cases usually result in the animals’ stress 
response, stereotypical behaviour, increased aggression towards conspecifi cs and 
people (Hosey et al. 2009: 475–476), extensive hiding behaviours, (oft en self-
destructive) attempts to escape, etc. Not only does it refl ect poor welfare, but 
this scenario is also not at all in accordance with the accredited zoo’s purpose of 
educating people about the animals. Even more, it does not help with research 
on the species’ natural behaviour nor with conservation aims, considering 
that knowledge of the species’ natural behaviour is the foundation of most 
conservation eff orts. Th erefore, fi nding ways to make visitors (more precisely, 
people in general) less frightening and more enriching for animals is gradually 
becoming more relevant in zoo studies (Hosey et al. 2009: 479).
Although the idea of socialisation – that is, the understanding of the necessity 
to reduce the captive animal’s fear of humans – has been well-known for a long 
time (Hediger 1950: 19), the concept of socialisation as an animal welfare program 
is relatively young.5 In the scientifi c literature of animal studies, the existing 
defi nitions of socialisation are remarkably ambivalent (oft en contradictory) and 
insuffi  cient. For example, Hosey, Melfi  and Pankhurst have defi ned socialisation 
as “the process, where animals routinely interact with people and become familiar 
with them, leading to changes in the human–animal relationship” (Hosey et al. 
2009: 232). An American canine behaviourist, Barbara Handelman, defi nes the 
socialisation of dogs as “a systematic process of exposing a pup to a wide range of 
dogs, people, and places. Th ere is a very narrow window for proper socialisation” 
(Handelman 2008: 243). Th e scientists of Wolf Park (Indiana, USA), where 
wolves, coyotes and foxes have been socialised with humans for over 40 years, 
defi ne socialisation in various ways, such as “the process of making an animal 
more suitable to live with humans” (Addams, Miller 2007: 70) or “to rear, or 
interact with it in such a way that it can use its repertoire of social signals with 
5 To the best of my knowledge, one of the fi rst scholars studying the socialisation of cap-
tive wild animals with humans explicitly for animal welfare purposes were the ethologists 
Dr. Erich Klinghammer and Pat Goodmann from Wolf Park (Indiana), who started their 
research in the socialisation of gray wolves in 1972. Previously, socialisation of some kind 
had been practiced by some zoos and sometimes even scientifi cally studied but usually for 
diff erent reasons than improving animal welfare. For example, ethologist Konrad Lorenz 
studied the process of imprinting and juvenile development. Biologist Heini Hediger talked 
about the necessity of reducing zoo animals’ fear of humans (to improve animal welfare) 
but not quite in the methods or terms of socialisation described in this article. As far as I 
am concerned, the only scholars who socialised animals for their research before Wolf Park 
were ethologist Erik Zimen, who socialised wolves, and ethologist Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 
who socialised wolverines. In his book Th e Wolf, a Species in Danger (1981), Erik Zimen 
referred to some benefi ts of socialisation to animal welfare.
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other animals [humans]”6 (Goodmann 2011).7 In my opinion, although being 
true, none of the mentioned defi nitions adequately and suffi  ciently represent 
the true essence of socialisation – reduction of the animal’s fear of humans by 
changing the perception of humans in the animal’s umwelt. Nor do they provide 
understanding of the relations of socialisation and other types of human–animal 
relationships occurring in the zoo. 
Socialisation is truly a matter of navigating in the fi elds of communication, 
interpretation, and relationships. As such, it is essentially a semiotic problem. 
In this chapter, I will introduce the semiotic mechanisms and methods of 
socialisation and, by doing that, attempt to clarify the defi nition of socialisation 
and its position in the discourse of human–animal relationships. Besides scientifi c 
literature, the chapter is based on my master’s thesis about the case-study of 
socialising red foxes (Kiiroja 2014), the knowledge I gained from working with 
socialised wolves during my internship at Wolf Park, my experience in socialising 
a litter of European grey wolves in Germany, and, above all, the priceless wisdom 
of Runar Næss (Animal Zoolution, Norway) and Pat Goodmann (Wolf Park, 
USA), experts in wolf behaviour and socialisation.
1. The semiotic ontology of socialisation of captive wild 
animals with humans
As previously mentioned, an individual-oriented approach to the welfare of zoo 
animals requires comprehension of the animal’s umwelt. Considering the animal’s 
umwelt is, in fact, an implicit task already in animal behaviour studies (although 
it has not always been understood as such). American biopsychologist Gordon M. 
Burghardt has even suggested the attempt to comprehend an organism’s private 
experience (including its subjective perceptual world, mental states, and subjective 
responses) to be the fi ft h aim of ethology8 (Burghardt 1997: 276). When it comes 
to the process of the socialisation of captive wild animals with humans, umwelt 
consideration is inevitable and, indeed, of the highest importance.
6 Although animals can be socialised to many species other than their own, this chapter 
concentrates on socialisation with humans.
7 Goodmann, Patricia A. 2011. Explain the diff erence between an imprinted or social-
ised animal, or are they the same thing? [WWW] https://theiwrc.org/archives/1647 
(31.07.2015).
8 Th e fi ft h aim of ethology refers to the four guiding questions about animal behaviour 
proclaimed by the honoured ethologist Niko Tinbergen in 1963: what is the function of 
the behaviour, what is the cause of the behaviour, what is the ontogeny of the behaviour, 
and what is the phylogeny of the behaviour (Tinbergen 1963: 410–433). 
186 LAURA KIIROJA
Umwelt, as a concept fi rst developed by Baltic-German biologist and 
semiotician Jakob von Uexküll, could be explained as the totality of an organism’s 
perceptual and eff ector realms, i.e. the sum of all sign processes in which the 
organism participates as an interpreter (Uexküll 1982: 66–67). To put it simply, 
an umwelt is the semiotic world of an organism (Kull, Torop 2003: 414). Uexküll 
explained that through every perception act, “the neutral object is transformed 
into a meaning-carrier, the meaning of which is imprinted upon it by a subject” 
(Uexküll 1982: 62). Not only does this process depend on the animal’s sense 
organs, but also on the individual’s past and current personal experiences. 
Th erefore, animals obtain a very selective and subjective view of the world 
around them.
How does the process of interpretation work? It could be explained with the 
mechanism of a functional circle, which basically means that every perception 
begins with a perceptual cue and ends by producing an eff ector cue on that 
meaning-carrier (Uexküll 1982: 66). While Uexküll claimed the most important 
general functional circles in most animals’ umwelten to be the circles of physical 
medium (i.e. the surrounding environment), food, enemy, and sex (Uexküll 1982: 
67), a Norwegian philosopher and biosemiotician Morten Tønnessen adjusted 
them to physical medium, food/resources, enemy and partner (Tønnessen 2009: 
54; Fig.1). Th is adjustment is important when taking into consideration the 
various kinds of social relationships, besides the reproductive ones, that function 
as partnerships in the animal’s umwelt.
             
Figure 1. Phenomenal fi elds (Tønnessen 2011: 44)
Tønnessen has brought out the concept of ontological niche, inspired by Danish 
biosemiotician Jesper Hoff meyer’s theory of semiotic niche. While Hoff meyer’s 
semiotic niche involves all the interpretive challenges off ered for the animal by 
its ecological niche (Hoff meyer 2008: 13), Tønnessen’s ontological niche involves 
the set of the animal’s active relationships at the current moment of the history 
of nature (Tønnessen 2009: 54). Th e ontological niche, therefore, determines the 
area in the phenomenal world occupied by the animal. Tønnessen has depicted 
Food/resources Partner
Physical mediumEnemy
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the ontological niche as phenomenal fi elds, where one animal’s phenomenal fi elds 
overlap with those of the other animal with whom it is in interaction (Tønnessen 
2009: 54). Such an ontological map suffi  ciently describes the various possibilities 
of human–animal relationships (as well as animal-animal relationships). 
Adapting this theory helps us understand the essence of socialisation. An 
animal that needs to be socialised is fearful of humans to begin with  – man 
occupies the phenomenal fi eld of enemy in this animal’s umwelt. In order to 
properly socialise the animal, its umwelt needs to be reconstructed by shift ing 
the position of man from the phenomenal fi eld of enemy to that of partner (Fig. 
1). However, in practice, this reconstruction is not that simple. It seems to me 
that there exist many transition-phases, such as the “rather negative signifi cance”, 
“neutral signifi cance”, “rather positive signifi cance” of people, before people in 
general obtain a meaning-carrier of a partner in the animal’s umwelt. To make 
it even more complicated, it so happens that some people, who have a strong 
positive relationship with the animal, are considered as partners, whereas 
unfamiliar people could still, by default, carry a meaning of an enemy.
Th e degree to which the animals are socialised is a matter of the zoo’s priorities. 
Th ere exist three basic levels of socialisation, although only two of them should 
be recommended in zoos when high animal welfare is a goal. First, an animal 
could be socialised to one person only. It will still have a relatively high fear 
level of other keepers as well as of visitors, which makes the benefi cial eff ect of 
socialisation rather low. Additionally, the animal could suff er under severe stress 
should the one caretaker quit working with the animal. A second and better way 
(animal welfare wise) would be socialising the animal to the zoo staff . In this case, 
the animal would have positive relationships with the zoo workers, but it could 
still be fearful of visitors. Th e third way would be general socialisation. Here, the 
animal would be socialised to all people. Th is would require multiple positive 
relationships with the zoo staff  as well as actively including positive interactions 
with visitors in the process of socialisation so that, eventually, visitors (at least 
the ones coming into the enclosure) would carry a positive signifi cance for the 
animal and be perceived as enriching (Næss, personal conversation, 30.03.2012).
At this point, it becomes indispensable to explain the diff erence between 
relationships and signifi cance. Namely, a positive signifi cance of a human for the 
animal does not automatically mean that there exists a positive human–animal 
relationship (or any relationship at all) between them. A relationship requires two 
individuals to have a “history of interactions between them that lead to a greater 
predictability about the outcome of future interactions; in other words, they get 
to know what each other is likely to do” (Hosey et al. 2009: 483). Deriving from 
that defi nition, in this chapter the development of human–animal relationships 
is considered possible between the animal and people who regularly spend time 
with it. A visitor-animal relationship as such does not exist (apart from the 
exceptional cases where the visitor frequently and regularly visits a zoo animal 
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and interacts with it). A visitor can have positive or negative signifi cance for 
the animal according to how the animal perceives it, but (s)he does not have 
a relationship with the animal. However, it is important to understand that the 
relationships that the animal has with its caretakers heavily infl uence the animal’s 
perception of zoo visitors as well as its experience of interaction with them 
(Hosey et al. 2009: 487).
With this in mind, it is comprehensible that the third way of socialisation – 
that of general socialisation – is the most favourable for umwelt-reconstruction. 
Th e fi rst two methods change the meaning-carriers of the people with whom the 
animal has a positive relationship to that of partner; however, the general public 
may still remain in the phenomenal fi eld of enemy, and the animal may still 
be stressed by unfamiliar people. Th is is so because, in such cases, the animal’s 
socialisation with humans only includes the people who look and behave a certain 
way (the way of the familiar keeper or the zoo staff ). In general socialisation, 
the umwelt-reconstruction is much more encompassing as positive partnership-
based relationships, positive visitor interactions, and proper desensitization 
(which will be discussed later in this chapter) enable the animal to perceive even 
unfamiliar people on a scale from neutral to positive (Fig. 2). Only then can 
one say that humans (in general) occupy the phenomenal fi eld of partner rather 
than of enemy in the individual animal’s umwelt. Th is is the level of umwelt-
reconstruction, set as a goal for proper socialisation in the context of this chapter.
Figure 2. Generally socialised zoo wolves relaxing with a handler in front of visitors in 
a 10000 m2 enclosure.
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2. Human–animal relationships involved in socialisation 
from the perspective of umwelt theory
Th e previous analysis revealed the importance of umwelt consideration in order 
to properly socialise an animal. Th e perspective from umwelt theory could also 
off er opportunities for much-needed understanding of the diff erences between 
human–animal relationships related to or involved in socialisation methods such 
as imprinting, taming and habituation. 
Let us start with the process of imprinting. Imprinting, especially human-
imprinting (i.e. the phenomenon of animals imprinting on humans), is quite a 
perplexing concept. In the scientifi c literature, imprinting is usually defi ned as 
a process of learning about one’s species identity, gender identity, or relatedness 
to other individuals during a young animal’s “critical period”9 when it is primed 
to bond easily with any living thing (Addams, Miller 2007: 70; Hosey et al. 2009: 
79–80). However, it is known that, in some species, food and habitat preferences 
may also be developed during this very young age (Goodmann 2011). Since 
in this chapter I am aiming to diff erentiate between diff erent types of human–
animal relationships, I will concentrate on the bonding and relationship-building 
element of imprinting.
Th ere are two important nuances of this sophisticated process that I would like 
to emphasise: the possibility of imprinting on inanimate objects, and the sexual 
and social elements of imprinting. Th ere are examples of animals imprinting on 
lifeless objects in case no living organisms are present during the “critical period” 
of imprinting (Ramul 1972: 99–100). It is a well-known fact that Konrad Lorenz 
had some of his geese imprinted on various inanimate objects, such as a lightbulb 
or a pair of gumboots. Chinese rice farmers have a centuries-old tradition of 
imprinting ducks on a special stick, which they later use to bring the ducks to the 
rice fi elds in order to restrain the snail population.10 Th e fact that animals can 
imprint even on lifeless objects illustrates the strength of the bond of imprinting – 
something that becomes very important to comprehend in socialisation.
Namely, proper socialisation (changing the meaning-carrier of humans 
in general in the animal’s umwelt) requires the animal to have strong positive 
relation ships with its caretakers. Th ese relationships could be divided into 
primary (imprinted) and secondary relationships (built aft er the animal’s “critical 
9 Th e critical period is “a period of development […] during which an animal develops a 
familiar bond with whatever species with which it is in primary contact. Also known as 
‘socialisation window’” (Addams, Miller 2007: ix). Th e length of the “critical period” var-
ies between species. For example, in foxes it ends at approximately three or four weeks of 
age (Addams, Miller 2007: 69). In wolves, the “critical period” is known to end at about 
six weeks of age (Næss, personal conversation, 25.06.2013).
10 Public Broadcasting Service 2012. My Life as a Turkey: Who’s Your Mama? Th e Science 
of Imprinting. [WWW] http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/my-life-as-a-turkey-whos-
your-mama-the-science-of-imprinting/7367/ (31.01.2015).
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period”) (Næss, personal conversation, 30.03.2012). Without primary relation-
ships, the animals’ bond with humans will be signifi cantly weaker, and the 
animals will never be as fearless of humans and able to enjoy their man-made 
surroundings in as relaxed, stress-free manner (Addams, Miller 2007: 70). Th e 
process of imprinting provides the necessary strong foundation for changing 
man’s position in the phenomenal fi elds of the animal’s umwelt. 
Th is line of thought brings us to the second important nuance of imprinting. 
Namely, it is a widely held view that being human-imprinted is not favourable to 
animal welfare since it results in animals who do not possess proper social skills 
to communicate with their own kind and are not interested in interacting with 
their conspecifi cs. Instead, human-imprinted animals are constantly looking 
for attention from people and direct all their behaviour (including sexual and 
socially challenging behaviour) at humans, making them both miserable and not 
suitable for the educational display of natural species-specifi c behaviour (Næss, 
personal conversation, 30.03.2012). How does this aspect fi t in with socialisation? 
Here I would like to suggest recognising two diff erent elements in the process of 
imprinting: sexual, i.e. imprinting the animal’s species identity and future mate 
preferences as was originally suggested by Konrad Lorenz (Goodmann 2011), 
and social imprinting, i.e. accepting another individual as being a natural part 
of its social group. All animals have an innate tendency to imprint on their 
biological parents or somebody who most resembles their biological parents 
(Addams, Miller 2007: 70) (among the organisms or objects that are present 
during the “critical period” of imprinting). Th is explains the reason why animals 
have to be hand-raised (starting during the “critical period”, before the onset of 
fear) in order to be properly socialised with humans.11 It is not enough to visit the 
baby animals regularly while letting them be raised by their socialised biological 
mother: this method (attempted by Wolf Park) will most likely produce animals 
who “will show some shortened fl ight distance12 from humans as they mature 
11 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of re-
moving baby animals from their mother. However, it has to be explained that people’s 
concern about the welfare of the mother is highly anthropomorphistic. For example, 
practical experiences with wolves reveal that the mother animal returns to its normal be-
haviour within an average of three days aft er its pups have been pulled, and this has been 
related to the time it takes for the mother’s milk to dry up (Goodmann, personal con-
versation, 14.01.2015; Næss, personal conversation, 25.06.2013). Th us I would conclude 
that the lifelong advantages of baby animals being socialised with humans outweigh the 
short-period stress of the mother animal whose off spring have been removed. However, 
I acknowledge that the situation would be diff erent with species known for their extraor-
dinarily strong mother-off spring bond (e.g. elephants and chimpanzees).
12 Th e fl ight distance is a characteristic escape reaction – specifi c for sex, age, enemy, and 
surroundings – that the animal shows when the enemy approaches within a certain dis-
tance (Hediger 1950: 19). Th at means fl ight distance is the distance that, when crossed 
by the enemy, makes the animal fl ee. If the possibility to fl ee is eliminated, the animal’s 
subsequent response is defensive aggression (Hediger 1968: 123–124).
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but they will not show much of their social repertoire to us [people] and they 
will not solicit many affi  liative interactions; rather, they tend to stay out of 
reach” (Goodmann 2011). Such animals would also be signifi cantly more fearful 
of humans when compared to animals that were hand-raised (Næss, personal 
conversation, 30.03.2012).
But how to avoid sexual imprinting on humans as foster parents during hand-
raising? Th is is why it is necessary to socialise multiple young animals together – 
if an animal has a choice, it will imprint sexually on its own species or the species 
who most resembles their own species (Addams, Miller 2007: 70; Næss, personal 
conversation, 30.03.2012). It has a genetically induced tendency to prefer its own 
species to humans (or any other species) if given a chance. When hand-raising 
young animals together with their littermates, they will learn their species identity 
as well as adequate species-specifi c behavioural and social skills13 by sexually 
imprinting on their littermates. Due to being exposed to humans as foster parents, 
the animals will imprint on humans socially, considering these certain people as 
members of their social groups. Th e validity of this diff erentiation is supported by 
practical experience (both my own and that of experienced animal socialisation 
experts), according to which such a socialisation method results in animals who 
are able to clearly discriminate between conspecifi cs and extraspecifi cs (humans) 
and who have proper communication skills for interacting with both of them 
(Næss, personal conversation, 30.03.2012).
In terms of umwelt processes, during the “critical period” of imprinting, the 
animal learns about the functional circles and phenomenal fi elds in its umwelt. 
Th e phenomenal fi elds of enemy and partner will be established. (Depending 
on the species, for example in wolves [Næss, personal conversation, 25.06.2013], 
the functional circle of the physical medium – the animal’s habitat preferences – 
and the functional circle of resources – e.g. the animal’s food preferences – will 
also be established in that early period of life.) One may conclude that to have 
humans obtain a meaning-carrier of only a social partner and the members of the 
animal’s own species obtain a meaning-carrier of a sexual (and social) partner in 
the animal’s umwelt, it is essential to socialise multiple young animals together 
(or at least have another compatible animal included in the socialisation process).
Another way to build a human–animal relationship that is partly involved in 
socialisation is taming. It is easy to confuse tame animals with socialised animals, 
and it is also oft en unclear what advantages socialisation has over taming. One 
fact unanimously agreed upon among scholars is that taming is the active (i.e. 
13 Except for the few behavioural and social skills that require being taught by parents or 
other adult members of their species, for example hunting skills or interacting with adult 
animals. Successful hunting is not a relevant skill in a captive environment. Communica-
tion skills with adult animals would be necessary if the young animals are to be intro-
duced to the rest of the pack aft er their hand-raising period. In such cases, frequent but 
short visits of socialised adult animals are included in the process of socialisation (Næss, 
personal conversation, 25.06.2013).
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intentionally conducted by humans) reduction of an animal’s fl ight distance from 
humans to zero (Addams, Miller 2007: 70; Handelman 2008: 266; Hediger 1950: 
156; Sebeok 1990c: 125). Th erefore, taming is innately involved in the process 
of socialisation. However, taming per se does not determine the methods of 
husbandry and, hence, the animal’s fearfulness of humans or whether the human–
animal relationship is positive or negative. An animal could be tamed by using 
aversive methods (such as punishment, dominance, etc.) so that a negative human–
animal relationship will be developed, despite the animal’s zero fl ight distance from 
humans (Næss, personal conversation, 25.06.2013). Excellent examples of such 
cases would be circus animals (elephants, big cats, and most wild animals) who 
usually do not have a positive partnership-based relationship with their trainer but 
a rather negative and fear-based one (Christian 201514; Pryor 1999). It is clear that 
animals tamed in such ways have poor welfare and are more likely a danger to their 
caretakers (Næss, personal conversation, 25.06.2013; Pryor 1999).
Additionally, an animal could be tamed at any age (Addams, Miller 2007: 
70–71; Pryor 1999), which means that taming does not necessarily involve the 
development of a primary human–animal relationship – a relationship which, 
as explained before, is critically important for changing the meaning-carrier of 
humans in general in the animal’s umwelt. On the other hand, taming an animal 
by positive interactions (such as social play and grooming, positive reinforcement 
training, etc.) contributes to establishing positive human–animal relationships. 
Hence, taming via positive methods is always an essential part of socialisation.
Habituation is yet another process partly involved in socialisation but oft en 
confused with it. In my opinion, the most adequate defi nition of habituation as 
a learning process is “the loss of an animal’s fear response to people [or to any 
environmental element that can elicit fear] arising from frequent non-con sequential 
encounters” (Smith, Stahler 2003: 5). Th e most important diff erence between 
socialisation and habituation is that the latter is, in its essence, an absence of a 
substantial human–animal relationship. Th ere is no history of interactions between 
a man and an animal that would lead to the development of a social relationship 
(as relationships are defi ned in this chapter). Neither does it involve changing the 
“enemy” meaning-carrier of man into that of ‘partner’ in the animal’s umwelt. 
Habituation simply results in man’s neutral to positive signifi cance for the animal in 
a certain situation. Th e phenomenon of habituation could occur even with animals 
living in the wild (who share their habitat with humans). Let’s take the example of 
raccoon dogs who eat at human garbage sites. Th ese raccoon dogs have learned 
about human habits of leaving food scraps behind and have been reinforced (by 
food) to lose the fear response to humans in this situation. However, there is no 
relationship between an individual human and a raccoon dog. 
14 Christian, Paul 2015. Th e Barbaric Tradition of ‘Breaking the Spirit’ of Elephants for Th eir 
Use in the Tourism Industry. [WWW] http://www.onegreenplanet.org/animalsandnature/ 
breaking-the-spirit-of-elephants-for-use-in-the-tourism-industry/ (31.07.2015).
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It is important to understand that habituation is not always a favourable scenario 
either for humans or animals. Wild animals need a healthy fear and fl ight distance 
from humans; it is a valuable survival mechanism. If they lose it, many species 
can become dangerous or pests to humans – both situations increase the risk of 
confl icts between the two. Apart from other problems, becoming dependent on 
human food, for example, can lead to animal health problems and suff ering from 
improper nutrition, as well as from a lack of hunting or foraging skills. It may also 
lead to unbalanced populations and changes in the animals’ important movement 
patterns (BC SPCA 2014).15 With these statements, I do not suggest that culture 
and nature should be kept separate and that all people should move into cities. Th e 
message I wish to send is that respecting wild animals for their natural behaviour 
and letting them live normal lives with a healthy fear of humans contributes to a life 
in harmony with other species much better than habituation does.
In a captive environment, some animals are habituated to humans to some 
degree and may benefi t from it. However, animal species that have a strong fear 
of humans usually do not get habituated enough (to people) to improve their 
welfare. Additionally, if the goal is to be able to get in direct physical contact with 
the animal (for husbandry purposes), habituation is usually not the best nor the 
safest situation. As mentioned before, habituation requires non-consequential 
(i.e. non-changing) encounters. Once an encounter with people has a negative 
consequence for the animal (which could easily happen in the dynamic zoo 
environment, even during indirect contact), the animal will likely become 
stressed and experience fear of humans. Some species may exhibit aggression 
towards people in such situations (this could oft en result in an attack). 
Th is is the reason why [unsocialised and only] habituated animals are the most 
dangerous animals to go in with – since they have a shorter fl ight distance 
from humans than wild animals do, they are more prompt to attack should 
they not approve of your behaviour. What makes the situation even worse 
is that, since there is no social relationship involved, there will be very little 
communication – the animal will either fl ee or attack immediately. A tame 
animal, who has a negative relationship with people, would at least give a fair 
amount of warning signals fi rst. (Næss, personal conversation, 14.05.2014).
In a zoo environment, some form of habituation is implicitly always present in 
the process of socialisation: a socialised animal is usually well-habituated to the 
visitors (strangers) outside the enclosure. Habituation to the public is the result of 
non-consequential exposure – the situation changes when the visitors come into 
the enclosure. In the case of a generally socialised animal, visitors that come into 
the enclosure will usually be perceived as positive. For an animal that is socialised 
15 Th e British Columbia Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 2014. Don’t Feed 
the Animals. [WWW] www.spca.bc.ca/assets/documents/locations/wild-arc/teacher-
resources/dont-feed-wildlife-2014.pdf (31.07.2015).
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only to the zoo staff  (the second way of socialisation) or to one keeper (the fi rst 
described way of socialisation), visitors that come into the enclosure could then 
have a negative signifi cance for the animal. I myself have been (immediately aft er 
entering the enclosure) attacked by a wolf who was well-socialised only with his 
keeper and habituated to the visitors behind the fence.
At this point, it has become clear that socialisation (to the level considered 
most favourable for animal welfare in the context of this chapter) involves 
the animal’s social imprinting on humans, taming methods that contribute to 
building a positive human–animal relationship, and habituation to unfamiliar 
people (whereas ideally, unfamiliar people would obtain a positive signifi cance 
for the socialised animal). However, it is crucial to understand that man as a 
meaning-carrier in a captive wild animal’s umwelt has a temporal dynamic. 
Socialisation (as well as taming) has to be kept up for the animal’s entire lifetime 
(Beaver 1999: 140; Hediger 1950: 156). Also, neither of the previously described 
processes result in genetic changes in the animal (i.e. they do not result in 
domestication) and have to be repeated for the animal’s off spring (Addams, 
Miller 2007: 70). Domestication is the selective breeding over the animals’ 
generations, aimed to produce off spring that are genetically more adjusted to 
living with humans (Addams, Miller 2007: 71; Barnard 2004: 265). Socialisation 
as well as taming may eventually result in domestication if, and only if, selective 
breeding is processed. A merely tame or socialised animal is genetically still a 
wild animal and, under certain circumstances, can have a full wild behavioural 
repertoire. “Being ignorant about this aspect and expecting a wild animal to act 
like a domesticated animal, may result in accidents causing bodily harm or even 
death” (Næss, personal conversation, 14.05.2014). 
3. The semiotic basis of efficient human–animal 
communication
Th e described processes of building positive partnership-based human–animal 
relationships and changing the meaning-carrier of man in an animal’s umwelt 
requires certain methods of human–animal interaction and animal management. 
Th ese methods include various types of social interaction and enrichment, 
positive reinforcement training,16 handling routines that are not stressful for 
16 In positive reinforcement training (PRT), the frequency of a desired behaviour is in-
creased by rewarding the animal. PRT always includes a minimum amount of negative 
punishment, which means decreasing the undesired behaviour by removing the positive 
stimulus (i.e. ignoring and not rewarding the behaviour). PRT does not use negative rein-
forcement (i.e. increasing the desired behaviour by removing something the animal does 
not like, for example physical pain) or positive punishment (i.e. decreasing the frequency 
of an undesired behaviour by adding an aversive stimulus). (Ramirez 1999: 546–547). It 
is important in socialisation never to use any kind of aversive training methods (nega-
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the animal, and visitor interactions. It is beyond the scope of this article to 
discuss the essence of each of these management methods more specifi cally. 
However, the goal of the following analysis is to explain that in order to add a 
positive association to the meaning-carrier of man in the animal’s umwelt, one 
has to make sure that the animal gains only positive experience from all these 
interactions with people. (In a zoo environment, it is not quite possible to foresee 
all negative experiences, but the goal should be to give one’s best eff ort to avoid 
them.) For that to happen, it is essential to have a profound understanding of the 
animal’s communication skills and interpretation processes in order to enable 
effi  cient human–animal communication.
Being able to recognise signals17 conveyed through diff erent channels used by 
the animal is another critical skill for successful human–animal communication. 
Not only do some animal species use more communication channels than 
humans,18 but many species also have an ability to perceive a wider range of signals 
through most of the communication channels (Sebeok 2001b: 24). For example, 
wolves are able to smell the changes of pheromone levels or hormonal balance in 
humans (e.g. they can smell fear or even detect human pregnancy) (Goodmann, 
personal conversation, 14.01.2015; Næss, personal conversation, 25.06.2013). 
How they interpret these smells is another question, but this fact illustrates the 
tive reinforcement or positive punishment) as it evidently damages the human–animal 
relationship and increases the animal’s fear of humans.
17 Here it is worthwhile to explain the diff erence between a sign and a signal. For semioti-
cians, a sign is basically something that stands for something else to someone in some 
capacity and context (Sebeok 2001a: 156). While adjusted to animal studies as the unit 
of communication and interpretation processes, one might consider the semioticians’ 
‘sign’ to be synonymous with the ethologist’s ‘display’ (which diff er in involving behav-
iour patterns) (Sebeok 1990a: 81). Signals, on the other hand, could be viewed as signs 
that “mechanically (naturally) or conventionally (artifi cially) trigger some reaction on 
the part of a receiver” (Sebeok 2001a: 44). For this reason, ‘signal’ is the key concept in 
animal communication.
18 For example, there are species known to use UV-light, ultrasound, magnetic, electric, 
solar, lunar and other stimuli in communication (Sebeok 2001b: 24). 
Th erefore, during the process of socialisation, one always has to be aware of 
the components that every communication act is built upon: the sender, receiver, 
channel, signal, code and context (Jakobson 1976: 346). To begin with, every 
individual animal requires diff erent ways of communication. Th ere are multiple 
studies that prove the existence of animal personality traits and their genetic basis 
(Briff a, Weiss 2010; Freeman, Gosling 2010; van Oers et al. 2004; McDougall 
et al. 2006; Hansen, Møller 2001; Tetley, O’Hara 2012; etc.). Additionally, the 
ways of communication that are acceptable by the animal greatly depend on the 
relationship between the human and animal (sender and receiver) (Wenner 1969: 
116–117). For example, an animal might enjoy a bellyrub or accept being picked 
up by someone with whom it has a primary relationship, while it may interpret 
an unfamiliar person’s attempt to initiate such contact as a threat. 
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diff erences in channel-usage one has to be aware of when communicating with 
other species.
Additionally, the misleading idea that the communication context is totally 
shared is the cause of the most serious accidents in which a human is attacked 
by an animal (Bouissac 2010: 53). Apart from actually transmitted signs and the 
current situation, context involves factors such as previous experience; exterior 
noise; seasonal, ecological and life history factors; the presence of strangers; etc. 
(Barnard 2004: 165; Hediger 1968: 3; Hosey et al. 2009: 476). Hence, it is clear 
that the perception of context is highly subjective. When working with foxes, 
I quickly learned that their willingness to perform certain behaviours during a 
training session or to get in physical contact with me depended on many factors, 
including the time of day, their motivation,19 or the presence of zoo visitors. Even 
more, it is important to take into consideration that the information of a signal 
and the response evoked by it may vary radically in diff erent situations even if 
the physical characteristics of a signal remain unchanged (Marler 1961: 267). For 
example, approaching hands during the visit of a veterinarian is probably not 
perceived to be as pleasant by the animal as reaching hands during a regular 
social interaction when this would indicate social grooming.
As far as the role of codes in human–animal communication is concerned, 
there are three important aspects to bring to light. First, in order to make sure that 
the animal gains a positive experience from interacting with people, one must be 
constantly aware of the human signals emitted and their potential signifi cance 
according to the communication codes of the animal. For example, direct eye 
contact, fast movements, high body postures (e.g. standing up) and wide body 
movements (e.g. waving hands) can be perceived as threatening by many animal 
species. Another example is hugging, an essentially primate behaviour, which 
canines tend to interpret as antagonistic (Goodmann, personal conversation, 
14.01.2015).
In the second important aspect about codes lies yet another fundamental 
reason for why hand-raising is important in socialisation. French zoosemiotician 
and philosopher Dominique Lestel has explained that a relationship based on 
partnership has two requirements: shared codes20 and rationality21 between the 
diff erent species (Lestel 2002: 56). It is a common understanding that a wild 
animal does not inherit human codes or rationality, and neither does a human 
19 “Motivation is generally thought of as some kind of internal process that infl uences the 
likelihood of whether or not the animal will do the behaviour” (Hosey et al. 2009: 85).
20 “A code is a transformation, or a set of rules, whereby messages are converted from one 
representation to another; an animal either inherits or learns its code, or both” (Sebeok 
1990b: 92–93).
21 “Th e rationality of the actors we are concerned with is further limited by the skills they 
have acquired or inherited for exploiting this information and, in particular, their se-
miotic abilities to produce signs and to interpret those produced by others or by the 
environments in which they fi nd themselves” (Lestel 2002: 59).
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inherit animal codes or rationality by birth. Th ese are skills learned by growing up 
together (Sebeok 1981: 115). In the process of socialisation, the young animal is 
desensitised22 to physical handling, loud speaking, laughing, singing, whispering, 
coughing, sneezing, smiling (teeth-exposure) and many other behaviours 
common to humans (Fig.3). In that way, the animal will learn to accept these 
behaviours as natural and a non-threatening part of human communication.
Figure 3. Wolf pups being safely desensitised to novel objects (camera) and human smiling.
At this point, one could ask why can’t the animals be desensitised to all potentially 
threatening elements of human behaviour, including direct eye contact, fast and 
wide movements, and high body posture? Th e answer lies in the fact that these 
are threat signals individually and are, hence, much more diffi  cult to desensitise 
(whereas, for example, smiling is more threatening when accompanied by a 
certain body posture and facial expression). It is not practically possible to 
22 Desensitisation means safe and nonthreatening introduction of novel experience 
(Addams, Miller 2007: 74–75). It is extensively used in the process of socialisation as liv-
ing in a human environment and meeting people can involve experiences (for example, 
loud or aversive sounds, arousing odours, unnatural or synthetic materials, human han-
dling) that are very unusual in the animal’s natural lifestyle and can therefore be fright-
ening and stressful for the animal (Addams, Miller 2007: 74–75; Hosey et al. 2009: 227). 
Th e most effi  cient way of desensitising is to start during the “critical period” of the young 
animal’s development when it “has no inbuilt knowledge of what is and is not ‘normal’ 
and is inclined to accept novelty rather than fear it” (Addams, Miller 2007: 75). 
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desensitise all potential human threat signals as it would be too time-consuming. 
Plus continuous exhibiting of threat signals could be too stressful for the young 
animals (and could therefore have a damaging eff ect on their socialisation). In 
addition, there might be situations in the future where threat signals could be 
benefi ted from. For example, when bringing new people in with wolves, the 
people are usually asked to stay standing (not in order to threaten the wolves but 
to appear less vulnerable) until the wolves have confi rmed their acceptance of 
and positive attitude towards the strange people.
Humans, too, learn about the codes of the animal in the process of hand-
raising. For instance, appeasing signals (small eyes, lip-licking, turning sideways, 
non-threatening body movement, etc.) are an everyday tool in calm and safe 
communication with animals (Fig. 4, Fig. 5). Also, when teaching the fox kits 
and wolf pups that humans are not to be bitten, I used auditory cut-off  signals 
that I had observed the animals using with each other when they had crossed the 
borders during social play. However, such kind of imitation of the other species’ 
codes is rather an exception than a rule. Namely, the third aspect about codes is 
something that does not seem to be widely known: being aware of the species-
specifi c communicational aspects does not mean that people should try to “speak 
the animal’s language”, i.e. communicate prevailingly by codes similar to the 
codes in the animal’s intraspecifi c communication. Th e reason lies in the mere 
fact that humans are not capable of producing all the species-specifi c signals used 
by the animals. Trying to imitate them could result in confusion and frustration 
for both communication partners. For example, in dominance displays, canines 
try to avoid fi ghting by providing the other with various warning signals (both 
consciously and subconsciously transmittable): lateral display,23 facial expressions, 
vocalisations, piloerection,24 pheromone signals, etc. (Addams, Miller 2007: 8, 
85). Humans are not competent enough (if capable at all) in communicating with 
such signals through such channels. Human attempts to dominate an animal 
23 Lateral display – a behaviour where the animal “walks side-on to their intended targets, 
displaying their largest dimension, with their back and tail arched, […] legs extended, 
[…] ears held parallel to the ground, […] and their fur piloerected” (Addams, Miller 
2007: 8).
24 Piloerection – “the raising of fur by muscles attached to the hair root, most oft en seen 
in the back of the neck, the shoulders, down the back and occasionally on the tail. Th is 
raised line of hair is commonly called the ‘hackles’. An autonomic reaction, and therefore 
a good indicator of an animal’s mood, as the animal cannot consciously control whether 
its hackles are up or down” (Addams, Miller 2007: xi).
usually result in the overuse of physical aggression, which could easily increase 
the animal’s fear of humans and potentially result in a defensive attack by the 
animal (Addams, Miller 2007: 87). 
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Figure 4. A visitor using appeasing signals.    Figure 5. A wolf using appeasing signals.
Th is is the reason why getting involved in dominance relationships with animals 
is not viewed as a proper method of socialisation in this article. Dominant-
submissive relationship between animals is a “consistent relationship between 
individuals  – one of whom ‘wins’ in ritualized aggressive displays, while the 
other regularly and voluntarily submits” (Handelman 2008: 84). It requires clear 
communication and is, in essence, a survival strategy rather than a forced power-
relation. A human–animal dominance relationship is usually forced and fear-
based, which is not compatible with the goals of socialisation as social confl icts and 
fear of humans is exactly what has to be avoided for the described reconstruction 
of the animal’s umwelt. For example, in a wolf ’s umwelt, dominant pack members 
do not occupy the phenomenal fi eld of an enemy – all pack members cooperate 
in everyday tasks and are partners regardless of their rank. Th e only exception 
could perhaps be the moment when the pack is trying to disperse the omega 
or to challenge the alpha wolf (which sometimes could result in fatal injuries 
for that one wolf) (Næss, personal conversation, 14.05.2014). Wolves from other 
packs are potential enemies, but there are no dominant-submissive relationships 
between wolves of diff erent packs. On the other hand, human attempts to 
dominate a wolf – due to the communication problems described above – tend 
to position the human on the phenomenal fi eld of enemy instead of partner in 
the animal’s umwelt.
Th ereby, I fi nd the term ‘leadership’ much more adequate when talking about 
teaching the animal acceptable social behaviour with humans. “Leadership is the 
ability to infl uence others to perform behaviours that they would not necessarily 
perform on their own” (Yin 2007: 415). It is crucial to understand that a strong 
human leader modifi es the animal’s behaviour by bestowing or withholding 
resources, not by using aggression and dominance (Handelman 2008: 85; Yin 
2007: 415). Here one could draw a parallel between being an authority and 
being an authoritarian (or a dictator). A good leader anticipates social confl icts 
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by means of distraction25 or substitution26. If the situation is of a more serious 
kind and none of the previous methods seem to have an eff ect, the keeper could 
resolve the situation by using cut-off  signals that signify a disliked behaviour. It 
is important to understand that the cut-off  signal itself is not a punishment but 
is rather a sign that indicates that a punishment is coming should the animal not 
stop the undesired behaviour. Th e punishment in the latter case would simply be a 
“time-out” (i.e. a form of “non-reward” or negative punishment where the animal 
is deprived of human interaction). (Addams, Miller 2007: 78–79) Th ese methods, 
coherent with positive reinforcement training principles, enable the solving of 
critical situations without damaging the animal’s perception of humans, while 
still keeping the experience of both the animal and the human positive (or at least 
as positive as possible).
Summary
Th e article explains the essence of the highly semiotic process of socialisation of 
wild captive animals with humans for animal welfare purposes. Although there 
are many more nuances about the methods of socialisation not discussed in this 
article, the main semiotic methods of socialisation were brought to light.
When approaching the phenomenon in question from the perspective of 
umwelt theory, it becomes clear that socialisation is the process of reducing the 
animal’s fear of humans with an ultimate goal of reconstructing the animal’s 
umwelt by changing man’s meaning-carrier of enemy into the meaning-carrier 
of social partner. It has the most favourable eff ect on animal welfare if the animal 
is generally socialised so that the process includes reducing the animal’s fear 
and improving its perception of unfamiliar people (including zoo visitors). As a 
result, the animal will feel more comfortable living in a human environment and 
exhibiting its full range of behaviour in the presence of humans (Addams, Miller 
2007: 10).
Th e level of socialisation considered adequate in this article requires the 
animal’s social imprinting on humans (possible to achieve by hand-raising a 
litter of animals during their “critical period” of imprinting), taming via methods 
25 Distraction – preventing behaviour before it happens by distracting the animal from un-
desired acts. An animal could be distracted by using anything that would draw its atten-
tion, e.g. velcro, car keys, crinkle of plastic wrap, a cardboard box, movement in leaves, 
touching its leg or tail, waving with some object, etc. (Addams, Miller 2007: 76–77).
26 Substitution – off ering the animal a better object to trade with or training the animal to 
perform an incompatible behaviour on demand. For example, when the animal has taken 
hold of a person’s glove, a keeper might off er the animal an attractive branch, ask it to run 
to a specifi c place to receive a treat, give it a cue to roll over and sit, or use another eff ec-
tive option. However, in order to avoid reinforcing the undesired behaviour, the animal 
should not be given treats as a trade item (Addams, Miller 2007: 77).
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benefi cial to building positive trust-based human–animal relationships, and 
in many cases (for example in zoos), habituation to unfamiliar people. It is 
important to understand that socialisation is a lifelong process that depends 
on continuous, positive human–animal interactions. Th e latter is only possible 
when the communication between a man and an animal is effi  cient. Th erefore, 
profound insight into the animal’s species-specifi c behaviour and diff erent 
aspects of interspecifi c communication (including codes, channels and contexts) 
is required. All things considered, socialisation is ontologically a semiotic process 
that requires a constant awareness of the semiotic aspects in the animal’s umwelt.
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Communication in the study of zoological gardens
Nelly Mäekivi
“[…] if there were no zoo, someone would invent one. 
And many have done so over the past 5,000 years, in 
various ways.” (Kisling 2001a: 1)
Introduction
Th is chapter has in its centre the analysis of primarily nonhuman but also human 
communication, and it aims to discover how human cultural perceptions, attitudes 
and management infl uence animal communication with its conspecifi cs, other 
species and the environment. J. von Uexküll’s concept of umwelt (e.g. Uexküll 
1982; chapters 1 and 2 this volume), A. Farina’s and A. Belgrano’s concept of 
eco-fi eld (e.g. Farina, Belgrano 2006) are essential in analysing zoo animals’ 
communication. In addition, H. Hediger’s work on zoobiology (e.g. Hediger 1964, 
1969) proves to be crucial in the context of the zoo. Th is chapter proposes that a 
more holistic view, which is inclusive of animals’ communication, is the best basis 
for comprehending and helping to resolve the diffi  culties that zoological gardens 
face in their endeavours. 
Zoological gardens are hybrid environments, where the cultural environment 
is intertwined with nature and where intra- and interspecies communication, 
including that of humans, takes place. In addition, these social, cultural and 
conservational institutions impart messages of their identity and goals. How the 
zoo environment is perceived by people and how its inhabitants and humans 
are able to communicate with and within this environment is dependent on 
the zoological garden’s historical background, designed environment, goals 
and portrayed self-image. As semiotic research objects, due to their hybrid 
nature, zoological gardens prove to be remarkably rich and diverse, providing 
myriad interconnected semiotic aspects to inquire about. Understanding the 
interconnectedness and complementarity of the biological, ecological and 
cultural sides of many topics in the study of zoological gardens should reveal 
why inconsideration of or disregard for diff erent aspects that are involved in 
constituting zoological gardens may lead to discrepancies or confl icts in the ways 
that zoological gardens operate.
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As a starting point, this chapter undertakes the problem of conceptualising 
and framing zoological gardens, considered in such a way as to reveal the 
foundations of zoological gardens’ aims within culture. Facets of zoos that will 
be further discussed are the designed and limited space and the human control 
over zoo animals. As a conclusion, some suggestions for future endeavours of 
zoological gardens are proposed.
1. Defining zoological gardens
Th ere are a variety of institutions that can be considered to fall under the category 
of zoological gardens: aviaries, insectariums, rehabilitation centres for endangered 
species, safaris, conservation parks, etc. (Kisling 2001b: viii). Th ere is no one 
commonly agreed upon defi nition of “zoological gardens” or of a “zoo”. Th e way 
that institutions describe or represent themselves may not coincide with how other 
interest groups perceive zoos and identify their functions. Th ese perceptions may 
vary from “collections of animal exhibits open to the public” (Lee 2005: 1) to a 
statement such as this: “Zoos are much more than places that display animals; they 
are centres for education, conservation, and science” (Bonner 2006: 8). Th e emphasis 
on either exhibiting animals for recreational purposes or conserving species for the 
sake of sustaining biodiversity, and every other defi nition falling in-between these 
extremes, is open for discussion when defi ning zoological gardens. Th e self-image 
of contemporary zoological gardens stresses the educational, conservational and 
scientifi c function of a zoo; however, historically the recreational facet is the oldest 
and is still the most prevalent among zoogoers. In order to shift  the perceptions of 
zoological gardens among diff erent interest groups, zoo personnel aim to change 
the narratives surrounding their institution. 
Th e technique employed by zoos in order to lift  the burden of the historical 
heritage of exploiting other species purely for human pleasure, and to change 
zoo’s status as entertainment centres, is to promote their changed functions 
through media and in the zoological gardens themselves. Th ere are widely known 
instances where “zoo” has been substituted with a completely diff erent concept, 
where the institution formally known as a zoological garden is now called a 
biopark or conservation park. “Off ering a new name to these institutions makes a 
clear break from the old model, which is fundamentally exploitative” (Kemmerer 
2010: 37).  It is important to stress that these means of renaming are meant to 
rid the zoo of its cultural connotations, which refl ect the history of the zoo.1 
1 “Zoological garden’ itself came to be substituted for the term ‘menagerie’, which signifi ed 
collections of wild animals gathered for the purpose of exhibition. Institutions estab-
lished in the 19th century started calling themselves zoos because zoos were considered 
to be professional institutions – despite the fact that many of them were not professional 
in reality” (Kisling 2001a: 38–39).
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Th us linguistic representations of zoological gardens contribute to their status 
in culture, and through the means of linguistic representations, an attempt is 
made to change these connotations. Today the cultural context that zoos belong 
to is largely shaped by environmentalist rhetoric in which zoos are presented as 
“Noah’s arks” and as “gardens of Eden” – last resorts of disappearing wildlife. Th is 
rhetoric seems also to be the underlying dominant in contemporary zoo design. 
Th e enclosure designs are meant to support bio- or zoocentric attitudes, the 
landscapes are more natural and immersion exhibits absorb people into “nature” 
(see e.g. Hyson 2000). 
Th e relevance of reframing zoological gardens’ purposes and goals are 
thus not only important for changing perceptions and attitudes but also for 
the practical level of how animals are kept in zoos. Th e way that animals are 
managed should be in accordance with how they are perceived, which means that 
the environment created for them should emphasise the reasons for and goals of 
keeping wild animals in captivity.
2. Designed space of zoological gardens
Any zoological garden forms a communication environment for humans and 
nonhumans. Th e created environment off ers and encourages some commu-
nicative situations; for instance, people are encouraged to learn about diff erent 
species and to emotionally connect with nonhumans, while nonhumans are 
encouraged (to a certain extent) to express their natural behaviour. However, 
some communicative situations are prohibited or discouraged, e.g. humans are 
prohibited from disturbing or touching most of the species, and most nonhumans 
are prohibited from engaging in predator-prey relations. Although there are 
many diff erent elements contributing to creating the zoo environment,2 most of 
the communication is shaped by the design of a zoo. Hence, when considering 
the most prevalent form of zoological gardens  – the city-zoo  – there are two 
factors that need the most attention: the space limitation inherent to running 
a zoo and the designing of that space. Th ese two factors play a crucial role in 
analysing how zoological gardens infl uence intra- and interspecies (including 
2 Th e developmental stage of a zoological garden (whether it is a menagerie type zoo or a 
contemporary establishment), the goals of the zoo (whether emphasis is put on scientifi c 
work, on conservation, or on education), the location of the zoo (climate and terrain, 
which condition the selection of species to be inhabiting the zoo), the size and type of the 
zoo (whether it is a city zoo or a biopark or something in between), the nature of the ex-
hibits (whether they are arranged ecologically, taxonomically, etc.), the collection of the 
zoo (emphasis on the number of diff erent species and animals), the fi nancial opportuni-
ties and standards (resources for developing the environment for animals and belonging 
to diff erent associations), and the zoo employees and visitors (their initiative to manage 
animals and communicate with diff erent species).
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human-nonhuman) communication and what eff ect the zoo environment has 
on the human perception of other species and on zoos themselves. It should also 
be acknowledged that the cultural framing of a zoo creates certain expectations 
of the visit (e.g. a nice family outing, an educational trip for school groups, 
experiencing nature, etc.).  
2.1. Human communication in the designed space of a zoo
When discussing human communication in zoos, it is relevant to also consider 
humans as biological beings. Biological features, such as the perceptual and 
eff ectual organs that every species (including humans) possesses, compose the 
underlying structure that enables a being to relate to its environment (e.g. Uexküll 
1982). In addition to cultural traditions and personal preferences, we as mammals 
are dependent on our physical build-up and the diff erent communication 
channels at our disposal (see chapters 1 and 2 this volume). Relevant literature 
seems to portray zoos as places that off er a mostly visual experience: “it is the 
style of exhibition that makes a particular zoo experience unique” (Mullan, 
Marvin 1987: 59). Th is is understandable considering the high usage of visual 
communication channel by humans. In closed quarters, there are still murals 
on the walls imitating landscapes clearly meant only for people, not the animals 
inhabiting those quarters. Emphasis on the visual has also led to more nature-like 
exhibit designs.3 Th is indicates that there is always a part of exhibit directed at 
the aesthetic experience of humans. Th e design of exhibits that emphasise natural 
looking scenes can be called iconic naturalism (Lindahl Elliot 2005), due to its 
mimicking nature to a certain extent. In addition to the visual channel, people 
are also encouraged to use a verbal medium and abstract thinking when in zoos, 
because next to enclosures one can fi nd signage not only of the concrete animal(s) 
kept in that exhibit but also references to its natural habitat, scientifi c name, 
etc.; basically, one can fi nd signs with information that is not directly perceived 
by people, but that enables them to compare the immediate with the abstract 
(Lindahl Elliot 2005). Th is sort of representation is symbolic-scientifi c, which 
indicates that visitors are encouraged to make use of verbal communication and 
an abstract approach to animals, thus enabling zoogoers to relate the animals 
they encounter in zoos with their wild counterparts (recognising distinctions 
and similarities in behaviour and/or morphology) (Lindahl Elliot 2005: 94, 2006: 
219). Th e analysis of signage can reveal what zoological gardens consider as 
important information to impart, what kind of discourse and rhetoric are used, 
and what kind of attitudes diff erent animals and signage cause in visitors. In 
addition, symbolic-scientifi c representation is also closely tied to our usage of the 
3 An additional reason is of course being in accordance with animal welfare and general 
keeping conditions.
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visual communication channel, due to the visual appeal of diff erent signs and of 
animals themselves. It is widely acknowledged that people tend to prefer to look 
at animals whose features are similar to us (i.e. large mammals) (Lacy 1995), 
whose umwelten are most compatible to ours. 
However, despite the visual inclination, in zoological gardens there is a 
tendency to simultaneously encourage the use of all other senses at the disposal 
of humans. For instance, the scent of the zoo is specifi c and oft en commented 
upon by people, so there could also be scent boxes for people to explore; there are 
also diff erent sounds to hear, textures of surfaces to touch, and animals in petting 
zoos to be stroked. In essence, it can be argued that zoological gardens are in fact 
indexical-multisensual places, which encompass any activity that makes visitors 
use all of their senses (Lindahl Elliot 2005) in order to get the fullest experience 
from a zoo visit. 
In addition to all beings employing diff erent communication channels, in the 
context of zoological gardens and from the point of view of humans, there is 
always the question of ethics in keeping wild animals in captivity, away from their 
natural environments. Th us, communicating the purposes of zoos proves to be 
important. Since zoological gardens state that animals are managed out of their 
natural habitat so that species could be saved and people could be educated on 
environmental matters, this off ers a more acceptable ethical ground for keeping 
animals in captivity than if nonhumans were in zoos merely for human pleasure. 
Closely tied to the issue of keeping animals ex situ, i.e. outside their natural 
habitat, is the question of the conditions that the animals are or should be kept 
in, and how those conditions mirror the functions of zoos, correspond to people’s 
perception of animals, and infl uence animal communication.
For people, the limitation of space in zoos elicits the most confl icting emotions. 
People want the animals to live in nature-like enclosures which project the feeling 
of the animal’s natural living, but on the other hand they want something totally 
unnatural from the point of view of wild animals: humans want to interact with 
nonhumans. Animals in situ, i.e. animals living in their natural habitats, usually 
do not present themselves; they tend to hide from people. However, any zoo 
would be unable to earn its revenue to support its endeavours if it could not 
guarantee that humans would be able to meet nonhumans during a zoo visit. 
One of the main motivations behind a zoo visit is to meet other species, to see 
and interact with wildlife. It is getting acquainted with a world that usually does 
not present itself that creates the thrill for the visitor. Meeting animals also 
encourages empathetic attitudes, which is in turn used by zoos to impart their 
conservational message. However, it is diffi  cult to project one’s feelings towards 
someone that cannot be seen or met. Th us, from the point of view of the visitor, 
there are two factors that have to be accounted for in zoo design: the animals 
have to be seen, and the enclosures have to be naturalistic. It is unacceptable 
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for zoogoers to see animals living in old barred cages with concrete fl oors – the 
exhibits have to look natural and not seem cramped. So a lot of exhibit design 
is created as a compromise, where the exhibits must not only guarantee good 
welfare for the animal, but also they have to satisfy the needs of humans and be 
attractive. Th is is also a reason why great emphasis is put on not only fauna but 
also fl ora. Today the fl ora sometimes constitutes as important a part of the exhibit 
as the fauna does. In designing a natural-looking exhibit, it should be also taken 
into account that due to vegetation it is much easier for the animal to hide itself 
from visitors, which in turn might again give rise to dissatisfaction with the visit. 
Th us zoological gardens must put a lot of thought into designing the space: it 
cannot be too small and artifi cial looking, but it cannot be too natural either; in 
addition, granting animal welfare is crucial.
2.2. Nonhuman communication in the designed space of the zoo
From the stance of nonhumans inhabiting the zoo environment, the limitations of 
space inherent to city-zoos and the design of that space pose additional problems 
to be solved, especially considering animal communication and animal keeping 
standards. Th e zoo environment should provide the animals with opportunities to 
express their natural behaviour to the fullest possible extent in ex situ conditions. 
Natural behaviour of course diff ers from species to species (and may vary even 
between individuals of the same species depending on their age, gender and 
personal preferences). Zoobiologist H. Hediger was probably the fi rst to deal with 
the issue of space needed for animals in zoos by writing about the specifi c spatial 
needs of animals. He explicated that spatial needs depend on the animal’s body 
size. When designing zoo exhibits, according to Hediger, the diameter of every 
enclosure should be composed of at least two fl ight-distance lengths, because 
if the enclosure is approachable from opposite sides, the animal can at will still 
remain at a safe distance from people even if latter are present on both sides. Th e 
length of the fl ight-distance is dependent on the species, the individual, and the 
degree of the threat (Hediger 1964: 32–33). Since the communicative abilities of 
diff erent species and the peculiarities of diff erent individuals vary immensely, 
this should also be accounted for. Th is variability indicates that in reality it is very 
diffi  cult to actually calculate not only the minimum but also the optimal size 
(i.e. the size that enables the animal to perform all of its natural behaviours with 
regard to space) of an enclosure. Of importance is not only the diameter of an 
enclosure but, depending on the species, also the height and depth. It is evident 
that the minimum size of an enclosure might not allow the animals to express 
some of their behaviours to a full extent (e.g. running or fl ying long distances); 
this is due to the limitations of the entire size of a city-zoo. It is also clear that 
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guidelines for enclosure sizes are normative for a given species4 and usually do 
account for specifi c individual needs (e.g. non-tame animals’ fl ight-distances are 
longer, and these animals thus require more space than conspecifi cs that are tame 
because the latter do not perceive humans as a threat). Th e animal’s individual 
needs for space and its complexity are usually accounted for when the animal is 
already living in a built enclosure (e.g. through enrichment). 
Th e size of the space is not the only variable, as mentioned before; another 
variable is that wild animals tend to hide from people if given the chance. Th us, 
many of the zoo animals are tamed, which means they are not constantly afraid 
of people, and their fl ight distance is reduced. Taming the animals also plays a 
crucial role in the animal’s relation to its environment because, from the stance 
of zoobiology, it is important to emphasise that tame animals are owners of their 
territory. Tame animals mark their ex situ living quarters the same way as their 
in situ conspecifi cs; they do not have the urge to escape. However, from the point 
of view of visitors, holding animals in captivity as “prisoners” is the way people 
may interpret the keeping of wild animals in zoos,5 especially if the exhibits are 
old-fashioned and not nature-like. It can be argued that for an animal it is more 
important to have places to rest, eat, and groom (the quality of space) rather than 
to enlarge the space by ten times (the quantity of space) (Hediger 1969: 197). 
Eventually the created space has to correspond to the animal’s umwelt, not only 
to people’s perception of the space.
In creating the environment for zoo animals, one should take into account 
the primary factors of limited space (inhibiting the freedom of movement in a 
physiological sense) and the secondary or indirect factors (defi ciencies in the 
subjective world, e.g. a lack of activities and versatility or inhibiting the animal 
in a psychological sense) (Hediger 1964: 31). Th e latter could be rephrased in 
a question: how rich is the zoo animal’s umwelt in comparison to its in situ 
conspecifi cs? 
2.3. Umwelt analysis of captive environments
In essence, according to zoobiology, there are two ways to approach the 
keeping of animals in a limited physical space: designing the space in as much 
correspondence to the animal’s capacity of movement as possible, or inhibiting 
4 For example, in 1997 the minimum standard for keeping one lion (Panthera leo) was 
considered to be 27.9 m2 (Shoemaker, Maruska, Rockwell 1997); however the standard 
issued in 2012 stated that the minimum space for an indoor facility should be 185.8 m2 
and for an outdoor enclosure should be at least 929 m2 (Association of Zoos and Aquari-
ums 2012). 
5 It should also be taken into account that “the free animal does not live in freedom: nei-
ther in space nor as regards its behaviour towards other animals” (Hediger 1964: 4). Th is 
could be illustrated with an example of lions – they do not cover long distances because 
they enjoy the walk but because they need to fi nd prey.
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the capacity of movement according to the space (for instance, in the past it 
was common to pinion the birds). Today’s standards for keeping wild animals 
in captivity accept only the fi rst approach. In zoobiology, the main objective 
way to assess the suitability of the environment for the animal is the animal’s 
reproductive success, because it is seen as a measure of welfare. However, 
there are plenty of counterexamples that speak against reproductive success as 
a measure of welfare; there are many species (e.g. brown bears and lions) who 
reproduce extremely well even in poor living conditions, while some species (e.g. 
giant pandas and mountain gorillas) have off spring very rarely in captivity, even 
in excellent keeping conditions (Wickins-Dražilova 2006: 29–30). Th us there is 
the question of the adequacy of objectively measuring how suitable the created 
zoo environment is for the animal and how much that environment relates to an 
individual and to the whole life of a nonhuman, not just measuring one aspect of 
it (i.e. reproduction). If it is sustained that spatial needs may diff er according to 
age and gender (not to mention personal preferences), then reproduction cannot 
be the only measure for environmental suitability  – there needs to be a more 
subjective approach that is inclusive of the variety of animal communication in 
a zoo environment.
An environment necessary to perform a certain function or activity can be 
called an eco-fi eld,6 which means that in order for the animal to perform a certain 
action in a certain context, the spatial arrangement must correspond to that 
activity (Farina, Belgrano 2006: 9). In zoos there is usually much more overlap 
of diff erent eco-fi elds than outside of the institution. It can be argued that the 
zoo environment is saturated with diff erent eco-fi elds, that they are accumulated, 
which indicates that there are many more possibilities for their (partial) overlap 
and intersection. For example, inside a single enclosure there might be much less 
physical space for the animals inhabiting that enclosure when compared to in 
situ animals, but most of the relevant eco-fi elds for meaningful behaviour may be 
present and fi t into limited quantitative space. 
One can assume that the eff ects of limited space and designed environment 
may aff ect various species diff erently. It is much more diffi  cult to grant animals 
with rich umwelten the necessary qualitative space (i.e. all the necessary eco-fi elds 
for species-specifi c communication) than for some other species (like the small 
animals [e.g. Daphnia] caught from the freshwater puddle that were living in K. 
Lorenz’s aquaria [Lorenz 1961]), whose umwelten are not so rich in perceptual 
and eff ector cues. Th e more complex the animal’s umwelt, the more eco-fi elds the 
animal needs and the more diffi  cult it becomes to enable them in a limited space. 
Th us it is proposed that the suitability of a zoo environment for a specifi c animal 
6 “Eco-fi eld is defi ned as a spatial confi guration carrier of a specifi c meaning perceived 
when a specifi c living function is activated. A species-specifi c cognitive landscape is 
composed of all the spatial confi gurations involved for all the living functions for a par-
ticular organism” (Farina, Belgrano 2006: 5).
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should be analysed through the presence of the meaning-carriers necessary for 
the actuation of diff erent functional circles and through the availability of the 
diff erent eco-fi elds needed to fulfi l all the activities of an animal. In addition to 
the presence of eco-fi elds, the degree to which an animal is able or allowed to 
perform the activities should also be accounted for.
It is possible that the created environment of a zoological garden may not diff er 
at all from the animal’s in situ environment because the factors that enable and 
infl uence communication may be alike both in situ and ex situ, which indicates that 
in the umwelt of the animal under scrutiny, there are no perceivable diff erences. 
To elaborate on this: all relevant eco-fi elds are fully present (including the overlap 
of diff erent eco-fi elds, which facilitate and inhibit diff erent actions), and all the 
necessary meaning-carriers are also present. Th e animal can communicate with 
other individuals and the environment in the same way as its in situ conspecifi cs. 
Th ere are also cases where there might be a distinction recognised by the 
animal, but this distinction may bear little relevance because all the functional 
circles are still complete (e.g. using man-made objects for playing or eating food 
that are not usually found in situ) even though the meaning-carrier has been 
altered. In this case, the comparison of the animal to its in situ conspecifi cs 
becomes more diffi  cult – e.g. the animal, although having a good physical and 
mental well-being in a zoo environment, may have (severe) diffi  culties in its 
natural habitat if the meaning-carriers that have been altered in the zoo are not 
present in its natural habitat. A good example of the current situation would be 
food; one case would be that in zoos, alligator snapping turtles (Macroclemys 
temminckii) are fed mice (along with worms, fi sh, and prepared diet); however, 
in situ mice are not part of their diet because they live in large rivers, lakes or 
swamps and eat primarily fi sh.7 Th is means that for a zoo alligator snapping 
turtle, the meaning-carrier of a mouse as food would be missing in its natural 
habitat, and depending on the proportion of mice in its diet and on its personal 
preferences (i.e. how much the turtle likes eating mice), the functional circle of 
feeding could be hindered.
Th ere are also plenty of instances where the diff erence between in situ and ex 
situ environments is distinctly perceived by the animal due to the fact that some of 
the functional circles are incomplete (e.g. the animal is not allowed to act upon an 
eff ector cue to the full extent) or some of the eco-fi elds might be missing because 
they lack a necessary object (e.g. it is common in zoos to avoid the predatory-
prey relationships of large carnivores, which indicates that the functional circle of 
hunting is excluded from the animal’s life). Th is exclusion is usually implemented 
by the means of restricting space because diff erent enclosures are physically 
separated from each other. However, those barriers do not totally confi ne animals’ 
7 See the Smithsonian National Park homepage: http://nationalzoo.si.edu/Animals/Rep-
tilesAmphibians/Facts/FactSheets/Alligatorsnappingturtle.cfm (Retrieved on 28.06. 
2015).
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communication. Although physical movement and tactile communication 
between animals in diff erent enclosures are indeed restricted, sounds and scents 
spread beyond the borders. In addition, there are many ways of designing an 
exhibit that permit visual communication with other species. For example, in the 
Tallinn Zoo there is a snow leopard enclosure situated in the middle of enclosures 
for bovid species, because “when the sheep see predators next to themselves, they 
start raising the population due to the feeling of danger. And leopards are also 
encouraged to breed when they see potential food near them every day” (Voog 
2009). Including also the properties of the chemical communication channel8 in 
addition to the visual, it can be argued that according to given example, a major 
part of predator-prey communication is granted. However, a major part is also 
absent. It may be possible that what is absent proves to be the most relevant in 
in situ communication – the ability to fi nd, hunt and kill one’s prey and, for the 
Bovidae, to employ predator avoidance skills. Th is example illustrates clearly that 
the shortcomings of a created zoo environment that does not allow all functional 
circles to be fulfi lled and off ers only partial or incomplete eco-fi elds may prove to 
have serious (even fatal) consequences in situ.
2.4. Methods for improving captive environments
A way to minimise or overcome the quantitative and qualitative shortcomings 
of zoo space is environmental enrichment and exhibit designs. As discussed 
before, both serve the purpose of satisfying the public in addition to granting 
good animal welfare. Environmental enrichment is defi ned as a process of 
improving zoo animals’ environments and care with the goal of increasing the 
behavioural choices of animals and thus enhancing animal welfare (Young 2003: 
2). Enrichment is also meant for eliciting desired species-specifi c behaviours and 
thus for diminishing or avoiding stereotypical behaviours9 (Hosey et al. 2009: 
263), which are quite prevalent in large mammals living in zoological gardens 
(e.g. large cats and bears tend to walk or trot in a circle or in a fi gure eight pattern). 
If enclosures today are usually designed together with architects and 
ethologists (see e.g. Ebenhöh 1992), then enrichment is still something considered 
as an aft erthought, i.e. when the exhibit has already been built (Young 2003: 
45). To elaborate on this: environmental enrichment is modifying the already 
created environment to the needs of an animal inhabiting that environment. So 
enrichment off ers a much more subjective approach, which enables the inclusion 
of the personal preferences and peculiarities of the animal(s) inhabiting that 
enclosure (e.g. whether there should be one or many eating and hiding places, 
8 Smells can last for long periods of time and can travel long distances, and darkness con-
stitutes no problem. 
9 Repeated and non-variable behavioural patterns, which are usually nonexistent in in situ 
animals (Margodt 2000: 50).
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whether there should be platforms on diff erent levels depending on the social 
hierarchy, etc.). Observing and analysing nonhuman communication with and 
within this environment prove to be crucial. Th is sometimes leads to situations 
where, in order to grant good animal welfare, there is no need to add something 
but rather to remove something (e.g. so that animal would not come to harm, like 
with hard plastic toys that chimpanzees may throw at other individuals rather 
than play with the toys [Young 2003: 62]). In essence, environmental enrichment 
can be divided into two large categories: the naturalistic approach and behavioural 
engineering. Th e naturalistic approach has its basis in creating as natural-like 
conditions as possible in order to stimulate animal behaviour; behavioural 
engineering concentrates on diff erent gadgets and machines that animals must 
operate to receive some sort of reward (e.g. treats) (Young 2003: 5). From the 
perspective of an animal, it may bear no diff erence whether the enriching objects 
actually look natural or not, because what matters for the animal is what can 
one do with the object (Young 2003: 9). If the object has properties that bear 
necessary perceptual cues (e.g. movement patterns of the object or scent) and 
that enable the animal to act upon them (through eff ectual cues sensu Uexküll), 
other properties of the object (e.g. shape, material) may become irrelevant. Th us 
the behaviour of an animal may not be unnatural simply because the objects 
are man-made and are perceived as unnatural by humans. However, due to the 
perception of humans, zoological gardens tend to employ more natural looking 
objects that are in accordance with the needs of nonhumans.
All things considered, it is fair to argue that contemporary zoos try to design 
their exhibits in a way that is in accordance with their scientifi c, educational, 
conservational and also recreational goals (Young 2003: 5). Th e balance is 
not always easily found; designing more natural looking exhibits might be in 
accordance with recreational and educational aims (the latter because naturalistic 
exhibits make it easier for people to relate to animals’ in situ environments), but 
from the stance of the scientifi c aims regarding natural animal behaviour and 
conservational functions, the successfulness of the exhibit is measured by the 
behaviour of an animal, not by the appearance of the exhibit (Margodt 2000: 
71). Th us there are instances where the exhibit looks more appealing to humans 
but limits the behaviour of an animal, e.g. the current trend of substituting bars 
for plexiglass. For people, plexiglass might create the illusion that there is no 
barrier between humans and nonhumans, that animals are not in “prison”, and 
that the animals thus have more nature-like living conditions. However, there 
are many species (e.g. new world monkeys) that use the bars for climbing and 
are now deprived of that opportunity due to plexiglass (one of their eco-fi elds is 
removed). Th ere are also other instances where the well-being of animals may 
suff er due to visitors’ attitudes (e.g. animals are prohibited from moving to back 
quarters during the opening hours of the zoo so that the animals cannot hide 
from the visitors). For this reason, the resources available for the zoo require 
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careful planning to guarantee the highest possible welfare of the animals, which 
pays the deserved attention to animal communication while simultaneously 
trying to meet the visitors’ needs.
3. Human management effects on nonhuman 
communication
Another common feature of zoos is that animals are always managed by humans 
who have the power to decide what and how much nonhuman zoo inhabitants 
eat, who they mate with, who and how much they have contact with, how their 
enclosures are designed, etc. As with the constriction of space, human control 
over animals and the eff ect on animal communication may vary in degree. 
In the principles of keeping wild animals in captivity, it is noticeable that there 
are some controversies, namely, simultaneously with providing the animals as 
many possibilities to exhibit species-specifi c behaviour as possible, an attempt 
is also made to maintain the well-being of individual animals. Th e latter 
indicates that animals should be kept in a way that avoids stress, injuries and 
factors causing death; they are usually prohibited from predatory behaviour, and 
dangerous conspecifi cs or other species are removed from their enclosures (Lee 
2005: 64–66). Th us there are distinct diff erences in the lives of ex situ and in situ 
animals. It should be stressed once again that not all species are infl uenced by 
these diff erences. It can be argued that most of the communicative diff erences 
(with some exceptions) of zoo animals compared to in situ conspecifi cs are still 
evident in cases where the well-being of an animal is not granted. Most oft en the 
failure to fully follow guidelines regarding the animals’ well-being arises from the 
objectives of a zoo (e.g. inducing stress by transporting animals between zoos 
for species conservation purposes or the aforementioned instance of keeping 
animals on display for educational and recreational reasons). 
Human control over nonhumans has its eff ect depending on the complexity 
of the umwelten of diff erent species and on the specifi c characteristics of an 
animal. Th e more complex the umwelt, the greater are the possibilities to interfere 
(willingly or unwillingly) with the functional circles of the animal. Th e most 
prevalent communicative diff erences between in situ and ex situ animals appear 
in intra- and interspecies social communication. 
Concerning inter-species communication, distinct social groupings might 
evolve  – for myriad reasons, animals not inhabiting even the same continent 
might form social bonds in zoological gardens. Th is means that a (social) 
meaning-carrier is created in their umwelt (in cases where an additional animal 
is integrated to the animal’s umwelt), or the meaning-carrier can also be changed, 
such as when an animal comes to substitute another animal (e.g. in the cases 
of sexual imprinting). For animals, these communication situations may be 
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positive, such as primates from diff erent species (capuchin monkeys [Cebus 
apella] and squirrel monkeys [Saimiri sciureus]) who show affi  liative behaviours 
towards each other (as in the Edinburgh zoo) (Leonardi et al. 2010). In such 
cases, the umwelten of diff erent species may overlap to the extent that enables 
them to recognise common communication contexts (tigers and lions that 
are known to even produce off spring in zoos). Th ere are also instances where 
communication with a representative from another species might have a negative 
eff ect on the animal because the indications to the communication situation 
might be incomplete or obscure due to the diff erences in umwelten. Th ese 
instances sometimes lead to confl ict or aggressive behaviour, as in the Antwerp 
zoo in Belgium when two diff erent species of dolphins, Tursiops truncatus and 
Sotalia guianensis, were made to share living quarters, and Sotalia guianensis 
exhibited aggressive behaviour towards Tursiops truncatus (Margodt 2000: 
33–34). Humans, while managing other species’ inter-species communication, 
also constitute one of the parties in communication. As discussed before, wild 
animals tend to fl ee from humans; thus taming and socialising animals serves 
the purpose of changing social communication contexts. Th us, if a wild animal 
interprets the meeting of a human as an antagonistic situation (as is usual in 
the case of predator-prey relationships), then an animal wants to disrupt it by 
fl eeing. However, in communication with a tame or socialised animal, the human 
is perceived as neutral or even as a companion (e.g. for play).10
With regard to intraspecifi c communication, a very common factor in-
fl uencing communication is transporting animals between diff erent zoos. 
Accredited zoos share the International Species Information System (ISIS), which 
contains data that determines which animals should have off spring together 
in order to sustain the biological diversity of the species’ gene pool. However, 
the translocation may have an unwanted eff ect on animal communication, 
such as the disruption of communication and intraspecies social bonds that 
the animal has already created in the previous zoo. Depending on the species-
specifi c social structure and behaviour, transporting animals may bear diff erent 
eff ects on animals. For example, nonhumans that create especially strong family 
bonds (elephants, wolves, orcas, lions, etc.) may suff er tremendously from the 
disruption of communication because many, if not all, meaning-carriers for 
social activities (grooming, playing, etc.) are erased. For animals with social 
hierarchies, it may also happen that the social group must rearrange its social 
hierarchy due to the leaving of an animal. In addition, for the animal moving 
to a new environment, it means meeting new individuals, e.g. new partners. 
Oft en this sort of forced communication may fail because animals may not be 
interested in the other conspecifi c and may even exhibit aggressive behaviour. 
For instance, in Motroparks zoo, a toe of a female gorilla had to be amputated 
10 For more detailed account on human-nonhuman communication in zoological gardens 
see e.g. Hosey 2008.
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because she and a male that had been brought into her enclosure in the hopes 
of mating fought with each other (Margodt 2000: 42). To avoid rejection from 
conspecifi cs and to avoid transporting animals altogether, sometimes the 
normal communication sequence is interrupted; it is not uncommon for female 
elephants to be impregnated and to give birth without ever meeting their partner 
and mating. Th is means that the communication process that might be relevant 
in the animal’s umwelt is eliminated, but the end result of that process (i.e. giving 
birth) still follows without the animal conducting the necessary activities for that 
end result. However, it might be argued that for some solitary species (e.g. bears 
or tigers), the translocation may be less stressful regarding intraspecifi c social 
bonds because social bonds may bear less relevance in their umwelt (except 
during the time of cub-raising for females) in comparison to animals that create 
strong social bonds.
Sometimes off spring are separated from their parents to enable the parents to 
have more off spring in a shorter timespan, or due to the fact that the parents are 
simply unable to rear their off spring (e.g. they have rejected their off spring). In 
that case, no bond is created between a parent and the off spring, which in some 
cases may in the future hinder the off spring from rearing their own off spring. 
Th is again proves to be an important point for species that teach their off spring 
about social communication and about communication with the environment 
(animals that create strong family bonds). Th ese species introduce new meaning-
carriers to their off spring (who/what is edible and who/what is not, who/what 
to be afraid of and who/what is harmless or a friend); they teach them diff erent 
eco-fi elds (where to fi nd water and food, where to build a nest or a burrow). For 
social animals, the most extreme case of disrupting communication is isolation – 
sometimes the poor health of an animal or incompatibility with his conspecifi cs 
demands separation. Th is may have the same kind of eff ect on the animal’s 
umwelt as translocation, but it may prove to be permanent in cases where 
isolated animals, due to their illness or aggression, are not reunited with their 
conspecifi cs and remain solitary till the end of their lives. Obviously the umwelt 
of isolated social animals becomes much poorer due to the removal of many 
meaning-carriers and thus also of functional circles. However, as mentioned 
above, there are also cases where zoological gardens do not have the opportunity 
for an injured or incompatible animal to be removed from its conspecifi cs, which 
again means that forced communication (that which the animal does not want to 
participate in) takes place. Th is may cause stress in both counterparts and result 
in confl icting behaviour, due to irritation- or stress-inducing meaning-carriers 
being always present and unavoidable. 
To summarize possible negative eff ects of human management on the social 
communication of zoo animals: there are situations where the communication 
between individuals is coerced or forced (e.g. aggressive animals sharing an 
enclosure), which is indicated by the constant stimuli of an unpleasant meaning-
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carrier; is disrupted (e.g. a keeper loses its ability to care for an animal; off spring 
are removed from their parents), which means that some meaning-carriers are 
removed (and sometimes substituted with others); or is eliminated (e.g. predator-
prey relations; calving without mating), which indicates that certain meaning-
carriers and functional circles are absent altogether.  
Th us it seems that although zoo environments are richer in eco-fi elds 
when compared to in situ environments, the main reasons for communicative 
diff erences arise from forcing or disrupting communication, or from the absence 
of social communicative contexts. Th is observation proves to be important when 
considering one of the zoological gardens’ main goals – species conservation – 
because the survival potential of the reintroduced animals depends on their 
communicative competence in their new environment. For many species, this 
competence also includes what they have already learned from their parents 
and conspecifi cs: how they are able to carry out observational learning and 
create social relations in their new environment. Although the animals up for 
reintroduction are usually maintained away from visitors and thus, in their 
case, the zoogoers’ expectations do not have to be met, animals are still reared 
under human management in captivity. Th is means that if there are signifi cant 
diff erences between in situ and ex situ environments, there may be serious 
repercussions to the animals’ abilities to adjust to their new environments and 
may seriously jeopardise their survival success. In turn, this aff ects the zoo in 
reaching its goal of species conservation.
Th is means that in order to conserve a species, it is important to consider 
individuals that constitute the species. Th e animals should not be regarded 
as purely members of a gene pool. In addition to genetic diversity, it is also 
important to maintain animals’ species-specifi c communication and to account 
for them as subjects with umwelten. Otherwise the reintroduction programs will 
not succeed. So it seems that in order to achieve the goal of species conservation, 
the zoo environment must be created in a way that is compatible with the animal’s 
umwelt and provide all the necessary eco-fi elds for intra- and interspecies commu-
nication and possibilities to cope with the environment itself (e.g. distinguishing 
between eatable and uneatable objects, suitable and unsuitable materials for nest 
building, handling extreme weather conditions, etc.).  
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Conclusion
Considering the interconnectedness of cultural, biological and ecological facets 
in topics relevant to zoos facilitates uncovering the reasons behind why it is oft en 
the case that what visitors desire, what animals require, and what zoological 
gardens are set to achieve are not in accordance with one another. A semiotic 
approach off ers a fertile ground for analysing human and nonhuman intra- 
and interspecies communication and communication with the environment, 
thus enabling the discovery of the shortcomings of the designed space of the 
zoo and of the possible eff ect of human perceptions and animal management on 
animal communication. Th is indicates that a more subjective approach that is 
inclusive of animal communication has the potential to aid zoological gardens 
in zoo animal behaviour studies, in their enclosure design principles and, most 
importantly, in their conservational endeavours (e.g. reintroduction programs). 
Th e suitability of a zoo environment for a specifi c animal should be analysed by 
considering the presence of the meaning-carriers necessary for the actuation of 
diff erent functional circles, the process of functional circles (whether they are 
complete or incomplete), and the availability of the diff erent eco-fi elds needed to 
fulfi l all the activities of an animal (and the degree that animal is able or allowed 
to perform the activities). 
Some of the questions that may prove to be fertile for future research about 
animal communication in zoos are the following: 
 Are all the necessary meaning-carriers for a specifi c animal present in the zoo 
animal’s umwelt? 
 Are the meaning-carriers the same as for conspecifi cs in situ? One should take 
into account also the age and gender of the animal. As to personal preferences, 
are the personal peculiarities of an animal with regards to meaning-carriers 
hindering its possible future communication in situ? 
 Are the diff erent meaning carriers of a zoo animal easily substituted? Are the 
meaning-carriers of a certain function diff erent compared to the meaning-
carriers of animals in situ? Is the meaning-carrier important for the animal 
(as with imprinting) and thus diffi  cultly substituted (if at all), or irrelevant (as 
with a random object of play) and thus more easily substituted? 
 Can the zoo animal perform all the species-specifi c functional circles? 
 Are all the species-specifi c eco-fi elds present? Is the animal able (or allowed) 
to make use of all the eco-fi elds?
 Are the eco-fi elds similar to in situ eco-fi elds? Would the animal be able to 
perform the same activity in situ (e.g. to locate prey)?
Th is list is by no means exhaustive, but it off ers a starting point for analysing zoo 
animal communication and also enables us to compare it to in situ conspecifi c 
communication, which in turn proves to be relevant for species conservation. 
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Semiotics of textual animal representations
Kadri Tüür
Introduction
Art, including literary creation, relies on carefully selected, elaborated and 
sequenced representations of the reality that is accessible to us, as well as of the 
imaginary realms that need mediation in some art form, in order to be shared 
between humans. In the contemporary world, picture-based representations of 
nature, such as nature documentaries and albums of nature photography, and 
even cartoons and mobile applications, form a substantially more important 
way of consuming nature representations than the written word does. However, 
the focus of the present chapter is on literary representations, particularly on 
nature writing as a specifi c type of literary creation where the emphasis is on 
representations of nature. A number of principles that are employed in nature 
writing are also applicable to nature representations in other forms. 
Th e present analysis of nature representations is exemplifi ed by the 
representations of birds in the text “Sounds” by Fred Jüssi, the most well-
known Estonian nature writer today. Th is text has elsewhere been analysed 
from a rigorously zoosemiotic point of view (Tüür 2009), and contextualised in 
the historical overview of Estonian nature writing (Maran, Tüür 2001). In the 
following, the notion of representation is discussed from the semiotic point of 
view, and it is subsequently associated with the concept of the nature-text as a 
complex semiotic object that is created in the interaction of natural and cultural 
elements (as elaborated in Maran 2007a). Th e underlying questions for the 
analysis are: How are nature-texts created, and what are the specifi c strategies 
of reading them? Where do our umwelten overlap with other species? What 
epistemological and conceptual diffi  culties arise when it comes to the mediation 
of other species’ umwelten by means of human sign systems? 
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1. Nature writing as a hybrid object 
As stated in chapter 2 of the present monograph, semiotics is an especially 
suitable methodology for studying hybrid objects  – phenomena that extend 
beyond one certain domain of human activity, a discipline, or a commonly agreed 
classifi cation. Our present set of research questions addresses both the cultural 
and natural phenomena that are expressed in nature writing. Traditionally, 
nature writing has been addressed in the framework of ecocritical studies where 
the focus of inquiry has predominantly been on the literary qualities of the texts, 
such as genre, tropes, metaphors, style, ethical and philosophical content, and so 
on. But as nature writing contains nature, as the term itself indicates, the ‘nature’ 
part also needs to be addressed. In addition to the discussions about what the 
various cultural meanings of ‘nature’ are, it is also worthwhile to have a look at 
how the enormous array of non-human reality is represented in literary form. 
What are the aspects that have been picked from the environment or from 
the behaviour of certain species, how have they been rendered in sign systems 
characteristic of human communication, and how does it all function in diff erent 
communication situations – both in intra- and in interspecies’ ones? In short, 
nature writing can be explained as a phenomenon in the intersection of the 
umwelten of diff erent species. Approaching nature writing as a testimony of 
interspecies’ communication may teach us many interesting things about other 
species, but most importantly about our own. 
In order to study nature writing semiotically, we must thus agree that it is 
a hybrid object that expands beyond the interest sphere of just one discipline, 
such as literary criticism. Nature writing is actually an exemplary hybrid object 
sensu Bruno Latour (1993), as it challenges and overcomes the typical modern 
distinctions between culture and nature, between human and other animals, and 
between objective and subjective. 
In the second chapter, three instances are listed where hybrid objects emerge: 
a) in human–animal communication when the umwelten of diff erent species 
partly and temporarily overlap; b) when the communicative and interpretative 
activities take place between an individual body and its endosemiotic processes; 
and c) between human culture and the natural environment. Nature writing as 
a hybrid object fi ts in the fi rst category. It oft en describes an author’s encounters 
with other species, be these animals, plants, or invertebrates. In order to establish 
a mutual contact, the umwelten of the participants in the encounter must at least 
minimally overlap  – although in many instances the human counterpart may 
act as if s/he was the only subject in the encounter. Semiotic analysis helps us 
to explicate the mechanisms that condition our communication with the rest of 
the world and, ideally, to make necessary corrections in our species’ behaviour 
according to the research results. 
According to the defi nition of fi ction, literary representations do not 
necessarily have a reference in reality, i.e. in the world accessible to us through 
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the senses. Nature writing as a specifi c sub-fi eld of literary creation relies on 
the representations of the phenomena in our environment. Nature writing in 
narrow sense is documentary prose that is based on the author’s personal, bodily 
experiences in nature, informed by knowledge of natural history and biology in 
general, rendered in an elaborate style of writing. In the attempt to defi ne nature 
writing in a narrow sense for heuristic as well as pragmatic purposes for the present 
chapter, we can rely on the dynamic model of nature writing as outlined in Tüür 
2007. According to this model, nature writing is formed in the overlapping area 
between belletrist writing, essayist writing, natural history writing, and texts with 
a pragmatic function, such as handbooks. Nature writing is meant to inform, 
entertain, and also raise questions in readers about the natural environment that 
it represents. Th e question of representation is thus of diff erent importance in the 
case of nature writing as compared to fi ction. Whereas in fi ction the ‘adequacy’ 
or feasibility of the representation is not of primary importance, it plays a crucial 
role in nature writing: for example, if nature is represented in a way that is for 
some reason perceived as inadequate by the readers, the piece of nature writing 
fails to function. One of the central intentions of a piece of nature writing is to give 
readers a personally presented, but still correct and up-do-date, knowledge about 
nature, be it about landscapes or about the other species that we may encounter 
in the wild. If these reader expectations are not met, the text loses its strength. 
In practice, it may sometimes be diffi  cult to draw a border between nature 
writing and other types of literary creation. American ecocritics have spoken of 
nature writing as a genre, but this is perhaps true only if we understand ‘genre’ 
as a conglomeration of the readers’ expectations, just as Paul Cobley (2001) has 
explained it in his article about genres in contemporary media. Finch and Elder 
in their introduction to the “Norton Book of Nature Writing” discuss the problem 
of discriminating between what is nature writing and what is fi ction (Finch, Elder 
2002: 27). If we think of genre in structuralist terms, as a conventional way of 
structuring one’s text and employing certain literary tropes, the variety within 
nature writing appears to be wider than a rigid defi nition would permit. Nature 
writing serves better as a heuristic device that helps to fi nd and focus on the 
most exemplary texts that have the greatest potential to yield interesting results 
in ecosemiotic analysis. 
In a wide sense, all writing has a component of nature writing because it is 
always based on human experiences of our perceived reality – even if reality is 
defamiliarised in literary creation, we are still able to recognise the defamilia-
risation on the basis of our own environmental experiences. Also the resources 
necessary for writing always come from nature, whether we recognise it or not.
As a sub-fi eld of literary creation, nature writing has the requirement that it 
should be written down in an elaborate style, and it most oft en uses metaphors 
and literary tropes as a crucial constitutive element of the story. Presumably this 
is also what diff erentiates nature writing from a purely scientifi c text – albeit not 
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entirely, because most research papers rely on metaphoric expression as much as 
any other human verbalisation. So we can conclude that nature writing reaches 
beyond the limits of literary creation into the realms of science, natural history, 
animal biology, autobiography, and so on. In order to bring all these varied 
aspects together into one coherent analysis, the understanding of nature writing 
as a hybrid object enabling semiotic study can be applied. 
2. Nature-text: a reading
Each object, be it hybrid or “pure”, requires a systematised approach in order to 
be successfully analysed. One suitable distinction here is between denotative and 
connotative meaning as outlined by Roland Barthes (2004). In the case of nature 
writing, denotative meanings are tied to the biological knowledge of the species, 
environments and communicative situations that are represented in a text of 
nature writing, whereas connotative meanings tie the text to its cultural context 
and pre-conditions, i.e. to the (oft en stereotypical) ideas about the conventions of 
nature representation that the reading public may have. 
Another systematising tool that is used here is the notion of nature-text. 
Timo Maran (2007a: 269–294), combining the theories of the Tartu-Moscow 
school of cultural semiotics, zoosemiotics as devised by Th omas A. Sebeok, and 
ecosemiotics as proposed by Kalevi Kull, has put forth the model of nature-text 
that embraces several representational aspects of a text. Th e model is presented 
in Fig 1. 
Figure 1. Components and interrelations in the complex of nature-text, from Maran 
2007a. 
Th e complex phenomenon of the nature-text is comprised of written text and 
the natural environment it relies upon. In the case of nature writing, the text 
itself is a result of an author’s personal experience (hike, stay, observation) of 
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some particular natural place or species. As such, it is based on the natural 
environment and refers back to it. As a rule, the experience determines the 
structure of the text in some way  – whether it is a ramble, a hunting story, a 
contemplation of magnifi cent landscapes and scenery, or an examination of the 
minute details of the ecosystem of the place visited. Th is way, the text and the 
environment are mutually embedded in each other. A nature-text, according to 
this scheme, is created only if an author has fi rst-hand experience of a particular 
natural environment and writes about his/her experience, usually in the form of 
non-fi ction. Th e fourth important participant in the making of a nature-text is 
the reader. Th e nature-text works better if the reader, too, has had a fi rst-hand 
experience of the natural environment that is represented in the written text. In 
addition to a familiarity with the environment, s/he should also know the genre 
conventions related to a non-fi ctional nature essay (nature writing). In Estonian 
culture, it is oft en the case that a reader also knows the writer, either personally 
(by having been hiking in the same areas, for example) or as a public media fi gure 
(like Fred Jüssi or Jaan Tätte). In this way, the author’s position and activities 
beyond the text of nature writing contribute an extra layer to the nature-text 
and to the reader’s interpretation of it. A nature-text only works properly when 
all of its four components are included in the process of interpretation in an 
interrelated manner.  
As Maran points out, contextuality is one of the central characteristics 
of nature writing (Maran 2007a: 273). Th at is, connotative meanings play an 
important role in the interpretation process. In fi ction studies, reading a work of 
literature against the background of its immediate environment of writing is not 
considered to be of primary importance for understanding it. Such a necessity 
may arise only occasionally, especially if an evident discrepancy occurs between 
the text and the environment it refers to. Only when the text reaches people 
who have a personal experience of the landscape may they notice the misplaced 
representation of nature that is based on a “falsely believed” assumption by the 
author, as well as by her earlier readers. Th e representations based on the actual 
natural environment play an important role not only in nature writing but also in 
fi ction. In regard to connotative meanings and regarding the readers’ perceptions 
of what is a truthful representation and what is not, it should be noted that quite 
oft en cultural conventions play their role in conditioning the perception. It is not 
always denotative aptness that makes a representation viable; it may also be the 
connotative adherence to the cultural norms of representation, and the reader’s 
ability to recognise these. 
As Maran (2007a: 271) has noted, both semiotics and ecology rely on research 
methods that are grounded in contextuality: each individual phenomenon 
acquires signifi cance in the context where it functionally belongs. Semiotic 
analysis as such must take into account the contextuality of any communication 
act, including written communication in an elaborate form, i.e. literary creation. 
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A literary work makes use of the external world in a similar manner as non-
fi ction. Representations of the environment in written text make sense insofar as 
we are able to relate these to our personal experiences as readers. 
It is instructive to take Fred Jüssi’s piece of nature writing entitled “Sounds” 
(Jüssi 1986: 27–28)1 and analyse it as a nature-text. Th is should give an idea of 
the multi-faceted nature of nature representations in a literary text, and also show 
that nature writing is by no means a “simpler” object for critical studies than a 
piece of fi ction. 
Jüssi’s text is set on an islet in the Baltic Sea. Th e time frame for the piece is an 
evening in early spring. Th e year of writing, 1976, is added to the text. Th e author 
observes the sounds and activities of several bird species: goosanders, long-
tailed ducks, swans, mallards, eiders, goldeneyes, and a blackbird. Two thoughts 
concerning the specifi cally human umwelt are woven into the discussion of the 
birds’ audible activities: one about the tacit knowledge of coastal people, and 
another one about the sense of longing for home that the sound of a goldeneye’s 
wingbeat may elicit. Th at is more or less all the information that we can obtain 
from the text itself. In order to understand the poetics of the text more deeply, 
contextual information is needed.
Let’s start with the location. Th e name of the islet is not mentioned in the 
text. Th e only geographical reference is encountered in the middle section of 
the essay, “Swans are trumpeting in Õunaku bay”. Õunaku is a small bay on the 
southeastern coast of Hiiumaa island. It is lined by a number of islets belonging 
to Moonsund Archipelago, but the one that Jüssi is standing on in that particular 
occasion must be Saarnaki. Its location is suitable for observing all the bird 
species mentioned in the text. Swans prefer to linger near shores when resting 
where they are able to grasp food from the seabed in shallow water. A personal 
experience of visiting these islets also helps to determine the possible physical 
and auditive landscapes – Hanikatsi is too far off  in the sea for a human to be able 
to hear the swans near the shore in Õunaku bay (see Fig 2).
1 Excerpts from the same text were used as a source for the semiotic study of sound rep-
resentations in the article “Bird sounds in nature writing” by the author of the current 
chapter (see Tüür 2009).
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Figure 2. Map of Õunaku bay (Source: Estonian Land Board).
Hanikatsi is the only possible alternative to Saarnaki as the location of the piece. 
A well and a house, referring to permanent human habitation, and connected 
with a footpath that, in turn, indicates recent and regular use, are mentioned: 
the writer describes his brief halt on his way from the house to the well to fetch 
water. Of the smaller islets around Õunaku bay, only Saarnaki (1564–1973) and 
Hanikatsi (1623–1965) have had permanent inhabitation, including farmhouses.2 
Information about the inhabitation of the islets can be obtained from old maps 
and archival documents, as well as from other books of nature writing (Rebassoo 
1972; Leito 1984). Th e well of Saarnaki has also been mentioned as an important 
element of the islescape by Tiit Leito, a nature writer and a long-time head of the 
islets’ nature reserve. Leito writes in his book “Four Seasons on the Islets” that the 
inhabitants of Saarnaki could tell the approaching winter by observing their well: 
when it fi lled up with water to its upper rim, ice and snow were about to arrive 
(Leito 1984: 5). 
Also Jüssi’s passage about the environmental wisdom of coastal people as 
contrasted with the atomic, factual knowledge of scientists can be associated with 
the former inhabitants of the islet. As we can infer from the dates mentioned 
above, Jüssi wrote his piece at a time when a centuries-long epoch of permanent 
human habitation on the small islets in the Baltic Sea had just come to its end. 
Th ree years prior to writing “Sounds”, the last man who lived on Saarnaki, Peeter 
2 Information for the visitors of the Hiiumaa islet protection area (in Estonian): http://
www.keskkonnaamet.ee/hiiu/kulastajale/kultuuriparand (21.11.2015).
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Saarnak, had drowned in a rowing boat accident on the stormy sea because Soviet 
authorities had banned the usage of motor boats and sailboats by coastal people 
(Klaas 2007: 7). Th us the reference to the vanishing wisdom of coastal people 
in this piece indirectly served as a comment about the political regulations that 
devastated the local life. 
Th e text reveals that Jüssi and his companions have arrived at the islet with 
the aim of setting up nesting boxes for goosanders. Th is is another minute but 
important detail that helps to determine the location. It cannot be found in 
written sources but only by a personal observation on the islets – on Hanikatsi, 
the nests for goosanders have been established in hollow trees instead of nest 
boxes. Th e described activity is a manifestation of an eff ort to keep up the ancient 
practices of coastal folks. Collecting waterfowl eggs to enrich one’s diet in spring 
is a practice that has been known to all Finno-Ugric people, and that thus has to 
be a vernacular habit thousands of years old (Mäger 1994: 274). However, the 
people who have set out to place the nest boxes in “Sounds” are modern scientists, 
not traditional dwellers, and thus their activities on the islet can be regarded as 
a nostalgic attempt to re-enact the past. Th e result is but a copy of the vanishing 
world with no practical purpose. As Leito later states about their maintenance 
activities on Saarnaki in a very self-critical manner,
We pitied the dilapidating houses on Saarnaki and so we decided to restore 
them. We made new roofs, patched the walls, set in doors and windows, 
cleaned the well and even mowed the yards. Now, looking at the windows 
with no glow inside, I can’t get rid of the feeling that I am standing among 
pieces of taxidermy. Yes, we did our best to make everything beautiful, but 
we could not provide the most important – the living soul. (Leito 1984: 26)
Th e time frame for the piece could be estimated to last about 5 minutes. On 
a crisp March/April evening, the average temperature is around 3 degrees C, 
and even colder in coastal areas where the sea cools off  the land more quickly.3 
On the basis of years-long personal experience, I can say that standing still for 
5 minutes in such conditions is quite enough, even if the observations of bird 
behaviour are as thrilling as they get. Stopping on the way to the well also hints 
that the author most probably stepped out of the house ad hoc, with no cap or 
gloves, and the chill would catch him quickly. No bodily sensations of the author 
are directly mentioned in this particular text, although they have been rendered 
elsewhere in his work. 
We can also determine the time and the weather conditions at the time of 
writing the text on the basis of the bird behaviour that is mentioned. Goosanders 
start nesting shortly aft er the breaking up of ice (Renno 1993: 53). Swans, according 
to the Collins bird guide, withstand the rather harsh conditions “closely following 
3  See the observation records at http://seire.keskkonnainfo.ee/. 
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[the] retreat of ice in spring” in their migration (Collins 2001: 38), arriving in 
Estonia in March (Renno 1993: 37). As we learn from the text, the swans had 
migrated in the beginning of March (i.e. the ice would have to break also around 
that time). Th erefore, it is probable that the piece had been written at the end of 
March, 1976. Leito (1984: 19) writes that April makes the sea ice unreliable, but as 
Jüssi remarks in his text that the ice had retreated extraordinarily early that year, 
the time can be settled to March. Th e appearance of the blackbird confi rms this 
opinion: according to Collins, the Northern European population of blackbirds 
is migratory, returning from Western Europe usually in March or April (Collins 
2001: 276). Th e blackbird is referred to as a ‘forest bird’, in contrast to the 
waterfowl whose sounds have been observed earlier. Th ere are some big ash trees 
around the houses on Saarnaki, and there is a remarkable group of lindens in the 
middle of the islet. It is true that the habitat of the blackbird is cardinally diff erent 
from that of the waterfowl. 
Another contrast between the blackbird and the waterfowl lies in the intensity 
of their sound-making: whereas the blackbird’s call is clearly territorial, the 
previously noted sounds are just part of the birds’ movement (such as swishing 
and splashing) or are used to keep the fl ock together (such as the trumpeting and 
owdelee-sounds). Th e blackbird is characterised as a noisy bird, and its call is 
described as “a series of metallic, high ‘pli-pli-pli-pli-pli-...’, which [...] turn into a 
crescendo” (Collins 2001: 276) which the bird oft en emits prior to going to roost. 
In the text, it is as if the blackbird’s sound intrudes the islet soundscape where the 
human listener is immersed, abruptly ending the brief moment of contemplation 
among the less intrusive sounds from the sea. Such contrast is without a doubt 
an essential part of the artistic composition of the essay; it starts out smoothly, 
meditatively, and comes to a sudden end. To take the parallel even further, the 
text’s composition can also be interpreted as a metaphorical parallel to the human 
history on the islet: it has begun slowly, in close association with the sea, and it 
suddenly ends because of intense, land-bound regulations. 
In conclusion, what we can see on the basis of this brief analysis of the piece 
of nature writing as a nature-text is that the text itself, its composition, and its 
natural and historical context make an intrinsically interwoven complex of 
meanings. In order to understand it, both denotative and connotative meanings 
have to be taken into account. In the case of a nature-text, connotative meanings 
are of primary importance: knowledge about the history of the islet’s inhabitation 
by humans helps us to understand better the disposition of the story, as well as 
the possible meanings and emotional weight of the human actions referred to 
in it. Connotative meanings help us to specify the location and the time frame – 
and also the possible climatic conditions and the circumstances of writing, as 
well as of the real event that the story is based upon. Contextualisation opens up 
whole new vistas of interpretation for a reader who is him- or herself engaged in 
the formation of the particular nature-text. Moreover, the personal experiences 
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of the writer, as well as of the reader, and the implicit intertextual references to 
the works of other authors with similar experiences from the same area help 
remarkably in detecting the hidden layers of meaning. In the case of nature 
writing, the verbal text and the natural-cultural environment it represents evolve 
as a representational complex. A successful interpretation of such a hybrid object 
requires knowledge of both from the reader. Part of the knowledge can indeed be 
obtained by visiting the described places and getting familiar with their natural 
features and inhabitants, either prior to or aft er reading a piece of nature writing 
about that particular location. 
3. Overlapping umwelten
In the present sub-chapter, umwelt analysis is applied from the three basic 
methodological approaches in zoosemiotic research, as outlined in chapter 
2. In the case of nature writing, instances of biocommunication and evidence 
about spatial organisation of some species may also occur, but the most fruitful 
approach in analysing the textual representations of animals still proves to be 
umwelt analysis. According to the defi nition derived on the basis of the works 
of Jakob von Uexküll, an umwelt is composed of all the meaning relations in 
the perception-based and in the action-based functional circles of an animal. In 
order to be able to render another species’ umwelt in writing, a human observer 
must have at least partly the same perceptual capacities that the animal has, 
as well as some knowledge of the underlying biology that helps us to create a 
contact zone between diff erent species. It must be kept in mind that the contact 
zone is not necessarily mutual in all cases, and not necessarily in favour of the 
human counterpart, either. In the course of an encounter, the observer’s and the 
observee’s umwelten usually overlap to a degree – that is, they perceive each other 
and oft en even establish a contact that is meaningful for all the engaged parties.
Knowledge of the structure of the umwelten of the other living beings, who 
are part of a piece of nature writing, is connected with the denotative meanings 
of the nature-text. In order to be able to estimate how the specifi c traits of 
other animals’ umwelten are represented in the text, what features have been 
emphasised, and what features have deliberately been left  unaddressed, we must 
have some denotative knowledge of the basic biology of the species that we 
encounter in a nature-text. 
In order to be more precise in estimating the nature of the inter-species’ contacts, 
it is necessary to make a distinction between communication and signifi cation 
(Martinelli 2007: 28). Th e former describes a situation where there is an intentional 
sender involved, and both sender and receiver share a considerable amount of 
the principles determining the form, the rules of codifi cation, and the context 
of the messages. Th is sort of interaction is usual in intraspecifi c communication, 
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such as human language. In the case of signifi cation, the semiosis resembles the 
way the inanimate environment is interpreted by a living creature (Maran 2007b: 
42; Nöth 2001: 72). In nature writing, instances of communication as well as of 
signifi cation can be found in the descriptions of human encounters with other 
animals. Making a distinction between communication and signifi cation may be 
subject to interpretations and intentions of the receiver to a considerable degree. 
For example, if a representative of another species is not vitally interested in its 
human observers, it may happen that it has no intention for any interaction with 
humans whatsoever. 
However, humans easily tend to interpret natural phenomena as symbolic 
communication on one hand or, on the other extreme, as unintentional signals 
resembling the ones present in inanimate nature. Th is raises a load of ethical 
questions regarding the proper relationship of humans with other species. 
What are the consequences if an animal’s behaviour elicits exaggerated or even 
inadequate reactions in the human umwelt? For example, misinterpretation of a 
“cute” little animal, such as a colourful but poisonous frog, may be dangerous or 
even lethal to either of the participants in such communication instances. Th ere 
are not many descriptions of such misguided communication in Estonian nature 
writing, but the potential for such events is implicitly there. Jüssi describes an 
encounter with a fi eld mouse in one of his texts:
Th en comes a mouse. It has slipped in from some crack in the wall, it has 
climbed on the table, and it is now munching away with my bread in the full 
peace of mind. It pays no heed to me. When I touch the silky fur on the back 
of the mouse with my fi nger, it rises to its hind paws and sniff s my hand. I 
have a somewhat uneasy feeling  – my fi ngertips smell of smoky lard and 
pine sap, and how do I know that it is not about to have a bite of me with its 
needle-sharp little teeth? (Jüssi 1986: 41)
Here the connection between a human and a mouse is established on the basis of 
one of the most inevitable needs in all animals – the need for food. Th e olfactory 
aspects of the contact are also shared, although the author hesitates about the 
possible semantic connotations the smells may have in the mouse’s umwelt, and 
about what action they may elicit in it. Th e third layer where the human and 
animal umwelten overlap is the realm of tactile sensations: the mouse feels and 
reacts to the human touch, even though this may seem an inadequate reaction, 
as we are stereotypically used to thinking of wild animals as having a fear and 
fl ight reaction to human presence. Th erefore, the human also anticipates the 
mouse’s touch and thinks of the little creature’s teeth as the organ of encounter – 
thus, in turn, fastening the stereotypical perception of any wild animal as having 
dangerous teeth, by which it makes its contacts with the rest of the world. In 
addition to knowledge of animal biology, a number of connotative, culture-
induced ideas seep through the textual tissue. We may thus conclude that human 
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interpretation of animal umwelten is inevitably marked by our human symbolic 
capacities, by cultural connotative meanings, and by the tendency to interpret 
encounters with other species as necessarily communicative situations. 
Uexküll has shown that thanks to the functional cycle in animal umwelten, 
animals are generally able to move away from the conditions that are not suitable 
for their life at a considerable speed, picking the direction of movement more or 
less at will. Th ey can also actively seek to alter the environment or its features in 
order to make them more suitable for their life needs. Even if the alterations in 
the environment are minor, they can be perceived as huge by some other species. 
For example, beavers construct dams on streams and rivulets in order to have 
dens and favourable feeding conditions. Humans may perceive this as a drastic 
and infavourable intrusion into the landscape, as the life-related activities of 
beavers result in fl oods, in irrigation or amelioration ditches being stuck and 
growing over with bush, in the decreasing of fi sh in streams, and so on. Th en 
verbal representations (including nature writing) of beavers and their activities 
come to play an important role in how such diff erent interests of the species with 
overlapping umwelten are perceived, represented, and negotiated. 
We have diff erent possibilities for rendering the animal’s perspective in verbal 
representations – as this way of mediating the environment is something alien 
to species other than humans. One option is to anthropomorphise the animals: 
to represent them as if talking to each other, reasoning about their behaviour; 
to depict them having emotions similar to those of humans, such as love, rage, 
fear, attachment; etc. Such an approach oft en results in children’s stories that have 
been criticised for their low level of sensitivity towards the genuinely species-
specifi c umwelt. Th e other option is to try to explain the animals’ behaviour, 
relying strictly on scientifi c data about animal ecology, ethology, and zoology. 
It requires special skill to convert the quantitative data obtained by the methods 
of hard science into an eloquent story that the readers would be keen to follow 
until its end.
Th e connecting point that ties together humans’ and other animals’ umwelten 
is indeed the life cycle: each individual is born (or hatched), it matures, moves 
about, mates, produces some off spring, and fi nally dies. All of these stages of life 
are observable in most vertebrates, thus providing a nice common ground for 
drawing aff ective parallels between the lives of diff erent species. Kinship relations 
and life cycles are universally present across species, providing a “natural” 
structural basis for nature writing that features animals and animal lives. Th us 
it can be claimed that animal representations based on a featured animal’s life 
cycle are relatively easily accessible to human readers who can in this way fi nd 
similarities with their own umwelt. Th is fosters sympathy towards other species, 
which is indeed one of the aims of nature writing, along with giving information 
about our fellow species’ lives, as they might see it themselves. 
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Th e life cycles of humans and other animals are organised in a syntactically 
similar manner  – i.e., the sequence of life episodes is more or less the same 
across a wide range of species. Th is fact gives us reason to make a brief excurse 
into the phenomenon of biotranslation here. Th e notion of bio-translation has 
been outlined by Kalevi Kull and Peeter Torop (2003) in order to analyse the 
diff erent translation mechanisms that may occur in literary texts, and to take 
into account the possible instances of translation between umwelten. In their 
article, Kull and Torop bring examples mostly from molecular level and from 
the translation mechanisms that occur in DNA. It is challenging to think about 
whether, and in what conditions, inter-species communication could be regarded 
as biotranslation. We can diff erentiate between three types of translation: 1) 
lin guistic translation, or a translation from one verbal language to another; 2) 
intersemiotic translation, e.g. in combining verbal text and photographs that 
are mutually complementary; 3) biotranslation, when the umwelt of another 
species is mediated to human readers in the form of literature or any other 
communication type characteristic of the human species. 
As Kull and Torop explain, translation requires two distinguishable sign 
systems and a successful transmission of meaning from one to the other. 
Biotranslation could thus be regarded as a transmission between umwelten. In 
the case of a regular translation, we can speak of the structure of the text, of 
its poetic function, and of the syntax as one of its constituting values. Kull and 
Torop argue in their article that for other animals, certain rhythmically repeated 
patterns of movement may serve as proto-syntax. Th us translation of an animal’s 
life events into a human narrative also emerges as a technical, as well as semiotic, 
problem: could we say that representing an animal’s life cycle by human means, 
such as literature, sound recording, or fi lm, is bio-translation? Th is question is 
intriguing, but the discussion would require a separate article, and must therefore 
remain only noted here. Th e present article and the umwelt analysis presented 
in the following serve as a preparation towards a more elaborate study of the 
question of biotranslation in the future. 
We as humans, especially in our written communication, cannot deny our 
perspective outside the limits of the umwelt of our own species: we always 
perceive and conceptualise the world around us as the representatives of the 
human species. Literary representation, however, enables us to create possible 
worlds and to position ourselves as if in other umwelten, without actually 
having to shapeshift . Th is is indeed one of the indisputable strengths of verbal 
representation. In comparison to photographic representation that inevitably 
features the technologically mediated human gaze, nature writing may be able to 
conceal the human subjectivity by bringing to the fore the features defi ning the 
umwelt of the “target species”. A story can be narrated from the point of view of 
another species, or it can be narrated neutrally, describing the life events of some 
representatives of other species as if from the point of view of an outside observer. 
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Employing the point of view of an omniscient narrator is also a possibility. All 
of these choices have been used in the tradition of nature writing, both Estonian 
and international. 
In order to see how the overlappings of human and bird umwelten have been 
used in Estonian nature writing, let us turn to Fred Jüssi’s piece “Sounds” as the 
model source again. Th e title suggests that the piece focuses on soundscapes 
and on auditive sensations. Th ese are described as experienced by the author 
while standing outside of a house on a small islet on the Moonsund Archipelago. 
It is early spring, and a number of waterfowl and migratory birds are audially 
observed. When people tell about their encounters with birds, these tend to be 
visual experiences. Visual perception dominates other senses that bring our 
brains information from the environment. Focusing on sounds in the present 
text is a manifest shift  to another perception channel, thus perhaps even creating 
some sense of unfamiliarity in readers. For birds of many species, auditive 
communication is much more important than the visual. By choosing to focus on 
sounds, Jüssi steps out of his own human ‘comfort zone’ and moves closer to the 
umwelt of birds for whom sound-based communication is of vital importance. 
Th e fi rst sound that the text mentions is the distant call of long-tailed ducks in 
a vernacular verbal rendering: “Aa au-li, aa au-li” (Jüssi 1986: 27) or “Ow ow-
owdelee, ow ow-owdelee” in translation (as rendered in Collins 2001: 64). Th is 
call has been poeticised in several Estonian literary works. A distant and nice 
sounding call from the open seas easily reaches the position of a symbol. In 
“Sounds”, it is followed by an explanation: “Th e long-tailed ducks are migrating”. 
Th is shift s focus to birds and directs the thoughts of the reader to the situation of 
migrating and to its possible meanings in the birds’ umwelt. It does not yet suggest 
that the sound has symbolic qualities for the human listener, but it prepares the 
reader for the passage towards the end of the text, which is about the “sound of 
longing” created by the swishing sound of male goldeneye’s wings. 
Th e verb used to characterise the sound of swans in the Estonian text, 
“pasundavad”, is not exactly the most poetic word one could think of (and thus 
is hard to translate, even though “whooping” is a taxonomically correct choice). 
It suggests a loud, blaring and slightly annoying sound to the human ear. Th e 
loud sounds of a fl ock are contrasted to a lone pair of whooper swans, “quietly 
minding their own business” by the shore. However, the importance of sound in 
fl ock behaviour is recognised. 
Jüssi also discusses the call of male eiders. In the story, that call is missing, 
thus acting as a zero sign in Sebeok’s sense (1994: 18) – that is, signifying by its 
very absence. As the author admits that he does not know whether male eiders 
would utter the call in the evening or not, he indicates that his knowledge of 
bird behaviour and about the place of certain sounds in an eider’s umwelt is not 
without certain gaps. Still, the distinction between fl ock calls and mate calls, as 
well as the territorial call of the blackbird at the end of the text, show that the 
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author has remarkable knowledge of the possible repertoire of bird sounds and 
that he can associate them with diff erent modes of behaviour. Humans, too, use 
diff erent sounds and verbalisations for analogous functions: to keep a group 
together and to express solidarity, to bond with their family members, and to 
declare one’s territorial rights. In addition to sounds, humans have a number of 
other very elaborate sign systems for the same functions, for example banners, 
coats of arms, border demarcations and military equipment for the expression 
of one’s territoriality. Th e sign systems used are diff erent, but the basic needs – 
social, individual, territorial – are shared across umwelten. 
Jüssi mentions the holes dug into the coastal mud by swans in search of food. 
Th is observation requires knowledge about waterbird biology and their feeding 
habits; otherwise the holes in the mud would remain cryptic signs. Although the 
author himself does not share this food searching strategy with swans, he is able to 
recognise and relate to it. Here the overlapping of umwelten does not happen on 
the processual level of the food search, but rather on the general level – all species 
must eat. Th at connects humans to swans and to other waterfowl quite eff ectively. 
Th is example can also be conceptualised as an instance enabling biotranslation: 
it is an inevitable function of life that is not missing from any vertebrate umwelt 
(things may be diff erent in the case of some insects that pass metamorphic stages 
during their life cycle). 
At the end of the piece, it is the territorial call of a blackbird that serves as a 
discrepant sound and awakes the human listener from his reveries. To tell the 
diff erence between the sounds of waterfowl and the call of a forest bird requires 
some denotative knowledge. For an ornithologically ignorant listener or reader, 
‘bird sounds’ may be all the same. Here, Jüssi juxtaposes the sounds of water 
birds with the call of a song bird and, as a result, is brought back by surprise to 
his own umwelt and to the meaningful behaviour valued in the human world: 
“Right, I was on my way to the well to fetch water...!” Th e activities performed in 
the umwelten of diff erent species may serve diff erent purposes, but the analysis 
hopefully managed to demonstrate that there are overlappings and contact zones 
in the umwelten of diff erent species that enable us to relate to each other over 
the limits of species. Stereotypical perceptions possessed by humans may indeed 
hinder the mutual communication, but nature writing at its best suggests that we 
are able to overcome this. Semiotic analysis of nature writing contributes to the 
creation of this understanding. 
Conclusion
Th e present chapter focused on animal representations in nature writing and 
on their analysis with the help of tools provided by the semiotic approach. 
‘Representation’ is a notion that is oft en used but seldom conceptualised. Here 
representations are understood as non-human environments and umwelten 
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that are perceived from within a human umwelt and rendered by means of sign 
systems that are available for humans’ intra-specifi c communication, such as 
literature, fi lm, and photo. Unlike in fi ction, the reality that is modelled into a 
cultural text plays an important role in understanding these texts. Th erefore, we 
can say that nature writing is a hybrid object: it extends beyond the scope of one 
individual discipline, such as literary criticism or biology studies, and challenges 
their limits. Semiotic methodology provides help in overcoming this tension. 
It suggests looking at nature writing as a communicative device that functions 
between humans in our species’ umwelt, and that also gives us insights into the 
umwelten of other animals. By regarding nature writing as involving a nature-
text that brings together the denotative and connotative knowledge about the 
represented reality and species, a semiotic approach provides tools for analysing 
it in a systematic manner. Th e central notion in the biosemiotic analysis of 
nature writing is defi nitely umwelt  – the species-specifi c way of perceiving 
the environment and of relating to it through actions. When the umwelten of 
diff erent species overlap, a contact zone is created and a possibility for meaningful 
communication and perhaps even for bio-translation arises. 
Human texts and our perceptions based on them aff ect real animals, and 
therefore we should be careful in producing nature writing as well as in our 
critical examination of nature writing. Jüssi’s writings are a good example that a 
wide array of non-human species can be represented not only by rendering their 
umwelten correctly, but also in a cordial manner. 
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I stop on my way to the well to listen to what the spring sea has to tell. 
It is evening, the sun has just set. Th e sea fell quiet a few of hours ago, and in 
the light of dusk only a soft  ripple is visible on its surface. Th e wind is about to 
turn, it seems. 
I haven’t been to the islets this early in the spring before. At this time of the 
year the sea is usually still full of ice, but this year it is diff erent. Yesterday we 
launched the boat, and today we are already on an islet to put up new nesting 
boxes for goosanders. And now it is evening and from the sea the sounds of the 
birds waft  my path to the well.
Ow ow-owdelee, ow ow-owdelee. Th e long-tailed ducks are migrating. Th ere 
are many of them on the sea. Earlier during the day they fl ew off  in fl ocks at the 
approaching boat, but the time of massive migration is still ahead. 
Swans are whooping in Õunaku bay. Th e swans came and left  at the beginning 
of March, there are only a few of them now. When sea water was low, I went to 
the shore to see their stopover sites. Th e mud was full of smaller and bigger holes, 
which the swans had hollowed there in search for food. Right here on the coast 
there’s a pair of whooper swans at the moment, but making no sound – they are 
quietly minding their own business.
Mallards quack and splash about by the reed bed. No sound of a male eider. 
I can’t recall if I have ever heard a male eider’s call in the evening at all. In the 
morning, and during the daytime, yes, but not in the evening. I don’t remember. I 
should remember to try and listen to it in the future. In a sense, fi shermen have a 
much better knowledge of the sea than biologists. Th ey have more observations. A 
researcher notes an observation and then looks it up in the notebook if necessary. 
Coastal folks do not walk around with notebooks and binoculars, but if you have a 
question, they rummage out their wisdom in response. Th is wisdom has seeped into 
them over the years lived on the sea and at the seashore, and is always close at hand. 
With their wings whistling, a small fl ock of goldeneyes fl ies across the islet. Here 
one gets used to the whistling of the goldeneyes, one no longer notices it, but in 
the inland woods and moors it is one of the most beautiful sounds in a springtime 
night. While the scream of a fox in a February night makes one feel like responding 
to the call, the whistling of goldeneye wings conceals the haste of someone driven 
by a longing for home. At least that is how it has seemed to me during nights spent 
in the woods by the campfi re.  
All of a sudden, a blackbird starts singing in an ash tree behind the house. Th e 
voice of a forest bird wakes me from my thoughts. Right, I was on my way to the 
well to fetch water...!
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Semiotic modelling of biological mimicry
Timo Maran
In recent decades, biosemiotics (with the subfi elds of zoosemiotics and eco-
semiotics) has established itself as an independent research paradigm with a 
conceptual framework, a professional association, conferences and a thematic 
publication series. Th e question still unsettled is to what extent a semiotic 
approach can be productive for diff erent research tasks in biology proper: 
evolutionary biology, ecology, species protection, etc. Th e gap between semiotics 
and biology may be, however, smaller than it seems. Claus Emmeche and Jesper 
Hoff meyer (1991) have demonstrated the hidden connection between biology 
and semiotics as core concepts used in molecular biology are oft en semiotic by 
nature. Th omas P. Weber has argued in Trends in Ecology and Evolution that 
a semiotic approach can be benefi cial for evolutionary biology in raising new 
hypotheses (Weber 2000). Semiotic methodology has also been successfully 
applied in landscape ecology (Farina 2012; Malavasi et al. 2014).
In this chapter, I make an attempt to demonstrate how semiotic modelling 
can be used in systemic analysis of biological mimicry (that is, deceptive 
systemic resemblance between diff erent species). As the fi rst part of the chapter, 
I introduce the common conceptual framework of biological mimicry and argue 
that shortcomings in classical biological approaches could be compensated for by 
including semiotic analyses. Th ereaft er I propose a fi ve-stage model of analysis, 
which incorporates classical mimicry theory and Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt 
theory, as well as semiotic and communication analysis. Th is model exemplifi es 
the general methodological approach proposed in this volume, where conceptual 
tools and methods are brought together for a specifi c research task in a toolbox-
like manner. Th is proposed research model can be expressed in the form of fi ve 
questions:
1)  What is the formal structure of a mimicry system?
2)  What are the perceptual and eff ectual correspondences between the partici-
pants of mimicry?
3)  What are the characteristics of resemblances?
4)  How is the mimicry system regulated in ontogenetic and evolutionary pro-
cesses?
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5)  How is the mimicry system related to human cultural processes? 
As a practical application of the research model, two well-known cases of 
mimicry are compared and analysed: brood parasitism of the common cuckoo 
and Lepidopteran eyespots.
Over the years, a vast number of writings on mimicry has been published 
in biological literature, most of these being case studies of specifi c mimicry 
resemblances. For instance the bibliography of mimetic phenomena compiled 
by the historian of biology and mimicry specialist Stanislav Komárek exceeds 
5000 items (Komárek 2003: 7). However, there are many less systematic accounts 
of mimicry that aim at providing a comparative and comprehensive overview of 
diff erent mimicry instances. Th e few existing mimicry typologies appear to be too 
static for matching the complexity of actual research. It is more common that the 
case studies form specifi c traditions of study by including also many ecological 
aspects of the observed species. Vivid examples are off ered by studies on brood 
parasitism, mimicry rings in Heliconius butterfl ies or the wasp–hoverfl y mimicry 
complex. Th e aim of the present article is to propose a methodology based on 
biosemiotic research methods that would allow a dynamical and comparative 
description of various mimicry cases. Th is methodology is exemplifi ed by 
focusing on specifi c mimicry types – brood parasitism and eyespots. 
My article is grounded on established terminology in which the phenomenon 
of mimicry is considered to be a tripartite relationship between 1) an imitating 
organism (the mimic); 2) an object of imitation (the model); and 3) a deceived 
or confused organism (the receiver) (Wickler 1968: 8–10; Vane-Wright 1976: 28, 
30; Pasteur 1982: 171–173). All three parties together form a mimicry system 
that is a relatively consistent structure in virtue of being regulated by relations 
amongst the participants. For instance, in the case of protective mimicry where a 
broad-bordered bee hawk-moth Hemaris fuciformis resembles a bumblebee to a 
European pied fl ycatcher Ficedula hypoleuca, the hawk-moth can be considered 
the mimic, the bumblebee the model and the fl ycatcher the receiver. Th e mimic in 
the mimicry system is generally considered to gain an evolutionary or behavioural 
benefi t and the receiver mostly to suff er because of the interaction. Th e position 
of the model varies depending on the specifi c mimicry type: in classical Batesian 
mimicry (where the mimic gains protection through resembling the model), the 
model suff ers because of the mimic’s presence, while in aggressive mimicry the 
model oft en benefi ts. Th is tripartite mimicry model has its roots in the works of a 
German biologist, Wolfgang Wickler (1965, 1968), and it has greatly improved the 
comprehension of mimicry by leading to the formalised description of mimicry, 
by establishing new mimicry types and by creating typological schemas of the 
mimicry systems (for example, Pasteur 1982; Wiens 1978; Vane-Wright 1976). 
For semiotics, the main advantage of this kind of threefold model appears to be 
in highlighting the possibility to analyse mimicry from diff erent perspectives: 
as a communicative relationship between the model and the receiver, as a 
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resemblance-based relation between the model and the mimic, and as a deceptive 
relation between the mimic and the receiver (see Maran 2008: 99–104).1 At the 
same time, it seems that the triadic description of mimicry as consisting of the 
mimic, the model and the receiver also has its serious drawbacks.
1. Critical discussion of the triadic mimicry model 
Th e tripartite model presumes the presence of the relations of resemblance 
between three participants mostly concretised as species.2 Th is actually does not 
appear to be a very common situation in nature. It is more frequent that one 
of the three positions of the triad is fi lled by several species: for instance, the 
resemblance between the broad-bordered bee hawk-moth and bumblebees can 
be confusing also to shrike Lanius sp. and to several other insectivorous bird 
groups beside fl ycatchers. In a similar way, the position of mimics and models 
can also be fi lled with more than one species. Furthermore, the number of species 
that can participate in a mimicry system is in many cases not limited; besides the 
dominant participating species, there may also be occasional participants (for 
instance, omnivorous birds, for whom the moths form a small part of their diet 
and for whom confusing a hawk-moth with a bumblebee is a rare event). In some 
other cases, the involved species cannot be clearly divided between mimics and 
models, and the participating species rather form a fuzzy set of resemblances 
called the Müllerian-Batesian mimicry complex. In such a case, the diff erence in 
edibility or dangerousness of the involved species is not clearly established, or it 
may vary between individuals or develop during their life. 
Th e number of participating species in a mimicry system is not the only 
problem for the triadic description of mimicry. German theoretical biologists 
Zabka and Tembrock have argued that in many cases the model is a more general 
feature or class of objects and in principle cannot be reduced to a single species. 
Th is is so, for instance, in the case where decaying meat is mimicked by carrion-
fl owers to attract fl ies, which are looking for carcasses to lay their eggs in (Zabka, 
Tembrock 1986: 172). Th e same type of phenomenon is described by Georges 
Pasteur as semi-abstract or abstract homotypy (Pasteur 1982: 191) and by Maran 
(2007: 239–243) as abstract mimicry, the examples of which cover a wide array of 
phenomena from eyespots to deimatic displays. In the case of abstract mimicry, 
the object of imitation appears to be some abstract meaning in nature and its 
1 Th is chapter is conceptually and terminologically grounded on my previous studies on 
the semiotics of mimicry (Maran 2007, 2008, 2011).
2 Th is does not necessarily mean that there are three species involved in the mimicry sys-
tem. Quite oft en two species fi ll the three roles: for instance, the model and the receiver 
can belong to the same species, as is usual in aggressive mimicry. Common mimicry 
typologies also acknowledge such a possibility and include the category of bipartite mim-
icry systems.
243Semiotic modelling of biological mimicry
physical expression; for instance, dangerous situations are marked by a sudden 
change of aff airs. 
A third source of problems is a possibility that one and the same individual 
can be simultaneously involved in more than one mimetic resemblance; a 
combination that can in some cases have structural importance for the mimicry 
system. For example, in its aggressive mimicry system, the monkfi sh Lophius 
piscatorius combines a cryptic resemblance of its body surface (mimic) to the 
seafl oor rich in algae and to other plants (model), and the resemblance of its 
foremost fi n ray (mimic) to a worm (model). Th e fi rst type of resemblance serves 
to make the monkfi sh hard to notice, and the second type helps to lure and catch 
smaller fi sh (signal-receiver). Both resemblances support each other and are 
active during the same communicative interaction between the monkfi sh and its 
prey species. Such an instance of mimicry cannot be easily accommodated by the 
classical mimicry triad.
When trying to formalise these examples, it appears that the systemic 
approach to mimicry has problems in 1) defi ning the set of elements (species) 
that belong to the (mimicry) system as a whole; 2) determining the location of 
elements with regard to predefi ned classes of mimics, models, and receivers; and 
3) the presence of classifi catory error, that is, the same element can belong to 
more than one class, or the same element can belong to more than one system. 
A partial solution to this problem would be to reconsider the mimicry triad to 
be a logical and conceptual relationship between three entities and not to take 
this as a necessarily ecological relationship between three species. In some cases, 
the involvement of actual species may correspond to the roles in the mimicry 
triad, but this is not, by any means, an inevitable condition. Another possibility 
would be to consider the mimicry system as having a double layered structure, 
consisting of a layer of ecological relations between species and a layer of semiotic 
sign relations. Species, or more correctly their particular populations, are indeed 
the actual biological entities that are involved in diff erent ecological relations 
such as predation, competition, parasitism and others, and their number and 
evolutionary characteristics can also change because of a particular relation. 
Th e second, semiotic layer would include a specifi c relation of resemblance, in 
which case we may ask, “What resembles what to whom in what respect?” On 
this level we are dealing with specifi c qualities and their similarity in the eyes of 
a particular beholder.3 Th ese two layers can combine with each other in many 
diff erent ways and can produce diff erent types of mimicry systems. 
In addition to the rigidness of the triadic system of mimicry, a radical diff eren-
tiation that is oft en assumed to exist between mimicry and other adaptations 
can also become an obstacle for studying various resemblances in nature. Quite 
oft en we fi nd in scientifi c literature arguments in favour of regarding one or 
3 Th e Danish biosemiotician Jesper Hoff meyer has described such a semiotic layer accom-
panying ecological relations as semethic interactions (Hoff meyer 2008: 189).
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another resemblance in nature as mimicry: such arguments thus presuppose 
that a distinct category of mimicry systems does exist. When we think about 
many occasional similarities between species and about the previous example 
of facultative mimicry, then the clear demarcation line between what is mimicry 
and what is not disappears. Th is is also supported by the fact that the recognition/
misrecognition between mimics and models by the signal-receiver is a probable 
event and not following any fi xed rule. Instead, we should rather talk about a 
landscape of mimeticity in nature or the capability of the natural forms to create 
confusion. 
Th is discussion is also closely related to the way in which the existence of 
mimicry systems in nature is argued for and proved. Th e strongest possible 
proof for mimicry as an evolutionary phenomenon is the demonstration that 
the change in some evolutionary agent (animate or inanimate) has caused a 
specifi c mimicry adaptation to emerge or proliferate. An example of this kind of 
strong proof is studies on the abundance of dark-winged moths in Great Britain 
during the rise of the coal-based economy in the nineteenth century, where the 
darkening of the visible environment correlates with the amount of melanismic 
moths (for example, Berry 1990), although even this case has been a subject of 
dispute. Such strong proofs are, however, more than rare, especially in the face 
of common claims about mimicry as an evolutionary adaptation par excellence. 
More oft en the existence of mimicry is argued for by indirect proofs:
1)  the correlation between the specifi cs of the receiver’s sensory perception and 
the resemblance between the mimic and the model;
2)  correspondences of the living areas of mimics and models;
3)  indications of predatory pressure, such as the relative abundance of the mimic 
and the model in the diet of a predatory receiver;
4)  the location of injury in the mimic’s body regarding mimetic features (such as 
birds’ beak marks on butterfl y wings);
5)  behavioural responses of the receiver to specifi c appearances of models and 
mimics (warning colouration);
6)  the receiver’s ability to learn from unpleasant experiences with models;
7)  experiments with the manipulation of mimetic features  – for example, 
painting mimetic features onto a non-mimetic organism or covering up 
mimetic features, etc.
Th ese various arguments are indirect in the sense that although they demonstrate 
various correlations between mimics and models or illustrate how an organism 
benefi ts from mimetic features, they cannot prove that mimetic features have 
developed because of the specifi c relations between models, receivers and mimics. 
At the farthest end of this scale of validity are cases where human senses are used 
to determine mimetic relations – if a mimic and a model seem similar to us, a 
mimicry resemblance is judged to exist. A good illustration of such a connection 
between human sensed similarity and supposed mimicry resemblance are the 
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artistic works and academic writings of an American painter and naturalist, 
Abbott H. Th ayer (1909). 
Th us, the problem with the perception of mimicry in mainstream biology is 
two-sided. First, mimicry is oft en seen as a distinct phenomenon that has defi nite 
borders, and second, it is also supposed to be provable as such. Many classical 
examples of mimicry in nature and also many arguments used to explain these 
do not, however, correspond to this widespread idea. To alleviate this problem 
and to bridge the gap between mimicry systems theory and actual case studies, 
it would be benefi cial to have more dynamical descriptions of resemblances in 
nature that would not take as a prerequisite the existence of mimicry as a clear-
cut tripartite system. For providing such tools of description, the biosemiotic 
approach can turn out to be helpful. Th is is so fi rst because of structural 
methodologies that are available in semiotics. Biosemiotics also does not rely on 
evolutionary functionality as a primary criterion for delimiting research objects, 
which makes it more responsive to such features of organisms whose advantage 
to their carriers is not obvious at fi rst sight.
2. Toolbox for modelling mimicry 
A wider and semiotics-based methodology, proposed in this chapter, is not 
strictly grounded on a single theoretical foundation but consists rather of a group 
of various methods that could be used like a toolbox to approach diff erent types of 
mimetic resemblances. In building this approach, I have integrated aspects of the 
classical mimicry theory, of Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelt-theory, and of semiotic 
and communication analysis into a model of fi ve-level analysis. Questions related 
to the meaning and signifi cance of a deceptive resemblance are not part of these 
tools, but are rather considered as a part of the initial research hypothesis that is 
either supported or rejected as an outcome of the analysis. 
Th e fi rst level of analysis departs from the classical tripartite Wicklerian model 
consisting of a mimic, a model and a receiver. Rather than trying to match this 
to every mimicry system, I would extend it to a general principle and ask what 
kind of confi gurations mimicry could take. For instance, mimetic resemblances 
in monkfi sh could be expressed as a compound model that includes one mimic 
and one receiver but two models: the background of the environment and the 
movement of a worm-like prey of the fi sh (see Fig. 1, left ). In a similar way, 
mimics and receivers could also be manifold. Th e mimetic resemblance of 
cuckoo bumblebees (subgenus Psithyrus) could in most cases be described as a 
compound model that includes one mimic and one model (a particular bumblebee 
species) but two receivers: the bumblebee host species (being simultaneously the 
model and the receiver) and insectivorous birds (see Fig. 1, right). On this level 
of analysis, it is also possible to distinguish in general terms between mimicry 
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and other types of resemblances. If it is possible to point out all three parties – a 
mimic, a model and a receiver, given that the receiver is not a human observer – 
then the resemblance can be regarded as a mimicry system. If this condition is 
not met, then some other type of resemblance, such as similarity because of an 
evolutionary affi  nity or convergence or some resemblance induced by human 
cultural description, should be suspected. 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of complex mimicry systems (author’s drawing). Th e 
unbroken arrow line represents the communicative relation between the model (MO) 
and the receiver (R) that is exploited by the mimicry system. Th e dashed arrow line 
represents the deceptive relation between the mimic (MI) and the model. Th e dotted 
line represents the relation of resemblance between the mimic and the model. Left : 
monkfi sh with two distinct models MO1,2 (a worm and the sea bottom). Right: cuckoo 
bumblebee with two distinct receivers R1,2 (a bumblebee host and an insectivorous bird, 
a host R1 being at the same time also a model MO). 
Th e second level of analysis proceeds from the umwelt theory of Jakob von 
Uexküll and focuses on the corresponding body structures of the mimic, on the 
model and the receiver (the properties of the original and the imitated signal), and 
on the communication channels and the behavioural regulation used (perceptual 
world Merkwelt and operational world Wirkwelt in Uexküllian terms). On this 
level of analysis, a more specifi c description of the resemblance can be achieved. 
For example, from a general biological perspective, one can say that in a broad 
sense the fl y orchid Ophrys insectifera as a plant is a mimic, but proceeding from 
Uexküll’s theory of umwelt, the similarity between the plant and the female of a 
particular wasp species is much more specifi c by being bound only to the outer 
surface of blossoms (see Maran 2007: 237). Th e second level of analysis enters the 
fi eld of qualitative phenomena by describing the specifi c percepts and activities 
that are employed in mimicry. Umwelt analysis sensu Uexküll (1982: 52–57) can 
bring out the correspondence or the non-correspondence between the perceptual 
capabilities of the animal receiver and the body structures of the mimic and the 
model. Th is enables us to consider whether the mimic and model are deceptively 
similar for the receiver, or if they are even perceptible at all. Paying attention 
to the Wirkwelt and the behaviour of the receiver regarding the mimic and the 
model allows us to make conclusions about the relevance of the resemblance 
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for the receiver. Th is is a signifi cant question, as in many cases the deceptive 
resemblance between two objects does exist for the receiver, but it is irrelevant 
just like it is irrelevant for an average human to distinguish between bumblebees 
and the bee hawk-moths that mimic these. By such argumentation, mimicry 
becomes grounded in the ethological functionality and not in the evolutionary 
functionality that would be much more diffi  cult to prove. 
Th e third level of analysis proceeds explicitly from semiotics as the study 
of signs and sign systems and focuses on meaningful units that resemble each 
other in mimicry. Th is level of analysis addresses the general conditions that 
make it possible for a confusion to emerge. A starting point for this discussion 
is an understanding that resemblance in mimicry is not univalent, but that there 
are diff erent possibilities for resemblance to occur. First, the resemblance can 
be described as a matter of degree ranging from non-resemblance to absolute 
similarity. Also concepts used in psychological studies of categorical perception 
(such as boundary perception, common characteristics resemblance, prototype 
resemblance and others) can be employed in distinguishing between various 
possibilities for a resemblance to emerge. In mimicry studies, three diff erent 
types of resemblance can be discerned on the basis of Peircean semiotics. Th is 
simplest type of resemblance can be described as a relation between one and 
many, and it is common in camoufl age – for instance, when a moth is lying on 
tree bark. Here the perception of the moth emerges from nowhere, and that allows 
us to relate camoufl age to Peircean fi rstness. Th e second type of resemblance is 
present when we are dealing with deceptive similarity between representatives 
of two species of which one is eatable and the other poisonous, as is the case 
of the typical Batesian mimicry. Such a type of mimicry requires comparison, a 
reference to the second, and seems therefore to relate with Peircean secondness. 
Th e third type of mimicry is present, for instance, in the case of eye-marks on 
the bodies of insects, fi sh and amphibians, or in the case of colourful patches 
on the bodies of many lizards and insects. Th ese patches are kept hidden in the 
normal body position but are fl ashed during escape. It seems that the unifying 
aspect of such mimicry systems is a common meaning: thus, for instance, big 
eyes, unexpected movement or warning colouration all signify something 
dangerous for the receiver. Such abstract mimicry requires that the meaning 
of the message is understood by the receiver and seems therefore to relate to 
thirdness. Besides this kind of distinction based on Peircean categories, mimicry 
can also be described as fi xed or adjustable, partial or complete, local or general, 
individual or collective, embodied or detached, etc. (for discussion of many of 
those possibilities, see Pasteur 1982). 
Th e fourth level of analysis proceeds from a cybernetic communication 
analysis of the mimicry system (Maran 2008: 19–24) by focusing on the position 
and nature of feedback cycles. Feedback enables dynamics to enter the act of 
communication, and it also enables the sender to change its behavioural and 
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communicative activity with respect to the receiver’s activity. On the metalevel, 
feedback in communication allows one to adjust messages and to choose 
between them, which in the long run enables the development of sign systems. 
In ecological relations that involve communication, it is possible to distinguish 
between communicative, ontogenetic and evolutionary levels of feedback 
regulation (see Maran 2008: 21–22). In communicative feedback, resemblance 
is regulated within a single act of communication. Th is is a prevalent regulation 
mechanism in behavioural and adjustable mimicries, such as the chameleon’s 
changing of colours to correspond to a specifi c environmental background. 
Th rough ontogenetic feedback, an individual’s personal experiences are formed 
or expressed. In phylogenetic or evolutional feedback, genotypic adaptations 
related to this particular communication act develop or manifest. Distinguishing 
between diff erent types of resemblance regulation allows us to include among 
mimicry also such resemblances that are induced by epigenetic memory – for 
example, by animal cultures where the dependence on genetic causation cannot 
be proved. Th is level of analysis helps to focus on dynamical, reversible and 
individual aspects of mimicry resemblance, such as individual song imitations 
by many birds (for instance, the European starling Sturnus vulgaris). 
Th e fi ft h level of analysis proceeds from the cultural level and focuses on 
the observer’s perceptual involvement in the mimicry system, as well as on the 
cultural and scientifi c status of the phenomenon. Th is level of analysis deals with 
the human observer in relation to the mimicry system. Th e starting point for 
this discussion is understanding that the umwelten of the human observer and 
of other living beings participating in a mimicry system are likely to be diff erent. 
Th ere may well occur situations when the messages of the model and the mimic 
are situated with respect to the umwelt of the human observer in such a manner 
that, from the latter’s viewpoint, they do not seem similar. For example, the red 
helleborine Cephalanthera rubra and the bellfl ower Campanula sp. are similar to 
a bee but clearly diff erent to the human eye. Likewise, a whole communication 
system may be left  concealed from the human observer. Th e location of a 
deceptive similarity in relation to the umwelt of a human observer may bring 
about a biased choice of the object to be studied and may lead a nature scholar to 
under- or over-interpret some mimicry cases. 
Besides the relations between an observer’s sense organs and a mimicry 
resemblance, the cultural-historic component of mimicry also needs attention. 
Th ere are mimicry systems that have a long history of being studied because of 
the peculiarities of the history of science. For example, mimicry in butterfl ies is 
a well-established fi eld partly because of the activity of the nineteenth-century 
naturalists in collecting insects. A collector’s main interest is to identify items 
correctly. Th is desire of the naturalists helped to advance systematics but at the 
same time drew attention to the confusions and ambiguities in nature, including 
mimicry. In addition, descriptions of mimicry resemblances may also include 
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cultural, religious or mythological layers. Th is is related to a historically much 
earlier search for and interpretation of signs of nature (so called signatures) that 
have been believed to have their origins in a supernormal or divine source. Th e 
cultural layer, which remains clearly out of the biologists’ scope, can still interest 
a semiotics that interprets resemblances in nature and in human culture not as 
distinct fi elds but as a continuous complex phenomenon. An artifi cial selection 
of domestic dogs provides a good example of such a connection, as seen in the 
human preference for dogs’ facial features that resemble human infants has been 
demonstrated (Hecht, Horowitzb 2015).
Brood parasitism is a very widespread biological phenomenon. It is estimated 
that approximately 1% of all bird species use some sort of brood parasitism, 
including nearly half of the 130 species of cuckoos, some cowbirds, indigobirds, 
whydahs, two genera of fi nches and some ducks (Payne 1977: 1). Most brood 
parasites are specialised to specifi c host species. Th e common cuckoo has 
more than 100 potential hosts; the most usual of these include reed warblers 
(Acrocephalus), leaf warblers (Phylloscopus) and warblers (Sylvia), robin 
(Erithacus), redstarts (Phoenicurus), and wagtails (Motacilla) (Honza et al. 2001: 
344, see Fig. 2). In some populations of host species, brood parasitism may 
aff ect up to 65% of all nests (Moskát, Honza 2002). Egg mimicry is supported 
by additional resemblances, as there are correspondences between the behaviour 
of the cuckoo chicks and the chicks of the particular host species (for example 
Kilner et al. 1999) and similarities in the appearance of the adult cuckoo and 
hawk species (Payne 1977: 8).
3. Comparative analysis of mimicry in brood parasitism and 
Lepidoptera eyespots 
In this section, I illustrate the proposed research methodology by analysing 
two well-known mimicry examples in comparison – the brood parasitism of 
the common cuckoo Cuculus canorus on various passerine host species and 
Lepidoptera eyespots. 
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Figure 2. An egg of a common cuckoo in a clutch of a common redstart Phoenicurus 
phoenicurus (collection of the Natural History Museum of the University of Tartu, the 
author’s photo).  
Eyespots are a common feature in animal visual communication systems, 
found in almost all kinds of ecosystems. Th ese iconic signs (i.e. signs based on 
resemblance) occupy the bodies of organisms living today as well as of those that 
were fossilised long before mammals fi rst appeared. In butterfl ies and moths, 
eyespots are most common and best studied in Nymphalidae but exist widely also 
in other families (e.g. Saturniidae, Sphingidae). Th e common understanding of 
the function of the eyespots is the “intimidation” hypothesis, according to which 
the function of the eyes is to deter predators and prevent an attack. Th e usual 
reasoning here is that eyespots intimidate predators because they represent an 
imitation of vertebrate eyes: this is the “eye mimicry” hypothesis (Blest 1958, 
see discussion in Kleisner, Maran 2014). Eyespots have yet other functions, such 
as playing a signalling role in sexual selection. In the butterfl y Bicyclus anynana 
(Nymphalidae), for instance, the dorsal wing pattern is supposed to play a role 
in female mate choice, whereas the ventral pattern serves a camoufl aging and/or 
predator-defl ecting role (Brakefi eld and Reitsma 1991; Stevens 2005).
Th e two common mimicry systems – egg mimicry of the common cuckoo and 
eyespots mimicry in Lepidoptera – could be compared using the methodology 
proposed above (table 1, fi gure 3). Here I rely mostly on formal comparison; a 
more detailed discussion on brood parasitism as a mimicry system can be found 
in Maran 2010.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































              
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the analysed mimicry systems (author’s drawing). 
Left . Common cuckoo’s (MI) mimicry system, cuckoos’ host species (MO1) and hawks 
(MO2) act as models. Th e unbroken arrow lines represent the communicative relation 
between the model (MO) and the receiver (R) that is exploited by the mimicry system 
(circular arrow represents autocommunication in the host species). Th e dashed arrow 
line represents the deceptive relation between the mimic (MI) and the receiver. Th e 
dotted line represents the relation of resemblance between the mimic and the model.
Right. Mimicry system of the Lepidopteran eyespots, where a butterfl y species acts as 
mimic (MI), taking advantage of the communicative relation between owls and small 
carnivorous mammals (MO) and small insectivorous birds (R). Note that from the 
perspective of the mimic, both Model and Receiver are not specifi c species, but rather 
abstract groups (and therefore blurred in the graph).
Discussion. Th ere are both considerable similarities and diff erences between the 
mimicry in brood parasitism and Lepidopteran eyespots. Both mimicry systems 
operate on the basis of visual communication (2, 5) and are thus accessible in the 
human umwelt. Th is proliferates human interest towards these mimicry systems 
but, at the same time, lays the ground for over-interpretation (this should be 
especially taken into account in the case of brood parasitism, which is also a 
common cultural narrative). Th e regulation in both mimicry systems are similar 
(3, 4), relying mostly on genetic processes on the population/species scale with 
some input from individual learning and recognition. In the case of brood 
parasitism (1, 2), the combination of species involved is much more delimited, 
and participants’ behavioural reactions are more emphasised and decisive.
From the semiotic perspective, essential diff erences between two mimicry 
systems (2, 3) can be pinpointed: egg mimicry in brood parasitism is detached 
(imitating and imitated objects are distinct from the bodies of the participating 
animals), comparable (objects compared are physically together), and complete 
(resemblance covers most aspects of a singular object). Th is creates preconditions 
for fi ne-tuning mimetic resemblance, recognition mechanisms and behavioural 
responses, of which many examples are known (for example, throwing out eggs 
that are bigger than eggs in the clutch are on average, Marchetti 2000). Lepidoptera 
eyespot mimicry, on the other hand, is an open mimicry system (1, 2, 3) that takes 
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advantage of the quick communication between winged organisms, and it relies 
on the receivers’ recognition capacity, memory and perception of the image of 
the eye. Eyespot mimicry is much less dependent on the specifi c receiver species 
(as there are many of these involved), but rather fl oats in the resemblances and 
meanings shared between the inhabitants of the biological community (cf. the 
concept of “ecological code”, Maran 2012). Th e eyespot mimicry system could 
potentially be considered an open mimicry system (diff erent from brood 
parasitism) that can easily incorporate new species and images. Th e analysis 
confi rms that both mimicry systems are indeed well-established and complex 
in the natural world. It further demonstrates that although both resemblances 
operate in the visual communication system and have basically the same 
group – small song birds – functioning as a receiver, the ecological and semiotic 
characteristics of the mimicry systems under observation are very diff erent.
Conclusions 
Th e present article develops a semiotic methodology for analysing mimicry 
systems, while recognising the limitations of the existing mimicry typologies and 
attempting to avoid these. Using a selection of dynamical tools for describing 
mimicry allows us to bring forth peculiarities of specifi c mimicry types and also 
to compare diff erent cases of mimicry with each other. Th e semiotic approach 
developed here has several advantages that also fi nd use in practical analysis. 
Th e methodology emphasises the role of perception in mimicry studies, thereby 
bridging evolutionary and psychological approaches. Th e fi ve stages of analysis 
exemplify diff erent strategies of argumentation and verifi cation of mimicry 
resemblances, allowing us to construct a range from just-so stories to well-
established coevolutionary adaptations.  
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Semiotics in the interaction of guide dogs and 
visually impaired persons
Riin Magnus
Th e interaction of the guide dog team members, as well as their perception of the 
environment, are built upon the usage of signs. Hence the semiosic foundation of 
the team’s cooperation could give rich material of analysis for diff erent subfi elds 
of semiotics: disability semiotics (see Rogers, Swadener 2001), anthropological 
zoosemiotics (see Martinelli 2010: 121–170), sociosemiotics and urban semiotics. 
It also opens up research vistas that until now have gained only minor interest or 
no attention within semiotic studies: the sensorial complementarity of diff erent 
individuals and species; the formation of shared meanings between diff erent 
individuals while carrying out specifi c tasks; and interspecifi c communication as 
a means of introducing new cues and meanings into individual umwelten.
Th at the diff erences in the sign usage of diff erent species and individuals are 
crucial for guide dog work was noticed already in the very early days of guide dog 
training. Guide dog training started in Germany during WWI. Th e fi rst guide 
dogs were trained in Oldenburg in order to aid soldiers who had lost their eyesight 
(Calabrò 1999: 20–21; Martens 1956: 13). Th e Institute for Umwelt research in 
Hamburg, headed by Jakob von Uexküll, started working out training methods 
for guide dogs in the 1930s (Uexküll, Sarris 1931; see also Magnus 2014a). Th e 
method developed by Uexküll and his colleagues was to rely on umwelt theory 
as a theoretical ground. Jakob von Uexküll had claimed that the umwelt of an 
animal is inextricably linked with the organism’s body plan. Hence, in order to 
insert meanings and objects that were of importance for the blind person into 
the umwelt of the dog, the dog’s body plan had to be changed. Th e employees of 
the Institute for Umwelt research therefore developed a cart, called a ‘phantom 
man’, which was meant to imitate a blind person and was attached to the dog. By 
moving around with the cart, the dog was to discover new meanings of objects 
(e.g. ditches becoming obstacles from now on) and was hence more independent 
of the signals of the trainer in the learning process. Although the method is still 
used in a few guide dog schools, it has never been widespread. Part of the reason 
is the insensitivity of the method to the activity of the person  – s(he) is as if 
a mere extension of the dog. In the following discussions, the initial premise 
of Uexküll  – that dogs and humans operate with diff erent signs  – is retained, 
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but this will be supplemented by a refl ection on the variety of interspecifi c sign 
processes upon which the guide dog work is built.
In the following text, the semiotic analysis of the guide dog team’s work will be 
arranged around two lines of investigation: 1) the perception of the two members 
of the team; 2) communication between the team members and with other human 
and non-human beings.1 In addition, semiotic tools could be made good use of 
when analysing the social reception and representations of the guide dog team, 
but these topics fall beyond the scope of the current chapter (but see e.g. McHugh 
2011). As perceptual and communicative semiosis diff er in their constitutive 
elements as well as in the roles carried by those elements, also slightly diff erent 
models and concepts are needed for their analysis (see e.g. Uexküll, T. v. 1997: 
449–450; Krampen 1989). A semiotic analysis of the sign systems and processes 
of the guide dog teams can fi nd application in the proposals for (semiotic) 
solutions to make the movement of the team in an urban environment smoother. 
Th at concerns the insertion of cues into the urban environment that would be 
accessible for the team; learning and teaching about the semiotic capacities of 
the other species for the guide dog handlers; and raising awareness about the 
specifi cs of the sign usage of the guide dog teams for the general audience.
1. Guide dogs as perceptual aid
Although guide dogs are oft en called the ‘mobility aids’ of visually impaired 
persons and their cooperation with the handler does indeed result in a better 
mobility of the latter, the mechanism and ultimate character of the aid is still 
based on perception and the mutual supplementation of two perceptual systems. 
Another common way to describe guide dog aid is to say that a guide dog 
replaces the eyes of the blind person. But this is not fully correct either, given 
the diff erences between the perceptual systems of humans with normal vision 
and dogs. In a review table of the diff erences between human and canine sensory 
systems, Ádám Miklósi has indicated that in comparison with the normal vision 
of humans, dogs have a wider visual fi eld and a more restricted binocular visual 
fi eld, and they cannot distinguish between the middle to long wavelengths nor 
between diff erent shades of gray that the human eye can diff erentiate (Miklósi 
2007: 140). Dogs’ wider hearing range and sensitivity to lower concentrations 
of diff erent chemicals make them more receptive to olfactory and acoustic cues. 
However, knowing the sensory physiological premises of the two species is only 
a starting point for telling which objects the subjects really respond to and in 
1 Some of the ideas presented in the following chapters have been already covered in a 
couple of earlier papers, which analyse the sign usage of guide dog teams and the chal-
lenges related to that (see Magnus 2014b, 2016). Th is chapter aims to synthesise the pre-
vious fi ndings and to place them in a common semiotic frame of analysis.
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which way. A semiotic analysis could supplement such a sensory physiological 
analysis by studying which of the potentially available percepts the animal does 
endow with meanings and does take as guides for further action. Th e mapping 
of the individual perceptual systems serves as a ground to further delineate 
the umwelten of the two individuals and to observe the possibilities for their 
complementary functioning. Jakob von Uexküll and his colleagues tried to work 
along these lines when studying the umwelten of dogs (Uexküll, Sarris 1931). 
Th ey observed how the dog’s understanding of things to sit on, things to lay on, 
and so forth diff ers from that of humans. Given these observations, one might 
further clarify in which parts the human and canine umwelten should be brought 
to overlap, if indeed one of them is to help the other.
An analysis of umwelten allows us to take a more detailed look at the overlap 
and divergence of the objects, the perceived sign vehicles2 and the meanings 
of the two members of the guide dog team. On this basis, an assessment of the 
accessibility of diff erent environmental objects can be given, and the reasons 
for the lack of access can be described. First, there are objects in the urban 
environment that both individuals can recognise via the same sign vehicles and 
that carry the same meanings for both, such as working noisy machines, which 
both individuals recognise and tend to avoid. Second, there are objects that are 
perceptible via diff erent sign vehicles for the team members and that carry a 
diff erent meaning, such as lantern posts, which should be avoided as obstructions 
for the blind but which are attractive marking places for dogs. Th ird, there are 
objects in the environment that are perceptible via diff erent sign vehicles for the 
team members, which are meaningful for one counterpart but meaningless for 
the other, such as benches or elevators. Fourth, there are elements that become 
perceptible only aft er specifi c training and aft er the acceptance of the other subject 
as one’s counterpart, such as open windows or any other objects that lie above 
the dog’s head. Fift h, there are signifi cant objects, the sign vehicles of which are 
imperceptible for both subjects, such as the green and red lights of traffi  c lights. 
Such a mapping of the two umwelten allows us to decide which elements of one 
subject’s semiotic system are able to supplement those of the other, and in which 
cases such a supplementation is impossible. In the latter case, the cues indicating 
the objects in the environment should be changed (as is done by the addition of 
acoustic signals to traffi  c lights).
Th e perception of the members of the guide dog team involves not just 
receiving and interpreting information stemming from the environment, but also 
active attendance to and search for cues that would help to guide the activity at 
hand. Th e guide dog who assists a visually impaired person in his/her movement 
and orientation is just as much a producer of environmental information as 
2 Th e term sign vehicle is here used in the sense of Charles Morris, as a particular physical 
event – such as a given sound or mark or movement – which mediates something and 
which is taken account of (Morris 1971: 96, 19).
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he/she is a receiver or mediator of this information. On the other hand, the 
guide dog team moves in a setting that is already charged with meanings and 
meaning-carrying cues. Th e design of buildings, the networks of streets and the 
segmentation of urban space off er guidelines for orientation, movement and 
spatial positioning  – the meaning is hence built into the urban environment. 
Following James Gibson’s line of thought, this induces a certain attunement of 
the organisms to the variables and invariants of information in the environment 
(Gibson 1979: 247; see also Greeno 1994: 377).
Th e major alternatives to guide dogs as perceptual and mobility aids are 
technical vision aids and the aid provided by accompanying human beings. Like 
technical aids, guide dogs supply their handlers with the feeling of independence, 
gained through the opportunity to choose one’s routes and paths while not 
depending on another person’s time and availability. In addition, guide dog aid 
introduces another kind of independence, which is inaccessible via technical 
and mechanical aids  – independence from the constant need to process and 
keep one’s attention on all sorts of environmental signals that might indicate 
one’s location (Richter 1995: 104–105). However, without the recognition of 
the interdependence of the two organisms as the fundament of guide dog work, 
neither of the above mentioned independences can be attained. If the dog is 
treated as a technical device rather than a living organism with his/her own needs 
and capacities, the co-movement can escalate into a confl ict or a surrender of 
one member instead of a cooperation (see Sullivan, White 1991: 81). If, on the 
other hand, all the ‘work’ part is left  to the dog during movement, the handler 
may fi nd him/herself following the paths and interests of the dog, which may not 
necessarily coincide with his/her own (see Hocken 2011[1977]: 121).
In anthropology as well as in technology studies, the technological supple-
mentation of human perception and action and its foundational signifi cance 
for culture has been treated in terms of extrasomatic mechanisms (White 1959) 
or exteriorised organs (Leroi-Gourhan 1993[1964]). Any new technologies or 
perceptual tools (Uexküll 1992[1934]: 319), which allow access to previously 
inaccessible stimuli (from UV-light to ultrasounds), can be seen as extenders 
of the human umwelt. In this context, the devices visually impaired persons 
use for their orientation are just one of many such ‘extensional organs’ people 
daily employ. As devices and mediators, they are objects through which other 
objects are perceived. Hence they have a special status as phenomena – instead of 
being objects that are perceived, they are objects that are perceived with (see also 
Merleau-Ponty 2005[1945]: 165). Although the most common non-living seeing 
aid used by blind people are white canes, several technical seeing and mobility 
aid devices have entered the market in the past decades. Th ese can be divided into 
two basic classes: those that are placed into the environment and send out signals 
(e.g. Remote Infrared Audible Signage [RIAS] or Talking Signs) and those that 
are carried by the visually impaired person (from sonic guides to lazer canes). 
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Diff erences in the reception and transmission of environmental cues through 
technical devices or via another organism become evident if the agency and 
cognitive aspect of the animal is accounted for. A guide dog serves as a selective 
and interpretive fi lter of environmental cues. Th e dog makes an initial selection 
of all the percepts available for his/her perceptual system, while relying on the 
meanings s/he is seeking for or attending to. Th e search for certain percepts 
can be guided and narrowed by the instructions of the handler, but even in 
these cases, the individual decisions of the dog about relevant cues are crucial 
for the movement of the team. Th e selectivity of the dog with respect to the 
environmental cues prevents the entrance of excessive signals into the handler’s 
perception, which is a common drawback of technical vision aids. 
As dogs come to distinguish between signifi cant and non-signifi cant cues 
via learning, they remain fl exible in modifying their choices and preferences 
throughout their work. Th is also means that a dog can forget and make mistakes 
in his/her choice or response to the signs. Since a guide dog, unlike a technical 
device, is not supplied with a preexisting and fi xed algorithm of signal detection, 
feedback and positive reinforcement are essential to maintain attention to some 
environmental cues and meanings while omitting others. In order to avoid 
developing a habitual and mechanical sign usage, the dogs also have to face 
new constellations of cues on a constant basis, even if in those situations the 
animal is more prone to make mistakes. If dogs follow the same route every day, 
inattentiveness to the novel cues may ensue, and unexpected situations may not 
be met with adequate responses.
Using dogs as a seeing aid requires the diff erences in the perceptual systems of 
dogs and humans, as well as the diff erences in their body plans, to be accounted 
for. Th e urban environment aff ords its inhabitants certain cues and meanings, 
and in turn, it ‘demands’ certain responses from those who want to navigate 
there. Th e combination of the canine’s and the visually impaired person’s sensory 
systems gives them better access to the aff ordances of urban space than each 
of them could access with their individual senses. For example, the human 
command to fi nd a zebra-crossing and the dog’s perceptual ability to fi nd such a 
place guarantees a safer crossing of the street for the dog as well as for the human. 
As a drawback, such a combination of perceptual systems raises the salience of 
cues that they would not need as individuals. Handlers need to be attentive to 
other pet animals walking in the streets, to patches of lawn that gird the streets, 
and to dropped pieces of food and other objects attractive for the dogs. Th e dogs 
need to attend to open windows and to obstructions lying above their heads 
(under which they could easily run if they were on their own), not to mention all 
the objects initially insignifi cant for them but taught to them during training – 
benches, doors of vehicles, elevators, etc.
Besides the transformation of the perceptual worlds of the team members, 
their eff ector worlds are also signifi cantly changed during their co-movement. 
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In Jakob von Uexküll’s terms, an eff ector world consists of eff ector cues, i.e. 
of those cues to which the organism should give a motoric response (Uexküll 
1992[1934]). Due to the physical attachment of the two subjects, the activities to 
be carried out depend on the bodily presence of another being, e.g. the objects 
that the dog could previously jump over or run under cannot be acted upon in 
the same manner when the visually impaired human is walking next to him. In 
other words, a shift  takes place in what William Warren has called the critical 
points and optimal points in the organism-environment system (Warren 1984: 
687). Th e critical points form the boundary conditions of movement or the 
handling of an object (e.g. how high and wide a gap between the platform and 
the train door should be so that it could still be crossed by the team). Th e optimal 
points refer to the properties of some element that the subject prefers and feels 
most comfortable with (e.g. the height and width of the platform-door gap that 
would demand the least eff ort from the team for crossing). Th e motoric response 
in these cases is never exempt from the perceptual ground  – carrying out or 
abstaining from carrying out certain activity presumes a perceptual assessment 
of one’s position and body-plan with respect to the environment. Th e case of the 
guide dog team demands the consideration of a body plan (which is extended by 
another being) and an assessment of the situation based on the attachment of the 
two organisms. 
2. Interspecific communication of the guide dog team
As was indicated in the previous paragraphs, guide dogs do not transmit to 
their handlers raw unprocessed percepts, but rather certain interpretations 
of the environmental cues they have encountered. Moreover, a concrete act of 
signifi cation or a response to some element in the environment makes sense only 
in the context of the previous interactions of the team members. If the guide dog 
comes to a halt, then such a behaviour can have dozens of meanings, but if the 
handler has previously asked the dog to fi nd a zebra, it means that a place which 
can be safely crossed is now in front of the team. If the handler has not given 
a search command prior to the halt, it most probably indicates an obstruction. 
Hence, depending on the previous chain of communication acts, the meaning of 
one and the same signifi er can vary. Th is also points to the fact that perception and 
communication in the guide dog team’s interactions cannot be fully separated.
Ethological research conducted on human-dog communication in the past 
one and a half decades shows that the dog’s coinhabitation with man has also 
brought along the development of specifi c communicative skills.3 Th ose skills are 
3 However, this theory has been challenged by the canine cooperation hypothesis, accord-
ing to which wolves are as attentive to their social partners as dogs, and dogs’ social skills 
hence have an evolutionary origin (see Range, Virányi 2015).
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sometimes referred to as human-like social skills (Hare, Tomasello 2005). Among 
them, the dog’s ability to attend to human ostensive-referential cues has gained 
special attention (Miklósi, Topal 2013; Kaminski, Nitzschner 2013). Th is means 
that dogs are talented in distinguishing and responding to human signs that are 
specially addressed to them. Th ese skills are the ultimate premises of guide dog 
work  – without partially shared communication systems, the two individuals 
would not be able to inform each other either about their intentions or about 
the environmental objects. Th e research on ‘addressing signs’, or signs that are 
employed to establish contact between interactors, has shown that eye signalling 
is one of the chief means of establishing contact between dogs and humans 
(Kaminski et al. 2012; Virányi et al. 2004). At the same time, eye signalling along 
with pointing gestures (Miklósi, Soproni 2006) is also important for referential 
communication between humans and dogs (Téglás et al. 2012). As such a “natural” 
means of communication is missing from the interactions between guide dogs 
and their visually impaired handlers, alternative communicative signs have to be 
developed through training and cooperation.
Guide dog users employ diff erent combinations of addressing and referential 
signs in their cooperation with their guide dogs, depending on the situation and 
on the capacities and preferences of the dog, as well as those of the handler. Some 
handlers make use of special addressing signals (like clicking sounds, saying the 
dog’s name before the command word, etc.), which are temporally separated 
from the referential words of command. Others pay attention to the mode of 
expression when giving the dog a command (intonation and tone of the voice, 
or supplementation with other encouraging acoustic or tactile cues). Special 
attention to the contacting signs is essential for keeping the dog’s attention on 
the work and on the activities of the handler. Unlike pet dogs, who are only 
occasionally addressed with obedience commands or asked to carry out some 
tasks, the communicative bond between the visually impaired person and the 
guide dog has to persist throughout the movement of the team, and this can 
sometimes last for hours. Besides the diff erences in the addressing signs used 
in the guide dog team’s work and in the interactions between a pet dog and a 
seeing handler, the referential signs are also diff erent from those used by pet-dog 
handlers. One of the major diff erences pertains to the specifi city and extension of 
the sign. When asking the dog to take a left  turn or fi nd a bench, the person may 
have only a vague idea about how far or in which direction the object of reference 
lies. With their utterance, the handlers produce a type rather than a token, and the 
localisation and identifi cation of the object require more independent eff ort and 
more processing of environmental cues by the guide dogs than is necessary for 
pet dogs. Th e dogs may use diff erent mnemonic strategies to fi nd environmental 
correspondences to the directions or guidelines given by the handler. In some 
cases, the dog has memorised cues that are specifi c to a particular place  – as 
when the handler asks the dog to fi nd the way home. In other occasions, the dog 
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may have learnt to identify a type of place via some cues specifi c to these kinds 
of places – this is so when a dog is capable of fi nding a cafe in a place where s/he 
has never been before. 
Th e question of ‘referentiality’ has been in the focus of inter- and intraspecifi c 
communication research since the 1960s (Struhsaker 1967). One of the major 
points of debate has concerned the question of whether animal communication 
can entail real external reference, i.e. (intentional) mediation of information 
about a state of the environment or about whether it simply is an expression of 
the animal’s internal state as an immediate response to some external stimuli (e.g. 
Smith 1969). Several later studies have concluded that animal communication 
entails an aff ective as well as a referential component (Hauser 1996: 473–522; 
Manser et al. 2002). However, at least in the context of guide dog work, such a 
separation does not necessarily make sense in the fi rst place. Several informants, 
whom I interviewed for my previous studies (see Magnus 2014b), noted that their 
own confi dence or confusion in certain situations is, as it were, “carried over” to 
the dog. Hence, the meaning that the dog attributes to the object also depends on 
the emotional state with which the handler approaches it. 
Although the establishment and the keeping of contact and referential 
communication appear to be the most important forms of communication 
for guide dog work, another particularity of the team’s interactions concerns 
metacommunication. Metacommunication refers to the team members’ ability 
to recognise such signs in the other’s behaviour that help to contextualise other 
signs produced by him/her. Above all, this concerns the skills to frame and to 
interpret the other’s signs either in the context of guiding work time or off -work 
time. Occasionally, the dog as well as the handler may attend to objects and signs 
that are of interest for him/her only and which divert his/her attention from 
the signs necessary for guiding work. If the other counterpart recognises such a 
diversion, s/he can direct the other back to the necessary frame of meaning. Th e 
handlers oft en use non-verbal acoustic signals and also give tactile signals via the 
harness to direct the dog’s attention back to work. In addition, it is possible to use 
preventive communication to obviate such diversions – to talk to the dog on a 
regular basis, to give feedback as oft en as possible, etc. 
Th e movement of the guide dog team involves not only orientation in physical 
space, but also entails one’s positioning in social space just as much. In other 
words, guide dog work consists not only of communication between the two 
team members and their mutually coordinated relations with the environment; it 
also consists of interactions with other pedestrians, pet-animals, urban wildlife, 
etc. When moving with their handlers, guide dogs are not supposed to contact 
other passers-by. What they certainly do, however, is observe the movement 
and activity of other people and use this to shape their own activity. In some 
occasions, the human use of objects helps to specify the meaning of physical 
elements – e.g. when people cross the street at a green light, sit on the bench or 
264 RIIN MAGNUS
open a door. In other cases, people’s behaviour does not correspond to or even 
contradicts the intended meaning of some structures in the urban environment 
(e.g. people crossing the street at a red light or taking shortcuts across the lawn). 
Conclusions
In addition to sociological, ethological and psychological studies, a semiotic 
investigation of the interactions between visually impaired persons and their guide 
dogs can enhance an understanding about the specifi cs of such an interspecifi c 
cooperation. A parallel description of the umwelten of the two individuals and 
the aff ordances of urban space allows one to demonstrate the correspondences 
and discrepancies between the two. A delineation of the discrepancies in turn 
allows one to further investigate whether they can be alleviated through a task 
specifi c combination of the two umwelten or whether some changes should be 
brought about in the environment.
A semiotic analysis of the guide dog team’s cooperation indicates that an 
umwelt is not a function of perceptual and motoric responses to environmental 
cues only, as was primarily stressed by Jakob von Uexküll; rather communication 
with other beings can also play a signifi cant role in umwelt formation. In addition, 
the cooperation of guide dogs and their visually impaired handlers exhibits a 
particular instance of the context dependency of meaning attribution. Th e context 
here is determined by the needs of another being, more specifi cally by his/her 
needs to access some objects which s/he is not capable of detecting with his/
her own perceptual system. Unlike the vision aid provided by technical devices, 
guide dogs do not serve as simple extensions of human senses but add another 
interpretative level to the reception of environmental cues. Although a possibility 
remains that dogs depart from their individual propensities in their choice and 
response to signs, they fi lter out most of the cues unnecessary for movement 
and, aft er undergoing training, are capable of relying on and transmitting the 
information most essential for the handler’s mobility.
Semiotic tools could also be used to analyse the convergence of human 
and non-human umwelten by other types of interspecifi c symbiosis. Domestic 
animals and the growing number of urban species could provide rich material for 
such studies. In narrower terms, other functions of animal assistance – hearing 
aid, mobility aid, therapeutic aid – could be of interest for semiotic studies. A 
comparison of diff erent forms of canine assistance would allow us to demonstrate 
which part of the canine umwelt remains constant throughout diff erent functional 
contexts and which part of it can be molded for specifi c human purposes.
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Animal umwelten in a changing world: Zoosemiotic perspectives 
represents a clear and concise review of zoosemiotics, present-
ing theories, models and methods, and providing interesting 
examples of human–animal interactions. The reader is invited 
to explore the umwelten of animals in a successful attempt to 
retrieve the relationship of people with animals: a cornerstone 
of the past common evolutionary processes.
The twelve chapters, which cover recent developments 
in zoosemiotics and much more, inspire the reader to think 
about the human condition and about ways to recover our lost 
contact with the animal world. Written in a clear, concise style, 
this collection of articles creates a wonderful bridge between 
human and animal worlds. It represents a holistic approach 
rich with suggestions for how to educate people to face the 
dynamic relationships with nature within the conceptual 
framework of the umwelt, providing stimulus and opportuni-
ties to develop new studies in zoosemiotics.
Professor Almo Farina,  
University of Urbino “Carlo Bo”
This important book offers the first coherent gathering of 
perspectives on the way animals are communicating with each 
other and with us as environmental change requires increasing 
adaptation. Produced by a young generation of zoosemiotics 
scholars engaged in international research programs at Tartu, 
this work introduces an exciting research field linking the 
biological sciences with the humanities. Its key premises are 
that all animals participate in a dynamic web of meanings 
and signs in their own distinctive styles, and all animal spe-
cies have distinctive cultures. Animal umwelten in a changing 
world reflects the emerging consensus in animal studies that 
is bringing radical shifts in theoretical, artistic, and historical 
understanding of rich interrelationships among animals.
Professor emerita Louise Westling,  
University of Oregon
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